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ABSTRACT

This dissertation exam ines discourses and experiences of reproduction in
Virginia, 1630-1785. I define reproduction a s an experiential reality that
contoured w om en’s lives in specific ways, a s a central demographic
phenom enon that shaped colonial populations, and a s a discourse of power
in the colonial project. Informed by feminist theory, queer theory, and
postcolonial theory, the dissertation exam ines the relationship betw een
reproduction and colonialism in the developm ent of a plantation econom y in
Virginia. I draw on a varied archive of court docum ents, colonial records,
new spapers and other print culture, plantation records, diaries, letters, and
medical texts. Chapter 1, ‘“A considerable parcel of breeders”: Reproduction
and D iscourses of Racial Slavery in Colonial Virginia,” exam ines the w ays
that developm ent of racial slavery in Virginia w a s based, in part, on the
appropriation of black w om en’s reproduction. I exam ine the roots of the 1662
law that defined slavery a s a condition of birth, finding the legal and cultural
precedent for the law in the conflation of servitude and bastardy. I further
exam ine the vernacular discourses of slavery that used reproduction to define
enslaved people (especially wom en) a s a kind of property legally similar to
livestock. I c lo se the chapter with a discussion of the Virginia H ouse of
B u rgesses d eb ates around defining sla v es a s real or personal property, and I
argue that th ese d eb ates were a co n seq u en ce of defining slavery a s a status
of birth. In Chapter 2, “Wicked, D angerous, and Ungoverned: The
T ransgressive Possibilities of Reproduction,” I exam ine the w ays that
childbearing could transgress colonial hierarchies and boundaries, especially
in c a s e s of bastardy and interracial birth. Throughout the chapter, I am
particularly interested in understanding the relationship betw een domination
and transgression, and the specific w ays that reproduction could inhabit the
sp a c e betw een th ose two poles. In Chapter 3, “Knowledge ‘not fit to be
discust publiquely’: Colonialism and the Transformation of Reproductive
Knowledge,” I exam ine the w ays that colonialism transformed Virginians’
reproductive epistem e. I attempt to reconstruct knowledge about
reproduction in this sp a c e and time, and I show how childbearing b ecam e a
potent intimate zon e for the negotiating of colonial power relations. In the
final chapter, ‘“S h e lives in an infant country that wants nothing but p eop le’:
D iscourses of Reproduction, Print Culture, and Virginia’s Colonial Project,” I
exam ine the competing d iscourses of reproduction that informed Virginia’s
colonial project. I argue that two competing discourses about reproduction on e that privileged “prolific reproduction” and another that privileged “rational
reproduction” - show the w ays that the experience of colonialism transformed
ideas about reproduction. This transformation occurred b eca u se the
exigen cies of the colonial project prioritized the maintaining of colonial
boundaries and hierarchies over the early notion of peopling a “virgin” land.
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INTRODUCTION:
Outlaw Reproduction, Colonialism, and the History of Early Virginia

“Thomas son of Matthew Hubbard by Mary his wife was bom November the 25th
1679.”
Charles Parish Records, York County, Virginia, 1679.1

“ 1 Blanket for the wench lying in [4 shillings].... To the Midwife for Negro Sarah 10
[shillings]”
York County Court, Account o f Orphan’s Estate, February 16, 1736.2

“Mr John Goodwin haveing this day in Court entered his information agt Judeth
Clarke servant to Capt Joshua Slade of York parish & county for fornication with a
negro, the sherr is therefore ordered to sumons her to the next Court for her personall
appearance then & there to answer the same.”
York County Court, June 25,1694.3

Mary gave birth to a son named Thomas. Sarah had a baby and lay in,
attended by a midwife. Judith bore a child and found herself a defendant in court.
These three moments in Virginia’s colonial past point to the simultaneously ordinary
and transformative moment of childbearing. The records are thin - we will never
know much detail about these births, much less how these three women felt about
them. And yet, occurring in a colonial space marked by ever-shifting hierarchies of
race, status, and gender, these three births are charged with meaning. All of these

1 Landon C. B ell, C h a rles P arish , York C ounty, V irginia H isto ry a n d R eg isters: Births, 16 4 8 -1 789,
D ea th s 1 6 6 5 -1 7 8 7 (R ichm ond: Library o f V irginia, 1996), v ix , 111. (H ereafter abbreviated as C PR .)
2 York D eed s, Orders, and W ills 18: 2 7 1 -2 . M icrofilm . L ocated at Library o f Virginia. (A ll York
C ounty records hereafter abbreviated as “Y ork D O W ,” w ith varying volu m e numbers. For som e
volum es, d eed s and w ills w ere recorded separately from ju d icial orders; those volu m es are abbreviated
as “JO ,” w ith the accom p an yin g date.)
3 York D O W 10: 3.
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births, I will argue, challenged the ever-shifting colonial ideologies, hierarchies, laws,
or social structures. And all of them, I will argue, simultaneously inform and
challenge our ability to understand the colonial past. Difficult to pin down in the past
or the present, all of these births were and are outlaw in some way.
In November 1679, Mary Hubbard gave birth to a son, Thomas. Mary would
bear two more sons in the next four years: Matthew, Jr. in February 1682, and John
in November 1683.4 Like other Anglo-Virginian women in this era before reliable
contraception, Mary bore children in rapid succession.5 The slim records of Charles
Parish in York County, Virginia give a small glimpse into the life - and births - of
Mary Hubbard. In colonial Virginia, parish clerks were legally bound to keep careful
birth and death records for the white inhabitants o f their parish.6 Those records were
handwritten into large ledgers - formulaic and repetitive columns spanning decades.
While parish records documented the birthdates of children, as legal documents and
church documents, the ledgers cannot and do not reveal much about the experience or
meaning of childbirth for women during this period - childbirth itself remains outside
the boundaries of parish birth records.
The Charles Parish records indicate that Mary Hubbard bore one more child
after her three sons were bom: in the winter of 1689, she gave birth to a daughter,

4 C PR , i l l .
5 Birth intervals - the length o f tim e b etw een full-term births - w ill be d iscu ssed in detail in Chapter 3.
S in ce Charles Parish (unlike som e other parishes) did not keep marriage records, it is unknow n how
long M ary and M atthew were married before T hom as w as born. H e may have been their first child, or
the Hubbards may have recently arrived to the parish with old er children.
6 T he recording o f births during M ary Hubbard’s tim e w as dem anded by a V irginia law passed in
1658, w hich required m inisters to keep records o f births, baptism s, marriages, and deaths w ithin their
flock. W illiam W aller H ening, ed ., The S tatu tes a t L arge; B eing a C o llectio n o f A ll th e L a w s o f
V irginia, fro m th e F irst S essio n o f th e L eg isla tu re (1 823; facsim ile reprint, C h arlottesville, V A , 1969),
1: 4 3 3 . (Hereafter, all references to the colon ial V irginia statutes w ill be abbreviated as “H en in g,”
follow ed by volu m e number and page number.)
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also named Mary, who would survive only one month.7 Baby M ary’s birth record
differs from her brothers’. Colonial Virginia birth records, even in their succinctness,
reveal the patriarchal assumptions of English culture. Babies were listed as the son or
daughter of their father: Thomas Hubbard was listed as “the son of Matthew
Hubbard” in 1679, as were his brothers.8 Mothers’ primary role in the records was as
vessels for legitimate births: Thomas Hubbard was bom “by [Matthew’s] wife,
Mary.”9 When baby Mary was bom, that formula was broken: Mary was listed only
as the daughter of her mother, Mary Hubbard. Further culling of the record reveals a
death record for Matthew Hubbard in November 1688, 13 months before the birth of
baby M ary.10 The widow Mary Hubbard was never tried for bastardy (perhaps
because her daughter died before Mary finished lying in); the birth record is the only
surviving testimony o f a moment o f outlaw reproduction that broke Virginia law and
custom.
While Mary’s births were recorded in the parish register, Sarah’s birth was
recorded only in an account of the estate in which she was held as property. In 1736,
the court-appointed guardians of John Burnham, an orphan, reported the value o f his
assets, which included several slaves: “Old Jack,” Will, Sarah, and Phaeby.11
Among other expenses, the account lists two charges which point to the birth
practices of enslaved women in this time and place: a ten-shilling fee for “a midwife
1

for the negro Sarah,” and a blanket “for the wench lying in.”

These records expose

7 C PR , 1 1 1 ,2 2 3 .
8 C PR , vix.
9 Ibid.
10 C PR, 2 2 3.
11 York D O W 18: 27 1 -2 .
12 Ibid. Sarah’s baby is not listed in the estate account: Sarah, W ill, Phaeby, and “O ld Jack” are all
listed along w ith the “w a g es” they earned that are credited as profits to the estate’s account. S la v es
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the tension always present in inherited chattel slavery - the birth of Sarah’s baby was
simultaneously a form of profit (her child would also be a slave) and an expense
(since Sarah required the attention of a midwife and whatever care that blanket might
signify).
From these piecemeal records, we can begin to imagine Sarah’s birth. First,
she had an English midwife: ten shillings was the usual fee for an English midwife at
the time, and it is unlikely that a black midwife could have charged such a rate.13 It is
possible that other women in the slave community attended Sarah in her labor and
birth, but their presence is invisible in the document, as it had no explicit monetary
value. Second, though enslaved, Sarah was afforded some time for recuperation, as
indicated by the blanket bought “for [her] lying in.” 14 Lying in was an English
custom of rest and healing for up to a month following a birth; traditionally, lying in
ended with “churching,” the first time a mother and her infant ventured into public
after the birth.15 We can’t know what this translation of English custom meant to an
enslaved woman of African descent. Possibly, she and the other women o f the
enslaved community reinterpreted the period of lying-in into a synchretic form that
had particular meaning for them. Another possibility is that, in a small slaveholding

belon gin g to orphans w ere typically rented out until the orphan cam e o f age, with the profits o f that
rent being credited to the orphan.
13 M id w iv e s’ rates and practices w ill be d iscu ssed in Chapter 3.
14 Ibid.
15 S ee chapter 2 for more on lyin g in practices and their potentially transgressive e ffects. On
“churching,” see Adrian W ilson , The M akin g o f M an -M id w ifery: C h ildbirth in E ngland, 1 6 6 0 -1 7 7 0
(C am bridge, M A: Harvard U niversity Press, 1995), 2 7 -2 8 . On the E nglish and A n glo-A m erican
tradition o f lyin g in, se e D avid C ressy, Birth, M a rria g e a n d D ea th : Ritual, R eligion , a n d the L ife-C ycle
in T u dor a n d S tu a rt E n g la n d (N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 1997), 80-94; Laurel Thatcher U lrich, A
M id w ife 's T ale: The Life o f M arth a B allard, B a se d on H e r D ia ry, 1 7 8 5 -1 8 1 2 (N Y : V intage, 1990),
188-93; W ilson , The M aking o f M an -M idw ifery, 2 6 -3 0 .
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like this one, Sarah’s lying-in was defined in more English term s.16 Nevertheless, we
see here a moment when customs surrounding birth, midwifery, and lying-in both
complicated and were complicated by the intimate relations of colonialism. These
sorts of moments can emerge only when our reading of the records recognizes that
childbearing holds complex, contingent, contradictory, and contested meanings, and
thus resists our ability to define it absolutely.
Another fragment of a record, this time from 1694: Judith Clarke was
summoned before the York County court under suspicion of fornication, bastardy,
and miscegenation. Three months later, the court decided against Clarke, ruling that
she would suffer 20 lashes and serve her master, Captain Joshua Slade, for two more
years.17 The court’s summons and decision are the only surviving record of Clarke’s
life in York County. Even so, they reveal much about the colonial projects of racial
division and status hierarchy in Virginia, as well as the ways that reproduction could
interrupt, frustrate, and highlight those projects.18 Judith Clarke was an English

16 Phillip M organ argues that because V irgin ia’s eco n o m y w as dom inated by sm all farm s, the world o f
V irgin ia’s en sla v ed p eop le w as “as m uch a w hite as a black w orld.” P hillip D . M organ, S la ve
C ou n terp o in t: B la ck C u ltu re in th e E igh teen th -C en tu ry C h esa p ea k e a n d L o w co u n try (C hapel Hill:
U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 1998), 101.
17 Y ork D O W 10: 28.
18 B y “status,” I mean to indicate the hierarchy o f w hite peop le (and free p eop le o f color) in this
colon ial context. A t the bottom o f this hierarchy w ere indentured p eop le o f European ancestry, and at
the top were the elite sla v eo w n in g planters. In the m iddle w as a large group o f free w hite people
ranging in status from form er servants to poor and m iddling farmers, artisans, and the em ergin g
merchant cla ss. W hile w hite interests were con solid ated w ith the em ergen ce o f plantation slavery by
the end o f the seventeenth century, these co m p lex status hierarchies fragm ented those interests.
H istorians have debated the degree to w hich w hites in colon ial V irginia w ere unified. On B a co n ’s
R ebellion as a m om ent o f co n solid atin g w hite interests on b asis o f race and gender, see Edmund S.
M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reed o m : The O rd e a l o f C o lo n ia l V irginia (N Y : W .W . N orton
and C o., 1975), 2 5 0 -9 2 ; Kathleen M . B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s:
G ender, R ace, a n d P o w e r in C o lo n ia l V irginia (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press,
1996), 137-86. R hys Isaac d ep icts a V irginia that used deference to prom ote unity despite
stratification. R hys Isaac, The T ran sform ation o f Virginia, 1 7 4 0 -1 7 9 0 (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f
North C arolina Press, 1982). A nthony Parent depicts the con solid ation o f planter interests at the turn
o f the eighteenth century as a deliberate series o f actions fueled by planters’ em erging cla ss
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servant, likely indentured to Joshua Slade for around seven years. Her sexual
relationship with an unnamed man of African descent crossed racial boundaries,
resulting in the birth of a child of mixed race and liminal status. That relationship
also crossed boundaries of status, as servant women were expected to remain celibate
during the course o f their servitude, in part to protect their masters from lost labor
during a woman’s pregnancy and lying in. No matter how calcified the racial order of
colonial Virginia, it was easily permeated by sexual relationships and the children
bom of them. Interestingly, it is records like these - records of births that challenged
racial boundaries, births that occurred outside of lawful marriages, births o f servant
women, births of free black women - that are most visible in the colonial archive
because these births were defined as criminal by the courts. The births about which
the most detail survives are those deemed “outlaw” by the courts - dangerous to the
colonial order, threatening to the organization of power in the colony. Perhaps it is
possible to see Judith herself as a sort of “outlaw” - defying the law of both the
colony and colonialism itself, and suffering for it when punished by colonial
authority.
All of these births are examples of what I call “outlaw reproduction” - births
that occurred outside the law or that otherwise resist easy categorization. The concept
of outlaw reproduction is useful in three ways. First, it suggests the ways that
particular births - ones that broke the law - found their way into public view during a
time when childbearing was a central aspect of women’s sphere and thus not often
made public. Second, the concept of outlaw reproduction points to the limitations

con scio u sn ess. A nthony S. Parent, Jr., F oul M ean s: The F orm ation o f a S la ve S o c ie ty in Virginia,
1 6 6 0 -1 7 4 0 (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 2 0 0 3 ).
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and the opportunities presented by the archive of early Virginia. Finally, it helps us
to view the intersections between reproduction and the colonial project in colonial
Virginia.
In colonial Virginia, it was the births that in some way broke the law - either
literally or figuratively - that emerged into public view. Both the birth o f the widow
Hubbard’s daughter and the birth of Judith Clarke’s interracial child fit into this
category. Births to unmarried women, or, in the parlance of the early modern world,
bastard births, were the clearest form o f outlaw reproduction, because they challenged
lines of inheritance, rules about sexual morality, and hierarchies o f social status.
Bastardy was a crime taken seriously in colonial Virginia, punishable by fines,
corporal punishment, jailing, or extended terms of service. Therefore, bastard births
left considerable evidence; these court cases, sometimes including sworn testimony,
are one time when women’s experiences and voices are present in the records. Other
births that somehow challenged cultural assumptions or caused crisis - cases of
infanticide, monstrous births, and miscarriages or abortions - could also be brought
into public view for adjudication. It is births that were somehow exceptional - births
that created problems that needed to be solved by legal or cultural measures - that
became visible.
The second advantage of the concept of outlaw reproduction is that it begins
to address the challenges presented by the colonial Virginia archive, as well as the
formation of that archive, which, in the case of court records, was a reflection of the
reach of the law itself. For the historian, childbirth is a somewhat hidden event:
difficult to view, hard to wrangle because it occurred outside of the public eye and

7

was thus rarely committed to the documentary records from which most historians
draw their conclusions.19 Most births in colonial Virginia were like Mary Hubbard’s
earliest three births - private, undocumented, and virtually silent save the cursory
records o f rudimentary colonial demography. Those taciturn parish records are
embedded with even more silences, as births by enslaved women like Sarah, as well
as women of Native American descent, rarely found their way into even these
records. Therefore, the Virginia archive - like all colonial archives - is itself an
artifact of Virginia’s politics of gender, race, and status.
The colonial Virginia archive privileges the voices and interests of elite white
men - the nascent slaveholding planter class that would achieve ascendancy by the
second quarter of the eighteenth century.20 Doing women’s history with such an
archive, lacking the women’s letters and diaries that are available for other times and

19 Judith W alzer L eavitt’s influential study o f childbearing in A m erica b egin s after the rise o f
physician -assisted labor in part because p h y sicia n s’ records have survived. Judith W alzer Leavitt,
B rou g h t to B ed: C h ild b ea rin g in A m erica, 1 7 5 0 -1 9 5 0 (N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 19 8 6 ), 9 -1 1 .
Catherine S ch o lten ’s study o f colon ial-era childbearing is on e o f the on ly studies to fo cu s on this
period, and it is built ex clu siv e ly from the records o f w hite, C hristian, m iddling and elite w om en from
the North. Catherine M . Scholten, C h ild b ea rin g in A m erica n S o ciety: 1 6 5 0 -1 8 5 0 (N Y : N ew York
U niversity Press, 1985). Laurel Thatcher U lrich ’s d eep reading o f the diary o f m id w ife Martha M oore
Ballard is excep tion al in that U lrich ’s m ain ev id en ce is the w riting o f a m id w ife herself; ev en so, that
diary had long been ignored by historians as being too ephem eral, repetitive, and lacking in detail to be
useful. Laurel Thatcher U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale, 8-9. A nother excep tion is the work o f L isa Foreman
C ody, w h ose history o f m idw ifery in Britain is based on an eighteenth-century public debate about
m idw ifery in w hich m id w ives th em selves participated (such a debate w as not duplicated in A m erica).
L isa Forman C od y, ‘T h e P o litics o f R eproduction: From M id w iv e s’ A lternative Public Sphere to the
Public Sp ectacle o f M an M id w ifery,” E igh teen th -C en tu ry S tu d ies 32, no. 4 (1999): A ll- 4 9 5 .
20 On the ascendancy o f the planter class, se e Isaac, The T ran sform ation o f Virginia, 3 4 -4 2 ; A lan
K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la ves: The D e ve lo p m e n t o f S outhern C u ltu res in th e C h esapeake, 1 6 8 0 -1 8 0 0
(C hapel Hill: U niversity o f N orth C arolina Press, 1986); M organ, A m erica n S la very, A m erica n
F reedom ; Parent, F oul M eans. R evelatory histories have been produced by using planter diaries; I
depend h eavily on planter w ritings for this study. S ee, for exam ple, R hys Isaac, L an don C a rte r's
U neasy K in g d o m : R evolu tion a n d R eb ellio n on a V irginia P la n ta tio n (N Y : O xford U n iversity Press,
2004); Kenneth A . L ockridge, The D iary, a n d Life, o f W illiam B y rd II o f V irginia, 1 6 7 4 -1 7 4 4 (Chapel
Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 1987); Kenneth A . L ockridge, On th e S o u rces o f P a tria rc h a l
R age: The C o m m o n p la ce B ooks o f W illiam B yrd a n d T hom as Jefferson a n d th e G en d erin g o f P o w e r in
the E igh teen th C en tu ry (N Y : N e w York U niversity Press, 1992); D aniel B lake Sm ith, In sid e th e G re a t
H ouse: P la n te r F am ily Life in E igh teen th -C en tu ry C h esap ea k e S o c iety (Ithaca, N Y: C ornell U niversity
Press, 1982).

places, one has to rely instead on court records and the personal papers of men. The
gendered formation of this archive was part of the gendered epistemology and
experience of the era. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich has argued that in the early modem
world, women’s lives were constructed around a different economy and different
centers of meaning and power than men’s lives.
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The archive, itself an artifact of

men’s public world, frames women’s experiences as outside of the realm of the law
itself until women’s experiences and knowledge were required by the public courts.22
Nevertheless, the elite white male authorship of the archive should not be seen
as an absolute silencing of the voices, experiences, and presences of people who were
not members of that small but inordinately powerful group. The disciplinary
attention of the law fell most often on people who did not have access to elite
privilege - free blacks, servants, poor people. Therefore, a deep irony o f the colonial
Virginia archive is that while middling women’s voices and experiences are difficult
(but not impossible) to ascertain, non-elite women are quite present in the archive.
They were the accused in bastardy cases, they were the women whose births were
considered profit by slaveowners, they were the women who bore children of mixed
race that challenged the colonial color line. To hear those voices or uncover those
experiences, the colonial archive must be read with care and attention.
This brings us to the last advantage o f the concept of outlaw reproduction: it
points to the particular intersections between colonialism and reproduction, and the
ways that reproduction was always connected with discourses of power in the
colonial world. Birth was a central means by which colonial power was made,

21 U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale, 7 2 -1 0 1 .
22 T his con cep t o f gendered k n ow led ge w ill be d iscu ssed more fully in Chapter 3.
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policed, and organized. As we see with the recorded births of Judith Clarke and
Sarah, births which challenged the nascent organization of colonial power - the
deference of servant to master, the easy distribution of human property, the continuity
of traditional cultures - are also births that become visible in the records. This
archival visibility of non-elite people points to the contested and contingent nature of
the colonial project itself. Using the colonial record of Dutch Indonesia, Ann Laura
Stoler has argued that the colonial archive records not only reflects elite men’s
interests, but the archive itself participated in the ongoing project of negotiating,
defining, and policing elite interests in the colonial economy. As such, we need to
read colonial archives as “condensed sites o f epistemological and political anxiety
rather than skewed and biased sources.”

‘J'K

Childbearing was central to the colonial

project’s aim of populating supposedly “virgin” lands, even as it could interrupt and
complicate the emerging discourses of race and power that colonialism created and
upon which it depended.
This dissertation uses the framework of outlaw reproduction to examine the
intersection of reproduction and colonialism in Virginia. I imagine reproduction and
colonialism as mutually constituted discourses of power: discourses of reproduction
impacted the colonial project and the colonial project transformed reproduction in
ways that organized, categorized, and disciplined colonized bodies. I argue that
reproduction was a crucial discourse of colonialism - a language and a set of ideas
emergent in both print culture and vernacular discourse meant to forward the nascent

21

Ann Laura Stoler, A lo n g the A rc h iv a l G rain : E p istem ic A n x ieties a n d C o lo n ia l C om m on S en se
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 2 0 0 9 ), 9 -1 0 , 20. S ee also A ntoinette Burton, “Introduction:
A rchive Fever, A rchive S tories,” in A rch ive S to ries: F acts, F ictions, a n d the W riting o f H isto ry, ed.
A ntoinette Burton (Durham , NC: Durham U niversity Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 6.
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and changing English colonial project in Virginia. I also argue that the power
relations of colonialism fundamentally transformed ideas, knowledge, and practices
surrounding reproduction. Finally, I argue that the birthing room, as a zone of
intimate contact, was a space that interrupted, created, challenged, and cemented
colonial relations. In this introduction, I will discuss the theoretical foundations for
my understanding o f reproduction as a cultural phenomenon and then lay out the
historiographical background for my work. I conclude with an outline of the chapters
that follow.
The theoretical underpinnings of my work - feminist theory, Foucauldian
histories, and postcolonial studies - provide the context for my understanding of
reproduction as a concept and a category of analysis. I define reproduction as an
experiential reality that defined the contours of women’s lives in specific ways, as a
central demographic phenomenon that shaped colonial populations, and, most
importantly, as a crucial and central discourse of power in the colonial project. By
seeing reproduction in this expansive way, we can resist the urge to universalize the
experiences of some women or assume an essentialism in which motherhood is
definitive of women’s lives. As Kathleen Brown argues, we must recognize that “the
experience of childbirth varies culturally, historically, and individually and is most
meaningfully analyzed when situated within a particular culture’s discourse of
reproduction, sexuality, bodies, and gender.”24 Certainly, in a world before the
advent of reliable birth control, childbearing was more intensely constitutive of
women’s lives than it is today; the point here is to recognize the differences between
24 Kathleen M. B row n, “Brave N ew W orlds: W om en's and G ender H istory,” W illiam a n d M a ry
Q u a rterly 5 0 , no. 2 (1993): 3 1 4 . S ee also Susan B ordo, U n b ea ra b le W eight: F em inism , W estern
C ulture, a n d th e B o d y (B erkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1993), 230.
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our modem, post-contraceptive subjectivities and the subjectivities o f women in the
past. A study of reproduction does not reduce women’s experiences to their role as
mothers, but instead asserts that if reproduction is a central discourse of power, then
women’s varied experiences of reproduction (which, for some, includes not
participating in it) can help us to understand the boundaries, trajectories, inclusions,
and exclusions in that discourse.
An attention to reproduction in this expansive way helps us to see how
women’s lives and discourses of gender, sexuality, and the body are actually
foundational, not tangential, to the history of colonialism. First, British colonialism
was particularly focused on concerns about population, since the colonies o f British
North America were settler colonies. As Joyce Chaplin argues, British colonialist
discourse “suggested that it was [English] bodies that guaranteed overseas possession,
both by creating a population that demonstrated territorial dominion and by
generating many hands to improve ‘wilderness’ through labor.”25 Chaplin shows that
this sense of British bodily colonialism was dependent on developing notions of
Native American inferiority, specifically in terms of reproduction and population
growth.

This was intensified in the developing slave economies of the plantation

south, where the growth of the laboring population was essential to the survival of the
colonial economy, and that growth occurred increasingly through childbearing rather
than through the importation of more indentured servants or slaves. Colonial Virginia
existed at the nexus of these competing population discourses, where the decimation
of the Native American population through disease, war, and the internal slave trade
25 Joyce C haplin, S u b je c t M a tters: T echnology, th e B ody, a n d S cien ce on the A n g lo -A m erica n
F rontier, 1 5 0 0 -1 6 7 6 (C am bridge, M A: Harvard U niversity Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 117.
26 C haplin, S u b je c t M a tters, 157-98.
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was coupled with the prioritization of growing the populations o f both English and
African descent.27
What does it mean to consider reproduction as not just experience or
biological process, but as a discourse of power? For Michel Foucault, “discourse” is
a specific concept - specifically, the urge to transform experience into language as a
means of organizing and disciplining that experience. Foucault defines discourse in a
way that is always embedded in specific and complex relations of power:
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field o f force
relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within
the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their
form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy.28
Discourses compete with each other and they are internally contradictory, but
ultimately they are about the consolidation of power around particular bodies of
knowledge through the exclusion of other ways o f being and thinking. For Foucault,
the modem world obsessively transforms sexuality into discourse, repositioning
sexuality within force fields of power and domination: “Sexuality must not be
described as a stubborn drive... [but instead] as an especially dense transfer point for
relations of power.”

Foucault’s understanding of discourse is useful here because it

reframes language as a terrain of power negotiations, domination, and resistance.

27 C haplin, S u b je c t M a tters, 157-98. On the internal trade in Indian sla v es and the creation o f Southern
culture, see A lan G allay, The In dian S la v e T rade: The R ise o f th e E nglish E m p ire in th e A m erica n
South, 1 6 7 0 -1 7 1 7 (N ew H aven, CT: Y ale U niversity Press, 2 0 0 2 ).
28 M ichel Foucault, The H isto ry o f Sexu ality: A n In trodu ction , trans. Robert H urley (N Y : V intage,
1990), 101-2.
29 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 103.
30 In on e reading o f Foucault’s definition o f discourse, “discourse is ‘where pow er and k n ow led ge are
jo in e d .’” C harles C. Lem ert and Garth G illian, M ich el F oucault: S o c ia l T h eory a n d T ran sgression
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Foucault’s framework of discourse operating within a field o f power relations
is useful to a study of reproduction for multiple reasons. First, Foucault’s focus is on
sexuality, but reproduction is absolutely central to how he understands the boundaries
of sexuality and its relationship to power. Importantly, in The History o f Sexuality,
Foucault is not attempting to understand sexuality as experience or identity (he in fact
rejects both notions), but instead working to narrate the emergence of the modem
world itself and the ways that sexuality, as a discursive construction, was central to
that narrative. Modernity, for Foucault, was marked by the state’s increasing power
to organize, discipline, and measure its people in terms of demography and
population, which, at their root, are always about the organization of sexuality and
reproduction.31 Second, Foucault’s understanding o f power as a field of force
relations demands analysis of power relations in intimate zones like the birthing
room, helping us to understand the ways that emerging colonial categories of power,
such as race, were enacted on an interpersonal level.32
Foucault’s narratives and methodologies do have limitations. Gayatri Spivak
critiques Foucault for uncritically reifying the European intellectual as an arbiter of
truth even as he fails to acknowledge his position of power within colonial

(N Y : C olum bia U niversity Press, 1982), 5 5 -6 , quoted in Em m a Perez, The D e c o lo n ia l Im agin ary:
W riting C h ica n a s Into H isto ry (B loom in gton : Indiana U n iversity Press, 1999), xvi.
31 T his transformation and its application to colon ial V irginia are discu ssed in detail in Chapter 4.
32 Foucault focu sed on intimate relationships - esp ecia lly fam ilial relationships - as the locu s for
pow er relations. Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 9 6 , 110-4. On intim acy and co lo n ia lism , see Ann
Laura Stoler, C a rn a l K n o w led g e a n d Im p eria l P o w er: R a ce a n d the In tim ate in C o lo n ia l Rule
(B erkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 2 0 0 2 ); Ann Laura Stoler, “T en se and T ender Ties: The
P olitics o f C om parison in North A m erican H istory and (P ost) C olonial S tu d ies,” in H a u n ted B y
E m pire: G e o g ra p h ie s o f In tim acy in N orth A m erican H isto ry, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham, NC:
D uke U niversity Press, 2 0 0 6 ), 2 3 -6 7 .
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discourses.33 Importantly, Foucault’s narratives fail to recognize the centrality of
colonialism and race in the creation of European modernity. Nevertheless, his
methodologies and concepts have been central to the creation of postcolonial critiques
of colonialism, notably those of Edward Said, who saw Foucault’s understanding of
the links between power and knowledge as absolutely central to the creation of
European colonialism.34 Ann Laura Stoler acknowledges this critique, but takes a
different approach - one I find useful in my own work. Stoler argues that sexuality
was a central discourse in the implementation of colonial projects, something that
Foucault seemed to recognize after the publication of The History o f Sexuality.

For

Stoler, this means that an attention to colonialism requires not a rejection of
Foucault’s insights, but a shifting of his chronology - colonialism’s bans on
interracial sex, for example, “linked individual desires to social reproduction in ways
that he dates for Europe a century later.”
Postcolonial theory also offers a critical intervention into the history o f early
Virginia, especially as I try to write a history that is centered on discources of power
and the experiences of non-elite women. Postcolonial theory offers several important
insights that fuel my project. First, postcolonial theory offers new and useful ways to
view American history and the history of American colonialism. Second,
33 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in C o lo n ia l D isc o u rse a n d P o st-c o lo n ia l
T heory: A R ea d er, ed. Patrick W illiam s and Laura Chrism an (N Y : C olum bia U n iversity Press, 1994),
6 6 -7 5 .
34 Edward Said, O rien ta lism (N Y : Penguin, 1978).
35 A nn Laura Stoler, R a ce a n d the E du cation o f D esire: F o u ca u lt's H istory o f S exu ality a n d the
C o lo n ia l O rd e r o f Things (Durham, NC: D uke U niversity Press, 1995). Stoler argues that, in his later
work, F oucault p laces the em ergen ce o f race as a discourse at the end o f the nineteenth century, but
that an attention to European co lo n ia lism sh o w s that race and co lo n ia lism w ere central d yn am ics in the
creation o f modern b ourgeois identities. L adelle M cW horter argues that race and sexu ality em erged as
parallel d iscou rses o f pow er, functioning in sim ilar w ays and m utually constitutive o f each other.
L adelle M cW horter, “S ex , R ace, and B iopow er: A Foucauldian G en ea lo g y ,” H yp a tia 19, no. 3 (2004):
38-62 .
36 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D esire , 41.
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postcolonial theory offers important insights into colonialism itself, specifically its
attention to colonialism as both a system of power and a constantly shifting process.
Finally, postcolonial theory’s attention to intimate zones offers a specific link
between reproduction and colonial projects.
While scholars have debated the application of postcolonial theory to
American history, especially early American studies, I find it a useful tool in
understanding power relations in the time preceding the American Revolution.
United States history provides both an affirmation and a challenge to postcolonial
narratives: as a collection of former settler colonies, the United States both threw off
colonial rule and reengaged in colonialism in the new nation’s own imperial
projects.

Nevertheless, if we consider colonialism as an epoch that laid the

foundation for high imperialism, then postcolonial theory’s insights into the meanings
of coloniality can be extremely useful in understanding the British colonies in North
America. Catherine Hall separates colonialism from imperialism in this way, arguing
that the high imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the “apogee”
of a colonial process best understood as:
...the European pattern of exploration and ‘discovery,’ of settlement, of
dominance over geographically separate ‘others,’ which resulted in the uneven

37 M alini Johar Schu eller and Edward W atts, “T heorizing Early A m erican Studies and
P ostcolon iality,” in M e ssy B egin n in gs: P o stc o lo n ia lity a n d E a rly A m erica n S tu d ies, ed . M alini Johar
Schueller and Edward W atts (N e w B runsw ick, NJ: Rutgers U niversity Press, 2 0 0 3 ), 1-28; Jack
G reene, “C olonial H istory and N ational History: R eflection s on a C ontinuing Problem ,” W illiam a n d
M ary Q u a rterly 6 4 , no. 2 (2007): 2 3 5 -5 0 ; D avid A rm itage, “From C olonial H istory to P ostcolonial
H istory?” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rterly 6 4 , no. 2 (2007): 25 1 -4 .
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development of forms o f capitalism across the world and the destruction
and/or transformation of other forms of social organization and life.
This colonial chronology places British North American history, including that of
early Virginia, squarely within the sights of a narrative of European expansion, the
rise of plantation capitalism, and the transformations of colonialism on both native
and immigrant subjectivities.39 Indeed, Ann Laura Stoler has argued that the
exclusion of America from postcolonial narratives is less about American
exceptionalism than the deeply politicized erasure of imperialism from the United
States’ historical self-conception.40 Indeed, if colonialism was a process of creating
colonized and colonial subjectivities - for Europeans even more than for colonized
others, according to Edward Said - then this process began with Columbus (or
earlier)41
Postcolonial theory offers an understanding of colonialism that unsettles
smooth or easy historical narratives and decenters power in those narratives. Robert
Blair St. George points out the breadth of postcolonial studies’ decentering project:

38 Catherine H all, “Thinking the P ostcolon ial, Thinking the Em pire,” in C u ltu res o f E m p ire:
C o lo n izers in B ritain a n d th e E m p ire in th e N in eteen th a n d T w entieth C en tu ries, ed. Catherine Hall
(N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 0 ), 5.
39 M ichael Warner, “W hat’s C olonial about C olon ial A m erica?,” in P o ssib le P a sts: B eco m in g C o lo n ia l
in E a rly A m erica , ed . R obert Blair St. G eorge (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 2 0 0 0 ),
4 9 -7 0 . On the lim its o f placin g A m erican settler co lo n ie s w ithin a p ostcolon ial fram ework, se e A nne
M cC lintock, ‘T h e A n gel o f Progress: Pitfalls o f the Term ‘P o st-co lo n ia lism ,’” in C o lo n ia l D isco u rse
a n d P o st-C o lo n ia l T heory: A R ea d er, ed. Patrick W illiam s and Laura Chrism an (N Y : C olum bia
U niversity Press, 1994), 2 9 1 -3 0 4 .
40 Ann Laura Stoler, “Intim idations o f Empire: Predicam ents o f the T actile and U n seen ,” in H au n ted
B y E m pire: G e o g ra p h ie s o f In tim acy in N orth A m erica n H isto ry, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham , NC:
D uke U niversity Press, 2 0 0 6 ), 1-22; Stoler, ‘T e n s e and T ender T ie s,” 2 6 -2 7 .
41 Said, O rien ta lism , 12. On the creation o f co lo n ize r s’ subjectivities in early co lo n ia lism , see:
C haplin, S u b je ct Matters-, M yra Jehlen, “T he Literature o f C olon ization ,” in The C a m b rid g e H isto ry o f
A m erican L itera tu re, vol. 1: 15 9 0 -1 8 2 0 , ed. Sacvan B ercovitch (N Y : C am bridge U niversity Press,
1994), 13-168.
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[Postcolonial theory] attempts to describe the subject matter and circuits of
social relations through which discourse works to shape relations of power
and knowledge, hegemony and consent, resistance and ritual, and thus makes
problematic any ethnocentric assumptions concerning center-periphery
models o f empire, population movement, and the flo w o f capital?2
According to postcolonial studies, colonialism must always be understood as a
process - one that was always contested, contingent, and questioned. Postcolonial
theory’s attention to what Malini Johar Schueller and Edward Watts call the “messy
beginnings” o f American history is particular useful in parsing the kinds o f shaky,
halting transformations that colonial Virginia underwent, such as the much-debated
shift from a dependence on English indentured labor to African enslaved labor and
the concomitant transformation in racial ideology.43
Colonialism was a process that created new subjectivities for both colonized
peoples and colonizers. Robert Blair St. George calls this process “becoming
colonial” - the self-conscious process by which European colonizers realized their
new identities as separate from those who inhabited Europe itself.44 On the one hand,
the subjectivities of those at the bottom of colonial hierarchies - slaves, Native
Americans, free people of color, and perhaps even indentured servants - may usefully

42 Robert B lair St. G eorge, “Introduction,” in P o ssib le P a sts: B ecom in g C o lo n ia l in E a rly A m erica , ed.
R obert Blair St. G eorge (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 2 0 0 0 ), 13, em phasis m ine.
S ee also Peter H ulm e, “P ostcolon ial T heory and Early Am erica: A n Approach from the C aribbean,” in
P o ssib le P a sts: B ecom in g C o lo n ia l in E a rly A m erica , ed. R obert Blair St. G eorge (C hapel Hill: U N C
Press, 2 0 0 0 ), 33 -4 8 .
43 Schu eller and W atts, ‘T h eo rizin g Early A m erican Studies and P ostcolon iality.”
44 St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 4 -5 . For the w ays that colo n ia lism remade E nglish su b jectivities, see
Kathleen W ilson , “C itizen sh ip , em pire, and m odernity in the E nglish provinces, c. 1 7 2 0 -9 0 ,” in
C u ltu res o f E m p ire: C o lo n izers in B ritain a n d the E m p ire in th e N in eteen th a n d Tw entieth C en tu ries,
ed. Catherine Hall (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 0 ), 157-186.

18

be understood using the tools of subaltern and postcolonial studies.45 The intersection
of power, silence, speech, and resistance inhabited by colonized people becomes a
space where we can begin to understand the complex impacts of the colonial project
on colonized bodies 46 On the other hand, it is important to be cognizant o f the
transformation of the subjectivities of all people impacted by colonialism, including
white Virginians, whose subjectivities were qualitatively different from those who
lived in Europe.47
The intimacies of colonialism brought the subjectivities of colonizer and
colonized into contact with one another.48 It is here, in these intimate zones where
people of all statuses interacted face-to-face, and therefore negotiated on an intimate
level the hierarchies and power relations of the colonial world, that we can see the
intersection of colonialism and reproduction. Ann Laura Stoler argues that the
complexities of colonial relations can best be understood by examining the intimate
spaces where subjectivities collided and differences were policed.49 Colonial contact
complicated notions of racial separation, both in terms of sociability and identity.50
Intimate spaces like the nursery, the birthing room, and even the courtroom were
45 Schueller and W atts, “T heorizing Early A m erican Studies and P ostco lo n ia lity ,” 11. On the
u sefu ln ess o f com parative fram eworks, see Stoler, “Intim idations o f E m pire.”
46 A nia L oom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o Tales: Issues o f fem ale subjectivity, subaltern agen cy and
tradition in colon ial and p ost-colon ial w ritings on w id o w im m olation in India,” in The F em in ist
H isto ry R ea d er, ed. Su e M organ (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 6 ), 3 0 9 -3 2 2 ; Spivak, “Can the Subaltern
Speak?” .
4 For an exam ple o f this aw areness o f differen ce and the an xieties o f colon ial self-fash ion in g, see
L ockridge, The D ia ry, a n d Life, o f W illiam B y rd II.
48 Mary L ou ise Pratt, “Arts o f the C ontact Z o n e,” P ro fessio n (1 9 9 1 ), 33 -4 0 ; St. G eorge,
“Introduction,” 19, 2 4 -8; Richard W hite, The M id d le G rou n d: Indians, E m pires, a n d R ep u b lics in the
G re a t L akes R egion , 1 6 5 0 -1 8 1 5 (N Y : C am bridge U n iversity Press, 1991).
49 Stoler, “T en se and T ender T ies” ; Stoler, C a rn a l K n o w led g e a n d Im p eria l P o w er.
50 On the children o f interracial co u p les as a ch allen ge to colo n ia l rule, see W inthrop Jordan, W hite
O v e r B lack: A m erica n A ttitu d es T o w a rd th e N eg ro (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press,
1968), 167-78. For an exam p le o f the com p lication s posed by lim inal racial identities in early
A m erica, see Jam es H. M errell, ‘“ T he Cast o f H is C ou n ten an ce’: R eading A ndrew M ontour,” in
Through a G la ss D a rk ly: R eflectio n s on P e rso n a l Iden tity in E a rly A m erica , ed. R onald H offm an,
M echal S ob el, and Fredrika T eute (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f North C arolina Press, 1997), 13-39.
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where colonialism was enacted on a day-to-day basis. These spaces were
transformed by the experience of colonialism, and the examination of those spaces
becomes crucial to understanding the meanings of the colonial project. Reproduction
is an especially potent site for these transformations: what did it mean when
women’s experience of social childbirth that occurred in the towns of England, the
villages of Africa, or the Native communities of pre-colonial Virginia shifted to occur
in the new context of the tobacco plantation?
Therefore, these intimate zones must be understood not just in terms of
contact or sociability but as spaces that literally created colonized bodies. Stoler
argues that sexuality, as a central discourse of power, was a space where women’s
choices were absolutely central to the colonial project: “ [in colonialism] the sexual
choices of white women were at issue: they are desired objects, but unruly desiring
subjects as well.”51 I argue that along with their sexual subjectivities, women’s issue
was “at issue” as well - reproduction in colonial spaces was the literal creation of
colonized bodies. It was not just sex and intimacy that challenged, transformed, and
furthered colonial projects - it was the creation of bodies, and the ability for colonial
authorities to categorize those bodies into emerging racial hierarchies. The intimacies
of colonialism embodied in interracial sex literally created new identities, crucially
marked by race, which complicated European notions of self and other.52
Therefore, my concern throughout this dissertation is to understand
experiences and understandings of reproduction in a space and time in which identity
categories, subjectivities, and hierarchies of power were all transforming via the
51 Stoler, R a ce a n d the E du cation o f D esire , 4 1 .
52 On the usefu ln ess o f postcolon ial categories such as lim inality and hybridity in interrupting stable
racial categories, see H ulm e, “P ostcolonial Theory and Early A m erica.”
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colonial project. I draw on and participate in multiple historiographies, including but
not limited to women’s history, histories of childbearing, histories of sexuality, and
histories of colonialism in Virginia. The methodology of women’s history provides
the foundation for my work: women’s history’s examination o f gender discourses of
power, its attention to the experiences of women, and its attention to the intersection
of gender, race, class, and sexuality provide a way of seeing the past that interrupts
dominant narratives and refocuses history away from centers of power. Second,
cultural histories of the period have examined the ways that discourses of gender and
race have intersected with ideas about the body and sexuality; these histories provide
a sense of the ways that understandings of the body and sexuality undergirded gender
and racial power relations, the creation of colonial spaces, and the framing of the
colonial project. Third, as a subset of women’s history, histories of childbearing have
examined the intersection of medicine, the body, sexuality, gender, and power.
Finally, histories of colonial Virginia offer a context for the time and place that I
study: the institutionalization of racial slavery, the expansion of the plantation
economy and the rise of the planter elite, and the shifting British colonial project in
this particular North American colony.
W omen’s histories of early America have explored the meanings of gender as
a social construct and discourse of power while simultaneously uncovering and
working to understand the experiences and lives of women during this period.53

53 On gender as a discourse o f pow er - or, more sp ecifica lly , a category o f analysis - se e Joan S co tt’s
influential essa y on gender. Joan Scott, “Gender: A U sefu l C ategory o f H istorical A n a ly sis,” The
A m erica n H isto ric a l R eview 9 1 , no. 5 (1 986): 10 5 3 -1 0 7 5 . S ee also Joanne M eyerow itz, "AHR Forum:
A H istory o f ‘G ender,’” A m erica n H isto ric a l R e v ie w 113, no. 5 (2008): 1346-56; Jeanne B oydston,
“G ender as a Q uestion o f H istorical A n a ly sis,” G e n d e r a n d H isto ry 2 0 , no. 3 (2 0 0 8 ): 5 5 8 -5 8 3 . W hile
endebted to Scott, m y approach d iffers sligh tly from hers. S cott w as primarily concerned w ith how
gender m ight be understood as a metaphor for understanding other top ics that d id n ’t seem to in volve
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While reproduction has been present in women’s histories’ focus on motherhood and
marriage, it deserves a focused analysis. The construction of motherhood, as well as
the changing meanings of the role o f motherhood, has been a central concern in
women’s history, especially the history of women in Early America. Whether
motherhood was a site of power, of duty, or o f resistance depended on women’s racial
identity, their status as free, servant, or enslaved, and the particular cultural meanings
attached to different women’s motherhood.54 Further, in this era of the fem e covert,
for women who married (or who could marry), their role as wives was absolutely
central to their access to a public voice, their control over their own property, and
their sexual subjectivities. In contrast, unmarried women’s lives were constructed
fundamentally differently than married women’s.55 In their focus on the politics of

w om en - military history, foreign relations, etc. W hile I am concerned w ith gendered discou rses o f
colon ia lism , I am m ore concerned with h o w the ex p erience and the pow er relations o f colon ialism
transformed the relations, discou rses, and exp eriences o f reproduction (and, thus, gender). D iscou rses
o f reproduction, like d iscou rses o f gender, are not perm anent or unchanging; their historicity is the
central concern m y work.
54 Linda K. Kerber, W om en o f th e R epu blic: In tellect a n d Id e o lo g y in R evo lu tio n a ry A m e rica (Chapel
Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 1980); M ary B eth N orton, F ounding M o th ers a n d F athers:
G e n d e red P o w e r a n d th e F orm ing o f A m erica n S o c ie ty (N Y : Knopf, 1996); Laurel Thatcher Ulrich,
G o o d W ives: Im a g e a n d R e a lity in th e L ives o f W om en in N orth ern N ew E ngland, 1 6 5 0 -1 7 5 0 (N Y :
V intage, 1980), 146-63. On the w ays that m otherhood has been constructed differently for black
w om en, esp e c ia lly in slavery, see: B row n, G o o d Wives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 12636; Jennifer M organ, L a b o rin g W om en: R ep ro d u ctio n a n d G e n d e r in N ew W o rld S la very
(Philadelphia: U niversity o f P ennsylvania Press, 2 0 0 4 ).
55 L ois Green Carr and Lorena W alsh, “T he Planter’s W ife: T he E xperience o f W hite W om en in
Seventeenth-C entury M aryland,” in A H erita g e o f H e r O w n: T o w a rd a N e w S o c ia l H isto ry o f
A m erica n W om en , ed . N ancy F. Cott and E lizabeth H. P leck (N Y : Sim on and Schuster, 1979), 25-57;
B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 73 -1 0 4 ; U lrich, G o o d W ives. Karin
W u lf argues that som e historians have inaccurately conflated “w om en ” w ith “w iv e s,” seein g the figure
o f the unmarried w om an as “a nexus for cultural ten sion s” in early A m erica; m y fo cu s on sin gle
m otherhood and bastardy is indebted to this perspective. Karin W ulf, N o t A ll W ives: W om en o f
C o lo n ia l P h ila d elp h ia (Philadelphia: U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press, 2 0 0 0 ), 9. On changing
understandings o f marriage over the course o f the eighteenth century, see: Ruth B lo ch , “C hanging
C oncep tion s o f Sexu ality and R om ance in Eighteenth-C entury A m erica,” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rterly
6 0 , no. 1 (Jan. 20 0 3 ): 13-42; Jay F liegelm an, P ro d ig a ls a n d P ilgrim s: The A m erica n R evo lu tio n
a g a in st P a tria rc h a l A u th ority, 1 7 5 0 -1 8 0 0 (N Y : C am bridge U niversity Press, 1991); Richard Godbeer,
S exu al R evolu tion in E a rly A m erica (Baltim ore: T he Johns H opkins U niversity Press, 2 0 0 2 ); Clare
L yons, Sex a m o n g th e R a b b le: A n In tim ate H isto ry o f G e n d e r a n d P o w e r in the A g e o f R evolution,
P h iladelph ia, 1 7 3 0 -1 8 3 0 (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f N orth C arolina Press, 2 0 0 6 ); Paula A . T reckel,
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gender and the ability (or willingness) of women to abide by their roles as wives and
mothers, women’s historians have shown how individual women might have chafed
against their prescribed roles, even as they participated in them.56 One goal o f this
dissertation is to treat motherhood and wifehood as important social constructs of
gender, imbued with particular political power, while paying careful attention to the
ways that reproduction was both central and peripheral to those constructions.
Shifting the focus away from motherhood or wifehood as roles or relationships allows
a focus on the experience of childbearing itself and the ways that reproduction was a
gendered discourse of power.
W omen’s histories are deeply concerned with gendered relations o f power,
and women’s histories of early America are specifically interested in the ways that
patriarchal power was enacted in the British colonies.57 My concern here is less with

‘“ The Em pire o f m y heart’: T he marriage o f W illiam Byrd II and L ucy Parke B yrd,” V irginia
M aga zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y 105, no. 2 (1997): 125-56.
56 On w o m en ’s resistance to prescribed roles, see: Hilary M cD . B eck les, N a tu ra l R eb els: A S o c ia l
H isto ry o f E n sla v ed B la ck W om en (N e w B runsw ick, NJ: Rutgers U niversity Press, 1989), 156-7;
B row n, G o o d Wives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 8 8 -1 0 4 ; C ynthia A . Kierner, B ey o n d the
H ou seh old: W o m en ’s P la c e in th e E a rly South, 1 7 0 0 -1 8 3 5 (Ithaca, N Y : C ornell U n iversity Press,
1998); C ynthia A . Kierner, S c a n d a l a t B iza rre: R u m o r a n d R epu tation in J effe rso n ’s V irgin ia (N Y :
Palgrave, 20 0 4 ); M organ, L a b o rin g W omen, 166-195; Terri L. Snyder, B ra b b lin g W om en: D iso rd e rly
Speech a n d the L a w in E a rly V irginia (Ithaca: C ornell U niversity Press, 2 0 0 3 ); Linda L. Sturtz, Within
H e r P o w e r: P ro p e rtie d W om en in C o lo n ia l V irginia, (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 2 ); W ulf, N o t A ll W ives.
57 Kathleen B rown m akes the ca se that patriarchy is a “historically sp ecific” con cep t, describing both
early modern d om estic relations (the father’s authority over the hou seh old ) and a primary discou rse o f
pow er. B row n, G o o d Wives, N a sty W enches, A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 4 -5 . Other historians o f this period
(notably M ary B eth N orton and H olly B rew er) have focu sed on the contem porary m eanings o f
patriarchy in the early m odern world: N orton fo cu ses on the gendered m eanings o f patriarchy, and
Brewer on the w ays that patriarchy im pacted v iew s o f children and childhood. Norton, F ounding
M oth ers a n d Fathers', H o lly B rewer, B y B irth o r C on sen t: C hildren, Law, a n d th e A n glo-A m erican
R evolu tion in A u th o rity (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 2 0 0 5 ). W hile this attention
to historical change is crucial, I find B ro w n ’s d efin ition esp ecia lly useful because it a ck n ow led ges the
interplay b etw een social relations and cultural assum ptions. Further, B row n is d eep ly concerned with
the relationship b etw een gender, class, and race id eo lo g ies. F em inist theorist bell hooks rem inds us
that a nuanced definition o f patriarchy d oes not posit the absolute pow er o f all m en over all w om en,
but instead, an understanding that patriarchal pow er is tightly linked to other d iscou rses o f pow er, such
as capitalism , w hite suprem acy, and heterosexism , bell h ook s, F em in ist Theory: F rom M a rg in to
C en te r (B oston , M A: South End Press, 1984), 24 -5 . T h ese fem inist d efin ition s o f patriarchy are
distinct from the early A m erican historical conversation about patriarchalism - the discou rse o f
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whether women as a group gained or lost power over the course of the colonial era
than with how colonialism itself transformed women’s knowledge, experience, and
subjectivities.58 One advantage of this concern with the impact of colonialism is that
it emphasizes the ways that discourses of power constructed different women’s
experiences in profoundly different ways because the intensification, transformation,
and creation of categories of difference such as race and status were central to the
colonial project. The point is not simply to observe differences between women, but
to examine the process by which differences were constructed in a colonial context.
As Jane Haggis, a historian of colonial India, argues, difference must be understood
not as “deviance from the norm” but instead as a “concept disrupting the complacent
authority of the dominant discursive presence.”59 Elsa Barkley Brown’s discussion of
intersectionality is useful here. She points out that all women’s material lives were
profoundly shaped by the intersection of race, class, gender, and status:
Middle-class white women's lives are not just different from working-class
white, Black, and Latina women's lives. It is important to recognize that middleclass women live the lives they do precisely because working-class women live
fatherhood that ju stified absolute rule by fam ily patriarchs, slaveholders, and kings w hich w as
ch allen ged by R evolutionary-era republicanism . That narrative o f patriarchalism d eserves a sustained
fem in ist critique. F liegelm an, P ro d ig a ls a n d Pilgrim s', Isaac, T ran sform ation o f V irginia, 2 0 -21;
M organ, S la ve C ou n terp o in t, 2 7 3 -9 6 ; Parent, F oul M ean s, 197-235.
58 On the question o f w hether w om en gained or lost pow er in the colon ial period, esp ecia lly the notion
that the early colon ial period w as a “g o ld en a g e” for w om en , see Carol R. B erkin, “W hat an alarm ing
crisis is this?: Early A m erican W om en and their H istories,” in The W orld T u rn ed U p sid e-D o w n : The
S ta te o f E igh teen th -C en tu ry A m erica n S tu d ies a t th e B egin n in g o f th e T w en ty-F irst C en tu ry, ed.
M ichael K ennedy and W illiam Shade (B ethlehem , NJ: L ehigh U niversity Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 2 5 4 -2 6 7 ;
K athleen M . B row n, “B eyon d the Great D ebates: G ender and R ace in Early A m erica,” R e view s in
A m erica n H isto ry 2 6 , no. 1 (1998): 9 6 -1 2 3 . T his is not to say that w om en did not lo se authority by the
eighteenth century. C ornelia H ughes D ayton ’s work on C onnecticut sh o w s the w ays that, as courts
A n glican ized over the eighteenth century, w o m en ’s v o ic e s w ere less often transcribed into the officia l
record; therefore, our understandings o f the “gold en age” are d eep ly im pacted by the availab le archive.
C ornelia H u gh es D ayton, W om en b efo re the B ar: G ender, L a w a n d S o c ie ty in C onnecticut, 1 6 3 9 -1 7 8 9
(C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 1995).
59 Jane H aggis, “W hite W om en and C olonialism : Tow ards a N on-R ecuperative H istory,” in F em in ist
P o stc o lo n ia l T heory: A R ea d er, ed. R eina L ew is and Sara M ills (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 3 ), 165.
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the lives they do. White women and women of color not only live different lives
but white women live the lives they do in large part because women of color
live the ones they d o .60
This was particularly true in the southern colonies, where the plantation economy and
slavery defined the conditions of daily life and ideological framework for all
women.61 Therefore, a major goal of my work here is to understand the ways that
reproduction was used to define and police race and status boundaries at a time when
those boundaries were being constructed.
This intersection between race, gender, and reproduction also links to
discourses of sexuality and the body. Drawing on Foucauldian perspectives (as I
discussed earlier in this introduction), historians of sexuality have shown the ways
that sexuality should not be understood as a biological drive, but instead as a
discourse of power and a site of conflict, especially in the contact zones of the
colonial world. Changing sexual mores linked with new political theories to impact
not just ideas about political and personal liberty, but to fundamentally transform
ideologies of gender, marriage, and family.

As part of a colonial project, these

transformations also centered on colonial discourses of race, as black and Native

60 E lsa B arkely B row n, “W hat has Happened Here: T he P olitics o f D ifferen ce in W o m en ’s H istory and
F em inist P o litics,” F em in ist S tu d ies 18, no. 2 (1 9 9 2 ): 2 9 8 . On race, intersectionality, and
interdisciplinary history, see Perez, The D e c o lo n ia l Im agin ary, xiiv.
61 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 187-211; Kirsten Fischer, S u sp ect
R elatio n s: Sex, R ace, a n d R esista n ce in C o lo n ia l N orth C a ro lin a (Ithaca, N Y : C ornell U niversity
Press, 2 0 02); Sharon B lock , R a p e a n d Sexu al P o w e r in E a rly A m erica (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f
North Carolina Press, 2 0 0 6 ), 126-209.
52 B loch , “C hanging C onceptions o f Sexuality and R om ance,” ; G odbeer, Sexu al R evo lu tio n in E a rly
A m e ric a ; L yon s, Sex am on g th e R a b b le ; Susan E. Klepp, “R evolutionary B od ies: W om en and the
Fertility Transition in the M id-A tlantic R egion, 1 7 6 0 -1 8 2 0 ,” The Jo u rn a l o f A m erica n H isto ry 85, no.
3 (1998): 9 1 0 -4 5 ; Joshua D. Rothm an, N o to rio u s in the N e ig h b o rh o od : Sex a n d F a m ilies a c ro ss the
C o lo r Line in Virginia, 17 8 7 -1 8 6 1 (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 2 0 0 3 ); M errill D.
Sm ith, S ex a n d S exu ality in E a rly A m erica (N Y : N e w Y ork U niversity Press, 1998); T reckel, “ ‘The
Empire o f m y heart’” .
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sexualities were interpreted by Europeans within a colonial framework, even as
peoples of African and Native descent struggled against those interpretations.63 Too
often, though, histories o f sexuality have bypassed issues of reproduction, focusing
instead on the pleasures and dangers of sexual and intimate contact.64 We must
remember that in this pre-contraceptive world where childbirth brought the threat of
death, sexuality was inarguably tied to danger for any woman who had sex with men.
These dangers were compounded for women on the bottom o f social hierarchies, such
as women who had children outside of marriage or women who bore children in
slavery. I argue in this dissertation that reproduction must be seen as absolutely
central - not peripheral - to discourses of sexuality; indeed, as I argue later in this
introduction, reproduction was absolutely central to the narrative of emerging
discourses of sexuality that Foucault outlines in The History o f Sexuality.
The early modem period and the Enlightenment saw tremendous change in
cultural discourses of the body that transformed understandings o f reproduction.
Thomas Laqueur argues that changing understandings of the sexed body were
constitutive of the emergence of a new gender ideology of innate gender difference in

63 Brown, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 4 2 -7 4 ; Chaplin, S u b je ct M atters',
Catherine C linton and M ich ele G illesp ie, The D e v il's L ane: S ex a n d R a ce in th e E a rly South (N Y;
O xford U niversity Press, 1997); Fischer, S u sp ect R ela tio n s, 5 9 -9 7 ; Martha E. H odes, Sex, L ove, R ace:
C rossin g B o u n d a ries in N orth A m erica n H isto ry (N Y : N e w York U n iversity Press, 1999); Jordan,
W hite O v e r B lack, 32-40; M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 12-49.
64 I borrow the phrase “pleasures and dangers” from the fem in ist anthology on sexu ality by the sam e
name. C arole S. V ance, ed ., P lea su re a n d D a n g er: E xplorin g F em ale S exu ality (B oston , MA:
R outledge, 1984). M ost histories o f sexu ality deal w ith childbearing on ly in the con text o f
contraception and illegitim acy. For such d iscu ssio n s focu sin g on early A m erica, see: John D ’E m ilio
and E stelle B . Freedm an, In tim ate M a tters: A H isto ry o f S ex u a lity in A m erica (C hicago: U niversity o f
C hicago Press, 1997), 11-4, 2 5 -6 , 27 -3 6 ; G odbeer, S exu al R evolu tion in E a rly A m erica , 120-132. In
the major anthology o f histories o f sexuality in early A m erica, Sex a n d S exu a lity in E a rly A m erica ,
only one essa y addresses childbearing, again in the con text o f illegitim acy. E lse L. H am bleton, “T he
R egulation o f S e x in Seventeenth-C entury M assachusetts: T he Quarterly Court o f E ssex C ounty vs.
Priscilla W illson and Mr. Sam uel A p p leton ,” in Sex a n d S exu ality in E a rly A m erica , ed. Merrill D.
Sm ith (N Y : N ew Y ork U niversity Press, 1998), 8 9 -1 1 5 .
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this period.65 These changing understandings of the body - indeed, the very notion
that the body itself was a changeable, mutable object - were deeply tied to
colonialism, such as emerging colonial subjectivities, understandings of the promises
and perils of the environment of the New World, and explanations for gendered and
racialized hierarchies of power.66 All of these transformations implicated discourses
of reproduction, in particular the ways that the reproductive body was implicated in
the transformation of gender ideologies and the forwarding of the colonial project.
Histories of childbirth in the early modem world - especially the long
transition from midwife-assisted childbirth to physician-assisted childbirth - provide
another historiographical bedrock for this dissertation. Historians have argued that
the shift from midwives to doctors occurred for a variety of reasons, including a
contemporary perception that physicians were better skilled, differential class- and
race-based access to medical care, and gendered attacks on women’s knowledge and
access to education.67 Increasingly, historians have focused on the cultural context

65 T hom as Laqueur, “O rgasm , G eneration, and the P olitics o f Reproductive B io lo g y ,” R ep resen ta tio n s
14 (1986): 1-41; T hom as Laqueur, M aking Sex: B o d y a n d G e n d e r fr o m the G reek s to F reu d
(C am bridge, M A: Harvard U niversity Press, 1992). Mary F issell offers a different p erspective,
show in g h ow non-elite texts, such as d om estic m edical texts, used different m etaphors to understand
the body, but fo llo w ed a sim ilar path towards increasingly m ale-centered understandings o f the body.
Mary F issell, “G ender and Generation: R epresenting R eproduction in Early M odern E ngland,” G e n d er
& H isto ry 7 , no. 3 (1995): 4 3 3 -4 5 6 . Susan Juster exp lores the intersections o f gender, religion, and
changing understandings o f the body. Susan Juster, “M ystical Pregnancy and H o ly B leeding:
V isionary E xperience in Early M odern Britain and A m erica,” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rte rly 5 7 , no. 2
(2000): 2 4 9 -2 8 8 .
66 Brown, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 34 7 -5 1 ; C haplin, S u b je ct M atters',
Trudy Eden, “F ood, A ssim ilation , and the M alleability o f the Human B od y in Early V irgin ia,” in A
C entre o f W onders: The B o d y in E a rly A m erica , ed. Janet M oore Lindman and M ich ele L ise Tarter
(Ithaca, N Y : C ornell U niversity Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 29-4 2 ; L ockridge, On th e S o u rces o f P a tria rc h a l R age,
33-7; Susan S cott Parrish, “T he Fem ale O possum and the Nature o f the N e w W orld,” W illiam a n d
M ary Q u a rterly 5 4 , no. 3 (1997): 4 7 5 -5 1 4 ; Susan Scott Parrish, A m erica n C u rio sity: C u ltu res o f
N atu ra l H isto ry in th e C o lo n ia l B ritish A tla n tic W orld (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f N orth Carolina
Press, 2 0 0 6 ).
67 D avid C ressy, Birth, M a rria g e, a n d Death', Jane B. D onegan, W omen a n d M en M id w iv e s: M edicin e,
M orality, a n d M iso g yn y in E a rly A m erica (W estport CT: G reenw ood Press, 1978); Barbara Ehrenreich
and Deirdre E nglish, W itches, M id w iv es a n d N u rses: A H isto ry o f W om en H e a le rs (N Y : T he F em inist
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for changing medical practice, finding its roots in the cultural and epistemological
shifts of the eighteenth century, such as the rise of the print public sphere, the cultural
role of literacy and the creation genteel subjectivities, the rise of consumer capitalism,
and the increasing importance of colonialism in British self-construction.68 Further,
histories of midwifery have focused on the role of midwives in communities, in
particular the ways that midwives, both black and white, were holders of knowledge
not just about childbirth, but about general medicine, social structures, and the law.
This knowledge made midwives especially important members of frontier
communities and slave communities.69
General histories of childbirth have tended to focus on the American north, as
well as on white women’s experiences; a shift in focus to the American south and the
impact of slavery and race expands and complicates the narrative of midwifery and
medicine.70 In the South, the power differential between midwives and physicians

Press, 1973, 20 1 0 ); Clare H anson, A C u ltu ra l H isto ry o f P regn a n cy: P regn an cy, M edicin e, a n d
C ulture, 1 7 5 0 -2 0 0 0 (N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 2 0 0 4 ); L eavitt, B ro u g h t to Bed; Scholten,
C h ild b ea rin g in A m erica n S ociety; Richard W . W ertz and D orothy C. W ertz, L ying-In: A H isto ry o f
C h ildbirth in A m erica (N Y : T he Free Press, 1977, expanded edition N e w Haven: Y ale U niversity
Press, 1989).
68 C ody, “T he P olitics o f R eproduction” ; L udm illa Jordanova, “Interrogating the C oncept o f
R eproduction in the Eighteenth C entury,” in C o n ceivin g th e N ew W o rld O rd er: The G lo b a l P o litic s o f
R epro d u ctio n , ed. Faye D . G insburg and Rayna Rapp (B erkeley: U n iversity o f C alifornia Press, 1995),
3 6 9 -3 8 6 ; Ruth Perry, “C o lo n izin g the Breast: Sexuality and M aternity in Eighteenth-C entury
E ngland,” in B ritish L itera tu re 1 6 4 0 -1 7 8 9 : A C ritica l R ea d er, ed. R obert D eM aria, Jr. (M alden, M A:
B lack w ell, 1999) 3 0 2 -3 3 2 ; Adrian W ilson , The M akin g o f M a n -M id w ifery.
69 Sharia M . Fett, “C o n scio u sn ess and C alling: A frican A m erican M id w iv es at W ork in the A ntebellum
South,” in N ew S tu d ies in the H isto ry o f A m erica n S la very, ed. Edward E. Baptist and Stephanie M . H.
Cam p (A thens: U niversity o f G eorgia Press, 2 0 0 6 ), 6 5 -8 6 ; V alerie L ee, G ran n y M id w iv e s a n d B lack
W om en W riters: D o u b le -D u tc h e d R ea d in g s (N Y : R outledge, 1996); U lrich, A M id w ife's Tale; Laurie
A . W ilk ie, The A rc h a e o lo g y o f M o th erin g : An A frica n -A m erica n M id w ife ’s T ale (N Y : R outledge,
2003).
70 S om e o f the m ost influential histories o f childbearing focu s ex c lu siv ely on w hite w om en in the
A m erican north. S ee, for exam ple, Leavitt, B ro u g h t to B ed; Scholten, C h ild b ea rin g in A m erican
S ociety; and W ertz and W ertz, L yin g In. A n excep tion to this geographical focu s is the w ork o f Sally
M cM illen , w hich fo cu ses on elite w hite w om en in the A ntebellum south. S ally G. M cM illen ,
M o th e rh o o d in the O ld South: P regn an cy, C hildbirth, a n d Infant R ea rin g (B aton R ouge: L ouisiana
State U n iversity Press, 1990).
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was exacerbated by race, where midwives - especially midwives of African descent served the black community and physicians served the white master class.71 The
racial division between midwives and physicians had extraordinary impact on
enslaved women. By the Antebellum period, planter-physicians took advantage of
their ownership of their patients, using black women’s bodies to experiments with
new techniques, to debilitating or even deadly effect.

77

On the other hand, so-called

“granny midwives” were keepers of knowledge and holders of considerable authority
in the slave community.73
This racial context was, of course, rooted in the fact that slavery was a status
inherited at birth, so women’s reproductivity was a site of profit for slaveowners.
Therefore, there was a deep tension for women in slavery between what Patricia Hill
Collins calls the “motherwork” that created and nurtured the black community and a
black subjectivity and the realization that motherhood was appropriated and exploited
by the institution of slavery.74 This tension between motherwork and appropriation
echoes the tension that existed between enslaved women’s reproductive role and their
productive role as laborers. Social historians of slavery have pointed to the ways that
enslaved women’s extraordinary labor demands led to higher rates of infant mortality
71 M arie Jenkins Schw artz, B irth in g A S la ve: M o th e rh o o d a n d M ed icin e in th e A n teb ellu m South
(C am bridge, M A: Harvard U niversity Press, 2 0 0 6 ); L ee, G ra n n y M id w ive s a n d B la ck W om en W riters.
72 Schw artz, B irth in g A S la ve, 2 2 5 -5 6 ; Terri K apsalis, P u b lic P riva tes: P erform in g G y n e co lo g y fro m
B oth E n ds o f th e Specu lu m (Durham, NC: D uke U niversity Press, 1997), 31 -5 9 .
73 Y w on e Edwards-Ingram , “African A m erican M ed icin e and the S ocial R elations o f S lavery,” in R a ce
a n d th e A rc h a e o lo g y o f Id en tity, ed. Charles E. Orser Jr. (Salt Lake City: U n iversity o f Utah Press,
2 0 0 2 ), 34 -5 3 ; L ee, G ra n n y M id w iv e s a n d B la ck W om en W riters; W ilk ie, The A rc h a e o lo g y o f
M otherin g.
74 Patricia H ill C ollin s, B lack F em in ist Thought: K n o w led g e, C on sciou sn ess, a n d th e P o litic s o f
E m po w erm en t (N Y : R outledge, 1990), 2 0 9 . Sim ilar to C ollin s, Jennifer M organ argues that
m otherhood w as the vector by w hich creolization occurred, thus creating black su b jectivities via the
work o f m othering. M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 105-43. On the appropriation and exploitation o f black
w o m en ’s reproductive role in slavery, see Hortense Spillers, “M am a’s B aby, Papa’s M aybe: An
A m erican Grammar B o o k ,” in F em inism s, 2 nd ed. Ed. Robyn R. W arhol and D iane Price Herndl (N ew
B runsw ick, NJ: Rutgers U niversity Press, 1997), 3 8 4 -4 0 5 ; M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 8 1 , 167.
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and maternal mortality.75 Jennifer M organ’s expert study of the role of reproduction
in the institution of slavery in Barbados and South Carolina explores all of these
issues, connecting the ways that women’s reproductive role was central to early
discourses of racial difference, deeply impacted women’s experiences as laborers and
mothers, and directly shaped their understanding o f their enslavement.76
Another intervention into the history of childbearing has been the introduction
of cultural historical perspectives. As previously discussed, the eighteenth century
saw radical changes in understandings of the sexed body. These changes in the
epistemology of the body occurred simultaneously with the rise of man-midwifery,
which itself was rooted in a notion of innate gender difference, where men claimed
medical authority on the basis of masculine rationalism and an emerging
understanding that childbearing had become newly important to the nation and the
national economy.77 Further, changes in early modem understandings of the body
had a direct impact on European and Euro-American women’s reproductive choices
and practices, such as the use of emmenagogues and extended nursing to limit
pregnancies.78 Susan Klepp has argued that these practices themselves had a cultural

75 C heryll A nn C ody, “C y c le s o f W ork and o f Childbearing: S eason ality in W o m en ’s L iv es on L ow
Country Plantations,” in M o re than C h attel: B lack W om en a n d S la very in the A m erica s, ed. D avid
Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (B loom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1996), 6 1 -7 8 ; W ilm a
King, “Suffer w ith them till death: S la v e W om en and their Children in N ineteenth-C entury A m erica,”
in M o re than C h attel: B lack W om en a n d S la very in th e A m erica s, ed. D avid Barry Gaspar and Darlene
Clark H ine (B loom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1996), 147-168; Richard Steck el, “W om en , W ork
and Health under Plantation Slavery in the U nited States,” in M o re than C h attel: B la c k W om en a n d
S la very in th e A m erica s, ed. D avid Barry Gaspar and D arlene Clark H ine (B loom ington: Indiana
U niversity Press, 1996), 4 3 -6 0 . For a counterargum ent, see Jerom e T eelu ck sin gh , “T he ‘Invisible
C h ild ’ in British W est Indian Slavery,” S la v e ry a n d A b o litio n 2 7 , no. 2 (2 006): 2 3 7 -5 0 .
76 M organ, L a b o rin g W omen.
77 Jordanova, “Interrogating the C oncept o f R eproduction.”
78 Barbara D uden, ‘T h e Fetus on the ‘Farther S h ore’ : T oward a History o f the U nborn,” in F etal
S u bjects, F em in ist P o sitio n s, ed. Lynn M . M organ and M eredith W . M ich aels (Philadelphia:
U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 13-25; Susan E. K lepp, “C olds, W orm s, and Hysteria:
M enstrual R egulation in Eighteenth-C entury A m erica,” in R egu latin g M en stru ation : B eliefs, P ractices,
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and political meaning, as women consciously limited their pregnancies as an
enactment of republican values.79
The third major body of historiography upon which I draw is the history of
colonial Virginia, especially the emergence of the institution of slavery, the expansion
of the plantation economy, and the rise of the planter elite. I make a theoretical
intervention into Virginia’s colonial history, arguing that postcolonial theory is a
useful tool for understanding the processes by which Virginia transformed from a
military outpost to a settler colony to a plantation economy and slave society.
Edmund Morgan’s survey of Virginia’s colonial period narrates that history, arguing
that the idea of freedom itself emerged as a result of the creation of the institution of
racial slavery.

As Anthony Parent argues, this process was one of consolidating

planter interests through the control of land, political power, and, importantly, a
growing enslaved population.81 Rhys Isaac and others have focused on how planters
embodied their power and whether the authority they claimed was recognized.82

In terp reta tio n s, ed . E tienne van de W alle and E lisha P. R enne (C hicago: U niversity o f C h icago Press,
2 0 0 1 ), 22 -3 8 ; T reckel, Paula A . “B reastfeeding and M aternal S exu ality in C olon ial A m erica,” J o u rn al
o f In terd iscip lin a ry H isto ry 20:1 (1 9 8 9 ), 2 5 -5 1 .
7 K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ies.” For another perspective on the fertility transition, Kenneth
L ockridge and Jan L ew is argue that the low erin g o f the elite w hite birth rate w as le ss about an
adoption o f republican values by w om en and more about w o m en ’s increasing fear o f childbirth and
maternal death at the end o f the eighteenth century. L ew is, Jan and K enneth A . L ockridge, “S ally H as
B een Sick: Pregnancy and F am ily Lim itation am ong V irginia Gentry W om en, 1 7 8 0 -1 8 3 0 ,” J o u rn a l o f
S o c ia l H isto ry 2 2 , no. 1 (1 988): 5-2 0 .
80 M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reedom .
81 Parent, F ou l M ean s. Other studies o f the con solid ation o f planter interests include Ira Berlin, M an y
T housan ds G on e: The F irst Two C en tu ries o f S la v e ry in N orth A m erica (C am bridge, M A : Harvard
U niversity Press, 1998), 109-141; H olly B rewer, “Entailing A ristocracy in C olonial V irginia: ‘A n cient
Feudal R estraints’ and R evolutionary R eform ,” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rterly 5 4 , no. 2 (A pril 1997):
3 0 7 -3 4 6 ; D avid W . Jordan, “P olitical Stability and the E m ergence o f a N ative E lite in M aryland,” in
The C h esa p ea k e in th e S even teenth C entury: E ssa ys on A n g lo -A m erica n S o ciety, ed. Thad W . T ate and
D avid L. Am m erm an (N Y : W .W . N orton and C o., 1979), 2 4 3 -2 7 3 ; K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d Sla ves.
82 Isaac, The T ran sform ation o f Virginia; B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s
P a tria rch s, 3 1 9 -6 6 ; L ockridge, The D ia ry, a n d Life, o f W illiam B yrd II; Parent, F oul M ean s, 173-94;
C arole Sham m as, “E nglish-B orn and C reole E lites in Turn-of-the-C entury V irginia,” in The
C h esa p ea k e in th e S even teenth C entury: E ssa y s on A n g lo -A m erica n S o c ie ty, ed. Thad W . T ate and
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These questions of power and its consolidation and contestation in colonial spaces
animate my work.
A major site of debate in Virginia history has been to identify whether the
transition to racial slavery from indentured servitude was planned and deliberate (as
Parent argues), or an “unthinking decision,” as Winthrop Jordan famously stated.83
Absolutely central to these histories is the notion that Virginia’s colonial mission was
inextricably tied with the creation and control of the unfree labor force, whether
indentured, enslaved, male, female, white, black, or mixed-race; colonialism, as
expressed in early Virginia, was about territorial domination and control over
colonized bodies.84 Yet, postcolonial theory offers a different approach, focusing less
on root causes (such as whether the move to slavery was motivated by racial animus)
but instead on recognizing the contested processes by which colonial power was
constructed and deployed.
The emergence of a gender analysis of Virginia’s colonial history has
invigorated the field, offering fuller understandings of this history. Kathleen Brown’s
comprehensive study of gender, race and power in early Virginia emphasizes the
intersection of gendered discourses of power and English, Native, and African

D avid L. A m m erm an (N Y : W .W . N orton and C o., 1979), 2 7 4 -2 9 6 ; T reckel, “ ‘T he em pire o f my
heart.’”
83 Parent, F oul M ea n s, passim ; Jordan, W hite O v e r B lack, 4 4 -1 0 0 . On the transition from indentured
servitude to racial slavery and the im plication o f race in that transition, se e Berlin, M a n y T housands
G on e, 17-28, 38 -4 6 ; B row n, G o o d Wives, N a sty W enches, a n d Arvcious P a tria rch s, 109-10; R ussell
M enard, “From Servants to Slaves: T he Transform ation o f the C hesapeake Labor S y stem ,” Southern
S tu d ies 16 (1977): 35 5 -9 0 ; Edmund M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 154-7; A lden T.
V aughan “T he O rigins Debate: Slavery and R acism in Seventeenth-C entury V irginia,” The V irginia
M aga zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y 9 7 , no. 3 (1 989): 311-54.
84 Parent’s approach - focu sin g on planters’ “land grab” as the root o f their cultural and political pow er
- m ost em b o d ies this linking o f territorial dom ination and labor relations as crucial elem en ts o f
colon ia lism in V irginia. Parent, F oul M ean s, 9-5 4 .
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women’s experiences in the colony.

oe

Early studies of English women’s experiences

in the colony focused on the role of women as wives and mothers, especially in the
context of the emerging plantation economy.86 More recently, examinations of how
some women’s experiences could move beyond those roles has shown the ways that
those roles and gender discourses could be resisted, interrupted, and undermined by
women of means.87
Reproduction is a useful interjection into these histories of early Virginia.
First and foremost, the role of reproduction in the establishment of racial slavery
shows how discourses of reproduction were absolutely central to Virginia’s colonial
project.

oo

More importantly, a focus on reproduction in the history o f Virginia is a

continuation of the intervention women’s historians have made into the writing of the
history of the colony. For example, social histories of the colony have emphasized
the utility of demography in understanding the development of Virginia’s colonial
society; some have made causal claims about Virginia’s demography on the type of
society that emerged.89 Reproduction itself remains under-theorized in this
demographic view where “natural increase,” “rate of replacement,” and sex ratios are

85 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s. Kirsten F isch er’s study o f colon ial
N orth C arolina fo cu ses on the centrality o f sexu ality and gender to the construction o f race in that
co lo n y . Fisher, S u sp ect R ela tio n s. M ary Beth N orton also ex a m in es the function o f gender d iscou rses
in colo n ia l V irginia, but she is not concerned w ith the intersection o f gender and race. N orton,
F ounding M o th ers a n d F athers.
86 Carr and W alsh, ‘T h e Planter’s W ife” ; Sm ith, In side the G re a t H ouse.
87 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s; Kierner, B e y o n d th e H ou seh old;
Snyder, B ra b b lin g W omen; Sturtz, W ithin H e r P o w er.
88 Jennifer M organ’s study o f reproduction and slavery fo cu ses on Barbados and South C arolina, w hile
gesturing tow ards the V irginia ca se throughout. M organ, L a b o rin g W omen.
9 K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d Slaves; M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reed o m , 4 0 5 -1 0 ; M organ,
S la ve C ou n terp o in t, 2 7 -1 0 1 ; Darrett B. Rutman, C harles W etherell, and A nita H. Rutman, “Rhythm s
o f Life: B lack and W hite Season ality in the Early C hesapeake,” J o u rn a l o f In terd isc ip lin a ry H isto ry
11, no. 1 (1 9 8 0 ); 2 9 -5 3 ; Darrett B. Rutman and A nita Rutman, “ ‘N o w -W iv es and S o n s-In -L a w ’:
Parental D eath in a Seventeenth-C entury V irginia C ounty,” in The C h esa p ea k e in th e S even teenth
C en tu ry: E ssa ys on A n g lo -A m erica n S o ciety, ed. Thad W . Tate and D avid L. A m m erm an (N Y : W .W .
N orton and C o., 1979), 153-82.
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seen as causal agents rather than as cultural phenomena or bodily experiences worth
exploring in and of themselves.90 In other words, by focusing on reproduction as both
experience and discourse of power, ideas about demography are historicized,
denaturalized, and made available for analysis. Further, an understanding of
reproduction as a colonial discourse helps to place women, gender, and sexuality at
the center of historical analysis and continues the exploration of the intersections
between gender, sexuality, and the emergence of race.
This dissertation both depends on and intervenes in these historiographies,
arguing that understanding reproduction as a cultural phenomenon and discourse of
power is a useful means of understanding both women’s history and the colonial
project in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Virginia. The chapters of this
dissertation all seek to explore the intersections of colonialism and reproduction in
early Virginia, each with a different focus and a slightly varying methodology. The
chapters are organized conceptually, and roughly chronologically, beginning with the
period preceding the 1662 law that made slavery a status inherited at birth, and
ending with Thomas Jefferson’s colonial vision, published in Notes on the State o f
Virginia in 1785. These chronological boundaries are in part created by my available
archive - for example, York County, Virginia, from which I gathered most of my
data, was incorporated in 1634. These boundaries are also the result of historical
exclusions to limit the scope and size of the project - it is for this reason that I do not
engage with the meanings of reproduction in rhetoric of the American Revolution, an

90 T hese dem ographic histories ultim ately fail to a ck n ow led ge that, in the w ords o f S. Ryan Johansson,
“...W o m en ’s individual b od ies [are] the basic individual unit [and n]ations, provinces, counties,
com m u n ities, occupational groups, households, or co u p les do not have babies, ex cep t by courtesy o f
m etaphor.” S. Ryan Johansson, “ ‘Im p licit’ P olity and Fertility during D evelop m en t,” P o p u la tio n a n d
D e velo p m e n t R e v ie w 17 (Sept. 1991), 392; qtd. Klepp, “R evolutionary B o d ie s,” 9 1 3 .
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era ripe for just such an analysis. Mostly, they are a result of thinking through history
through the lens of a feminist and postcolonial analysis, which allows for the
available archive, rather than received historical narratives, to shape the analysis.91
In the first chapter, “A Considerable Parcel of Breeders: Reproduction and
Discourses of Racial Slavery in Virginia,” I examine the ways that development of
racial slavery in Virginia was based, in part, on the appropriation of black women’s
reproduction. The 1662 law of slavery by birth asserted that black women’s children
would be enslaved or free according to their mother’s status. This law conflated
blackness, slavery, and reproduction in order to naturalize slavery as an institution. It
did so by rooting inherited slavery in two preexisting British legal discourses:
bastardy law and inheritance law. I draw on Foucault’s understanding of the
relationship between discourse and power to examine the ways that colonial legal
structures, when enacted on an individual basis in the form of wills, deeds, and other
transfers o f property, were central in the creation of colonial discourses of
reproduction.
In Chapter 2, “Wicked, Dangerous, and Ungoverned: The Transgressive
Possibilities of Reproduction,” I examine the ways that individual women’s
reproductivity could destabilize the seemingly solid, but always tenuous, discursive
formations that constructed inherited racial slavery and colonial relations in Virginia.
In the chapter, I draw on feminist, queer, and postcolonial theories of resistance and
91 On the w ays that w o m e n ’s history questions and rem akes canonical historical narratives, see Joan
K elly, “D id W om en H ave a R enaissance?” in B ecom in g V isible: W om en in E u ro p ea n H isto ry, ed.
R enate Bridenthal and C laudia K oontz (B oston , M A: H oughton M ifflin , 1977), 137-64; Perez, The
D e c o lo n ia l Im agin ary, 2 4 . S om e exam p les o f w o m en ’s histories rethinking or questioning
ch ron ologies in early A m erican history include: B lock , R a p e a n d Sexu al P o w e r in E a rly A m erica , 5-6;
Juster, “M ystical Pregnancy and H oly B leed in g” ; Clare L yons, S ex am o n g the R a b b le. For the w ays
that postcolon ial theory interrupts early A m erican historical narratives, see Warner, “W hat’s C olonial
about C olon ial A m erica?” .

35

transgression in order to examine the ways that women’s reproductive lives could
offer possibilities for crossing lines of power in this colonial space. I examine the
ways that the reproduction o f white servant women, free white women, enslaved
women, and free women of color could all have particular transgressive meanings.
The chapter concludes with an examination of the ways that free families of color
transgressed lines of power through their liminal identities, extralegal marriages, and
matrilineal geneaologies. Throughout the chapter, I am particularly interested in
understanding the relationship between domination and transgression, and the specific
ways that reproduction could inhabit the space between those two poles.
Chapter 3, “Knowledge “not fit to be discust publiquely” : Colonialism and
the Transformation of Reproductive Knowledge,” discusses reproduction in Virginia
through an intersection of colonialism and Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge.
The chapter examines two parallel questions regarding reproduction and history:
what knowledge did women (and men) have about reproduction in that place and
time, and what can we, in the present day, know about such intimate experiences
during that period? In this chapter, I argue that colonialism fundamentally
transformed bodies of knowledge about reproduction: the intimacies of colonialism
remade the relationship between reproduction, knowledge, race, gender and power,
ultimately allowing masters and patriarchs to claim knowledge about and power over
reproduction that had formerly been held by women. While I seek to reconstruct the
reproductive knowledge held by women and men in this colonized space, I do so with
the understanding that my knowledge is contingent upon an archive that is itself an
artifact of colonization. These theoretical questions guide my analysis as I try to

36

reconstruct the medical environment of colonial Virginia, the boundaries of
midwives’ knowledge, the meanings of reproduction in women’s understanding of
their worlds and lives, and the ways that colonialism transformed all of these.
In the final chapter, “She lives in an infant country that wants nothing but
people” : Discourses of Reproduction, Print Culture, and Virginia’s Colonial Project,”
I analyze the ways that the colonial project necessarily involved discourses of
reproduction, as English colonizers imagined settling Virginia lands. I use Foucault’s
concept of biopower - the modem state’s project of developing rational population
strategies - to understand how colonialism transformed English discourses of
reproduction. A varied archive of colonial writing (Virginia’s laws, colonial writers
like William Byrd, Thomas Jefferson, and Robert Beverley, and the Virginia Gazette)
shows that the colonial project was rooted in ideas about reproduction, but that those
ideas were not stable or absolute. The early colonial project idealized prolific
reproduction, a discourse in which English bodies were assumed to fruitfully multiply
to populate the new land. The colonial project itself required a new understanding of
reproduction - a discourse of rational reproduction, in which ideal reproduction
should be controlled, measured, and scientifically measurable. These two discourses
of reproduction were distinct, but they were also competing and overlapping. The
emergence of racial hierarchy in the colonial project inspired the discourse of rational
reproduction.
*

*

*

Ultimately, this dissertation attempts a straightforward task: I work to make
sense of the ephemeral and fragmentary references to reproduction that occur
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throughout Virginia’s colonial archive. When Mary Hubbard bore her four children,
when an enslaved woman named Sarah gave birth with the help of a white midwife,
when Judith Clarke was punished for bearing a mixed-race child, their reproductive
lives came momentarily into the view of colonial record-keepers and thus are
available, however fragmentarily, for us to consider. Each of their experiences
marked them as outlaws in some way: these women bore bastard children,
interrupted the easy distribution of property, complicated long-held midwifery
traditions, and challenged boundaries of race and status. In examining these and
other records of reproduction in the colonial archive, I’ve found that reproduction was
absolutely central to the aims of colonialism in Virginia: the creation of a laboring
population, the populating of lands claimed by the colony, and the organization of
power and property in this developing society. I’ve found that by focusing on
childbearing, the lives of non-elite women and the intersections of gender, race, and
status come better into view. I’ve found that reproduction was both a discourse of
power and a path for some women’s transgression of that power. For Mary Hubbard,
Sarah, and Judith Clarke, their experiences of childbearing may have marked them as
outlaws, but they also give us a glimpse, however fragmentary, into the meanings of
reproduction in this colonial space.
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CHAPTER 1
“A considerable parcel of breeders” :
Reproduction and Discourses of Racial Slavery in Colonial Virginia

William Fitzhugh was a young Virginia lawyer and planter in 1679, when he
wrote to fellow Virginia planter Robert Beverley, expressing the absolute necessity of
legitimacy in deciding lines of inheritance:
None can be begotten but of a father and a Mother, and he must have in him
two bloods: Blood of the father and the blood of the mother, these bloods
Q 'S

commixed in him by lawfull Marriage, constitute and make him heir.
For Fitzhugh and his seventeenth-century peers in both England and Virginia, only a
legitimate child could inherit, and that legitimacy was defined both socially and
physically. First, a legitimate heir’s parents were bonded by “lawfull Marriage,”
blessed by the church and sanctioned by the state. Second, a legitimate heir was the
bodily offspring of the parents, whose “bloods [were] commixed in him.” Only
children who fulfilled these two qualifications - being what seventeenth-century
writers called the “natural” child of legally married parents - could inherit. This was
one of the most basic rules that governed the inheritance of estates in Virginia.
At the same time that Fitzhugh defined the conditions of legal inheritance, he
was amassing an enslaved labor force comprised of people who would never be able
to lay claim to either their own legitimacy or the legitimacy o f their heirs. Instead,
the people who Fitzhugh enslaved would themselves be the property inherited by

92 Richard B eal D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d h is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 1 6 7 6 -1 7 0 1 : The F itzhugh L etters
a n d O th er D o cu m en ts (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North Carolina Press, 1963), 68 -9 .
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Fitzhugh’s own heirs. Enslaved people’s own family bonds - the “bloods commixed”
in their own genealogies - were summarily severed as slaveholders organized and
divided their own estates. We see the effects of this when Fitzhugh died in 1703.
The Fitzhugh estate included over fifty people - men, women, and children, including
infants - listed as slaves in Fitzhugh’s will and estate inventory.93 Those enslaved
people’s family bonds were ignored with impunity when the Fitzhugh estate was
divided amongst Fitzhugh’s heirs.94 For example, the three children of one enslaved
woman, Black Pegg, were divided amongst three separate heirs.95 Fitzhugh divided
the world into two neat categories - those who inherited, and those who would be
inherited. This was a fundamental truth of the institution of slavery.
Embedded in the division of the Fitzhugh estate was a basic rule of chattel
slavery, one which had been adopted during Fitzhugh’s own lifetime, and which
enabled him to claim ownership over such a large number of enslaved people. In
1662, the Virginia assembly ruled that slavery was an inherited status, passed from
mother to child, such that the status of any child bom in the colony was determined at

93 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d H is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 3 7 3 -8 4 .
94 I use the terms “en slaved p eo p le” and “sla v e ” with som e sp ecificity here, and throughout this
chapter. I use the term “e n sla v ed ” because I intend to em p h asize the w ays that slavery w as forced upon
p eop le o f A frican d escen t by the p eop le w ho en slaved them . S een in this w ay, w om en (and m en, and
children) were not sla v es - they were forced into slavery by the p eop le w ho w ou ld be their m asters and
m istresses. T he use o f the term “en slaved ” helps to remind m e that slavery w as a p r o c e s s (som eth in g
done to p eop le) through force and through law , as w ell as a status applied to som e p eop le. On the
other hand, in the law , as w ell as in inheritance docum ents such as w ills and inventories, en slaved
p eop le were reduced to inheritable objects. In those cases, I often refer to en slaved peop le as “sla v e s.”
T his d iv isio n o f terms ech o es Robert B erkhofer’s distinction betw een “N ative A m erican” and
“Indian.” Berkhofer used the term “N ative A m erican” to refer to the actual native p eo p les o f the
A m ericas, and the term “Indian” to refer to European and E uro-A m erican representations o f N ative
A m erican p eop le. Sim ilarly, I use “en slaved p eo p le” to connote the p rocess o f en slavin g p eop le against
their w ill, and the term “sla v e” to refer to slaveh old ers’ representations o f those p eop le. R obert F.
Berkhofer, Jr., The W hite M a n ’s Indian: Im a g es o f the A m erica n Indian fr o m C olu m bu s to th e P resen t
(N e w York: V in tage B o o k s, 1979), xvii.
95 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d H is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 382.
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birth by the status of their mother.96 Thus, in Fitzhugh’s will and inventory, the
enslaved people themselves were often identified in terms of their familial
relationships, especially between mother and child, since the children of enslaved
mothers were themselves enslaved, because that familial relationship conferred
ownership onto the slaveholder.

07

With the 1662 law of slavery by birth, slavery and

reproduction would become tightly intertwined. By determining slave status as a
condition of birth, slaveholders were able to capitalize upon and exploit the
reproductive lives of enslaved women, as any child bom to any enslaved woman was
the property of the woman’s master. This was an extraordinary legal move. As
Jennifer Morgan argues, with the 1662 law of slavery by birth:
Slaveowners appropriated [black women’s] reproductive lives by claiming
children as property, by rewriting centuries-old European laws of descent, and
by defining a biologically driven perpetual racial slavery through the real and
imaginary reproductive potential of women whose ‘blackness’ was produced
by and produced their enslavability.98
Morgan’s analysis here points to the centrality of women’s reproductive lives not
only to the development of the institution of slavery, but to the invention of race. The
1662 law of slavery by birth attempted to naturalize the institution of slavery by
attaching it specifically to the bodies of infants bom to enslaved women of African

96 H ening 2: 170.
97 For exam ple, B lack P e g g ’s children, in both the w ill and the inventory, are identified as such. D avis,
W illiam F itzhugh a n d H is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 382.
98 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 1.
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descent. Thus, Virginia’s slaveholders conflated blackness, slavery, and reproduction
in their efforts to naturalize the institution of slavery."
To recognize the centrality of reproduction to the invention of race and
slavery, we must examine the context for and the impact of the passage of the law of
slavery by birth. This analysis, while centered on the discursive production of
slaveholders (and the colonial government that served as their representatives), is
aimed at understanding some of the meanings of enslaved women’s reproductive
lives in this colonial space. As Hazel Carby succinctly argues, “within the economic,
political, and social system of slavery, women were at the nexus o f its
reproduction.” 100 Following from this understanding of the centrality of women’s
reproductive lives to the making of racial slavery, I aim to both expose the creation of
the institution of slavery as a discourse of power, and to, as much as possible,
understand the meanings those discourses would have on enslaved women’s lives.
Thus, William Fitzhugh’s legalistic understanding of inheritance rubs up against the
impact that understanding would have on Black Pegg, her children, and the other
people he enslaved.
The development of the institution of slavery is one of the central debates of
American historiography. Was the turn to slavery an “unthinking decision,” in the
words of Winthrop Jordan, the last step in a long process of dehumanization of
blackness, Africa, and Africans?101 Or, was the institutionalization of racial slavery a

99 On the con flation o f race and slavery with the law o f slavery by birth, see M organ, L a b orin g
W om en, 3 -4 . S e e also B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 133.
100 H azel Carby, R eco n stru ctin g W om anhood: The E m erg en ce o f the A fro -A m erica n N o v e list (N Y :
O xford U niversity Press, 1987), 24.
101 Jordan, W hite O v e r B lack, 4 4 -9 8 . Jordan’s an alysis is esp ecia lly useful because it ack n ow led ges
the pow er o f language and id eo lo g y in the d evelop m en t o f social system s. Jam es C am pbell and Jam es
O akes, “T he Invention o f Race: R ereading W hite O v e r B la ck ,” R e view s in A m erica n H isto ry 2 1 , no. 1
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strategic move meant to quell class conflict, as Edmund Morgan argues?

IO')

Anthony

Parent argues that the development of slavery in Virginia was a conscious effort of
the emerging planter elite in an effort to consolidate their power and influence.103
While these have been compelling questions for generations of historians, my goal in
this chapter shifts this debate slightly. I attempt to uncover the process by which
planters decided to link discourses of slavery, race, and reproduction in order to
solidify slavery as an institution. By tracing the complex and often contradictory path
by which slavery became a status inherited from one’s mother, I am attempting to
understand how planters conceived of owning, and capitalizing on, reproductive
human property. In so doing, I hope to better understand the meanings of
reproduction in this colonial space.
In trying to uncover these meanings, I offer in this chapter an analysis of the
emergence of the law of slavery by birth. Virginia’s slave laws were a legal
contradiction. Chattel slavery was not part of English common law, though English
common law did not explicitly ban the practice. Instead, slavery’s legality was rooted
in other legal practices - the taking of prisoners in war and the accepted practice of
extracting labor as payment for debt were two such examples.104 Both o f these longheld practices allowed for the claiming of others’ labor by force. Yet, the other

(1993): 172-83; Karl E. W esthauser, “R evisitin g the Jordan T hesis: W hite O v e r B lack in SeventeenthCentury England and A m erica,” The J o u rn a l o f N eg ro H isto ry 8 5 , no. 3 (2000): 112-22.
102 M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 2 9 5 -3 1 5 . Slavery, M organ argues, w as not
adopted until it w as e co n o m ica lly advantageous to planters. M organ argues that a desired side effect
o f the adoption o f slavery w as the reduction o f the population o f form erly indentured freedm en, w h ose
rage w as expressed during B a co n ’s R ebellion.
103 Parent, F ou l M ean s, 5 5 -7 1 .
104 D avid Brion D avis, The P ro b lem o f S la very in W estern C u ltu re (N Y : O xford U niversity Press,
1966), 6 2 -9 0 , 181-6; T hom as D . M orris, Southern S la v e ry a n d The Law, 1 6 1 9 -1 8 6 0 (C hapel Hill:
U niversity o f North Carolina Press, 1996), 4 1 -3; Orlando Patterson, S la very a n d S o c ia l D eath : A
C o m p a ra tive S tu d y (C am bridge, M A: Harvard U niversity Press, 1982), 105-31.
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primary aspect of chattel slavery - that slave status was a status inherited from one’s
mother - had no precedent in English common law.105 In fact, the law o f slavery by
birth directly contradicted English common law, especially the laws governing
patriarchal inheritance. In this chapter, I argue that the law of slavery in Virginia
found its roots in other parts of English law, specifically laws that defined bastardy,
inheritance, and property law. First, English bastardy law ruled that any child bom to
an unmarried mother was legal the “child of no man.” By defining slaves as legal
bastards, Virginia law was able to deny enslaved children the legal protections
offered by legitimacy and paternal identity. Second, English property law
categorized slaves as reproductive property. Like livestock, the owner of a
reproducing female was assumed to own also the “issue” of that female. We see in
these twin definitions of inherited slavery - in which the slave is by definition
illegitimate and in which the slave is by definition a form of reproductive property the ways that reproduction was central to the development of an emerging local
discourse of slavery and race.
My analysis emerges from the reading of two main bodies of evidence: first,
the written laws that governed the colony, and second, the wills and other documents
that governed the inheritance of property. English colonial laws were notoriously
contradictory, both between colonies and within colonies. Colonial leaders exercised
considerable autonomy in interpreting and applying English common law to their
own colonial environment. Jack Greene suggests that these internal contradictions
were central to the English colonial project: “this [contradictory] legal inheritance
105 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 128-35; Fischer, S u sp e ct R ela tio n s,
124; April L ee H atfield, A tla n tic V irginia: In terco lo n ia l R ela tio n s in the S even teen th C en tu ry
(Philadelphia: U niversity o f P ennsylvania Press, 2 0 0 4 ), 157; M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 72.
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gave settlers enormous flexibility in adapting the law to local conditions while
marking them as resolutely, even militantly, English.” 106 Warren Billings’ analysis of
the 1662 law of slavery by birth illustrates this sense of colonial lawmakers’
flexibility in their reading of English common law. Billings argues that the Virginia
Assembly “ransacked” English Common Law in order to find a precedent for slavery
by birth “which satisfied the yearning to remain faithful to tradition while resolving a
problem for which tradition afforded no remedies.” 107 It seems that English common
law was flexible enough that it could justify whatever legal practice was needed in
developing colonial societies.
This “ransacking” of English law to fit colonial context was, in part, an effort
by lawmakers to create and uphold colonial discourses o f power. Robert Blair St.
George, examining the usefulness of postcolonial theory in the study of early
America, calls local languages, ideas, discourses, and legal interpretations a
development of a colonial “vernacular theory.” 108 He emphasizes that power,
especially in a colonial space, can be “creative as well as coercive,” and that these
colonial vernacular theories were always embroiled in the creation of discourses of
colonial power.109 Therefore, if we understand Virginia’s legal structures as an
emerging vernacular theory of race and servitude, we can begin to understand the
process by which slavery was institutionalized in a colonial space.
Such an analysis must take into account the ways that race, gender, and status
operated in the colonial world, as well as in the development of colonial legal

106 G reene, “C olonial H istory and N ational History: R eflection s on a C ontinuing Problem ,” 2 4 1 .
107 Warren M . B illin g s, ‘T h e C ases o f Fernando and E lizabeth Key: A N o te on the Status o f B lack s in
Seventeenth-C entury V irgin ia,” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rterly 3 0 , no. 3 (1 9 7 3 ): 4 7 3 .
108 St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 5, 26.
109 St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 10.
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structures. In her analysis of rape cases in British colonial North America, Sharon
Block emphasizes that these local iterations and applications of the law were essential
to the process of creating and maintaining hierarchies of gender, race, and status, as
incidents and narratives of rape became the locus around which early American
identities were inscribed, racial hierarchies were constructed, and gendered structures
of power were maintained.110 In the Virginia case, Anthony Parent argues that the
emerging planter class, who dominated the colonial legislature, used the law to
forward their own economic interests, and therefore, the laws they passed reflected
their own priorities.111 If this is the case, then the Virginia law was not just an
expression of gentry rule, but of gentry desire.
Michel Foucault draws this connection between the law and desire. Foucault
concedes that the law and power have been, of course, tightly linked: “In western
societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has always been formulated in
terms of law.” 112 Even so, Foucault argues, the law always masks its origins, and
thus its own power: despite beliefs in the fairness and rationality of law, the law is
“the code according to which power presents itself and prescribes that we conceive of
it.” 113 This understanding o f the law certainly lines up with Parent’s observation that
class power and legal power were very nearly identical in the Virginia colony. Yet
Foucault warns us not to rely on juridical discourses for our understanding of the
mechanisms of power, because actual human interactions existed outside of and
beyond the realm of the law - the law may have tried to construct desire by
110 B lock , R a p e a n d Sexu al P o w e r in E a rly A m e ric a , 1 26-162. Race is central to B lo c k ’s argument
here: “the racialization o f rape w as the primary A m ericanization o f British com m on law regarding
rape.” B lo ck , R a p e a n d Sexu al P o w e r in E a rly A m e ric a , 148.
11 Parent, F oul M ean s, 30-8.
112 Foucault, The H isto ry o f S exu ality, 87.
113 Foucault, The H isto ry o f S exu ality, 87-8.
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forbidding particular actions, but people still engaged in them.114 Foucault argues
“that power in modem societies has not in fact governed sexuality through law and
sovereignty” but instead power acts through “a multiplicity of force relations.” 115
What is useful here is the recognition that juridical discourses expressed the desire of
state power for control and hegemony, but it was in intimate relations that power is
exercised, shaped, and wielded.
This reading of Foucault would seem to discount his ideas as being useful to a
reading of the legal structures of colonial Virginia. But if we recall Anthony Parent’s
argument that the legislature and the planter class were nearly identical in colonial
Virginia, we realize that the Burgesses’ writing and rewriting of the English common
law was not a disembodied act - it was an attempt for them to create control over the
world that they created. In the case of slave law, juridical discourses, as much as they
masked the interests of power, were an expression of desire by individual planters to
assert control over the lives, bodies, and sexualities of the people that they enslaved.
This becomes even clearer when we include wills and other inheritance documents in
the field o f juridical discourse - these were hand-drawn documents in which
individuals made and unmade families, relationships, and identities.116 Ann Laura
Stoler, in her rereading of Foucault in a postcolonialist framework, argues that it was
in these intimate spaces - especially sites of interracial sex and desire and the banning
of interracial sex - that colonialism was enacted.117

114 Foucault, The H isto ry o f S exu ality, 90.
115 Foucault, The H isto ry o f S exu ality, 9 0 ,9 2 .
116 Jennifer M organ calls the language o f w ills the “moral grammar” o f slavery. M organ, L a b o rin g
W om en, 69.
1171 exam ine later the relationship betw een the law o f slavery by birth and law s banning interracial
sex. Stoler, “Intim idations o f Em pire,” 2-4. S ee also Perez, The D e c o lo n ia l Im a g in a ry, 101-4.
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In the first section of the chapter, I examine the law and elite discourses of
power, in the ways that bastardy law and slavery law were intertwined and co-defined
in the emerging legal structure of the colony. In the second section, I examine the
day-to-day enacting of power by individual slaveholders, as masters used the
language of animal husbandry to assert their dominion over enslaved women and
children. In the third and final section, I examine the ways that slaveholders’ power
was incomplete and inconsistent: even as planters’ laws would seem to establish
absolute control over the reproduction of enslaved peoples, we see the ways that
reproduction and sexuality could not be contained by those structures. Ultimately, as
Foucault makes so clear, attempts to exert absolute power can crumble under their
t 1Q

own weight.

Overall, I argue that colonial power structures were rooted in twin

goals: the exploitation of black women’s reproduction and the disciplining o f white
women’s reproduction.

Bastardy and Servitude
According to English common law and inheritance practices, children
inherited their property, status, and name from their father. Inheritance practices had
deep cultural and political meanings: in the status society o f early modem England,
legitimate inheritance was the basis for the social order and of the monarchy itself."9

118 Foucault, The H isto ry o f S exu ality, 95 -6 .
119 M arylynn Salm on, W om en a n d th e L a w o f P ro p e rty in E a rly A m erica (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f
North C arolina Press, 1986); C arole Sham m as, “E nglish Inheritance L aw and Its Transfer to the
C o lo n ies,” The A m erica n J o u rn a l o f L e g a l H isto ry 31, no. 2 (1987): 145-163. H olly B rew er contends
that argum ents over inheritance form ed the basis o f E ngland’s political con tests in the seventeenth
century; ultim ately, prim ogeniture system s w ere transform ed to uphold patriarchal pow er over and
ab ove the aristocratic status pow er that ju stified the m onarchy. B rewer, B y B irth o r C on sen t. Kathleen
B rown d iscu sses the irony o f the 1662 law o f slavery by birth in relation to patriarchal inheritance.
B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 129.
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These inheritance practices and ideologies were imported to England’s colony in
Virginia: testators, whether they followed the practice of primogeniture or divided
their estates among their children via entail or other legal means, assumed that
legitimate children were the rightful primary heirs of all that their father had amassed
during his life. Legitimacy was built into the language of inheritance, as testators
willed property to their “natural” children, bom “of my body.” 120 By the middle of
the seventeenth century, this inheritance tradition was taking on new meaning in the
English (and Anglo-American) ideology o f patriarchal power, where the power o f the
patriarch (whether literal father, God, or King) was duplicated in the family, religion,
and the state.121 In the British colonies, fatherhood conferred full personhood to the

120 For exam p les o f testators referring to “natural” children, se e York D O W 2: 4 0 5 ; Y ork D O W 3: 28;
York D O W 3: 48; Y ork D O W 3: 77; York D O W 4: 189. For testators referring to the children “o f
their b od y,” se e Y ork D O W 3: 48; York D O W 4: 189.
121 K athleen B row n em p h asizes that “d o m estic” patriarchy, or “the historically sp ecific authority o f the
father over his h ou seh old ” w as continually being constructed and contested throughout the colon ial
period. B row n, G o o d Wives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 4 -5 . T h is d om estic patriarchy
w as mirrored in p olitical patriarchy, in w hich “universal fem ale subordination [w as used] to establish
and exp lain the naturalness o f the political order.” P olitical patriarchy, expressed m ost clearly in
R obert F ilm er’s 1642 political treatise, P a tria rch a , infused p olitical, religiou s, and co lo n ia list
d iscou rses both in England and the co lo n ies. B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s
P a tria rch s, 15-7. M ary B eth N orton argues that b ecau se o f its uneven sex ratio, the C hesapeake w as
never able to liv e up to the Film erian ideal. Instead, seventeenth-century V irgin ia’s dem ographically
m ale-dom inated so ciety anticipated a Lockean ideal in w hich the state did not mirror the pow er o f
fathers over children, but instead operated through the con sen t o f the govern ed (as w ith husbands and
w ives). U nfortunately, N orton elid e s race in her analysis, and her d iscu ssion o f the C hesapeake
functions m ostly to illum inate the w ays that N e w E ngland w as able to liv e up to the Film erian ideal.
N orton, F ounding M o th ers a n d F ath ers, 3-14 . H o lly B rew er argues that seventeenth-century
patriarchalism ju stified not m en ’s pow er over w om en , or even fathers’ pow er over children; instead,
patriarchalism w as exp ressed in the system o f prim ogeniture, in w hich inherited status dictated all
social hierarchies, from the fam ily to the church to the m onarchy. For B rewer, gender hierarchy and
the hierarchy o f adults over children were new con cep ts that needed to be ju stified in a p ost-L ockean
w orld. B rewer, B y B irth o r C on sen t, 2 1 -4 . A ll o f these d efin ition s are useful here: B ro w n ’s em phasis
on gendered pow er helps us to center w om en in the analysis, w hile N orton ’s d iscu ssio n , how ever
flaw ed, o f how V irginia failed to liv e up to the Film erian ideal helps us to focu s on the w ays that the
experience o f c o lo n ia lism w ould m ake and rem ake political theories and discou rses. B rew er’s
analysis, w h ile it overem p h asizes the pow er o f w om en in the Film erian m odel, h istoricizes the
discu ssion o f patriarchy in con n ection to prim ogeniture and inheritance, rem inding us that status,
defined by inheritance structures, w as a primary exp ression o f hierarchy before the em ergen ce o f
patriarchalism. M y interest is in both exp lorin g the d evelop m en t o f patriarchal pow er in V irginia, and
in recogn izin g the w ays that patriarchy w as expressed through d iscou rses o f race as w ell as gender and
status.
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extent that, as Mary Beth Norton has argued, mothers qua mothers are virtually
absent from the colonial statutes, while fathers qua fathers are nearly omnipresent.

122

In Virginia’s colonial context, patriarchal inheritance and power would take
on especially potent meanings, especially regarding the labor relations of the
plantation economy. For property-holding men of Virginia’s eighteenth century slave
economy, the possession of servants and slaves was considered evidence of one’s
patriarchal authority. In 1726, planter William Byrd II embraced this view when he
described his position: “Like one of the patriarchs, I have my flocks and my herds,
my bond-men, and bond-women, and every soart of trade amongst my own servants,
so that I live in a kind of independence on every one, but Providence.”

171

For Byrd,

Virginia’s colonial labor hierarchy created for him a position akin to the biblical
patriarchs - complete authority, endowed by God, and answerable only to God.
Yet the transfer of the English patriarchal tradition to Virginia was not
immediate or absolute, and the development of racial slavery actually challenged the
tradition of patriarchal inheritance in important ways. Most notably, the 1662 law
that declared that any child in the colony should be free or enslaved “according to the
condition of the mother” overturned the centuries-long tradition in which one’s status
was inherited from one’s father.124 In other words, the law that solidified inheritable,
life-long, racial slavery by birth was a direct affront to the English tradition of
patriarchal inheritance and authority. Since the 1662 law of slavery by birth ran

122 Mary B eth N orton, F ounding M o th ers a n d F ath ers, 143-4. D espite a com parative fram ework that
includes the C hesapeake region, N orton’s argum ent ignores an important exception: the 1662 law o f
slavery by birth d efin ed an entire class o f p eop le not in term s o f their fathers, but in term s o f their
mothers.
123 M arion T inling, ed. The C o rre sp o n d e n c e o f The Three W illiam B yrds, o fW e sto v e r , V irginia, 16841776 (C harlottesville: U niversity o f V irginia Press, 1977), 1: 35 4 -5 .
124 H ening 2: 170.
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counter to patriarchal inheritance, Virginia’s lawmakers would draw upon another
legal and discursive precedent to solidify inherited slavery: an already-present
linkage between bastardy and servitude in colonial law. This section will examine the
complex and contradictory relationship between the logic of black servitude and
patriarchal inheritance, and will then trace the linkages between bastardy and
servitude in Virginia law during the colonial period. Ultimately, by rejecting the
precedent of patriarchal inheritance, the 1662 law of slavery by birth and its
reiterations into the eighteenth century drew legal and discursive connections between
illegitimacy, servitude, female sexuality, and race with the ultimate goal of extracting
ever more labor from women (especially, but not exclusively, black women) and their
children.
The 1662 law of slavery by birth did not institute a new practice; evidence
exists that some children were held in slavery from their birth well before 1662.
Instead, what made the law remarkable was its disjunction from the precedent of
patriarchal inheritance, which, until the passage of the law, was understood to include
at least some African servants and slaves. As we will see, as late as the 1650s, some
English planters treated African laborers as indentured servants, who, when freed,
were entitled to own property as patriarchs in their own right.

1I S

Further, the courts,

both on the county level and the colonial level, acknowledged black paternity in
multiple ways. In other words, prior to 1662, we can see ways that African and
mixed-race servants were included in the English tradition of patriarchal inheritance

125 On the transition from indenture to slavery, and the treatment o f A fricans and p eop le o f African
descen t as indentured servants, see: Berlin, M an y T housands G o n e, 17-28, 3 8 -4 6 . B row n, G o o d W ives,
N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 109-10; M enard, “From Servants to Slaves: The
Transform ation o f the C hesapeake Labor S y stem ,” 3 5 5 -9 0 ; M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erican
F reed o m , 154-7; V aughan, “T he O rigins D eb ate,” 31 1 -5 4 .
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o f both property (in the transfer of property to African men as freed indentured
servants) and status (in the assumption that mixed-race children’s status was inherited
from their fathers).
One way to understand the manumission of male indentured servants
(whatever their race) was as the conferring of the status of “patriarch” onto a former
dependent.126 The property (including land, clothes, and com) distributed to freed
male servants was, in part, an effort to create independent households (headed by
these newly landowning men) in the colony’s hinterland. Property transferred to
female indentured servants also fed into this tradition of patriarchal property
ownership. During the seventeenth century, English female indentured servants were
expected and largely able to immediately marry upon the completion of their term of
service; therefore, their property was absorbed into their husband’s estate,
augmenting his status as patriarch and property holder.

197

For some masters, this conferring of patriarchal status - i.e., ownership of
inheritable property and authority over dependents - included male servants of
African descent as well. For example, in 1656, two black men, Phill and Nicholas,
were freed from temporary servitude and given the basic tools of life so that they
could support their children. When Nicholas Martiau died, his will decreed that “my
Two Negroes Phill & Nicholas shall...be free” and that they should receive land, a
cow, com, clothes, and building supplies for houses, “for the good of them and their
126 M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 2 2 3 . M organ em p h asizes the abuses o f freedom
d ues by masters, arguing that masters knew w ell that custom ary freedom d ues w ould elevate a former
servant to householder status. Sim m ering anger about these and other abuses, M organ argues, erupted
in B aco n ’s R eb ellion in 1676. K athleen B row n argues for this con n ection b etw een servitude,
patriarchy, and B a co n ’s R eb ellion , m aking clear that the con solid ation o f w hite, m ale planter pow er
after the R eb ellion w as about refram ing a new definition o f m asculine honor that e x p licitly exclu d ed
m en o f A frican descent. B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 174-86.
127 Carr and W alsh, “T he Planter’s W ife,” 28 -3 1 .
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children.” 128 This explicit acknowledgement of Phill’s and Nicholas’s status as
fathers was not accidental. The mention of Phill and Nicholas’s children implies an
intention of patriarchal authority as well as patrilineal inheritance - Phill and
Nicholas’s property would provide for the support of their children, and, in time,
would become the property of those children. In another case, in 1660, Thomas
Whitehead willed his clothes, two cows, a horse, and a house and land to “my negro
man John.” 129 Not only did Whitehead confer upon John the property to establish
himself as a patriarch, he entrusted John with a patriarch’s responsibility as well,
naming him as guardian to Whitehead’s orphan goddaughter.130 In both of these
cases, newly freed men of African descent were understood to be, to use Mary Beth
Norton’s term, “fathers qua fathers.” 131 If, as black feminist theorist Hortense
Spillers argues, enslavement was “a cultural situation that was father-lacking,” the
cases of Phill, Nicholas, and John point to a brief period during which at least some
black men were understood to be fathers, and their children were not “father-lacking”
at all.132
Along with property, status also was inheritable from one’s father, even by
people of African descent in seventeenth-century Virginia.133 In 1655, the court of
Northumberland County declared that Elizabeth Key, a mixed-race woman (variously
called a “Negro” and a “mulatto” in the court records) who claimed she was being

128 T his w as more property than a freed indentured servant typically received, but M artiau seem ed to
intend that the property be shared betw een Phill and N ich o la s. York D O W 1, 33 7 -9 .
129 York D O W 3: 82.
130 Ibid.
131 N orton, F ounding M oth ers a n d F ath ers, 143-4.
132 Spillers, “M am a’s B aby, Papa’s M ayb e,” 4 0 3 .
133 Brewer, B y B irth o r C on sen t, 23. Brew er em p h asizes that prim ogeniture w as about the inheritance
o f not on ly property, but also title. B y exten sion , prim ogeniture w as the b asis for all status
relationships in seventeenth-century England, both in term s o f id eo lo g y and practice.
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held as a “pretended Slave,” should be free.134 The court ruled in Elizabeth’s favor
after hearing several depositions that asserted that Elizabeth was the daughter of a
black woman and her English master. The court relied on the English patriarchal
precedent to make its decision: “by the Comon Law the Child of a Woman slave
begott by a freeman ought to bee free.” 135 The court decided that Elizabeth Key’s
status, like her name, should be inherited from her father. Elizabeth Key’s case is
significant in its difference from what would become standard practice in the colony
- ju s t ten years later, her status would never have been determined along paternal
lines.
Yet colonial Virginia was marked by competing practices. Simultaneously
with these cases that explicitly included African and mixed-race people in the English
tradition of patriarchal inheritance, other cases show an exclusion of Africans and
mixed-race people from that tradition. Significantly, before the passage o f the 1662
law of slavery by birth, there is evidence that many children were, in fact, considered
slaves from birth. A case from 1657 shows the ways that this new practice - the
enslavement of children from birth - competed with the old tradition of affording
freed indentures with patriarchal status. Anne Barnhouse formally freed Mihill
Gowan, a “Servant” man of African descent.136 Along with granting his freedom,
Barnhouse gave Gowan “a male childe bom ye 25th of August in ye year o f our Lorde
God 1655 of ye body of my negro Prosa being baptised by Mr Edward Johnson the 2d

134 Warren M. B illin g s, ed. “T he C ase o f E lizabeth K ey, 1 6 5 5 -5 6 ,” in The O ld D o m in io n in the
S even teen th C entury: a D o cu m en ta ry H isto ry o f V irginia, 1 6 0 6 -1 6 8 9 (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f North
C arolina Press, 1975), 165-9; B illin gs, ‘T h e C ases o f Fernando and E lizabeth K ey,” 4 6 7 -7 4 . Brown,
G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 132.
135 B illin gs, “T he C ase o f Elizabeth K ey,” 167.
136 York D O W 3: 16.
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of September 1655 & named William.” 137 Only later in the document is it made clear
that the child, William, was not intended to be M ihill’s servant or slave, but was in
fact M ihill’s own son. That the property transfer was intended as a manumission was
given further weight by the mention of W illiam’s infant baptism: while the law was
ambiguous at this point, it was still customary in Virginia that Christians could not be
enslaved.138 While the intent of this case would seem to follow the logic of
patriarchal inheritance - the son is freed along with the father - the legal mechanism
by which the boy was freed was a deed, which transferred moveable property from
one owner to another. Rather than relying on the assumption that the child’s status
would be inherited from his father, Mihill Gowan and Anne Barnhouse used property
law to achieve their aims, thus transferring ownership of the boy from Barnhouse to
Gowan. The competing practices of seventeenth-century Virginia’s treatment of
servants and slaves of African descent comes clear in the different ways that father
and son were understood to be held in service: Mihill was considered a free man,
temporarily in servitude, but his son was considered a slave from birth.
Unfortunately for W illiam’s mother Prosa, her freedom was not assured by this deal.
No record survives of her fate.
The fact that Mihill Gowan had to jump through legal hoops to invent a way
to free his son (rather than, as with Elizabeth Key, have the authorities assume that
the child’s status was the same as the father’s, once paternity was determined) is just
one example of how the emerging logic of slavery by birth had begun to percolate.
Other cases point to a growing practice in Virginia, even before 1662, in which both

137 Ibid.
138 In 1667, V irginia form ally declared that baptism w ould not free an en slaved person. H ening 2: 2 6 0.
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slaveholders and the courts assumed that the children of enslaved women were
enslaved from birth. The 1644 inventory of Thomas Ludlow’s substantial estate
included “Tom a negro boy about 5 yeares old.” 139 Similarly, William Stafford’s
inventory, also from 1644, included several “Negro” children: 4-year old Mary, 3year-old Elizabeth, an unnamed one-year old boy, and a 2-week-old baby boy, also
unnamed.140 The fact that some people o f African descent were treated as indentures,
while others were treated as slaves from birth, reveals not just contradictory practices
in the ascribing of servant versus slave status. It also reveals the simultaneous
existence of two contradictory understandings of the relationship between servitude
and patriarchy. In the case of indenture, the indenture contract may have established
temporary servitude, but it also guaranteed that the servant bore the right to
participate in and benefit by the social legitimacy afforded by patriarchal

139 Y ork D O W 3, 108-9. T he L udlow inventory is itse lf ev id en ce o f the am biguity o f status am ongst
black servants ev en as early as the 1640s. F ive-year-old T om is the on ly on e o f eigh teen “negroes” in
the inventory for w hom an age is unam biguously listed. N everth eless, m any o f the other servants,
black and w hite, are listed w ith am ounts o f tim e (ranging from six m onths to tw elv e years) after their
nam es. W ere these units o f tim e referring to the p erson ’s rem aining tim e to serve (as seem s clear w ith
an aging E n glish servant, “W illiam lie s an auntient man season d abt 3 yrs”), or did they refer to the
person’s age (w h ich w ould clearly indicate inherited slavery if such w as the ca se for “B e sse a negro
abt six m onthes” )? M ost o f the tim e, the unit o f tim e is listed on ly for children in the inventory: the
“negro b o y s” or “negro girls” w ere listed w ith tim e, w h ile m ost “negroe w o m en ” and “negro m en”
were not. T his w ou ld seem to im ply that the tim es listed were ages, and not rem aining tim e to serve.
On the other hand, the ca se o f B esse is again am biguous, sin ce she is not listed as being a “g irl” .
A ssessed valu es for the servants are also am biguous. B e sse has the secon d lo w est value o f any servant
listed (4 0 0 pounds tobacco): w as this because she w as an infant, or because she had on ly a short tim e
left to serve (as w ith A lic e C o o k e, w ho had 10 m onths to serve and w as therefore valued at ju st 100
pounds)? T he am biguity and m ultiple p o ssib le readings o f the L udlow inventory m ake clear the
ch allen ges for any m odern reader w ish in g to ascribe singular m eaning or clear intent to these
docum ents, m uch le ss to use these docum ents as absolute ev id en ce o f extant racism or perpetual
slavery.
140 York D O W 2: 185. For a 1655 marriage agreem ent w hich included a 5-year-old b oy, along with
another b oy w h o se age is unlisted, see York D O W 1: 2 6 5 . For a 1660 sale o f a black w om an along
with her children, see Palm er, W m . P. ed. C a le n d a r o f Virginia S ta te P a p e rs a n d O th e r M a n u scrip ts,
1652-1 7 8 1 (R ichm ond, 1875), 1: 2-3.
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inheritance.141 In the case of racial slavery, some people were defined by servitude
as a fact of their birth - these slaves by birth would be specifically denied
participation in patriarchal inheritance.
With these competing practices in place, it is perhaps not surprising that, when
the House of Burgesses passed the 1662 law o f slavery by birth, they did so because
“some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a negro
woman should be slave or free.” 142 The Burgesses’ solution to these doubts - that a
child should be free or enslaved “according to the condition of the mother” - ran
counter to the principle of patriarchal inheritance upon which English property law
was based.143 Thus the question arises: if the law of slavery by birth contradicted the
tradition of patriarchal inheritance, upon what precedent was the new law based?
British colonial law, including Virginia law, was at once conservative and creative:
the lawmakers reacted to existing conditions and legal precedents, while still needing
to provide interpretations and new laws that fit their new context. Living in this
collision of old precedents and new conditions, the Burgesses created new ways to
expand their own interests as property holders and masters over unfree labor. As we
will see, the Burgesses used other existing English laws - specifically, bastardy law to make sense of their novel departure from English property law in 1662.
Lisa Zunshine, commenting on historians’ demarcating the Euro-American
long eighteenth century as “the age of illegitimacy” (because illegitimacy rates
increased significantly during that period), argues that the era is better labeled “the

141 W inthrop Jordan argued that indenture w as understood as a temporary cessation o f o n e ’s birthright
o f freedom through con sen su al contract, b ecause, from the sixteenth century, “personal freedom had
becom e the normal status o f E nglishm en.” Jordan, W hite O v e r B lack, 49.
142 H ening 2: 170.
143 Ibid.
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age o f ille g itim ac y ” because of “the multiplicity of cultural meanings of
bastardy.” 144 As a concept, bastardy was and is an exploding category, imbued with
multiple meanings and conveying multiple discourses. In other words, “illegitimacy”
is more than just the birth of a child to unmarried parents - instead, it encompasses all
of the cultural meanings, anxieties, and discourses attached to illicit sexuality and
outlaw reproduction. In seventeenth-century Virginia, the concept of bastardy
became inextricably linked with the concept o f servitude, and particularly female
servitude. As we will see, bastardy was inextricably connected in seventeenthcentury legal discourse with servitude, sexuality, and, increasingly, race. As such,
bastardy became the legal and discursive basis for slavery by birth. Starting with the
first local fornication law, passed in 1643, continuing to the passage of the 1662 law
of slavery by birth, and repeated in laws throughout the rest of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, Virginia’s legal system connected and even conflated bastardy,
servitude, sexuality, and, increasingly, blackness.
Early modem English jurists recognized the internal contradictions of English
inheritance traditions and bastardy laws. In his seminal treatise on English

144 L isa Z unshine, B a sta rd s a n d F oundlings: Illeg itim a cy in E ig h teen th -C en tu ry E n g la n d (C olum bus:
T he O hio State U n iversity Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 2. W hile they are archaic, I use the term s “bastard” and
“bastardy” b ecau se those were the term s used in the courts - and, as I argue, they had sp ecific
m eanings in their sp ecific cultural context. I do not intend for those terms to be d ism issiv e o f or
disrespectful towards unmarried w om en or their children. On the “age o f illeg itim a cy ,” see Peter
L aslett, Karla O osterveen, and Richard M . Sm ith, eds. B a sta rd y a n d Its C o m p a ra tiv e H isto ry: S tu d ies
in th e h isto ry o f ille g itim a cy a n d m a rtia l n on con form ism in B ritain, F rance, G erm an y, S w eden , N orth
A m erica , J a m a ica a n d Ja p a n (C am bridge, M A: Harvard U niversity Press, 1980). E lsa H am bleton
argues that Puritan N e w E ngland w as able to avoid an increase in illegitim acy b ecau se o f the rightful
authority o f the church: E lsa H am bleton, D a u g h ters o f E ve: P reg n a n t B rid e s a n d U n w ed M o th ers in
S even teen th -C en tu ry M a ssa ch u setts (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 4 ). L ike Z unshine, other historians resist the
idea o f an “a ge o f illeg itim a cy .” Ann T w inam finds “the age o f illeg itim a cy ” to be an inappropriate
concep t for colo n ia l Spanish Am erica: A nn T w inam , P u b lic L ives, P riv a te S ecre ts: G en der, honor,
Sexuality, a n d Ille g itim a c y in C o lo n ia l S panish A m erica (Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press,
1999). Clare A . L yon s sees an ex p lo sio n o f illegitim ate births in eighteenth-century Philadelphia, but
attributes them to a local em brace o f dem ocratic values, rather than a universalized “age” : L yon s, Sex
A m on g the R ab b le.
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inheritance law, Henry Swinburne wrote that, like property, even the degraded status
of slavery should follow the paternal line of inheritance: “O f all men which be
destitute of libertie or freedome, the slave is in the greatest subjection.... even his
Children also are infected with the Leprosy of their Father’s Bondage.” 145 This
would indicate that the 1662 law of slavery by birth countered English patriarchal
precedent. Nevertheless, Swinburne went on to note that the English law itself was
contradictory: the civil law stated that children’s status followed the mother, while the
common law held that the child’s status followed the father’s. Later in his treatise,
though, Swinburne offered a clue as to why the Virginia Burgesses decided to make
slavery inherited from the mother: “A Bastard shall not be bound, though the Father
were a Bond-slave, because the Law doth not acknowledge any Father in this Case:
For by the Law a Bastard is sometimes called filius nullius, the Son of no Man;
sometimes filius vulgi, the Son of every Man.” 146 In other words, a bastard child’s
status as a servant could follow only the mother’s status, because a bastard child was
“the son of no man.” That child could claim neither the father’s property nor his
status, and so defaulted to the mother’s status. The Virginia law of slavery by birth
would follow the same logic, though it distilled that logic through the lens of race the children of (free) white men and (enslaved) black women were not their father’s

145 Henry Sw inburne, A trea tise o fte ste m e n ts a n d la st w ills, C o m p ile d o u t o f th e L a w s E cclesia stica l,
C ivil a n d C anon, a s a lso o u t o f th e C om m on L aw s, C u stom s a n d S ta tu tes o f th is Realm . 5 th ed.
London: n.p., 1728. E ighteenth C en tu ry C o llectio n s O nline. G ale. 5 June 2 0 1 3 .
< http://find.galegroup.com .proxy.library.vcu.edu/ecco/infom ark.do?& source=gale& prodId=E C C O & us
erG roupN am e=vi va_v cu & ta b ID = T 0 0 1& docId=C W 125320327& typ e=m u ltip age& con ten tS et=E C C O
A rticles& version = 1.0& d ocL evel= F A S C IM IL E >. Several historians have drawn the con n ection
betw een Sw inburne’s treatise and V irgin ia’s slave law . M orris, Southern S la v e ry a n d The L aw , 4 3 -4 4 .
B illin gs, “T he C ases o f Fernando and E lizabeth K ey,” 4 7 2 . M y point is not to argue that Sw inburne’s
essay w as the b a sis for V irginia’s law , but instead w as part o f the legal print culture from w hich the
law sprang. On the A nglo-A m erican legal print culture, esp ecia lly legal treatises, see B rewer, B y B irth
o r C on sen t, 3 6 9 -7 5 .
146 Swinburne, A tre a tise o fte ste m e n ts a n d la s t w ills, 76.

59

children, but instead, fatherless. The law implied that all enslaved women’s children
were legal bastards, having no recourse to their father’s property or status - and, that
as such, they were also slaves themselves.
The 1662 law of slavery by birth was rooted in a local precedent that linked,
both legally and discursively, illicit sex, bastardy, and servitude. This linkage
emerged gradually and locally in Virginia; significantly, the earliest bastardy cases in
the colony were not linked to servitude. Virginia’s first fornication laws were passed
in 1643; prior to 1643, the courts followed English common and ecclesiastical law
when adjudicating fornication and bastardy cases. Therefore, in the earliest decades
of the colony, fornication and bastardy were treated as moral crimes and were
punished with corporal punishment and public penance. For example, in 1627, when
John Ewins and Jane Hill were charged with fornication by the Virginia General
Court, Ewins suffered 40 lashes, and Hill was required to confess her sins while
standing before the parish wearing a white sheet.147
By the middle of the seventeenth century, with the growth in the servant
population, the enforcement of fornication law had shifted from concern over
morality and religious purity to control over servants.148 In 1643, two local

147 ‘‘D ec isio n s o f the General Court,” V irginia M a g a zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y 4 , no. 1 (1 896): 27.
For a sim ilar case, se e “D e cisio n s o f the General Court,” V irgin ia M a g a zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y
4 , no. 3 (1897): 2 5 1 . Public penance and the w earing o f a w hite sh eet w as the practice o f the E nglish
ecclesia stica l courts, a practice adopted by the county courts in V irginia. John R uston Pagan, A nne
O rth w o o d ’s B a sta rd : S ex a n d L a w in E a rly V irginia (N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 2 0 0 3 ), 7, 11 -2,
119-23.
148 On the grow th o f the E n glish servant population in V irginia, see: W esley Frank C raven, White,
Red, a n d B lack: The S even teen th -C en tu ry V irginian (C harlottesville, V A : U niversity o f V irginia
Press, 1971), 16. R ussell M enard argues that the seventeenth-century peak o f m igration for
indentured servants from E ngland to V irginia occurred betw een 1650 and 1670; this grow in g servant
population inspired the passing o f increasingly strict regulations on servants. R ussell R. M enard,
“British M igration to the C hesapeake C o lo n ies in the Seventeenth C entury,” C o lo n ia l C h esa p ea k e
S o ciety, ed . L ois Green Carr, Philip D. M organ, and Jean B. R usso (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f North
C arolina Press, 1988), 112-3.
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fornication statutes, the first passed in the colony, addressed the crime in two ways.
The first of these fornication laws formally established British ecclesiastical law for
morality crimes in the colony. The statute grouped fornication together with
drunkenness, and framed both as crimes against God and nature: these were “high and
foule offences” that amounted to “the abuse of God’s creatures.” 149 While this law
was passed, it was little exercised: in York County, penance and ducking (the
punishments meted out in moral trials) were used only a handful of times after 1643,
and never after 1661.150 Throughout the colonial period, few cases involving solely
fornication charges were brought before the county courts: the clearest evidence of
fornication was the birth of an illegitimate child, and those cases involved bastardy
charges. Those cases of fornication that were brought before the court typically
crossed some social boundary. For example, in 1646, the York County court
summoned Edward W right because he “did lye with Joane Evans his servant
mayde.” 151 The case against Wright was never pursued - perhaps his public
humiliation in court was deemed punishment enough.
If the first 1643 fornication statute had little impact, the second 1643
fornication statute, which outlawed marriage and fornication by servants, proved
foundational to how the colony would deal with servant sexuality. The servant
149 H ening 1:240. W hile this statute focu sed on servant marriage, its enforcem ent took the form o f
bastardy indictm ents.
150 A fter 1643 in York C ounty, penance and ducking w ere sen ten ces in a total o f sev en ca se s in volving
fornication. Four o f those ca se s in volved irregular marriage - marriages not recogn ized by the church,
so that the cou p le w as said to be both married and livin g in fornication. York D O W 2: 3 5 0 , 3 8 7 . On
the prevalence o f inform al marriages in the southern co lo n ies, see G odbeer, Sexu al R evolu tion in E a rly
A m erica , 120-22. T w o o f the seven ca ses in volved extraordinary circum stances - on e was a ca se o f
interracial sex, and the other in volved an accusation o f infanticide. York D O W 3: 2, 120, 125, 128.
O nly one o f the sev en ca ses - the 1657 bastardy and fornication trial o f Elizabeth Turner - involved
the kind o f ca se s that w ould dom inate the cou rt’s register after 1643: a servant w om an accu sed o f
bearing a bastard child. B esid es penance, Turner w as also sentenced to dou b le her term o f service. In
other w ords, for Turner, both statutes w ere applied to her case. York D O W 3:1.
151 York D O W 2: 188.
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marriage law introduced two new priorities in the disciplining of sexuality in the
colony, both of which focused on servant sexuality. First, the fact that there were two
separate statutes was significant: from the first passage of local fornication and
bastardy laws, the law treated servant sexuality differently than the sexuality of free
people. Framed as servants’ crimes, fornication and secret marriage were seen to
cause “many great abuses & much detriment...against the law of God and likewise to
the service of man ye masters.” 152 Second, the statute punished servant women
convicted of fornication or secret marriage with more service, effectively
compounding servants’ indentures as punishment for illicit sex. This made the
surveillance and disciplining of servant sexuality a site of potential profit for masters.
With the 1643 fornication laws, the Virginia Assembly began to create a legal
environment that conflated illicit sexuality, illegitimate births, and servitude.
The 1643 laws regulating servant marriage would be passed again, with minor
adjustments, in 1652, 1658, and 1660.153 Undergirding the multiple laws barring
secret marriages in the mid-seventeenth century was a desire to limit the birth of
bastard children by servants. Tellingly, the Assembly referred to the 1658 version of
the law as “[the act] touchinge Secrett marriages and Basterdizinge.” 154 The birth of
a child by a servant woman could be seen as virtually cataclysmic: in a 1661 case,
the hiding of a bastard child bom to an indentured woman was decried as a crime
“sufficient to ruine a Countrey.” 155 The consummation of an illicit marriage

152 H ening 1:252-3.
153 H ening 1: 2 5 2 -3 , 4 3 8 -9 . Warren M . B illin g s, ed. “S o m e A cts N ot in H en in g ’s Statutes: T he A cts o f
A ssem b ly , April 1652, N ovem b er 1652, and July 1653,” V irginia M a g a zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y
83, no. 1 (1 9 7 5 ): 37 -8 . Jon Kukla, ed. “S o m e A cts N ot in H en in g ’s Statutes: T he A cts o f A ssem b ly,
October 1660,” V irginia M a g a zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y 83, no. 1 (January 1975): 83.
154 Kukla, “S o m e A cts not in H en in g ’s S ta tu tes,” 83.
155 York D O W 3, 128.
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(culturally defined not just by elopement, but by the pregnancy and childbirth of the
woman involved) or birth of a child to an unwed indentured mother signaled a loss of
control by the master over his servant, and a loss of time and labor during the
servant’s pregnancy and lying-in.156
The enforcement o f the various secret marriage and fornication laws exposes
the assumptions the undergirded the laws. First, despite the existence of laws barring
fornication by free women and men, prosecutions focused almost exclusively on
servant women and their partners.157 Following the passage o f the 1643 fornication
and servant marriage laws (and their multiple reiterations), the overwhelming
majority of cases tried in York County involved servant women: as early as the
1650s, every single bastardy trial of that decade involved a servant woman.

1SR

That

156 M ary B eth N orton has argued that seventeenth-century V irginia marriages w ere considered
legitim ate on ly w hen they w ere fertile. B y exten sion , then, pregnancy w as a critical marker o f a “real”
marriage: “In the e y e s o f contem poraries, the best ev id en ce o f a proper marriage w as provided by its
offsprin g.” M ary B eth N orton, “C om m unal D efin itio n s o f G endered Identity in Seventeenth-C entury
E nglish A m erica,” in Through a G la ss D a rk ly : R eflectio n s on P e rso n a l Iden tity in E a rly A m erica , ed.
R onald H offm an, M echal S o b el, and Fredrika J. T eute (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North Carolina
Press, 1997), 6 0 -6 1 . M asters’ lo ss o f servant w o m en ’s labor during pregnancy and lyin g-in w ill be
d iscu ssed ex ten siv ely in Chapter 2.
157 Mary B eth N orton has found that, in the seventeenth century, the C hesapeake c o lo n ie s saw a far
greater number o f bastardy ca ses than w ere tried the N ew England co lo n ies. Sh e argues that this w as
because sin gle w om en held very different statuses in the tw o regions: in the C hesapeake, sin gle
w om en w ere typ ically indentured servants, w hile in N e w E ngland (w ith its more traditional fam ily
structures), sin g le w om en w ere free daughters. W here pregnant sin gle w om en in N e w E ngland could
exp ect to g et married (thereby conferring legitim acy on their ch ild ), pregnant sin gle w om en in the
C hesapeake w ere charged w ith bastardy. N orton d o es not d iscu ss the political im plications o f these
different patterns: I argue here that, in the con text o f indentured servitude, illegitim ate births had not
ju st social im plications but political and cultural im plications as w ell. M ary B eth N orton, F ounding
M oth ers a n d F ath ers, 3 3 6 -7 . For another d iscu ssion o f m aster’s anxiety over servant w o m en ’s
sexuality, see B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 9 4 -1 0 4 .
158 In the ca se s brought before the Y ork C ounty court betw een 1640 and 1700, there is a distinct
pattern o f targeting servant w om en for fornication and bastardy prosecutions. In the 1640s, on ly
16.66% o f the 6 ca ses in v o lv ed servant w om en (n ote that 5 o f the rem aining ca se s in v o lv ed irregular
marriage - co u p les said to be livin g in fornication because their marriages w eren ’t recogn ized by the
church). But, after the passage o f the 1643 law s, the court’s prosecutions shifted to servant w om en. In
the 1650s, fully 100% o f the 7 total fornication and bastardy cases w ere brought against servant
w om en. In the 1660s, 84.21% o f the 19 ca ses were brought against servant w om en. In the 1670s, it
w as 94.73% o f 19 cases. In the 1680s, it w as 75.86% o f 2 9 cases, and in the 1690s, it w as 86.36% o f
22 cases. In the 1700s, the numbers sk ew very differently: on ly 38.63% o f the 4 4 cases w ere brought
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bastardy would be construed as a problem exclusive to unfree women reflects
Virginia authorities’ assumption that single free women who became pregnant would
marry the father of the child.159
Second, the enforcement of the fornication and servant marriage laws over the
years show that the actual focus of the courts was the birth of bastard children, not
illicit sex. If illicit sex were the primary concern, then fornication would have caused
greater apprehension among the authorities than it actually did. In reality, starting
with the first York County court records in the 1640s, fornication was treated as a
pro-forma charge, punishable only when a pregnancy was confirmed or a child was
bom .160 Further, there was not a single prosecution for secret marriage in the history
of York County, meaning that secret marriage was either a vanishingly rare
phenomenon, or that it was not considered a meaningful threat. Instead, the secret
marriage law effectively barred any woman (or man) serving an indenture from
marrying; therefore, servant women’s children were automatically considered
bastards. It seems clear that curbing or punishing illegitimate births by servants was

against servant w om en; over the course o f the eigh teen th century, the numbers w ould continue to
dw indle. O ne reason for this is the shift in the laboring population from w hite servants to sla v es o f
A frican descen t. Further, as w ill be d iscu ssed further in this chapter, this shift in prosecutions aw ay
from servant w om en can be explained by a sh ift in priorities by the courts: free w hite and m ixed-race
w o m en ’s childbearing w ould b ecom e the fo cu s as the courts becam e ever m ore focu sed on the status
o f m ixed-race children.
159 Indeed, premarital pregnancy rates were high in the seventeenth-century C hesapeake. L o is Green
Carr and Lorena W alsh found that 1/3 o f M aryland brides w ere pregnant during this period. Carr and
W alsh, ‘T h e Planter’s W ife,” 32. B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 194.
160 T he Y ork C ounty records m ake clear that fornication w as a pro-form a charge. O f 3 7 9 total
bastardy, fornication, and m iscegen ation ca ses b etw een 1648 and 1789, 100 included a sp ecific charge
o f fornication (often com b in ed w ith other charges). O f those 100 fornication ca ses, in on ly 9 cases
w as there d efin itely no child born. Furthermore, 4 o f those 9 ca ses w ere ca se s o f irregular marriage,
all occurring in 1648, where each man w as accused o f “liv in g in fornication” w ith a w om an that the
court sp ecifica lly referred to as the m an’s “w ife ” (i.e., their marriages w eren ’t recogn ized by the
colon ial governm ent, either for religious reasons or because the marriages w ere perform ed casu ally by
the participants). O f the rem aining 5 ca ses, 2 w ere d ism issed , 2 were left incom plete, and o n e w as a
case o f m iscegenation. C learly, in the overw h elm in g majority o f ca ses, the ev id en ce o f fornication
w as pregnancy or birth.
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the real focus of these statutes, as the number of bastardy charges increased with each
passing decade.
Finally, as Virginia framed fornication and bastardy as servants’ crimes, it
simultaneously whittled away at paternal accountability for the care and support for
the illegitimate children bom of those unions, virtually guaranteeing that children
bom to servant women would themselves become indentured servants into adulthood.
In all of the secret marriage statutes, as well as later bastardy statutes, men fathering
bastard children were held responsible for those children’s support. Nevertheless, the
actual prosecutions show that a decreasing number of men were named in bastardy
prosecutions or held responsible in any w ay.161 For all intents and purposes, after
1650, bastardy became not just a servant crime, but a female crime. In York County,
fathers were named in bastardy cases at a decreasing rate, and, more significantly, by

161 T he fo llo w in g chart sh o w s the precipitous d eclin e o f the court’s determ ination o f paternal
responsibility for bastardy. N o t all o f the m en punished w ere named as the purported fathers - som e
w ere, according to a 1723 statute, the ow n ers o f hou ses in w hich unreported births o f bastard children
occurred (though it is p o ssib le that the tw o categories overlapped). C ases w ere left in com p lete for a
number o f reasons: they m ay have been in co n clu siv e, the ca se m ay have been dropped, the mother
m ay have been able to support the child alone, or the case m ay have ended in the marriage o f the
parties or som e other settlem ent outside o f court. A cquittals are counted as com p leted cases.

Decade

Total
number of
cases

Total cases
completed
in records

1640s

6

5

5

100%

1650s
1660s

7
19

6
14

4

66%

1670s
1680s
1690s
1700s

20
29
22
43

19
22
20
37

5
6

36%
32%
27%
15%

1710s

27

1720s

30

23
21

3
2

13%
10%

1730s

32

28

31
26

28
26

0
0

0

1740s
1750s
1760s

27

1770s

7

Men punished (includes
purported fathers and
other men punished)

6
3
3

Percentage of completed
cases in which a man
received punishment

8%

0
8%

25

2
0

0

5

2

33%
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the 1690s, only 15% of bastardy cases resulted in any man being punished or
otherwise held responsible for the support of the child, even if a father was named.
This pattern would hold throughout the eighteenth century, so that, by the 1730s and
continuing through the 1760s, virtually no men received any punishment for bastardy.
In March of 1662, Virginia’s fornication laws were rewritten again, this time
outlining specific bastardy statutes and making abundantly clear the discursive links
between bastardy, servitude, and female sexuality. The Virginia statutes were
overhauled that year, as the colony’s leaders realigned with the crown during the
Restoration.

I

The Restoration-era laws would cement these existing practices in

legal language that focused even more clearly on servant women. Once again, secret
marriages were banned, but the new law not only banned fornication, but also laid out
specific punishments for the birth of bastard children.

These new statutes

represented a culmination of the process begun in 1643, transforming fornication
from a moral crime punishable by penance to a servant’s crime punishable by the
extension of service.
Despite being written during the Restoration overhaul of Virginia’s statutes,
the new laws would build upon the long-standing conflation of servitude with illicit
sex and illegitimate births. First, the new punishments for bastardy would
specifically target servant women. Further, in the new statutes, fathers were
nominally held responsible for child support, but, in practice, men were rarely named

162 Pagan, A nne O rth w o o d ’s B a sta rd , 4 4 -8 . Jon Kukla outlines the p rocess by w hich V irginia redrafted
its law s in the w ake o f the R estoration, beginning in 1660. Kukla, “S o m e A cts N ot in H en in g ’s
S ta tu tes,” 7 6 -9 7 . M any o f the law s passed in 1662 - including the law o f slavery by birth - seem to be
an effort to m ake the law match up w ith current practice. T his helps to exp lain the delay b etw een the
courts’ focu s on servant w om en in bastardy ca se s and the passage o f an actual bastardy law.
163 H ening 2: 114-5.
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as responsible in the court records.164 Finally, in the new statutes, service was again
the primary punishment for all involved in bastardy cases - mothers, fathers, and
infants. The 1662 statutes cemented the relationship between bastardy and servitude,
and rationalized that relationship through clear sentencing structures.
While servant women’s bearing of bastard children had been punished by an
extension of terms of service since 1643, the Restoration-era rationalization of
Virginia’s laws created a standard which guaranteed that women bearing bastard
children would be sentenced to two more years of service. Prior to 1662, servant
women who bore bastard children were punished by the county courts with varying
amounts of extra service, ranging from no service at all to a year of added labor to
“double the time of service.” 165 After 1662, punishment by extension of service
became far more cut and dried: servant women convicted of bastardy saw two years
added to their indenture.166 For example, when Mary Bell was convicted of bastardy
and fornication in 1674, she was ordered to serve her master, Edward Baptist, “2
compleat years at the expiration of her first time.” 167 Some women saw extension
piled on top of extension. Sarah Paskins was convicted of bastardy in 1673 and
sentenced to two extra years of service.168 When she “had a second bastard child in

164 H ening 2: 115, 166. A ccording to the law , if a purported father w as a servant, he could be required
to serve extra tim e in lieu o f paying for the support o f the child.
165 Troth Ebbs w as co n v icted o f bastardy in 1658, but served no extra tim e because the infant died.
York D O W 3: 4 3 . M ary G unnell served on e year for bearing a bastard ch ild in 1660. York D O W 3:
78, 88, 9 1 , 9 2 , 94. On the other hand, in 1657, both Ellianr Bray and E lizabeth Turner w ere required
to serve d ouble their original tim e o f service. York D O W 2: 324; D O W 3: 5. T he 1662 cem en ted the
preexisting practice o f dem anding labor as punishm ent for bastardy, even w h ile estab lish in g tw o years
as the standard punishm ent for each bastard birth. For more on why tw o years w as seen as an
appropriate sentence, see chapter 2.
1 H ening 2: 114-5. Free w om en con victed o f bastardy paid a fine.
167 York D O W 5: 68. T he tw o-year sentence w as observed by the C ouncil and General Court o f the
co lo n y as w ell. S ee the 1670 ca se o f W illim ot Rogerm an: H.R. M cllw a in e, ed ., M in u tes o f th e C ou n cil
a n d G e n e ra l C o u rt o f C o lo n ia l V irginia, 2 nd Ed. (R ichm ond: V irginia State Library, 1979), 238.
168 York D O W 5: 5 4 , 56.
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the time of her first service,” she was sentenced to yet another two years of service.169
Free women were to be fined or whipped, but, significantly, after the passage of the
1662 bastardy laws, not a single free woman was convicted of bastardy in York
County until 1694.170 Because it was meted out primarily to women serving
indentures, the punishment for bearing bastard children was, in practice, a means of
extracting ever more labor from servant women.
In practice, the requirement o f service extended to servant women’s children
as well as to the woman herself. If, in Swinburne’s term, the bastard child was filius
nulius (the child of no one), then women bearing illegitimate children had little
recourse to gain financial or moral support from the father of their children. Further,
as we have seen, in shifting focus in bastardy cases to servant women, the courts
made little effort to establish paternity or to gamer paternal support in these cases.
Therefore, if bastard children could not be supported by the mother and in the likely
absence of paternal support, that child would be promptly indentured out until
adulthood (even as early as the age of weaning).171 Infant indenture seems even more
likely if the woman was a servant and still had time left to serve her master or
mistress - the courts would consider her unable to support the child. For example,
when Mary Denham was convicted in 1665 of bearing a bastard child while she was
indentured to Ashaell Batten, not only was she sentenced to two extra years of
service, but her child was “kept under the charge” of the churchwardens o f Maston

169 York D O W 5: 91.
170 Sign ifican tly, the first free w om an co n v icted o f bastardy after the passage o f the 1662 law s w as a
free w om an o f color, M ary C atilla, w h o se stepfather paid her fine in 1694. York D O W 9: 3 4 1 .
171 On the indenture o f bastard children during infancy or im m ediately fo llo w in g w eaning, see: Pagan,
A nne O rth w o o d 's B astard, 108-10; Carr and W alsh, “T he Planter’s W ife,” 30.
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Parish until the age of 2 1.172 Servant women’s children were routinely separated
from their mothers, considered wards of the parish, and sold into indentures until they
reached the age of majority. If, as Edmund Morgan remarked, the practice of
indentured servitude taught Virginia masters to “treat men as things,” it certainly
taught them to separate mother and child as well as to claim the labor of children as a
result of their birth.173
This was the context into which the 1662 law of slavery by birth was passed.
Since 1643, Virginia’s legal structure had forged a legal and discursive link between
servitude, illicit sex, and illegitimate births. Servant sexuality was treated as
fundamentally different from - and more harmful than - the sexuality of free people.
The courts targeted servant women especially, both by prosecuting them at a much
higher rate than free women, and by ceasing to demand paternal responsibility for
children’s support. Finally, the extension of service became the standard punishment
for bastardy. This was true for children as well as for servant women: bastard
children were destined to a life of service, at least until adulthood, as a result of the
conditions of their birth. Bastardy had become synonymous with servitude, both in
the targeting of servant women and in demanding service from women and children
as punishment for the crime.
The 1662 law of slavery by birth was passed just six months after the new
bastardy statutes, also as a part of the Restoration-era overhaul of the colony’s laws.
Seen in this context, where servitude and illegitimacy were inextricably linked, the
law of slavery by birth was an extension of existing colonial law, even as it was a
172 York D O W 4: 28, 52. A s w e w ill see later in this chapter and in Chapters 2 and 3, E n glish servant
w om en fought hard - against considerable odds - to maintain ties w ith their children.
173 M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 129.
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repudiation of the tradition of patriarchal inheritance. The law of slavery by birth
specifically targeted black women and their children: “Negro womens children,” the
title of the law stated, were “to serve according to the condition o f the mother ” 174
The law’s explanation, though, drew the connection between this new definition of
slavery and the bastardy and fornication laws which preceded it: “If any Christian
shall commit fornication with a negro man or woman, hee or shee soe offending shall
pay double the fines imposed by the former act.” 175 Fornication and bastardy were
inherent to the makeup of the law of slavery by birth.
It is important to remember that the 1662 law of slavery by birth did not
invent the idea of inherited slavery; nevertheless, the law stands as the first time the
practice was actually enshrined in the legal code o f an English colony, and its impact
should not be underestimated.176 Further, because the law was not the first to treat
black women as a fundamentally different from white women, it also must not be
construed as having originated racial slavery or racial difference.177 Indeed, as with
bastardy law, the law of slavery by birth was passed to standardize existing practice,
as conflicting opinions arose as to the status of mixed-race children: the law was

l74H en in g 2 : 170. Italics in original.
175 Ibid. T he im plications o f this new legal con cep t - the banning o f interracial sex - w ill be d iscu ssed
in more detail later.
176 M orris, Southern S la v e ry a n d th e L a w , 4 3 . M orris a ck n ow led ges the roots o f the 1662 law o f
slavery by birth in bastardy law , but argues that, ultim ately, the law o f chattel property w as more
important in the practice o f slavery as an institution. T he treatment o f sla v es as chattel property w ill be
d iscu ssed in the secon d and third section s o f this chapter; I argue that ev en treating sla v es as chattel
w as rooted in en slaved p e o p le ’s reproductivity.
177 Kathleen B rown argues that, by taxing black w o m en ’s labor differently than w hite w o m en ’s labor,
the 1643 tithing law w as a sign ifican t step in the creation o f racial slavery via the dep loym en t o f
gender id eo lo g y . B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 116-128.

70

passed because, according to the Burgesses, “some doubts have arrisen whether
children got by any Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave or ffree.”

178

There were clear connections between the law of slavery by birth and the
existing conflation of servitude and illegitimacy. Legally, bastard children were
children without fathers; the appellation of enslaved children as “negro women’s
children” (in other words, as children who had only mothers) framed those children as
bastards. In the absence of fathers, white bastard children had been required to serve
into adulthood; such was the case for children of enslaved black women, except those
children’s service, by virtue only o f their mother’s race, would be life-long. The
colony’s bastardy laws had asserted a hierarchy between free and servant women’s
sexuality and reproduction, had punished servant women’s breaking of the law with
even more service, and had demanded service from children as a consequence o f their
birth. The targeting of black women and their children in the 1662 law of slavery by
birth was an extension of these practices. In this way, the law followed a perverse if
comprehensible logic: Kathleen Brown points out that it was simply not possible to
extend the term of service of women who were “already understood to be serving for
life.” 179 The law of slavery by birth, by explicitly targeting “negro women” and their
children, racialized the hierarchy of women’s sexuality: if white servant women’s
sexuality was to be disciplined, enslaved black women’s sexuality would be exploited
by this law.

178 H ening 2: 170. T he fact that the 1662 law w as passed am idst the R estoration-era overhaul o f
V irgin ia’s law s, m any o f w hich w ere out o f date or contradictory, further im p lies that the practice w as
already in effe c t prior to the la w ’s enactm ent. It is sign ifican t, though, that w h ile the overhaul o f
V irginia law s w as aim ed (and largely su cceed ed ) at m aking V irginia’s statutes hew m ore c lo se ly to
E nglish law , the law o f racial slavery by birth stood outside o f E nglish precedent. Pagan, A nne
O rth w o o d 's B a sta rd , 4 7 -8 .
179 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 131.

71

The key difference in the 1662 law of slavery by birth was the expansion of
the discursive link between servitude and bastardy to include race as well. Three
laws passed concurrently with the 1662 law of slavery by birth make clear that the
intent of the new law was to conflate race and servitude - in other words, to use the
regulation of reproduction and sexuality in order to create a new definition of racial
slavery. First, a new tithing law specifically targeted black women’s labor, asserting
a fundamental difference between black and white labor and laborers. Second, the
Assembly designed specific punishments for masters who fathered bastards by white
servant women. And, finally, within the body o f the law of slavery by birth itself,
Virginia passed its first law barring interracial sex. An examination of these three
laws reveals the attempt by the Assembly to define racial slavery through the
regulation of sexuality and reproduction.
The 1662 tithing law overturned a 1643 law that taxed black women’s labor
equally with men’s. The new tithing law would seem to be unrelated to the question
of slavery by birth, but in fact it shows the ways that Virginia’s master class was
reframing plantation labor in terms of race and birth. The intent of the original tithing
law was to tax planters for all of their laborers, defined in 1643 as all men and all
“negro women” over the age of 16.180 Kathleen Brown argues that the 1643 tithing
law was a crucial initial step in defining racial slavery, significant in its particular
focus on gendered labor: “The tax levied on African women in 1643 was the earliest
distinctive and clearly unfavorable treatment of African people to be enshrined in law
in Virginia.” 181 According to the new 1662 tithing law, some masters had been

180 H ening 1 :2 4 2 .
181 Brown, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 116.
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employing white women in their tobacco fields, in order to capitalize on their tax-free
labor. The new law would tax not only black women, but any and all women who
“worked in the ground.” 182 While the new taxation law would be short-lived, it
reveals the inner workings of the nascent ideology of racial slavery. With slavery by
birth, slave status (and therefore taxable labor) was defined not as a category o f labor
and laborers, but as a status inherited at birth. It did not matter what kind of labor one
did; what mattered was one’s birth status. The law of slavery by birth had made the
1643 tithing law obsolete.
Second, during that same session in December 1662, the Virginia legislature
disallowed masters from claiming servant women’s extra labor if the woman named
them as the father of their child.183 The law did limit masters’ ability to abuse their
power: “late experiente shew that some dissolute masters have gotten their maides
with child.” 184 Nevertheless, the law was intended to protect masters as a class, while
still punishing servant women for bearing children: concerned that “if a woman gott
with child by her master should be freed from that service it might probably induce
some loose persons to lay all their bastards to their masters,” the Burgesses required
that the woman’s extra service be sold to the parish.185 To further illustrate the ways
that this law actually protected masters, very rarely in York County’s colonial history
was a master named as fathering a servant woman’s child, and no such cases were

182 H ening 2: 170. Kathleen B rown argues that the 1662 taxation law w as rescinded because it w as
unenforceable: “crafting individual d efin ition s o f tithability based on labor perform ed rather than on
the sex o f the laborer” proved too onerous a task for county courts. B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty
W enches, A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 120-2.
183 H ening 2: 167.
184 Ibid.
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heard after 1700.186 One of those rare cases illustrates the gender, race, and status
politics imbedded in the 1662 law. In that 1687 case, a recently freed servant named
Phillis named her former master, Daniel Taylor, as the father of her child.187 While
Phillis was punished with 18 lashes, Taylor was not punished at all.188 Since Phillis is
listed in the court records without a surname, it is likely that she was a free woman of
African descent. If this is the case, it is possible that the court heard the case as a way
to censure Taylor for having a sexual relationship and fathering children with a free
woman of color. Ultimately, that the law nominally protected white women from
sexual abuse by their masters only underscores the fact that black women had no such
legal protection from their masters.189 Masters not only claimed the labor of black

186 There are five extant ca ses in the York C ounty records o f masters b ein g nam ed as the father o f their
servants’ children after the passage o f the 1662 law. In tw o o f those ca ses, the court did hold the
master responsible for the bastardy. S ee the 1662 case o f M ary M inshall (Y ork D O W 3: 175, 176) and
the 1680 ca se o f E lizabeth M organ (Y ork D O W 6: 2 3 6 ). T ellin g ly , tw o o f the fiv e ca se s are actually
disputes b etw een masters, both occurring in 1697: the w om en , n ow indentured to new masters,
accused their form er masters o f fathering their bastard children. In other w ords, th ese ca se s w ere not
exam p les o f masters being punished for fathering bastard children, but disputes over w h o w ould
provide support for the child. S ee the law su it b etw een Francis C allow h ill and the estate o f W illiam
Kinard (Y ork D O W 10: 3 6 0 , 3 6 9 ,4 0 4 ,4 3 3 - 4 ) and the bastardy trial o f Sarah W o o d (Y ork D O W 10:
4 0 6 ). T he last ca se is the ca se o f P hillis and D aniel T aylor, d iscu ssed below .
187 York D O W 8: 4 3 . W hile P hillis w as indentured at the tim e o f con cep tion , she had been freed by
the tim e o f the suit. T herefore, sin ce T aylor cou ld not claim to have lo st any labor during her ly in g in,
P hillis w as not subjected to additional years o f service.
188 Ibid.
189 Sexual a ccess w as part o f the very d efin ition o f slaveow nership. Sharon B lo ck em p h asizes the w ay
that “m astery” w as constructed in early A m erican m eant that fem ale servants and slaves w ere “prime
targets for sexual coercion by their m asters.” B lock , R a p e a n d Sexu al P o w e r in E a rly A m erica , 6 4 -7 4 .
Kirsten Fischer notes that the v io len ce m eted against slaves (in clu d in g rape) w as far greater than that
suffered by w hite servants; sexu alized v io len ce itse lf w as a pow erful shaper o f racial id eo lo gy . Fischer,
S u sp e c t R ela tio n s, 160, 189. K athleen B row n points out that the law did not recogn ize the rape o f
en slaved w om en (as op p osed to free and indentured w hite w om en ) because “no man w as recogn ized as
being injured by the o ffe n se .” B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 2 1 0 .
B lack w o m en ’s historians and black fem in ists have em p h asized the constant threat o f rape against
en slaved w om en and girls w as a fundam ental aspect o f life both during and after slavery: D arlene
Clark H ine, “Rape and the Inner L iv es o f Southern B lack W om en: T houghts on the Culture o f
D issem b la n ce,” in Southern W om en: H isto ries a n d Id en tities, ed. V irginia Bernhard, B etty Brandon,
Elizabeth F o x -G en o v ese, and T heda Perdue (C olum bia: U niversity o f M issouri Press, 1992), 177-89;
bell hooks, A in 't I a W om an: B lack W om en a n d F em inism (B oston: South End Press, 1981), 24-9;
T helm a Jennings, ‘“ U s C olored W om en Had to G o Through a P len ty’: Sexual E xploitation o f A fricanA m erican S la v e W om en,” J o u rn a l o f W om en ’s H isto ry 1 (W inter 1990): 4 5 -7 4 ; Brenda S tevenson,
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women who they impregnated, whether by rape or by coercive sexual relations, but
they also gained the life-long labor of her child.

100

The most important legal addendum to the 1662 law of slavery by birth was
embedded in that law itself: the introduction of the first anti-miscegenation edict in
the entire body of English law.191 The law of slavery by birth had two parts. The
first, which and defined inherited slavery, declared that “all children borne in this
country shalbe held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother.”

|Q2

T h e s e c o n d p a r t o f th e la w d e c l a r e d t h a t “ i f a n y C h r is tia n s h a ll c o m m i t t f o r n i c a t i o n
w i t h a n e g r o m a n o r w o m a n , h e e o r s h e e s o e o f f e n d i n g s h a l l p a y d o u b l e t h e f in e s

imposed by the former act.”

1Q-}

As we will see, if the law of slavery by birth was

intended to create a dualistic racial system, in which whites were assumed to be free
and blacks were assumed to be enslaved, then interracial reproduction was newly
problematic.
Prior to 1662, there was no legal bar against interracial sex or interracial
reproduction. There is some evidence that interracial sex was considered an
especially egregious form of fornication before 1662. For example, in 1630, Hugh
Davis was whipped “for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of
Christians, by defiling his body by lying with a negro.” 194 On the other hand, in

L ife in B la ck a n d W hite: F am ily a n d C om m unity in the S la ve South (N Y : O xford U n iversity Press,
1996), 2 3 6 -7 .
190 Sharon B lo ck argues that m aster-slave sexual relationships, even w hen co n sen su al, alw a y s included
an elem en t o f coercion . B lock , R a p e a n d S exu al P o w e r in E a rly A m e ric a , 6 4 -7 4 .
191 Jordan, W hite o v e r Black, 139.
192 H ening 2:170.
193 Ibid.
194 H ening 1: 145. T h is often cited case has been interpreted as som e o f the first ev id en ce o f racism in
the co lo n y . M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 333.
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1643, Thomas Tiemer fathered a child with an unnamed free woman o f color.195 The
case was treated as a moral crime. Tiemer was required to do public penance, and the
woman was unpunished, a sentence no different than any other free couple convicted
of bastardy at the tim e.196 The Tiemer case would indicate that interracial sex and
reproduction was not problematic as late as the 1640s. The 1662 antimiscegenation
law ended these competing legal practices, but it did not end interracial relationships,
of course.
The 1662 anti-miscegenation law, because it was coupled with the law of
slavery by birth, linked bastardy and sexuality to race in the creation of inherited
racial slavery. The effect of this linkage was manifold. First, white women’s
reproduction would be increasingly disciplined as a means of maintaining the color
line. As we will see, after 1662, the courts would focus on punishing (increasingly
harshly) white women who bore interracial children. The advent o f slavery by birth
and the institution of antimiscegenation laws required the disciplining of white
women’s sexuality. This discipline took the form of bastardy and miscegenation
prosecutions for white women who dared to cross the color line. As Ann Laura Stoler
argues, in a colonial context, “the sexual choices of white women were at issue; they
are desired objects, but unruly desiring subjects as well.” 197 More importantly, white
women’s “issue” was at issue as well: the children that were products o f these
relationships needed to be categorized, accounted for, and, in a colonial labor
economy, exploited.

195 York D O W 3: 2.
196 A ca se in 1640, in volvin g Robert S w eat and an unnam ed “negro servant w om an ” fo llo w ed the sam e
pattern. M cllw a in e, M in u tes o f the C o u n cil a n d G e n e ra l C ourt, 4 8 3 .
97 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D esire, 4 1 .
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Second, the color line was permeable in the other direction, as white men
were able to father children with enslaved women with impunity, knowing that those
children would inherit the status of their mother. Cases like Thomas Tiemer’s where white men were held responsible for the birth of interracial children - would be
virtually unheard of after 1662. This permeability of the anti-miscegenation law must
not be underestimated: references to so-called “mulatto” slaves occur throughout the
colonial record. Examples abound of these children, the daughters and sons of
enslaved black women and unknown white men, such as in 1718, when Thomas
Jones sued for ownership of “negro Women 4 mulatto Children & a parcell of
Plate.” 198 Ann Laura Stoler points out that discourses about interracial sex “were not
discourses designed to find a solution.” 199 In other words, antimiscegenation laws
were not meant to end the practice outright, but instead to police the boundaries of
European group identity by defining outsiders as dangerous, polluting, and
“abominable.” The law of slavery by birth did not end interracial sex, but instead
created two categories of interracial children: the interracial children of enslaved
women were chattel slaves, while the interracial children of white women were
dangerous challenges to racial purity.
After 1662, the rule that one’s status was determined by the status of one’s
mother was repeated, solidified, and expanded in the statutes, and, even as the
transatlantic slave trade flourished, the principle o f slavery by birth became the
198 York D O W 15, 340. That these w om en and their children had been reduced to the status o f objects
is clear in this exam ple: arranged in a series, they w ere the linguistic eq u ivalen t to “a parcell o f Plate.”
199 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D e sire, 4 6 . In fact, S toler’s Foucauldian reading o f
antim iscegenation statutes su g g est that the law s c re a te d desire, rather than curtailing it. W rites Stoler,
“A basic tension in the sexual p olitics o f colon ial states w as the prom ise o f n ew p o ssib ilities for
desiring m ale subjects and objects for them , but im plem ented p o licies that sim u ltan eou sly clo sed those
p ossib ilities d ow n .” S toler, R a ce a n d the E du cation o f D e sire, 178-9. S ee also Parent, F oul M eans,
116.
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central logic of creating and growing the laboring population. The language of the
1662 statute would be repeated frequently throughout the colonial period. In 1667, a
statute declaring that baptism did not automatically free a slave referred to “slaves
from birth.”200 A 1696 fornication law repeated the 1662 language of slavery by
birth: “all children bom in this country be bond or free, according to the condition of
their mother.”201 The omnibus slave code of 1705 also declared, “all children shall be
bond or free, according to the condition of their mothers.”202 The 1705 language was
repeated in the 1748 and 1753 slave codes.203 Finally, in 1785, the Virginia
Assembly defined slavery for the new state, defining slaves as “such as were so on
the first day of this present session of assembly, and the descendants of the females of
them.”204 The language was different, but the logic was the same: slavery was
perpetual, and it followed the line of female descent.
Beyond simply repeating the law of slavery by birth, these statutes further
emphasized and intensified the discursive and practical connections between
servitude, illegitimacy, and, increasingly, interracial sex. Fornication and bastardy
would continue to be criminalized throughout the colonial period in Virginia; further,
interracial births would be subject to increasingly stringent penalties. The slave laws
of 1691, 1705, and 1723 intensified the connection between bastardy, servitude, and
interracial sex by creating what eventually amounted to a quasi-inherited slavery for
mixed-race illegitimate children. In all of these laws, legitimacy and freedom were
conflated - a legitimate child was, by definition, a child born free - while illegitimacy

200 H ening
201 H ening
202 H ening
203 H ening
204 H ening

2:260.
3: 137-40.
3: 4 4 7 -6 2 .
5: 5 4 7 -5 8 ; H ening 6: 356-7.
12: 182-3.
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and servitude were linked. Children born to unfree women (whether servant or slave)
were, by definition, illegitimate, and were subject to some level of servitude, based on
the status of their mother. Race, of both mother and child, was the factor by which
the extent of that child’s servitude would be defined.
This connection between miscegenation, bastardy, and servitude was made
clear in 1691, when Virginia passed a new fornication law, as well as the slave code
entitled “an act for the suppression of outlying slaves.”205 Like the original 1662 law
of slavery by birth, the 1691 laws were especially concerned with the birth of mixedrace bastard children to white women (especially servant women), and the intention
of the law was to extract ever more labor from those women and children. The new
laws expanded punishment for mixed-race bastardy from the double fine laid out in
1662 to five years extra service or a £15 sterling fine (a prohibitively high fine for any
but the wealthiest Virginians to pay).

Furthermore, any mixed-race children bom

to white women would be subject to 31-year indentures, rather than the traditional 21
years. In other words, in cases of interracial bastardy, both women and children were
subject to even greater amounts of increased servitude.
The 1691 anti-miscegenation law made clear that the problem of
miscegenation was not just illicit sexual contact, but the birth of babies who blurred
the color line: the law was labeled as a law “for the prevention of that abominable
mixture and spurious issue.”207 Here, race and bastardy are linked in a language that
signalled monstrous reproduction: sexual contact, or “mixture,” between races was

205 H ening 3: 7 1 -5 , 86-7.
206
For an exam ple o f the double fine, see the m iscegen ation ca se o f E lizabeth B anks, w h o w as
sentenced to 3 9 lashes and four years o f service for bearing a m ixed-race bastard ch ild in 1683. York
D O W 6: 4 9 8 .
207 H ening 3: 86-7.
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“abominable,” and the “issue” bom of these unions was “spurious,” or illegitimate,
illegal.208 These babies were monstrous not just because of their skin color, but
because their birth was a threat to the emerging racial order of the colony. To term
these infant bodies as “abominable” or “spurious” also points to the belief that the
black body itself was monstrous, and that contact with black bodies made white
bodies dangerously vulnerable.

We see a manifestation of this emerging discourse

of racial danger in the actions of the county courts, which increasingly focused on
policing interracial sex. The York County quarterly court presentments from
February 1695 provide a potent example: that month, every single criminal case that
the court heard was somehow concerned with interracial sex.210
The York County courts interpreted the 1691 anti-miscegenation law as an
expansion of the bastardy statutes, wherein illicit sex and illegitimate births were
punishable by increased service by white women, and lengthening that service even
more for the “abominable” crime of interracial sex. For example, Elizabeth Owell, a

208 M idw ifery m anuals o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries included m uch d iscu ssio n o f the
birth o f so -ca lled “m onsters.” S ee, for exam p le, A r is to tle ’s C o m p lea t M a s te r P ie c e in T hree P a rts:
D isp la y in g th e S e cre ts o f N a tu re in the G en era tio n o f M an (1 7 5 5 ), E a rly A m erica n Im prin ts no. 4 0 7 3 5 ,
76 -7 7 . Eucharius R osslin , The B yrth o f M ankynde, O th erw ise N a m ed th e W om ans B o o k e (F acsim ile
o f 1545 edition. N ew York: T he C lassics o f M ed icin e Library, 1994), 12, 50. S ee chapter 4 fo r a
d iscu ssion o f the m eanings o f m onstrous births in V irgin ia’s print culture.
209 B lack fem in ist scholars and historians have deconstructed racist d iscou rses o f black fem ale
m onstrosity. Jennifer M organ argues that ideas o f black fem ale m onstrosity w ere inextricably linked
w ith an xieties about sexu ality and reproduction. M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 12-50. Londa Schiebinger
d iscu sses the w a y s that ideas about the m onstrous black fem ale body inform ed scien tific d iscou rses in
Europe during this sam e period. Londa Schiebinger, N a tu r e ’s B ody: G e n d e r in th e M akin g o f M o d e m
S cien ce (B oston: B eacon Press, 1993). T h ese d iscou rses continue today in popular culture, continuing
to tie black fem ale sexu ality with dehum anizing notions o f m onstrosity and anim alism , bell hooks
argues that these d iscou rses w ere and continue to be central to an id eo lo g y o f hierarchical racial
separation, by “a llo w in g ] w h ites to sexu alize their world by projecting onto black b od ies a narrative
o f sexualization d isassociated w ith w h iten ess.” bell hooks, “S ellin g H ot Pussy: R epresentations o f
B lack F em ale S exu ality in the Cultural M arketplace,” in The P o litic s o f W om en 's B o d ies: S exuality,
A ppea ra n ce, B eh a vio r, ed. R ose W eitz (N Y : O xford, 1998), 112-122. A s I d iscu ss later in this
chapter, this discourse o f black fem ale anim alism can be seen in the d aily casual and legal language o f
slaveow nership.
210 York D O W 10: 106-7.
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servant of Mary Tinson, was convicted of “haveing comitted the sinn of fornication
with a Negro,” and bearing “a molotto child” in 1695.211 She was sentenced to two
years service for bastardy (which was meant as a repayment to her mistress for her
lost labor and other costs incurred during her lying in), and another two and a half
years to repay her mistress for paying her fine. In another case brought to court in
1700, Ann Winball was brought to court because she “had a molatto chid borne of her
body.”212 Her case was not decided until 1703, when her indenture was set to end.
Sarah Starkey, Ann’s newly widowed mistress, sought to extend Ann’s service,
explicitly referring to the 1691 act. The court took Winball into custody, and sold her
for 5 years more service. The proceeds of the sale went to W inball’s mistress.
Embedded in the 1691 anti-miscegenation law were enforcements that further
cemented the discursive intertwining of bastardy, color, and labor: mixed-race
children bom to white women were subject to 31 years, rather than 21 years, of
forced labor. Illegitimate birth doomed a child to a form of servitude by birth temporary, but still inherited as a matter o f course by virtue of the circumstances of
one’s birth. The automatic 31-year indenture of the mixed-race children of white
women more closely linked illegitimacy and race to nearly perpetual labor: their
indenture had them serve well into adulthood, especially with the still-low life
expectancies of the Virginia colony. The mixed-race children of black women, of
course, served for life: theirs was a fully inherited perpetual slavery.
The 1705 slave code, which had repeated the language of the 1662 law of
slavery by birth, also repeated the 1691 language of “abominable mixture and

211 York D O W 10:106-7, 121, 152.
212 Y ork D O W 11: 3 6 5, 374; York D O W 12: 80.
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spurious issue.”213 The law linked interracial bastardy with servitude, not just by
targeting servant women, but by punishing free women with 5-year indentures if they
could not pay their fine. Servant women saw their time of service extended greatly
for bearing bastard children.214 Free white women were routinely sold into 5-year
indentures following their conviction, and their children indentured out for 31 years.
In 1706, Rebecca Stephens, a free white woman unable to pay the £15 sterling fine,
was sold for 5 years to the parish.215 Women struggled to raise the £15 fine, in order
to avoid being auctioned off into service by the parish. Mary West, recently widowed
in 1722, was charged with “having a Mulatto Bastard.”216 In concurrent lawsuits
regarding debts owed by her deceased husband, she struggled to retain as much o f the
value as possible from her husband’s estate. Eventually, she was able to pay the £15
fine and avoid 5 years of service.
Mulatto children of white women were already required, since 1691, to serve
to the age of 31. In 1723, the linkage between birth, inheritability, servitude, and race
was intensified, as the Burgesses decreed that if any woman serving a 31-year
indenture herself had a bastard child, that child would also serve to the age of 31.
The new law was aimed at extracting the maximum amount of labor possible, based
on birth and racially-marked illegitimacy. Kirsten Fischer emphasizes that the result
of the law was that “mixed-race children, though nominally free, effectively spent

2,4 H ening 3: 4 5 3 -4 .
214 R achel W ood w as con victed on three separate o cca sio n s for interracial bastardy, each tim e finding
her service exten d ed . York D O W 13: 7 2 , 115, 137, 2 1 6 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 5 , 2 6 3 . S ee also the ca se o f M ary
H anson and the en sla v ed man named D ick, York D O W 12: 4 1 4 ,4 2 4 ; York D O W 13: 17.
215 Y ork D O W 13: 19. S ee also: the ca se o f Mary Bryan, York D O W 13: 66; the ca se o f Elizabeth
Cunnears, Y ork D O W 14: 41; the ca se o f Cleopatra B ee, York D O W 19: 4 5 , 5 6 , 6 2 , 7 2 , 7 9 , 89; and
the ca se o f Elizabeth D utchficld, York JO 1: 141, 146, 157, 365.
216 Y ork D O W 16: 101, 120, 134, 153, 156, 162, 169, 179, 197.
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their most productive and reproductive years as servants.”

i7

As such, this new rule

amounted to a sort of quasi-inherited slavery, in which mixed-race people, already
serving well into adulthood and therefore more likely to bear children while
completing their term of service, passed on that same extended servitude to their
children for no reason other than their mixed-race background.218 This was a de facto
(if not de jure) form o f inherited slavery.
This 31-year indenture was like slavery in another way: women saw their
children sold away from them, for what may have been their entire lives. Mothers
serving indentures struggled to maintain relationships with their children. Martha
West was a mixed-race woman who bore two sons, Charles and James, during her
own 3 1-year indenture to Sarah Walker.219 In 1732, Sarah Walker petitioned the
court to bind the two boys to her for their 31-year indenture, rather than having their
labor sold by their parish. Martha must have been pleased by this agreement: it
assured that her children would remain near her during their lives. Cases like Martha

217 Fischer, S u sp ect R ela tio n s, 125. D ou glas D eal points out that this law capitalized on the fact that
the first generation o f 31 -year indentured servants were th em selv es approaching adulthood. D ou glas
D eal, “A C onstricted W orld: Free B lack s on V irgin ia’s Eastern Shore, 1 6 8 0 -1 7 5 0 ,” in C o lo n ia l
C h esa p ea k e S o c ie ty , ed. L o is Green Carr, Philip D . M organ, and Jean B. R usso (C hapel Hill:
U niversity o f North Carolina Press, 1988), 278.
218 T he notion that exten d ed indentures w ould m ake som e servants more lik ely to bear bastard children
seem s to e ch o Peter L aslett’s con cep t o f the “illegitim acy-p ron e su b -so ciety .” Laslett im plied that the
“illegitim acy-p ron e su b -so ciety ” w as a group w ithin a so ciety that w as more lik ely to have children
outside o f w ed lock because o f their different moral standards than the dom inant culture. T hose
illegitim ate children, then, w ould be lik ely to have illegitim ate children o f their ow n . In fact, I argue
that quite the op p osite p rocess w as occurring in V irginia. T he con d ition s for illegitim acy were
cem ented into law by the V irginia governm ent. V irginia law , by exten d in g indentures w ell into
adulthood, and also by refusing to recogn ize interracial marriages, literally created the con d ition s in
w hich large numbers o f children w ould be born to parents w ho w ere either unmarried or w hose
marriages w ere not recogn ized by the state. W hile servants, slaves, and free blacks m ay have indeed
held different sexual m ores than the dom inant culture, the con d ition s for illegitim acy w ere created by
the state itself. Peter L aslett, “L ong-term trends in bastardy in E ngland,” in F am ily life a n d illic it lo ve
in e a r lie r g e n e ra tio n s ( N Y : Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1977), 102-159.
219 York D O W 17: 295. T his is on e o f the few ca ses that I’ve found in w hich w hite m istresses actively
aided their fem ale servants and slaves. A s w ill be discu ssed later, propertied w hite w om en were
com p licit or actively in volved in the exploitation o f black w o m en ’s reproductivity.
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W est’s were the exception - most mixed-race servants were not able to assert such
control over their relationships with their children.
Two patterns emerged after the passage of the 1662 law of slavery by birth.
First, illegitimacy and servitude continued to be discursively linked, as the laws for
each overlapped well into the eighteenth century. Second, as servitude was
racialized, so was illegitimacy: punishments for bastardy were gradated in terms of
race, as mixed-race illegitimate children were expected to complete indentures that
stretched well into their adult years. Childbearing was at the center o f both these
patterns. Slavery by birth was the central logic defining the entire servant population
of the colony, regardless of color. The enforcement of slavery by birth created a
gradated system of race and servitude, ranging from the inescapable lifelong servitude
of black women’s children to the temporary servitude (treated as a temporary
aberration from innate freedom) of white servant women’s white children. By
appropriating the reproductive lives of black women, the slaveowning class found an
economic boon in the law of slavery by birth.
In so doing, Virginia lawmakers created several overlapping classes of
laborers who stood outside of the logic of patriarchal inheritance upon which the
colony’s wealth and laws were based. The children of enslaved women were, in
Swinburne’s terms, “children of no man” - legally fatherless. In a world in which
everything - property, status, name - was inherited from one’s father, the bastard
child stood outside of the lines of inheritance, able to inherit neither from their fathers
or their mothers.220 Enslaved children had a similar status, unable to claim any link to

220 T h ese law s w ou ld be liberalized on ly after the R evolution. In 1785, V irginia declared that bastard
children could inherit from their mother “as if they had been law fu lly begotten o f such m other.”
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either father or mother. This was an obvious protection for the white men who
fathered enslaved children: the enslaved children of white men had no claims on their
father’s property, thus protecting the all-important patriarchal lines of inheritance that
resulted in the solidification of the estates and power of the planter class. Whether
the mixed-race children of enslaved women were the sons and daughters o f their
master, or another white man, and whether they were the products of rape or
consensual sex, the effect was the same: slavery may have been marked by race, but it
was a product of birth. It is not an exaggeration to argue that, in the seventeenthcentury Anglo-American world, this legal fatherlessness was a method of systemic
dehumanization. Enslaved people were denied a patronymic, and thus denied a
recognized genealogy. Not only were they unable to inherit property, they became
property themselves. Legal fatherlessness was the basis for slavery in Virginia law;
reproductivity would be central to how slaves were understood as a category of
property as well.

Property and Slavery
By the eighteenth century in the Anglo-American colonies, slavery was a
system of life-long servitude, marked by race, wherein the slave was defined as the
property of the master. Virginia’s adoption of life-long slavery by birth had
capitalized on the pre-existing legal context of English bastardy law. That life-long
labor was racially coded: slavery was inherited exclusively by the children bom of
enslaved black and mixed-race women. In other words, reproduction was central to

N otably, bastard children’s right to inherit w as not extended to their fathers’ property. H ening 12:
138-9.
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defining slavery as both life-long and race-based. Similarly, the adoption o f the
principle of chattel slavery - the ownership o f enslaved bodies as property - was
itself rooted in pre-existent English property law. Further, like the linking o f slavery
to bastardy law, the principle of chattel slavery exploited enslaved women’s
reproductivity. As we will see, if bastardy law had made it possible for slaveholders
to claim the life-long labor of enslaved people by birth, then property law made it
possible for slaveholders to imagine a racial hierarchy in which white slaveholders
could literally own black bodies. Here, w e’ll see again the emergence of a racial
ideology in Virginia simultaneous to the development of slavery as an institution. In
the long process of inventing race in the Americas, reproduction was both a central
discourse and a means by which race was codified in social practice.
In defining enslaved people as property, Virginia’s slaveholders once more
used the law to advance their own interests. As we have seen, colonial Virginia law
was simultaneously reactive and creative. The 1662 law of slavery by birth serves as
a potent example of this dualism. The law of slavery by birth was reactive in its
codification of pre-existing practices - enslaved women’s children were clearly
enslaved before the passage of that law. Even if the law was reactive, it was also
creative: by drawing on pre-existing bastardy law, Virginia’s planter-legislators
maximized their own wealth by constructing new discursive connections between
sexuality, race, illegitimacy, and labor. As when they defined slavery by birth via
discourses of illegitimacy, Virginia’s lawmakers would define their slaves as property
via existing notions of property ownership. Again, existing law - here, the property
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law regulating livestock ownership - would become the basis by which the emerging
planter elite would solidify and maximize their economic holdings and their power.
The last quarter of the seventeenth century saw the amassing o f vast
plantations by an emerging planter class. Aided by access to slave labor, a legal
system written by the planters themselves, inheritance laws that favored the amassing
of large estates, and a headright system that offered free land to planters who
purchased imported slaves, the planters who were best able to capitalize on these
resources found great wealth in the tobacco economy.221 But prior to the rise of the
so-called “great planters” Virginia’s inheritance system was in crisis. High mortality
rates interrupted the primogeniture patterns that organized property in England:
property-holding widows held far greater power than their sisters in England, minor
children had a depressingly high chance of being orphaned, and second and third
marriages called lines of inheritance into question.222 Surviving records evince
property-holders’ anxiety over proper inheritance in a world where mixed families
were the norm. For example, the lawyer William Fitzhugh’s letters are full of his
explications of complicated patterns of inheritance where simple parent-to-child
inheritance was not possible. Fitzhugh feared the “Confusion & uncertainty” that

221 K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la v e s, 2 6 3 -7 ; M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 2 7 1 -2 9 2 .
Parent, F oul M ea n s, 9 -79; C arole Sham m as, “E nglish Born and C reole E lites,” 2 7 4 -9 6 .
222 On m ortality rates and their effec t on inheritance, see M organ, A m erica n S la very, A m erica n
F reedom , 158-179. On w id ow s, see Carr and W alsh, “T he Planter’s W ife,” 2 5 -57; Snyder, B ra b b lin g
W om en, 117-139; Sturtz, Within H e r P o w er, 2 4 -2 9 . On orphans, see Rutman and Rutman, “N o w W iv es and S o n s-in -L a w ,” 153-182. A llan K u lik o ff argues that the im provem ent o f these conditions
w as essen tial to the rise o f the planter class at the turn o f the eighteenth century, K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d
S la ves, 6 0 -3 , 171-2, 167-8.
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Virginia’s complex family structures meant for what were intended to be orderly lines
of inheritance by primogeniture.223
Within this uneasy context, property ownership and property law were central
to emerging discourses o f power in Virginia. Therefore, property law was a potent
site for constructing the emerging legal framework for racial slavery. In tying labor
to illegitimacy, Virginia’s planter elite had created a legally fatherless laboring
population without claims to inheritance. Instead, laborers would themselves be
defined as objects to be inherited by others. In this section, I will argue here that
what specific type of property slaves would be considered would be a result of their
reproductivity. Indeed, enslaved women’s reproductivity - a key feature o f their
humanity - would become the means by which they would be dehumanized as
property, since livestock was the category of property to which slaves seemed the
most similar.
Even as tobacco dominated the Virginia economy, livestock was a key
category of property and wealth in the colony. April Lee Hatfield has argued that if
tobacco was Virginia’s major export to England, livestock were Virginia’s major
export to the other colonies - for example, the counties of the Eastern Shore and
Southside depended on livestock even more than tobacco for their income.224
Plentiful livestock (meaning breeding livestock) were a sign of colonial success,
223 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d his C h esa p ea k e W orld, 6 8 -9 . C om m enting on the children o f second
marriages (a com m on phenom enon), Fitzhugh m akes clear that the m ixed fam ilies and step-children o f
the typical seventeenth-century A n glo-V irgin ia fam ily posed a distinct ch allen ge to E n glish inheritance
patterns. A nother seventeenth-century V irginia writer, W illiam B u llock , argued against this practice,
claim in g ju stifiab ly that it m eant that h alf-sib lin gs cou ld have w ild ly different inheritances or be
disinherited com p letely. W illiam B u llock , V irginia Im p a rtia lly exam ined, a n d left to p u b lick view , to
b e co n sid e re d b y a ll J u d icio u s a n d h o n est m en (L ondon, 1649), E a rly E nglish B o o k s O n lin e, 15. B y
n ecessity, V irgin ia’s county courts (including York C ounty) focu sed a great deal o f tim e and energy on
d ecid in g com p licated inheritance disputes.
224 H atfield, A tla n tic V irginia, 45.
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frequently reported in British colonial booster texts. In his pamphlet extolling the
virtues of the Chesapeake colonies, Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruitful Sisters
Virginia and Mary-Land, John Hammond remarked that Virginia’s abundant
livestock were a resource to other colonies: “From this industry of theirs and great
plenty of Com, (the main staff of life) proceeded that great plenty of Cattel and Hogs,
(now innumerable) and out of which not only New England hath been flicked and
relieved, but all other parts of the Indies inhabited by Englishmen.”225 Trudy Eden
argues that beyond their economic value, livestock had significant cultural value:
plentiful domesticated livestock were a sign of Virginia’s Englishness, and therefore
its civilization.226 Other colonial boosters, such as William Bullock, recounted the
presence of “English Provisions” as a sign not only of the success of farmers, but of
the essential inhabitability of the New World.227
Besides their productivity (i.e., their production of wool, milk, or meat, or
their labor in tilling fields or transportation), livestock were profitable because of
their reproductivity. Some of the earliest Virginia laws were aimed at expanding the
numbers of cattle and hogs - especially breeding females - in the colony. A 1630
law “for the better increase and multiplying of cattell in this colony” demanded that
“all the female increase o f neate cattell bee with all care and diligence preserved and
kepte.”228 The law made it a criminal act (punishable to whatever extent the
Governor and Council saw fit) to kill any female cattle “unlesse they bee such as are

225 John H am m ond, L eah a n d R achel, or, the T w o F ruitfull S isters V irginia a n d M a ry-la n d : T heir
P rese n t C on dition , Im p a rtia lly s ta te d a n d re la te d (L ondon, 1656), E a rly E nglish B o o k s O n lin e, 5.
226 Eden, “F ood, A ssim ilation , and the M alleability o f the Hum an B o d y ,” 2 9 -4 2 . S ee also C haplin,
S u b je c t M a tte rs, 149-51.
227 B u llock , V irginia Im p a rtia lly E xam in ed, 7-8.
228 H ening 1: 152.
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eyther past breedinge, or are likely to dye by some infirmity.”

/y/}Q

Female livestock

were especially valuable because their young automatically belonged to their owner
as well. The famous eighteenth-century jurist William Blackstone confirmed this in
his description of the legal principle of partus sequitur ventrem: “of all tame and
domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner of the dam or mother.”

Virginia

wills are full of language acknowledging the reproductivity, and therefore the
profitability, of female livestock. From the earliest recorded wills in York County,
testators designated not only livestock but the “increase” of that livestock to their
heirs.231 Such inheritances were especially valuable, because they offered not just
immediate income but the potential for future income - this was property that literally
grew in value.
Following the 1662 law of slavery by birth, planters transferred their
understanding of inheritable wealth from livestock to slaves: enslaved human
property began to be listed along with their so-called “increase.” This linguistic shift
was not just accidental or convenient: through this discursive coupling of livestock
with human property, individual planters enacted their power over enslaved people.
In a colonial world where print was rare and wills were often the only written
documents that individuals ever produced, these wills, in the words of Jennifer

229 Ibid.
230 W illiam B lack ston e, C o m m en ta ries on the L a w s o f E n glan d, vol. 2, (O xford, 1765 -6 9 ), E ighteenth
C en tu ry C o llectio n s O n lin e, 3 9 0 . Interestingly, B lackstone g o e s on to state that “for the m ost part in
the human sp ecies [E nglish law ] d isa llo w s that m axim .” C learly, the excep tion to w hich he alluded
w as the hum ans w ho w ere en slaved in the British co lo n ies and in Britain itself.
231 For ju st a few ex a m p les o f the “increase” o f liv esto ck see the 1637 w ill o f Joseph H am (“Cattle
w ith their increase,” York D O W 1: 5 0), the 1670 w ill o f Jam es M oore (“all m y C attle fem a le...& their
fem ale increase” , Y ork D O W 4: 3 6 8 ), a 1691 deed o f gift by Susanna G ood w yn ( “ 1 h eiffer...w / all her
increase (v izt) m ale & fem ale together,” York D O W 9: 87 ), and the 1713 w ill o f Jam es Purvis (“one
young mare & her increase,” York D O W 14: 2 2 2 ). Virtually every colo n ia l w ill that included
livestock guaranteed ow nership o f the “increase” o f that liv esto ck to future heirs.

90

Morgan, were key sites for the development of an emergent “moral grammar” of
slavery.232 Wills were personal documents, and as such they demonstrated the ways
in which white Virginians fashioned and adopted ideologies of racial hierarchy in
their daily lives. In these wills, we see the development of an ideology of racial
slavery that first conceived of humans as reproductive property, by discursively
connecting those humans to livestock. In other words, the wills provide a window
into the ways that individual Anglo-Virginians enacted emerging discourses o f race,
slavery, and power in their daily lives and in the ways they imagined their futures.
Analysis of these documents produces, in a sense, a cultural history of common, daily
language.
Wills and other legal documents drew a connection - sometimes oblique and
sometimes incontrovertible - between the “increase” of livestock and the childbearing
of enslaved women. In 1668, Frances Harrison inherited both livestock and slaves
from her father, Robert Harrison. Frances received not only “the first mare foal...with
her increase” of his “great Bay mare” but also Harrison’s “negro woman called
[Betsy?] & the children that have or may come on her.”233 In 1669, when Mary
Ludlowe, the wealthy widow of Thomas Ludlowe, married the Reverend Peter
Temple, she distributed her inheritance from her first husband among her children.234
Throughout the marriage agreement are glimpses of enslaved women and girls whose
reproductive lives had been transformed into economic gains for Mary’s children.

232 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 69. Jennifer M organ has also com m ented on the frequent use o f the
language o f “increase” in Berm uda in the 17Ul and 18th centuries. She writes: “T erm s such as
‘p ick an in ies’ were rare - the more com m on term s such as ‘in crease’ and ‘p roduce’ su g g est that
slaveow n ers understood quite early the value o f the reproductive liv e s o f laboring w om en in their
ev o lv in g con cep tion o f th em selves as ow ners o f human property.” M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 82.
233 York D O W 4: 180.
234 York D O W 4: 258.
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“Molatto Moll” (likely the daughter o f a black woman and a white man, whose life
long enslavement was made possible by the 1662 law) and her “whole Increase male
and female forever” were transferred to Mary’s son George.235 Nanne, the six-yearold daughter of a man Mary called “old Lawrance” would be transferred to Mary’s
daughter, Elizabeth, along with “her whole increase.”

Nanne’s five-year-old sister,

Besse, would be transferred to Mary’s daughter, also named Mary, “with her whole
Increase male & female forever.”237 Each of Mary Ludlowe’s children also received
livestock along with these enslaved women and girls; the livestock were listed, just
like the slave women and girls, along with their “increase.” Colonial Virginia court
records - in wills, inheritance disputes, probates, marriage agreements, deeds, records
of the sale of slaves, estate divisions, and other cases - affirmed the ownership as
chattel not only of enslaved women, but of their future children, or their “increase,”
as well.238 Livestock had provided a ready-made legal language for the ownership of
reproducing enslaved bodies.
Indeed, that these two categories of property - livestock and slaves - were
understood to be equivalent, and that their sameness was rooted in their
reproductivity, can be seen in the frequent cases in which the separation between the
“increase” of livestock and the “increase” of slaves is blurred in the records. In these
examples, a modem reader cannot easily determine whether the offspring or the
families of enslaved women are the “increase” to which the records refer; more likely,

238 The York county records are full o f references to en slaved w o m en ’s “ increase,” a language that
persisted into the eighteenth century. M ore exam ples: D O W 5: 81 (1 6 7 4 ), D O W 11: 4 0 8 -1 0 (1 7 0 1 ),
D O W 14: 107 (1 7 1 1 ), D O W 14: 3 9 6 (1 7 1 4 ), D O W 16: 4 8 3 (1 7 2 7 ), D O W 19: 2 4 5 (1 7 4 3 ), D O W 19:
3 1 3 -4 (1 7 4 4 ), D O W 19: 3 3 7 (1 7 4 5 ), D O W 19: 4 2 7 - 8 ,4 3 9 (1 7 4 6 ), JO 2: 4 1 5 -7 (1 7 5 4 ), JO 3: 19-20
(1759 ).
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these references to “increase” include both the children and the livestock. Some of
these examples occur in the years preceding the 1662 law of slavery by birth,
indicating yet another way in which enslaved women’s status (and the status of their
children) were in question before the passage of that law. In the 1651 prenuptial
agreement between John Chew and Rachel Constable, the blurring of slaves and
livestock was clear when John promised to Rachel “Two Negro Men servants called
Tony and Sampson Two Negro Women called Ann and Kate one old Gray Mare with
all and every their Increase.”239 When Surrey, England resident John Cheesman
appointed Virginian Lawrence Smith his attorney, he gave Smith control over all of
his Virginia property, except for “two negroes Vizt one named Missce and Margaret
and two mares, that the sd John Cheesman wholly reserves with the Encrease
thereof.”240 Such blurring between the increase of livestock and the increase of slaves
continued after 1662. When William and Mary Stark married in 1714, William
granted to Mary both cattle and enslaved women, listed as “Jenney, Nanney, Sarah,
Lucy & six young heifers of about three or four year old & the increases.”241
The conceptual connection between livestock and enslaved people was more
than just a linguistic one. The notion that slaves and animals were fundamentally
similar was foundational to slaveholders’ sense of themselves as owners of human
property, and therefore had a deep impact on the lives of enslaved people. As we will
see, the slave-as-livestock connection can be seen in slaveholders’ most basic
practices of property ownership. First, slaves, like livestock, were seen as

239 York D O W 1:132.
240 York D O W 3: 162-3. For more p re-1662 exam p les o f such blurring b etw een the increase o f
livestock and sla v es in York C ounty, see: D O W 3: 32 (1 6 5 7 ), D O W 3: 6 4 (1 6 5 9 ), and D O W 3: 69
(1659 ).
241 York D O W 14: 333.
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investments that grew in value. Second, female slaves, like female livestock, were
differently valued than male slaves. Finally, slaves’ economic value, like that of
livestock, was central to the support of white children. Ultimately, I will argue that
the slave-as livestock connection had tremendous impact on the lives of black women
and their children: whether conceived as a mother/child dyad or separated from one
another, the impact of slavery on black families was rooted in the notion that enslaved
property was fundamentally similar to property in livestock. In all of these practices,
slaveholders enacted the idea that slaves and livestock were fundamentally similar
sorts of property because they were reproductive.
Slaveholders saw black women’s reproductivity as an opportunity for
economic investment: this was property that literally grew in value as it grew in
numbers. Jennifer Morgan has argued that, because wealth in slaves depended on
black women’s reproductivity, slaveholders saw black women’s wombs as “the site of
venture capitalism.”242 This speculative economy in black babies extended even to
enslaved girls, long before they were of childbearing age. In 1713, John Rogers gave
an enslaved girl named Lucy to his granddaughter, Eliza Goodwyn, herself a young
girl. Rogers had clearly thought through the economic value of Lucy’s future
reproductive life. Lucy’s first child would also be Eliza’s property, but Lucy’s
children thereafter would be distributed amongst Eliza’s siblings. Rogers even
considered the possibility that some of Lucy’s children might not survive infancy: if
her first child should die, Lucy’s second child was to belong to Eliza. What is
remarkable, though not uncommon, about this case is that Lucy was only two years
242 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 167. Jerome T eelu ck sin gh has m ade a sim ilar observation, pointing out
that, by the end o f the seventeenth century, “[British Caribbean] planters v iew ed the purchase o f slave
w om en as a capital investm ent.” T eelu ck sin gh , “T he ‘In visib le C h ild ’,” 238.
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old - probably only recently weaned - when Rogers was speculating on the value of
her future children. Her children, too, would be separated from her as toddlers, for
the benefit of Rogers’ white progeny.243
In this merchant-capitalist world, slaveholders used language of capitalist
investment to refer to enslaved women and their children.244 This was a practice
rooted in the ownership of livestock. While “increase” was the most common term
used to refer to the future offspring of cattle or hogs, the language of some wills
reveals that reproductivity was seen as a form o f capital investment or a sort of
banking relationship. Wills referred to calves as “increase & p[ro]fits,” to cattle and
their calves as “principall and increase,” and to the future offspring of a calf as
“p[ro]fitts.”245 This language o f banking, interest, and profits would be extended to
enslaved women as well. When Maree, a “Negro wench,” was willed by William
Felgate to his wife, Felgate noted that “what proffitt shall be made of hir” should be
delivered to his daughter, Mary Bassett. As it would be virtually impossible for a
holder of multiple slaves to determine exactly the value of the labor of one slave, it is
clear that the “proffitt” to which Felgate referred was the future children of Maree.246
Because enslaved women’s reproductivity was seen as an investment in future
values, whites valued enslaved women differently than enslaved men. Enslaved
women had a dual value, both productive (as laborers) and reproductive (as bearers of

243 Y ork D O W 14: 309. E xam ples o f young girls being w illed along w ith their future “increase”
abound. S om e exam p les include: York D O W 4: 2 5 8 (the L u d low e-T em p le marriage agreem ent
d iscu ssed earlier), Y ork D O W 8: 4 1 1 -2 , York D O W 11: 76. C ases o f toddlers and infants being
separated from their mothers are discu ssed later in this chapter.
2 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 8 2 , 91.
245 York D O W 2:1 2 4 , York D O W 2: 180-1, York D O W 4:322.
246 York D O W 3: 92.
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future slaves).247 Admittedly, the demographic picture for Virginia would seem to
belie the notion that planters valued or priced women for their reproductivity. The
enslaved population in Virginia would not be self-reproducing until after the 1730s until then, the growth of the slave population depended on purchase, via the
transatlantic slave trade, not reproduction.248 It was not until the 1750s that lowered
infant mortality rates, higher birth rates, and an equaling of the sex ratio allowed the
enslaved population in Virginia to grow via reproduction, as opposed to importation
(though, of course, the international slave trade would continue in Virginia until
1785).249 Even with women’s dual value as producers and reproducers, planters were
more likely to buy male slaves and purchase those male slaves at higher prices.
Nevertheless, even in the context of this demographic picture, reproduction was still a
considerable factor in the institutionalization of slavery. Although slaves were not
self-reproducing, evidence suggests that whites understood reproduction to be a
significant means of growing the enslaved population. The discrepancy between
social practice and demography, therefore, indicates that the cultural understanding of
enslaved women as a form of reproductive capital took hold even as the enslaved
population was too sick, too traumatized, and too overworked to enable self
reproduction.250
While women were not more highly priced than men - though, as we will see,
they were similarly priced - women were differently valued than their brothers, sons,
and husbands. Jennifer Morgan’s research on the Caribbean indicates that even in the

247 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 144, 154. King, “Suffer w ith them till death,” 147-168; Steckel,
“W om en, W ork, and H ealth,” 4 3 -6 0 .
248 K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la ves, 6 7 -7 0 .
249 H ening 12:182-3. K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la ves, 6 9 -7 4 .
250 K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la ves, 6 7 -7 0 .
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deadly sugar colonies of the late seventeenth century, planters saw value in women’s
reproductivity.

She argues that, even as men outnumbered women as laborers,

Caribbean planters began to value women “more systematically as potential
reproducers.”252 She has found that, from early in the colony’s history (also before
slaves were self-reproducing in that colony), Bermuda planters listed slaves in malefemale pairs, indicating slaveholders’ interest in reproduction. Anthony Parent argues
that similar practices in Virginia were intended to express masters’ control over the
enslaved population: ‘T h e pairing of male and female enslaved was less about
benevolence than social control. Planters wanted to maintain a reproducing, tractable,
and healthy workforce.”253 Similar social pairings exist in the York County records
in Virginia. For example, when the estate of Pinkethman Eaton was divided upon his
death, the slaves were listed in quasi-familial groups, with each group valued at
between 160 and 170 pounds: “Joe Lucy Matt & Lett,” “Jack Temp. Fanny & Matt,”
“James Jake Mary & Nell,” “Michael Cate & Hannah,” “David Frank Judith &
Child,” and “George Sarah Nanny & Tom.” The exact relationship (if any) of the
slaves in each of these groups is unknown; nevertheless, the presence o f at least one
woman in each group indicates that reproduction may have been a consideration in
the division of Eaton’s slaves, as it was for the Caribbean estates that Morgan
examined.254

251 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 84 -5 . B y exam in in g N e v is w ills betw een 1650 and 1675, M organ also
found that 79% o f sla v eo w n in g h ou seh old s held at least one en slaved w om an, im plying that
reproduction w as an interest in purchasing sla v es, ev en if w om en w ere outnum bered by m en. I have
not undergone a sim ilar quantitative exam ination o f York C ounty w ills to be able to assert the
numerical frequency o f w om en in slaveholder holdings, but I can attest anecdotally to a frequency in
the presence o f w om en in seventeenth-century w ills.
252 Ibid.
253 Parent, F oul M ean s, 232.
254 York JO 1768-1770: 4 0 4 . Other earlier exam p les include Y ork D O W 5: 81, York D O W 11: 4 0 8 -1 0 .
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Examination of one wealthy planter’s purchases clarifies the ways that women
were differently valued because of their reproductivity. Throughout William
Fitzhugh’s letters, we see that the reproduction of his enslaved labor force was a
concern as Fitzhugh sought to purchase a youthful labor force that included female
slaves. In 1681, Fitzhugh sought to buy between six and eight “boys or girles, men or
women.”255 He directed Ralph Wormeley to purchase five or six slaves, “whereof
three or four to be boys, a man & woman or men & women, the boys from eight to
seventeen or eighteen, the rest as young as can procure them.”256 In his instructions
to Wormeley, Fitzhugh allowed that he would be willing to pay more for boys and
men: “boys according to their age & growth are valued in price.”257 Fitzhugh desired
to have more boys, who he saw as strong laborers and knew would be more
expensive. In the context of extremely high mortality for imported slaves, young men
and boys were the most expedient purchase: they could do more labor before their
likely premature death. Nevertheless, Fitzhugh also specified that he wanted women
“as young as can procure them.”258 We can surmise that while these women would
be effective laborers, he also likely hoped that their youth would make them more
likely to bear more children. In 1683, Fitzhugh again was seeking to buy slaves, and
outlined for John Jackson what prices he was willing to pay. Interestingly, he
specified the same prices for slaves regardless of gender - 3000 pounds of tobacco for
boys or girls aged seven to eleven, 4000 for boys or girls aged eleven to fifteen, and
5000 for “every young man or woman that shall be above 15 years of age, & not

255 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d his C h esa p ea k e W orld, 105-6.
256 Ibid.
257 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d his C h esa p ea k e W orld, 104.
258 Ibid.
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exceed 24 ”259 As always, youth was Fitzhugh’s primary concern - he ascribed the
greatest value to teenagers and young adults, as both women and men could do labor,
but only young adult slaves were likely to bear children.
In a later letter, written in 1686, Fitzhugh describes the fruits of his
investments. He had amassed four separate plantations, totaling almost 25,000 acres.
He described the plantation where he lived to Doctor Ralph Smith: the thirteen-room
house was “furnished with all accomodations for a comfortable & gentile living,”
numerous outbuildings including “a Dairy, Dovecoat, Stable, Bam, Hen house,
Kitchen & all other conveniencys,” an orchard, a garden, numerous livestock, and a
palisaded yard. He also described his slaves: “a choice crew of Negros at each
plantation, most of them this Country bourn, the remainder as likely as most in
Virginia, there being twenty nine in all.”

“Country bourn” slaves, of course,

referred to the slaves that had been born in Virginia, the children o f the women he
enslaved.261 For Fitzhugh, his country-born slaves were of the highest value: they
were more likely to survive, did not have to be purchased, and also symbolized the
health and reproductivity of the adult slave population.262 Fitzhugh’s country-bom
slaves also marked his success as a planter: his aims of creating a youthful,
reproductive enslaved population had been met.

Ofi'K

For planters like Fitzhugh, the

259 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d H is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 127.
260 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d his C h esa p ea k e W orld, 175-7.
261 T his particular Fitzhugh letter is d iscu ssed further later on in this chapter. A s w ill be discussed
then, it is clear from a later section o f the letter that the reference to “C ountry bourn” sla v es indicates
the children o f w om en that Fitzhugh h im se lf en slaved , not lo ca lly born sla v es he purchased from other
Virginians.
262 Other slaveholders also held this v iew , esp ecia lly in the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century
issu es o f the V irginia G a zette are full o f advertisem ents for slaves and slave auctions. L ike W illiam
F itzhugh’s letters, these ads often em phasized that “V irginia born” slaves were valuable slaves. See,
for exam ple, V irginia G a zette, Purdie and D ixon , M ay 12, 1768, page 2.
263 In her an alysis o f the acquisition o f sla v es by G loucester County planter L ew is B urw ell II in the
1690s and 1700s, Lorena W alsh identifies a sim ilar pattern in purchases o f en slaved w om en and men.
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purchase of slaves had a dual goal: procuring enough laboring hands to maximize
tobacco production and provide an increasingly comfortable standard of living to the
planter, while still including enough women to ensure steady reproduction.
This dual function for slaves - both productive and reproductive - was a
major consideration in the support of Virginia’s large population of white
“orphans.”264 Because slaves, like livestock, were reproductive, they were seen as
providing long-term, accretive value to support these white children until they
reached adulthood. Livestock had long been used in Virginia to support the large
numbers of orphaned white children that populated Virginia in the seventeenth
century. The county courts held regular hearings aimed at assessing the proper care
and support for orphans’ estates - especially their property in livestock.

Parents

regularly included language in their wills indicating that livestock and their increase
were intended to support the upkeep and education of surviving minor children, as
well as those children’s children.266 In agreements drawn up before they entered into
second marriages, widows typically specified that particular livestock would be the
property of their children from their first marriages (thereby assuring that those
W hile the overall population o f B u rw ell’s sla v es had a sk ew ed sex ratio, w ith more m en than w om en,
w o m en ’s childbearing greatly expanded the en sla v ed population on the plantation. W alsh argues that
the larger en slaved populations seen on large plantations (lik e B u rw ell’s and his contem porary
F itzhu gh ’s) were more able to sustain slave fam ily life during this period. Im plicitly, W a lsh ’s analysis
duplicates those o f Jennifer M organ and m yself: ev en if planters sought m ale sla v es as laborers, their
acquisition o f fem ale sla v es in sign ifican t numbers indicates their desire to create a reproductive
enslaved population. Interestingly, W alsh finds that by the m id-eighteenth century, harsher w orking
condition s had actually decreased the rate o f childbearing am ongst the en slaved p eop le on the B urw ell
plantation. Lorena W alsh, F rom C a la b a r to C a r te r ’s G ro ve: The H isto ry o f A V irgin ia S la ve
C om m u n ity (C harlottesville: U niversity o f V irginia Press, 1997), 29 -3 1 .
264 T h ese “orphans” w ere m ost often the property-ow ning children o f d eceased fathers, w h o had been
w illed property in the form o f land, livestock , and slaves. Until children reached the age o f majority
(in the ca se o f b o y s) or married (in the ca se o f girls), their property w as m anaged by court-approved
guardians, often a m ale relative. A s Linda Sturtz argued, w hen w id o w s remarried, they used this
system to protect their and their children’s estates from absorption by the w o m a n ’s new husband.
Sturtz, W ithin H e r P o w er, 19-29. S ee also Norton, Founding M o th ers a n d F ath ers, 147-56.
265 S ee, for exam ple, York D O W 2: 3 9 9 -4 0 3 .
266 S ee, for exam p le, York D O W 1: 145, D O W 2: 2 0 1 , D O W 3: 9 8 , D O W 3: 106-7, D O W 4: 327.
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children would have financial support, even as the widow’s estate was absorbed by
her new husband).267 For example, in 1655 Margery Griggs assured that, even if the
livestock she had owned were sold by her new husband, William Hay, Margery’s son,
‘J f . Q

John, would receive the proceeds from the sale.

Orphaned children who could not

be supported by family members were typically assigned to indentures or
apprenticeships that were overseen by the courts. In these cases, livestock were used
to fund those apprenticeships and, since the orphan legally owned the animal as well
as its increase, assure that when these orphans reached adulthood, they would have a
continuing source of income beyond the skills they learned during their indenture.
Support of white orphans and other white children was yet another area where
Virginians used ownership of livestock and their increase as a model for the
ownership of slaves and their children. As valuable reproductive property, enslaved
people were regularly given or willed to white children, in order to assure that child’s
future income. In 1715, William Wise gave to his young granddaughter, Frances
Wise, “one negro woman named Frank.” William saw the dual value in giving Frank,
who was 20 years old at the time of the will, to his granddaughter. He stipulated that
“the labor of this negro woman to be for the maintenance of my sd grandaughter
Frances” and that Frances also would receive “all [Frank’s] increase male &
female.”

97 n

Wise also stipulated that Frank and her future children should be

267 S ee, for exam ple, Y ork D O W 2: 120, D O W 2: 162, D O W 2: 279.
268 York D O W 1 :2 6 5 .
269 S ee, for exam ple, York D O W 2:1 4 4 , D O W 3:42.
270 York D O W 14: 396. For sim ilar cases, se e York D O W 11: 7 6 , D O W 13: 197, 206.
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inherited by Frances’s heirs: the reproductive lives of Frank and Frances would be
perversely linked by ownership, inheritance, and labor.271
It is vital to recognize that, especially in the transfer of human property to
their children, white women were active in the exploitation of black women’s
reproductive lives. Early American women’s historians have argued that property
law was an advantage for white women in the seventeenth century: much more than
their English peers, or women of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, white widows
of seventeenth-century Virginia were able to wield public and private power by
means of their ownership of property.272 In a way, the high mortality rates of the
seventeenth-century Chesapeake offered to women a legitimate, but exceptional, form
of matrilineal inheritance, as widows directed the disposal of their estates for the
protection of their children. This power for white widows to protect their children,
though, came at the expense of black women’s and children’s lives. As Linda Sturtz
argues, slaves were, in a sense, feminized property in eighteenth-century Virginia:
widows worked hard to retain their dower rights to slaves, and wealthy families were
more likely to give their daughters slaves (and give land to their sons).

As a result,

271 T he W ise w ill entailed Frank to Frances. B y directing that Frank and all o f her d escendents
b elon ged to Frances, W illiam W ise intended to create a virtually unbreakable bond b etw een Frank’s
fam ily and F rances’s fam ily throughout the generations. T he p rocess o f entail and its sp ecific
conn ection to V irginia slavery is d iscu ssed later in the chapter.
272 N orton, F ounding M o th ers a n d F athers, 153-6; Carr and W alsh, “T he Planter’s W ife,” 34-40;
Sturtz, W ithin H e r P o w e r, 19-29. On the d eclin e o f w id o w s’ pow er in the eighteenth century, see
B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 2 8 7 -2 9 1 ; Sturtz, Within H e r P o w er, 2934. F ocu sin g on C onnecticut, C ornelia H ughes D ayton argues that the A n glicization o f the law
(m aking legal structures m ore form al, increasing the use o f p rofessional law yers in court) w as a
precipitating factor in w o m en ’s loss o f pow er at the end o f the seventeenth century, not least because
w o m e n ’s v o ic es w ere no longer heard in the public space o f the court. A s w ill be d iscu ssed further in
Chapter 3, the co n scio u s A n glicization o f V irgin ia’s law , beginning w ith the R estoration in 1662, w as
having a sim ilar effec t on w om en in V irginia. D ayton, W om en B efore th e B a r, 8.
273 Sturtz, W ithin H e r P o w er, 52. S laves were an esp ecia lly attractive addition to a dow ry because they
could be ea sily m oved onto a husband’s land w hen young w om en married. S ee, for exam p le, York
D O W 14: 13, 17-8.
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white women were frequent agents (and benefactors) in the appropriation of black
women’s reproductivity. In an early example, Frances Jones, a widow, directed in
1657 that her son, Francis Townshend, should receive a large share of her property,
which she had inherited upon her husband’s death. Townshend received land,
livestock including oxen, horses, hogs, and cattle, household goods, and the labor of
white servant men. He also inherited “one negro woman named Sarah and her child
Francis two yeares old.”274 Frances Jones was clearly a powerful, wealthy woman
who protected her property in order to support her son. She also was part of the first
generations of Anglo-Virginian slaveholders who chose to exploit, for their own
benefit, black women’s reproductive lives.
We have seen the ways that, by connecting slaves to livestock both
discursively and legally, Anglo-Virginians were able to conceive of slaves as a
particular kind of reproductive property. This legal-linguistic construction would
have devastating effects on the fragile families that enslaved women and men were
building in the colony. Since whites held absolute ownership over the children of
black women, they were able to dispose of that property as they saw fit - including
separating families at will. Whether keeping mothers and children together, or
separating them through inheritance or sale, slaveholders sought to maximize the
reproductive potential of enslaved women while still claiming the labor of both them
and their children. Such was the absolute power of the slaveholder: both the fostering
and the destruction of slave families were forms of reproductive exploitation.
Perversely, the choice by a slaveholder to keep mothers and children united
was a way that slaveholders actively exploited enslaved women’s reproductivity and
274 York D O W 3: 32. S ee also: York D O W 8: 4 1 1 -2 .
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dehumanized enslaved women as property similar to livestock. In their wills and
other legal documents, Virginians signaled the value, health, and profitability of
reproductive animals by noting when animals were pregnant, nursing, or recently
weaned. Doing so indicated the greater value o f an animal (the value o f a pregnant
animal needed to account for the value of the offspring), and it also indicated that
newborn animals needed special care in order to make good on their investment.
Therefore, pregnant cattle or pigs might be described as “breeding” and cattle and
horses might be listed as “sucking,” or nursing. 275 Mare colts were considered more
valuable after they had first “foaled.” Nursing cattle were milking cattle, and were
therefore especially valuable. Most commonly, individual cattle and other livestock
were listed “with calves” or “with colt sucking,” therefore indicating not only the
reproductive value of the adult animal but the inseparability o f the mother and its
young.276
Once again, this was a language that bled into the language of slaveownership,
emerging not only in wills (documents composed by individuals) but also in
inventories and other court-produced documents (indicating that the state also
participated in the development o f this slave-as-livestock construction). When Major
Joseph Croshaw died in 1670, his large estate was divided amongst his heirs. As was
the convention, female livestock were listed with their young and according to their
reproductive status: cows listed with “sucking” calves, and highly valued mares with
“sucking” colts. Along with those cattle and horses were listed people. Two
enslaved women, Moll and Rose, were listed along with “One Negroe Girle Sucking

275 York D O W 3: 148, D O W 4: 3 2 2 , D O W 4: 288.
276 York D O W 2: 3 7 9 , D O W 4: 2 2 4 , D O W 4: 288.
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May.” While it is not clear whose daughter May was, it seems reasonable to assume
that either Moll or Rose was nursing May as the inventory was being compiled.
Similarly, another enslaved woman named Moll was listed along with three children:
“One Negroe Girle sucking One Negroe Girle three years old Named [Han?] One
Negroe Girle named Besse.”277 It is unclear whether Han and Besse were M oll’s
daughters, but it is likely that the unnamed girl who was still nursing was Moll’s
daughter. The identical language was used to describe Moll and her daughter, and
little May and her mother, as had been used to describe cattle.
In the Croshaw inventory, mothers and daughters were listed with the same
language as cattle and calves. Other documents show a persistent urge to link
mothers and infants; this linkage discursively connected the reproductive value of
livestock to the reproductive value of enslaved women. Like cattle and calves, which
were frequently listed with combined values rather than individual values, enslaved
women and their children were listed with a single value. Such was the case of Anne
and her daughter Hager, who were listed for a combined value o f 40 pounds sterling
in 1667.278 Nan and her son Sam, and Sew and her daughters Jane and Dina were all
sold in 1706; their values were calculated in terms of mother-child units, not as
individuals.279 Enslaved women were very frequently listed in court documents (such
as deeds of sale and estate inventories) along with their children.280
Lacking more detailed evidence, are we to read these as examples of
slaveholder benevolence in keeping children with their mothers, or examples of
277 York D O W
278 York D O W
279 York D O W
280 York D O W
309, D O W 16:
3: 227-8.

2: 2 9 4 , D O W 4: 288.
4:1 4 3 .
12: 4 3 7 .
2:63, D O W 3:32, D O W 4: 2 5 8 , D O W 4: 3 7 0 , D O W 6: 2 6 -8 , D O W 11: 7 6 , D O W 14:
4 8 3 , D O W 19: 167, D O W 19:245, D O W 19: 2 5 0 , JO 1: 3 3 1 -2 , JO (1 7 6 8 -7 0 ): 4 0 2 , JO
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slaveholders capitalizing on enslaved women’s reproductive labor in nursing and
raising their children? Even as these women were fortunate to stay united with their
children, that unity was marked by the discourses o f power and ownership of white
slaveholders who must have seen themselves as maximizing the value of their
reproductive property. While these listings may seem to affirm the mother-child
relationship, because that language is part of owners’ wills, the language is still an
artifact of the slaveholder’s power (or the power o f the slave state, in the case of
state-produced inventories). Hortense Spillers argues that that perverse linkage
(between mother and child) by the owner (who may indeed have been the father of
the child) underscores enslaved women’s inability to “claim” their own children. In
this world where some children were chattel property, Spillers argues, “The offspring
of the female does not ‘belong’ to the Mother.”281
The all-too-frequent separation of mothers from their children and siblings
from one another exposes the heartlessness of the enterprise of enslavement. This
practice, also, seems to be rooted in understandings of the ownership of reproductive
livestock.

Inventories included considerations of whether or not calves were

“weanable,” or able to be separated from their mothers in order to be sold.282 To
separate mother and young too early would endanger the young, and therefore
endanger the investment. On the other hand, once physically independent from their
mothers, livestock’s “increase” was easily divisible, and was sold to settle debts and
balance inheritances.283 This convention informed the practice of dividing slave
families for the purposes of balancing inheritances; the practice required a
281 Spillers, “M am a’s B aby, Papa’s M ayb e,” 395.
282 York D O W 2: 2 7 5 , 3 9 5, D O W 3: 34.
283 York D O W 4: 132.
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dehumanization of the families being divided. In 1741, Daniel More, an heir of
James Sclater, requested that the executors of Sclater’s estate meet and officially
divide the estate amongst Sclater’s heirs. The court ordered the executors to “divide
the Negroes wch [Sclater] dyed possessed of together with the Increase thereof since
his death into 3 equal parts and that they assign one equal third part thereof to each of
‘J Q A

the Children of the sd. [Sclater] and the other third part to the sd. Danl. More.”

In

other words, all of the slaves were to be either distributed amongst the heirs or sold
(and the proceeds distributed equally amongst the heirs), including the children that
had been bom since Sclater’s death. That this would undoubtedly require the
separation of families was par for the course, as enslaved women and their children
were reduced to mere “increase.”
If livestock were salable as soon as they were weaned, then so were enslaved
children. Western African women typically nursed their children for up to two years;
this choice both improved the health of their babies and helped women to actively
space their pregnancies.285 Enslavement in the Americas interrupted these patterns.286
The result was that toddlers and even newborn infants were sold or inherited
separately from their mothers. Two-year-old Tom was given to Peter Goodwyne by

284 York D O W 19: 17. Other exam p les o f the d ivision o f so-called “increase” include: D O W 14: 107,
D O W 14: 3 9 6 , D O W 16: 4 7 5 , D O W 17: 2 7 4 , D O W 18: 3 3 7 , D O W 18: 6 3 2 -3 , D O W 19: 337.
285 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 6 6 -7; Barbara Bush, “Hard Labor: W om en, Childbirth, and R esistance
in British Caribbean S lave S o c ie tie s,” in M o re than C h a ttel: B lack W om en a n d S la v e ry in the
A m erica s, ed. D avid Barry Gaspar and D arlene Clark H ine (B loom ington: Indiana U n iversity Press,
1996), 2 0 2 -2 0 3 .
286 Shorter periods o f breastfeeding were required if en slaved w om en were to m eet sla v eh o ld ers’ labor
expectations. That this w ou ld result in more frequent births m ight have been seen as an advantage by
the slaveholders, even if it resulted in unhealthy babies. Richard S teckel has found that, b ecau se o f
w o m en ’s work requirem ents on A ntebellum -era cotton plantations, breastfeeding could be reduced to a
mere three-m onth period. Steck el, “W om en, W ork and H ealth,” 50. N ursing, esp ecia lly as it related to
the frequency o f pregnancies for black and w hite w om en, w ill be d iscu ssed in Chapter 2.
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his mother, Blanch Goodwyne, with no reference to the fate of Tom ’s mother.287
Judith was only nine months old when she was separated from her mother to be given
to Ann Morris.288 When Mary Moss and her children divided the estate of M ary’s
deceased husband, the court ruled that “the Increase” of the slaves (i.e., the children
bom since the official inventory had been done) be sold, and the proceeds divided and
shared amongst the heirs.289 That “Increase” was “a Child of about a Month old
(Toney by name) which we [the court] value to £6.”290 It’s unclear in the court order
who Toney’s mother was - indeed, to the court, it did not matter, as Toney was sold
to equalize the inheritances of the Moss family. The dehumanizing logic of slaves-aslivestock was apparent whenever children were sold or inherited separately from their
t

parents.

291

Real Property and Personal Property
Even as slaveowners discursively constructed the ownership of slaves as
fundamentally similar to the ownership of livestock, the House of Burgesses would
persistently debate the question of slaves as a legal category of property. Should
slaves be considered personal property (also termed chattel property and moveable
property), like livestock? Or, should slaves be considered real estate - tied to the land
as the feudal serfs o f English precedent? These debates exposed the fractured
colonial consciousnesses of the planters, who themselves made up the Burgesses, as
they sought to work both in their own interests as slaveholders and in the interests of
287 Y ork D O W 8 :4 1 1 -2 .
288 York D O W 16: 180.
289 York JO 3: 19-20.
290 Ibid.
291 Som e exam p les include: York D O W 4: 114-5, D O W 4: 189, D O W 4: 190, D O W 4: 2 5 4 , D O W 4:
3 3 7 , D O W 9: 2 0 4 , D O W 12: 2 7 7 , D O W 16: 316, D O W 19: 2 5 0 , D O W 19: 4 2 7 -8 .
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the crown.292 These legal debates complicated the everyday practices that had
governed slaveholding since the seventeenth century, especially the treatment of
slaves as livestock. Ultimately, it was the reproductivity of slave property that would
decide the debate and define slaves’ legal status. I argue in this section that in their
debate over what kind of property to label slaves, the Burgesses defined what they
called the “nature” of slaves via racialized discourses of reproduction.
In the debate over whether slaves were real or personal property, slaveholders
sought to structure inheritance law to best serve their own interests. As Thomas
Morris has argued, the real versus personal estate debate “defined, if anything, the
status of the owner and not the slave.”

While the debate had little effect on the

daily lives of slaves (slaves were, after all, still defined as property, and subject to the
wills of slaveholders), the Burgesses were seeking ways to protect the economic
interests of property holders and their heirs. Defining slaves as real estate held two
primary advantages for slaveholders. First, when a property holder died, their
moveable property could be sold off to pay off any of the estate’s outstanding debts.
By defining slaves as real estate, property owners sought to protect their estates, of
which slaves were the most valuable property other than land. Second, when slaves
were defined as real estate, testators could choose to place slaves in entail permanently transferring ownership of those slaves (and their children - thus ensuring
ownership in perpetuity) to a new line of heirs outside of the direct line of

292 A ccord in g to A nthony Parent, the actions o f the H ouse o f B u rgesses w ere an enactm ent o f the
em ergin g c la ss c o n scio u sn ess o f planters. A nthony S. Parent, Jr. F oul M eans. T he B u rg esses’ desire
to please the C rown had b ecom e one o f the d efining features o f that b od y after the 1660s, w hen the
new ly reinstated governm ent o f G overnor B erk eley had overhauled V irgin ia’s law s fo llo w in g
V irgin ia’s prom ise o f a llegian ce to the C rown after the Restoration.
293 M orris, Southern S la very a n d th e L aw , 65.
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primogeniture.294 This option was attractive to large planters, who used entail to
divide their large holdings amongst multiple heirs, while still ensuring that those
plantations would remain intact and productive. Furthermore, as Linda Sturtz and
Holly Brewer have both argued, entail was a primary means by which elite white
women in Virginia could own and hold onto property. As such, by defining slaves as
real estate, the House o f Burgesses made it possible for propertied white widows to
control even more wealth, even after they remarried.295 The debate over personalty
and realty was protracted (lasting over forty years) precisely because it was centered
on the foundational questions of power in a slave society: how should human
property be legally defined, how should that property be distributed amongst heirs,
and how could the disbursement of property be used to expand the power of the
planter elite?
For modem readers, the debate over realty and personalty is one o f legal
esoterica. Even so, we must be cognizant o f the ways that these legal debates could
preoccupy elite Virginians’ minds and time in the eighteenth century. A primary
priority of the Burgesses was to create a body of statutes that furthered the interests of
the great planters with the least amount of controversy, confusion, or internecine
conflict. The statutes written by the House of Burgesses were designed to expedite
294 H o lly B rew er has argued that, contrary to earlier interpretations, vast am ounts o f property w as
entailed in colo n ia l Virginia: she calcu lates that, by the tim e o f the R evolution, up to 1 5 % o f
V irgin ia’s land w as held in entail. B rew er argues that the d ecision to d efin e sla v es as real property
(and thus subject to entail) w as an attempt by V irginia planters to recreate a form o f feudalism in the
co lo n y , where planters were lords and slaves w ere vassals. N on eth eless, B rew er d oes not d iscu ss the
attempt by the B u rgesses to rescind the real estate law in 1748. If planters were interested in form ing a
feudal so ciety in 1705, w hy w ould they change their m inds in 1748, w ell before the R evolutionary-era
dism antling o f entail? B rewer, “E ntailing A ristocracy,” 3 0 7 -4 6 .
295 Brewer, “Entailing A ristocracy,” 3 4 2 -3 . Sturtz, W ithin H e r P o w e r, 52 -7 . Sturtz m akes a
con vin cin g argum ent that the realty/personalty debate centered on the question o f w id o w s’ property
ow nership. Sign ifican tly, though, because her focu s is on w hite propertied w om en, Sturtz d o es not
take into account the m eanings o f slavery itse lf or the sp ecific m eanings o f the en slavem en t o f w om en
w hen she d iscu sses these law s.
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inheritance processes and reduce the “law suits and controversies” (labeled by the
Burgesses as “many mischiefs”) that clogged up the county courts.

7Q

The realty

versus personalty debate, though, was more than just a procedural dispute: at the
heart of the debate was the question of how best to capitalize on the value of slaves’
bodies as reproductive property.
The Burgesses passed the first Virginia law that defined slaves as real estate
in 1705, along with the passage of the first comprehensive slave code in the colony.
The real estate law duplicated much of the language of a similar Barbadian law, as the
sugar colony’s dependence on slave labor and development of a unified gentry class
had preceded that of the tobacco colony.

7Q7

Virginia’s 1705 law ruled that “all negro,

mulatto, and Indian slaves...shall be held, taken, and adjudged, to be real estate (and
not chattels)” for the purposes of inheritance.298 As was discussed earlier, slaves
were conceived as a category o f property especially profitable for the support of
surviving spouses and children. By defining slaves as real estate, slaves would be
inherited via the same processes devised for land, processes that were aimed at
keeping estates as consolidated as possible while still providing for multiple heirs.
By legally tying slaves to the land upon which they worked, the Burgesses hoped to
ensure that heirs would inherit both land and the laborers to work that land. Further,
the law provided the legal basis for a practice w e’ve already discussed: the inventory,
valuation, and division of slave property (including the increase of those slaves)

296 H ening 4: 2 2 2 .
297 M orris, Southern S la very a n d the L a w , 66. U nlike V irginia, Barbados w ould not attempt to rescind
its real estate law . T he con n ection s betw een the planters o f Barbados and the planters o f Southside and
Eastern Shore V irginia planters have been explored by April L ee H atfield - it is p o ssib le that these
business and fam ilial co n n ectio n s were a vector for the application o f Barbadian law in V irginia.
H atfield, A tla n tic V irginia, 137-68.
298 H ening 3: 33 3 -5 .
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amongst heirs. Several exceptions were built into the law. For example, sales of
slaves would not be regulated like land sales, slaves could be claimed as return for the
debts of an estate, and slaveholders would not be extended the right to vote unless
they also owned land.
By 1728, the Burgesses confirmed that defining slaves as real estate had been
“very beneficial for the preservation and improvement of estates in this colony.”299
That year, the Burgesses expanded the language of the 1705 law, making clear that
the “true design” of the 1705 law was to ensure the productivity o f inherited lands, a
goal which “[could not] be done, according to the custom and method of improving
estates in this colony, without slaves.”300 By considering slaves as real estate, the
Burgesses argued, the state could “establish a method for settling slaves, and their
increase.”301 In other words, by declaring slaves to be real estate, the Burgesses
sought to capitalize not just on the slaves’ labor, but on their reproductivity as well.
By entailing slaves to the estates upon which they worked, the Burgesses sought to
guarantee that the owners of those lands would have claims to slave labor far into the
future: the “slave or slaves, and their increase, so long as any of them shall be living,
shall descend, pass, and go, as part of the freehold” to an unending line of white

299 H ening 4: 222.
300 H ening 4: 2 2 4 . B y on e m easure, the B u rgesses w ere correct in their observation: the 1705 entail
law had been one o f m any law s written by landow ners to expand and so lid ify their holdings. B y
com m anding slave labor and taking advantage o f inheritance law s that favored the nascent gentry
(those law s, it should be noted, were written by the slaveholders and landow ners th em selv es), property
holdings in the first quarter o f the eighteenth century w ere consolidated into vast fam ily estates.
A nthony Parent has called this process (o f w hich the 1705 law w as one o f the last step s) “the land
grab,” and argues that the gentry con solid ation o f estates via the law w as a co n scio u s, deliberate
process o f increasing their ow n pow er. A nthony Parent, F oul M ean s, 9-5 4 .
301 H ening 4: 2 2 4 .
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owners, their children and heirs.302 To declare slaves to be real estate guaranteed to
heirs not just land, but ownership of human property in perpetuity.
In 1748, the Burgesses revisited the issue of slaves as real estate with a
striking turnaround: the 1705 and 1728 acts “having been found inconvenient, and
not to answer the ends thereby intended,” were summarily repealed.303 “For the
future,” stated the Burgesses, “all slaves whatsoever shall be held, deemed, and taken,
to be chattels personal.”304 Indeed, claimed the Burgesses, to consider slaves as real
estate was to indulge in a dangerous fiction: “slaves are in their nature personal
estate, and not real.”305 This language of slaves’ “nature” is exceptional in the
colonial Virginia statutes - rarely, if ever, did the Burgesses consider slaves’
“nature,” either as people or as property. Therefore, this invocation of “nature”
should be considered as an intentional rhetorical choice. The idea of “Nature” had
powerful, multiple meanings in the eighteenth century.

Nature and Nature’s God

were sites of absolute truth, and to make claims about an object or person’s nature
was to make claims about their core meaning and identity. To make claims about
slaves’ “nature” as property was both to state an undeniable truth claim and to assert a
racialized notion of slaves as salable objects. What had caused a legal reversal that
required such potent language?
The problem lay in the very reproductivity that had made the entailed estates
so advantageous. Entailed estates had become more problematic than profitable,

302 H ening 4: 2 2 5 .
303 H ening 5: 4 3 6 .
304 H ening 5: 4 3 8 -9 .
305 H ening 5: 4 4 0 . Later in the law , the B u rgesses argued that personal estate w as sla v e s’ “natural
cond ition .” H ening 5: 4 4 1 .
306 Schiebinger, N a tu re s’ B o d y ; C haplin, S u b ject M a tte r, Parrish, A m erican C u riosity.
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according to the Burgesses. The Assembly described the ways that the real estate law
had harmed planters:
Because in time [the slaves] overstocked the plantations, and often the tenant
was the proprietor of fee simple land, much fitter for cultivation than his
intailed lands, where he could work his slaves to a much greater advantage.
But on the other hand the frequent removing and settling them on other lands
in other counties and parts of the colony, far distant from the county court,
where the deeds or wills which annexed them were recorded, and the intail
lands lay; the confusion occasioned by their mixture with fee simple names of
the same name and sex, and belonging to the same owner; the uncertainty of
distinguishing one from another, after several generations, no register o f their
genealogy being kept, and none of them having surnames, were great michiefs
[sic] to purchasers, strangers, and creditors.307
Here, the Burgesses imagined a “typical” aggrieved planter, who might own slaves
both in fee simple and in entail, and his entailed slaves could not be moved (without
considerable legal wrangling) from the estate to which they were entailed.
But why had the entail of slaves become a problem for the Burgesses’
idealized planter? This section of the law makes clear that, for slaveholders, the
unruly reproduction of enslaved people had made the real estate law untenable. By
defining slaves as real estate, the Burgesses had made a core aspect of the
profitability of slavery - that slaves were self-reproducing property - unprofitable.
The slaves had “overstocked the plantations” and were, in the eyes of the slaveowner,
sitting idle rather than laboring in his interests. The term “overstocked” is itself a
dehumanizing one, implying the uncontrolled reproduction of livestock animals. The
law created, in the view of slaveholders, artificial categories amongst their human
property: if some slaves on an estate were entailed, and others were not, how should
their “mixture” be categorized? The birth of such “mixed” enslaved children became
legal problems, rather than an expansion of the slaveholders’ property. We see the
307 H ening 4 4 1 -2 .
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discourses of bastardy, slavery, race, and reproductivity intertwining here: it is no
coincidence that this language of “mixed” children recalls the language used to
describe the free mulatto children of free mulatto, black and white women, or the
enslaved children of black mothers and white fathers. There was also the issue of
bureaucracy: slaveholders bristled at the notion that they’d have to carefully record
the complex genealogies of slave families.308
Most egregiously, the law that defined slaves as real estate forced slaveowners
to recognize the family relationships of their slaves. The very practices used to
dehumanize slaves, from denying surnames to separating families, were made
problematic by the real estate law. Since at least 1662, slaves had been denied
surnames (slaves, after all, were children of enslaved mothers - a surname would link
them to fathers, and therefore to legitimacy or even to whiteness). By extension, the
process of enslavement meant that slaves were denied genealogies (slaves’ natal
alienation - to use Orlando Patterson’s term - denied them links to the past and the
future).309 Finally, the real estate law denied slaveholders the opportunity to move or
sell individual slaves at will. Instead, slaves were tied to the land upon which they
were bom, and therefore connected to their families of birth.310 The problem of the
entail law was that, by forcing slaveholders to recognize the familial relationships of
slaves, it forced slaveholders to confront the humanity of their human property.

308 It should be pointed out that, w hen in volved in law suits over the ow nership o f the increase o f
slaves, slaveholders w ere m ore than w illin g to reconstruct the very g en ea lo g ies that were d eem ed so
egregiou s in this 1748 statute. S ee, for exam ple, York JO 2: 4 1 6 -7 , and D O W 19: 172-3.
3 Patterson, S la v e ry a n d S o c ia l D ea th , 7.
310 Lorena W alsh has pointed out that, by entailing sla v es, slaveholders “unintentionally afforded their
bondsp eop le more generational continuity and for a tim e more settled p laces o f residence than w as the
lot o f m ost sla v e s.” W alsh, From C a la b a r to C a rte r's G ro ve , 45.
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Ultimately, the 1748 statute was disallowed by the King in 1751, and slaves
were again considered real estate.311 While it was in the interests of slaveholders to
categorize slaves as personal estate, ultimately, the Crown’s interests (not the least of
which was the upholding of primogeniture, the justification for monarchy itself) won
out.312 Slaves would continue to be considered real estate until the outlawing o f the
entail system in the 1770s.313 All the while, slaveholders were able to hold and
control their estates, whatever category of property slaves were considered. This is
not to say that the debate did not matter. If this was the case, what are we to make of
planters’ complaints so-called “overstocked” plantations? Entailing slaves could only
“work” if planters were willing to record slaves’ geneaologies, allow families to live
and grow together, to take seriously both the maternal and paternal lineages of
enslaved children. In other words, required planters to recognize that enslaved people
were not livestock: slaveholders were forced to confront the humanity of enslaved
peoples’ reproductivity. The attempt to define slaves as personal estate was not just
about maximizing planter profits and holdings. Like the discursive connection drawn
between slaves and livestock, the personal estate law was an attempt by planters to
deny the humanity of their property.
*

*

*

In 1686, William Fitzhugh (the planter discussed earlier who placed the
highest value on so-called “Country bourn” slaves) trumpeted his wealth and

3,1 H ening 5: 5 6 7 .
312 Brewer, B y B irth o r C o n sen t, 22 -4. B ecau se prim ogeniture (including entail) w as the b asis for
m onarchy, any interruption w as a threat. N everth eless, it is important not to misinterpret the 1748
V irginia statute as an attempt at dem ocratizing inheritance. Instead, the 1748 statute w as an attempt to
m ake inheritance practices work in the interests o f the crow n.
313 Brewer, B y B irth o r C on sen t, 22-4.
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financial solvency. After describing his extensive plantation in a letter to Doctor
Ralph Smith, Fitzhugh concluded:
Thus I have given you some particulars, which I thus deduce, the yearly Crops
of com & Tobo. together with the surplusage of meat more than will serve the
family’s use, will amount annually to 60000 lb. Tobo. wch. at 10 shillings P
Ct. is 300 L annum, & the Negroes increase being all young, & a considerable
parcel of breeders, will keep that Stock good for ever. 14
By reducing enslaved black women to “breeders” and their enslaved children to
“increase,” Fitzhugh revealed the logic of racial slavery which exploited black
women’s reproductivity for profit. This reproductive exploitation was part o f an
emerging ideology that demanded the dehumanization of enslaved Africans as a
justification and explanation for their enslavement. By calling women “breeders,”
Fitzhugh implied that black women were little more than animals, like the livestock
he owned and bred for profit. By calling children “increase,” Fitzhugh asserted that
his slaveownership was a for-profit venture, and that claiming black women’s
childbearing was a crucial means of becoming wealthy in the new world. Fitzhugh
saw his wealth, like slavery itself, as perpetual - able to support him and his heirs “for
ever.”
When William Fitzhugh called black women “breeders,” or when Mary
Ludlowe referred to the “brood” of one of her slaves, or when William Byrd II urged
settlers of the malarial Great Dismal Swamp to buy “both sexes, that their Breed may
supply the loss [should older slaves die],” these slaveholders made clear the end result
of the logic of slavery by birth.315 In their personal documents, their legal documents,

314 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d H is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 177.
315 York D O W 5: 82. W illiam Byrd II, “Petition for W astelands in V irginia and North C arolina
C om prising the D ism al S w am p [ 17 2 9 |,” B rock C ollection , 2 5 6 (2 9 ), H untington Library, qtd. in
Parent, F oul M ean s, 232.
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and their state documents, Virginia’s slaveholders defined enslaved people as legally
and linguistically similar to livestock. Did that logic extend to coercive sexual
exploitation of black women for the purposes of breeding? There is every reason to
assume that it did. The fact that explicit textual examples of slave breeding don’t
seem to exist for this period should not give a false sense o f the realities of slavery by
birth. Indeed, the commonplace use o f language such as “brood,” “breeder,”
“increase,” and “profit,” makes clear that, far from such practices lacking specific
evidence, they were part of the foundational logic of slavery.316 The fact that such
casual language of livestock and breeding so permeated whites’ writing makes clear
that breeding intentions (if not outright coercion) were the rule, not the exception.
Anglo-Virginian culture was so saturated with the idea of slave breeding that the
practice was barely worth articulating. Seen in this light, all slaveholding in the
colonies should be considered a form of slave breeding, since all slaveholding was
predicated on the idea of ownership not just of enslaved women, but of their
childbearing capacity as well.
If this was the case, did Fitzhugh, Ludlowe, and Byrd literally think o f black
women as animals? Jennifer Morgan has argued that categorizing enslaved people as
livestock was about humiliating black women, not about a literal belief in black
women’s lack of humanity: “An enslaved person was branded ‘like’ an animal in
■y

order to humiliate, not because she was an animal and was insensate.”

|7

This may be

the case, but it should be noted that the documents where the language o f livestock

316 Jennifer M organ argues that w hile no on e in the Caribbean “articulated a p osition on the lo g ic o f
‘breed in g’ the en sla v ed ,” the lo g ic o f breeding w as an “inherent supposition” o f racial slavery.
M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 128. S ee also, Fischer, S u sp e c t R ela tio n s, 165-6 and Parent, F oul M ean s,
232.
317 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 105.
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and breeding appeared (letters, wills, legal documents) were meant exclusively for
white readers. Instead, the language of livestock and breeding was just one of the
ways that whites desensitized themselves to the humanity of those they enslaved.
Because that language was part of the day-to-day exigencies of slaveownership, it
exposes the ways in which emerging understandings of innate racial hierarchy were
inherent in the very basis of slaveowning as an institution and as a practice.
Nevertheless, if reproductivity provided slaveholders a language with which
to deny the humanity of the people they enslaved, the debate over real and personal
estate shows us that that same reproductivity forced slaveholders to confront that
humanity as well. Ultimately, the language of livestock used by slaveholders reveals
the deep dualities and contradictions inherent in the exploitation of black women’s
reproductivity. For enslaved women, childbearing could be an act of extraordinary
hope and agency - literally a visceral means of creating humanity in the midst of
inhumanity.318 On the other hand, enslaved women’s childbearing contributed to the
profits, and ultimately the power, of their oppressors.319 How did women make
choices about childbearing in this context? Were there ways that women could
exercise their agency within their reproductive lives? If reproductivity was
foundational to the coercive power of slavery, could it also be a site of resistance?

318 Jennifer M organ em p h asizes this hopefulness. M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 116-19.
319 D orothy Roberts em p h asizes the w a y s that, both during and after slavery, black w o m en ’s
childbearing “profited the system that subjugated [them ].” D orothy R oberts, K illin g the B lack B ody:
R ace, R eprodu ction , a n d th e M ean in g o f L ib e rty (N Y : V intage, 1997), 4 0 -1 .
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CHAPTER 2
Wicked, Dangerous, and Ungoverned:
The Transgressive Possibilities of Reproduction

In 1692, years after Mary Walters was freed by her former master, Isaac
Collyer, Walters sued Collyer’s widow, Mary Bennit, “for the unjust detention &
withholding” of W alters’ child.320 Now a free black woman, Walters had been freed
by Collyer some time previously. Mary W alters’ claim to her child’s freedom was
rooted in the 1662 law of slavery by birth: Mary claimed that her child had been bom
after she had been freed. Corroborating this claim, M ary’s husband Joseph testified
that his wife “was with child when she was freed from Collyer.”321 Mary Bennit
disagreed, arguing that the child “was borne in the time of its mother
being.. .Collyer’s slave.”322 Indeed, Bennit claimed, the child was bom “a long time
before” Collyer freed Mary Walters.323 Several witnesses corroborated Mary
Bennit’s testimony, and ultimately the court sided with Bennit. Because Mary
Walters’ child was bom to an enslaved mother (regardless of her current status), that
child was rightfully a slave for life. Mary and Joseph Walters went home without
their child.
Mary Walters was summoned back to court a year later. This time, Mary was
the defendant in an assault and battery case. Mary, the court claimed, “hath most
notoriously & wickedly abused [Elizabeth Sampson] not only by words but alsoe by

320 York D O W 9: 155. T he child w as never named in the court records. Mary (C ollyer) B ennit had
remarried after the death o f Isaac C ollyer.
321 York D O W 9: 179.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
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blows & offered great violence upon her.”324 Mary was punished with “29 lashes on
her bare back” and then imprisoned until she could “give sec[urity] for her future
good behavior.”325 However, the court was not satisfied with this straightforward
punishment. The justices argued that Mary’s life, which they described as “wicked &
dangerous” and “ungoverned,” would “prove of dangerous consequence if some
cause be not speedily taken to prevent her.”326 Therefore, the court determined, Mary
W alters’ bond would not be collected to guarantee her good behavior - it would
instead finance her “transportation out of this colony.”
The deportation order against Mary Walters was rooted in the court’s newly
adopted belief that Mary was not in fact a free woman. The justices accused Mary of
fraud, saying that her “pretence o f being a free Negro” was unsustainable because
Mary was “not.. .in the least capable of maintaining the same.”328 Just a year
previously, the court, based on the testimony of Mary, her husband, and her former
mistress, had implicitly believed that Mary had been freed from slavery. Ultimately,
this former stance changed because since that ruling, Mary Walters had become a
problem - a violent, angry, unpredictable problem. Mary’s racial status, along with
her inability to prove her history o f slavery and freedom, gave the court an
opportunity to literally make that problem go away.
Mary W alters’ story is one of transgressing the lines of power that organized
colonial Virginia society. It is also a story of how those transgressions were met by a
colonial court willing to reverse its own decisions in order to enforce the racial social

324 York D O W 9: 270.
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 York D O W 9: 297.
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order. As a free black woman, Mary challenged her former mistress in court at a time
when the rights of free black people were being increasingly curtailed in the
colony.329 The court, of course, held the upper hand: no matter how convincing
Mary’s testimony, the court decided in the favor o f Mary’s white mistress. The
language of the later case, in which Mary is described as “wicked,” “dangerous,” and,
significantly, “ungovemed,” shows the ways that Mary’s life and actions transgressed
the increasingly calcified racial hierarchy of the colony. Mary’s violence was
interpreted by the court as a lack of proper discipline and deference - as a lack of
mastery. For the court, the answer to Mary’s lack of govemability was to reverse its
own decision and recategorize Mary as a slave. Fascinatingly, the court did not
attempt to actually re-enslave Mary: she was so “ungovemed” that they banished her
altogether. This reversal by the court, ironically, exposed the fallibility of that
institution and the limits of their power. As we will see, this was a prerogative
claimed more than once by the court: met with a black or mixed-race free person
who transgressed lines of racial and gendered power, the court was more than willing
to change course in order to maintain dominance.
Mary W alters’ story also shows the centrality of reproduction to women’s
lives and subjectivity in this colonial space. The cmx of Mary W alters’ lawsuit
against Mary Bennit was a dispute over Mary W alters’ reproductive history,
specifically whether the birth of her child occurred before or after she was freed.
From the distance of centuries, we can’t discern what caused the conflicting timelines
in the testimonies of Mary Walters and Mary Bennit. Nor can we assert that the rage
329 D ou glas D eal, “A C onstricted W orld: Free B lack s on V irgin ia’s Eastern Shore, 1 6 8 0 -1 7 5 0 ,” in
C o lo n ia l C h esa p ea k e S o ciety, ed. L ois Green Carr, Philip D . M organ and Jean B. R usso (C hapel Hill:
U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 1988), 2 7 5 -3 0 5 .
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that boiled over in Mary W alters’ fight with Elizabeth Sampson was in any way
related to the Mary’s loss of her child. Nonetheless, Mary W alters’ violent rage - a
rage that so shocked the colonial authorities that they demanded she leave the colony
- calls to mind Frantz Fanon’s observation that “the violence which has ruled over the
ordering of the colonial world... that same violence will be claimed and taken over by
the native.”330 It is hard to imagine that Mary W alters’ rage was not in some part
fueled by the violent injustices she had endured, one example of which was the loss
of her child to the exploitation of colonial slavery by either an accident o f that child’s
birth or a misrepresentation of that birth by M ary’s former mistress.
In creating and enforcing the law of slavery by birth, Virginia’s lawmakers
sought to erect an absolute legal and social structure: slavery and freedom were
linked to race, and race was marked by birth. By building this legal structure on the
foundation of bastardy law, the planter elite had created a system in which
illegitimacy laws were enforced on the basis of race. White women’s illegitimate
children were subject to some labor, enslaved black women’s children (all of whom
were treated as illegitimate) were subject to lifelong, inherited slavery, and mixedrace children were subject to ever increasing amounts of unfree labor. This link
between illegitimacy and servitude also impacted white women and free women of
color, who were punished with forced servitude for the crime of bastardy. Seen in
this light, the creation of racial slavery was an exercise of patriarchal power: slavery
was the ability of a particular group of men to define, claim, discipline, and capitalize
upon the reproductivity of women. As was discussed in Chapter One, the effect this

330 Frantz Fanon, The W retch ed o f the E arth (N Y : G rove Press, 1963), 40.
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system had on women varied by their race and status, but, because all women’s births
were on some level suspect, all women were subject to these laws.
Even as Virginia’s patriarchs, via their colonial government, sought to create
an airtight system, cracks still appeared. Hidden in the court documents are stories of
women who defied authority, either intentionally or not, and sought to create lives for
themselves and their children: their outlaw reproduction is the focus of this chapter.
My goal here is to understand how some women could make power work in their own
interests even in the face of the overwhelming discursive power of colonialism and
racial slavery. Ultimately, the process of creating colonialism and racial slavery in
Virginia inadvertently created possibilities for the transgression o f those very
systems. First, even in attempting to create an absolute legal structure, Virginia’s
lawmakers created spaces for individual women to find ways to use the law and the
culture to protect themselves and their children. W e’ve seen this in Mary W alters’
case, when she tried (albeit unsuccessfully) to sue her former mistress. Second, on a
cultural level, the assertion of patriarchal power through colonialism and racial
slavery, in a sense, created its opposite: patriarchal Virginia created a world in which
reproduction could carry the keys to freedom, personhood, and familial stability.
Specifically, free black families like the Walters family, who existed outside o f the
dualistic framework of racial slavery, challenged the notion that blackness and
slavery were absolutely linked. In some cases (like Mary W alters’), the court would
reassert its power and authority; in others, free black families found ways to continue
their lives outside of the boundaries set by colonial elites. While these patterns of
transgression should not be overestimated - the power o f colonialism, especially in
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the form of racial slavery, was devastating on both an individual and a systemic level
- the actions of women who transgressed lines of power and authority must be
recognized.
This chapter aims to uncover outlaw reproduction in the context of
colonialism and racial slavery. How could reproduction be a site for transgression in
a culture of overwhelming domination? First, I will explain the theoretical
underpinnings for my understanding of transgression within systems o f domination.
Second, I will explore the meanings of transgression in the reproductive lives of
women in Virginia’s colonial culture. Finally, I will attempt to reconstruct the lives
of two women and their families who straddled the color line in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Virginia. These two family histories emphasize the ways that
marginalized women’s reproduction could unsettle the foundations of early Virginia’s
systems o f racial hierarchy and racial slavery.

From resistance to transgression
In this discussion thus far, I have tried to avoid using the term “resistance” in
favor of another term and another framework: transgression. Attention to people’s
resistance to structural power has been absolutely central to the development of
histories “from the bottom up,” especially histories of slavery.

1

Historians of

women in slavery, in particular, have focused on understanding the ways that
resistance, accommodation, and domination were intertwined in a complex matrix.

331 For exam p les o f the centrality o f resistance to the historiography o f A m erican slavery, see: John W .
B lassin gam e, The S la ve C om m unity: P la n ta tio n L ife in th e A n tebellu m South (N Y : O xford U niversity
Press, 1972); E ugene G en o v ese, Roll, Jordan , R oll: The W orld the S la ve s M a d e (N Y : V intage, 1976);
M organ, S la ve Counterpoint', Sterling Stuckey, S la ve C u ltu re: N a tio n a list T h eory a n d the
F ou n dation s o f B la ck A m erica (N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 1987).
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W omen’s resistance to slavery ran the gamut from nonviolent protest (such as work
slowdowns) to armed rebellion, but women’s role as the primary caretakers for
children made them differently invested than men in preserving their safety and their
children’s safety.332 Because of their role as mothers, women’s resistance often took
on different forms and had different priorities than men’s resistance. Acknowledging
the complexity not only of enslaved women’s resistance but of historians’ debate
about that resistance, Jennifer Morgan argues that historians must avoid seeing
resistance and accommodation as an absolute binary, as such a dualism “suggests an
ability to clearly delineate the meaning of various behaviors and does so while
suggesting that there is consensus about the terms in play.”

For Morgan, resistance

is a meaningful concept only if we understand it fully in the context of the domination
of slavery. Otherwise, well-meaning historians run the risk of reducing enslaved
people to “imaginary automatons” forever trapped in a “vacuum of perpetual
resistance.”334 In other words, resistance itself - as a way to understand agency, as a
way to understand the relationship between individuals and power, as a way to
understand change in social and historical systems - is a concept under debate.
In this chapter, I draw on three bodies of theory to provide a framework for
understanding the relationship between power and women’s resistance to that power
in the context of the law of slavery by birth, where reproduction was understood as
332 On the variety o f form s o f w o m en ’s resistance in colon ial slavery, see B eck les, N a tu ra l R e b e ls,
156-7. S ee also: Stephanie M . H. C am p, “T he Pleasures o f R esistance: E nslaved W om en and B ody
P olitics in the Plantation South, 1 8 3 0 -1 8 6 1 ,” N ew S tu d ies in th e H isto ry o f A m erica n S la very, ed.
Edward B aptist and Stephanie Cam p (A thens: U niversity o f G eorgia Press, 2 0 0 6 ), 8 6 -1 2 4 ; M organ,
L aborin g W om en, 166-195; Deborah Gray W hite, A r ’n ’t I a W oman ? F em ale S la v e s in th e P la n ta tio n
South (N Y : N orton, 1985), 76 -8 4 ; B etty W ood , “S o m e A sp ects o f Fem ale R esistance to Chattel
Slavery in L ow Country G eorgia, 1 7 6 3 -1 8 1 5 ,” The S la ve ry R ea d er, ed. Gad H eum an and Jam es
W alvin (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 3 ), 5 5 1 -6 8 .
333 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 166-7.
334 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 167.
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part of a nexus of sexuality, race, and servitude. Michel Foucault’s definition of
power - as emerging from multiple points within a discursive field - demands that we
acknowledge the power held by all actors within a structure, even those with less (or
seemingly no) formal authority. Readers of Foucault in feminist and queer theories
have offered possibilities for rethinking the ways that transgressive lives or actions
that expose the artificiality of structures of power can weaken, or at least expose, the
foundations of that power. Finally, postcolonial theorists have grappled with the
relationship between the academic and the historical subject, questioning whether
historians and other academics can recover the lives and voices of those at the bottom
of hierarchies. This chapter is informed by a reading of all of these bodies of theory.
Foucault reminds us that discursive structures o f dominance contain within
them the means for their own transgression: resistance is rooted in, springs from, and
therefore reflects the very power it counteracts. For Foucault, power “must be
understood...as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which
they operate and which constitute their own organization.”

lie

Foucault’s

poststructuralist understanding of power, in other words, frames power as not held by
or embodied in those at the top of hierarchies, but instead as emanating from and
between (and thus able to be claimed by) people at all levels of society. The point
here is not to deny the existence of hierarchy, but instead to recognize the ways that
power is made, remade, and exchanged in the intimate zones where individuals
interact.336 Foucault alerts us that, if power is understood as intimate or multiple
(i.e., not simply held by rulers), then resistance to power is simultaneously as

335 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 92.
336 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 4 4 -6 ; Stoler, “Intim idations o f Em pire,” 3.
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universal and as multiple as power itself. Again, Foucault’s poststructuralist stance
allows for a rethinking of power and resistance as emanating from individuals, rather
from classes. Foucault argues:
[Power relations’] existence depends on a multiplicity of points of
resistance.... These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power
network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt,
source of all rebellions, or pure law o f the revolutionary. Instead there is a
plurality of resistances, each of them a special case.

1T7

In this context of multiple power relations, even people at the bottom of hierarchies
influenced the cultural systems in which they lived.338
Foucault’s definition of power and understanding of resistance have been
critiqued, reframed, and expanded by other theorists, notably feminist theorists and
post-colonial theorists. Some feminist critics have argued that Foucault’s discussion
of the multiplicity of power relations denies the existence of structural power, and
thus would seem to deny the reality of men’s oppression of women (or even, we
might surmise, slaveholders’ oppression of those they enslaved).

However,

Foucault’s critique of totalizing theories of power still acknowledged that power was
337 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 95 -6 .
338 Kirsten F ischer fram es w o m en ’s resistance in colon ial N orth C arolina in ju st th ese Foucauldian
terms, arguing that “far from being p assive recipients o f a n ew social order, [w o m en ’s] resistance and
accom m odations to the e x ig e n c ie s o f bio-p ow er fundam entally influenced race relations in the colon ial
setting.” I address F oucault’s notion o f biop ow er in Chapter 4. Fischer, S u sp ect R ela tio n s, 6-7.
339 S om e radical fem inist and so cia list fem in ist theorists sharply critiqued this aspect o f F ou cau lt’s
theories, arguing that by d en yin g structure, Foucault m ade it im possible for oppressed groups to
organize for their o w n liberation. S ee, for exam ple, N ancy Hartsock, “Foucault on Power: A T heory
for W om en?” in F em in ism /P ostm odern ism , ed. Linda J. N ich olson (N Y : R outledge, 1990), 157-175. I
find more co n v in cin g the more measured critique o f Susan B ordo, w ho praises the attention to
com p lexity, heterogeneity, and resistance by Foucault and other poststructuralists and postm odernists,
w hile still cautioning against a “m eth od ologism ” w hich w ould elevate his theories to a new canon.
Further, Bordo su ggests that p ostm odernism ’s attention to heterogeneity and differen ce is rooted in
sim ilar attention paid by fem inism and other social ju stice m ovem ents. Susan B ordo, “F em inism ,
Postm odernism , and G en der-Skepticism ,” in F em in ism /P ostm odern ism , 133-156.
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focused in the hands of the few. Foucault’s theories allow that power can and does
coalesce into systems of domination through the repetition of particular discourses of
power. Importantly, though, because they emerge in a discursive field, these systems
of domination are never absolute: for Foucault, power is “a multiple and mobile field
of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable effects of
domination are produced.”340 Rather than seeing power as a result o f domination,
Foucault sees domination as the effect o f power.
Foucault reminds us that even as discourses are repeated, they are tenuous and
unstable - indeed, the incessant repetition of discourses exposes their instability. In
Chapter One, we have seen how this operated in the creation of a culture of inherited
racial slavery in early Virginia: repeated discursive patterns created the possibility
for particular kinds of reproduction to be tied to perpetual labor, and for particular
kinds of property ownership to be tied to certain women’s reproductivity. The system
of racial slavery in early Virginia, while clearly a system of domination, was also an
unstable one in significant ways. We have seen this in the debates over realty and
personalty discussed in Chapter One: power had coalesced in the hands o f planters
through their exploitation of black women’s reproductivity. The debate over real and
personal property revealed the inability of the elite to control the very discourses of
reproductivity, servitude, and race upon which racial slavery depended. Drawing on
this foundation, this chapter explores the ways that women could exploit these sites of
instability for their own and their children’s benefit.
If systems of power are inherently unstable, then resistance to power can take
myriad forms. Feminist theorist Johanna Oksala uses the twin concepts of
340 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 102.
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transgression and limit-experiences to understand some of the forms resistance can
take in a Foucauldian framework. Oksala’s reading of Foucault’s theory offers a
compelling model for thinking about how bodily experiences can pose challenges to
discourses of power. Drawing on Foucault, Oksala argues that:
Limit and transgression are irrevocably tied to each other; they constitute each
other and constantly reaffirm and contest each other. Transgression creates a
limit that exists only in the movement that crosses it. It literally crosses over
the limits and thus brings and explicit experience of limits into being.341
In other words, the relationship between limit and transgression is parallel to the
relationship between domination and resistance. Limits are unknown before they are
crossed; attempts at domination are resisted. But what do these transgressions look
like, and why do they matter?
Oksala outlines three modes of transgression that she terms “limitexperiences,” or experiences that exist on the edges of discourse and, as such,
transgress cultural boundaries.342 These limit-experiences are useful to us here in
understanding the relationship between resistance and domination. First, and most
obviously, limit-experiences transgress lines of power, crossing over from what is
perceived as normal, legal, or permissible, to that which is deemed abnormal, illegal,
or impermissible. In terms of this discussion of reproduction in colonial Virginia,
illegitimate births, by definition, transgressed lines of power by standing as
undeniable evidence of sexuality outside of the narrow boundaries of patriarchal
marriage. Second, Oksala discusses limit-experiences that transgress lines of
341 Johanna O ksala, “A narchic B odies: Foucault and the F em inist Q uestion o f E xperien ce,” H yp a tia
19, no. 4 (2 0 0 4 ), 110.
342 O ksala, “A narchic B o d ie s,” 112.
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knowledge, crossing over from the intelligible and understandable to the unspeakable
and unknowable. In this study, w e’ve already seen how cross-racial births pushed the
boundaries of knowledge, as lawmakers struggled to categorize and make sense of
babies that challenged boundaries of race, servitude, and freedom. The birth o f free
interracial children challenged the dualistic framework of racial slavery, in which
slavery and blackness were co-defmed. Finally, limit-experiences transgress
boundaries of subjectivity, as people move from understanding their place in social
categories and hierarchies to being “[thrown] outside of ourselves,” and outside of
normativity.343 Again, cross-racial births provide an example of this kind of limitexperience, but this time, we must imagine or discern what it meant to individuals to
live outside or in the liminal spaces o f the rigid hierarchies of colonial Virginia’s
racial discourse.344
Oksala’s framing of limit-experiences as transgressing various boundaries
trains our eye away from mass revolution (the mythical “soul of revolt,” in Foucault’s
acerbic phrasing) to the meanings of individual interactions. Understanding the
meanings of transgression requires attention to local spaces, intimate zones, and
individuals in a discursive field. But are these individual interactions meaningful in a
political sense? Biddy Martin argues that, if neither power nor resistance emerges
from a central locus, then “a very different form of political organization and struggle

343 O skala, “A narchic B o d ies,” 113.
344 Greg D en in g em p h asizes the lim inality o f colon ial identities, sin ce co lo n ia l sp aces were “p laces o f
am bivalence and unset d efin ition .” Greg D en in g, “Introduction: In Search o f a M etaphor,” Through a
G la ss D a rk ly: R eflectio n s on P erso n a l Id en tity in E a rly A m erica (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f North
Carolina Press, 1997), 2. In his introduction to P o ssib le P a sts, Robert Blair St. G eorge em p h asizes
that this lim inality w as part o f a process o f “b ecom in g c o lo n ia l,” a p rocess that w as alw a y s occurring
for all p eop le, as they shaped and were shaped by the colo n ia l project. St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 4 -5.
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suggests itself.”345 For Martin, seemingly fragmented, individual, incoherent, or
under-theorized transgression may indeed be deeply effective, because it is the local
struggle that undermines the repetition of discourses of power. Martin’s recognition
of local struggles is profoundly useful in recognizing the complex political meanings
of women’s lives and choices in the context of colonialism. For example, even as
New World slavery was an Atlantic phenomenon, its myriad local formations (such
as Virginia’s conflation of illegitimacy with labor) demonstrate the ways that even
global phenomenon had specific local iterations. Early American historian Robert
Blair St. George uses the term “vernacular theory” to describe the development of
local discourses of power, authority, and resistance in colonial American spaces - a
concept strikingly parallel to Martin’s discussion of a localized feminist politics.346
Our task here, then, is to uncover the ways that transgressive lives or experiences
challenged the emerging vernacular theory of colonialism in Virginia, or may have
created alternative vernacular theories themselves.
My point is not to exaggerate the power of individuals, but to recognize the
ways that individuals can destabilize the cultural systems that frame their lives.
Indeed, queer theory and lesbian history’s analysis of queer lives within the context of
heteronormativity allows that, for marginalized people within discursive power
structures, simply living - if living is understood as occurring within and against a
constructed framework of gender and sexuality - might be understood as a form of
subversion. Judith Butler argues that “heterosexuality must be understood as a

345 B iddy Martin, “F em in ism , C riticism , and F oucault,” in F em inism a n d F ou cau lt: R eflectio n s on
R esista n ce , ed. Irene D iam ond and L ee Q uinby (B oston , M A: Northeastern U n iversity Press, 1988),
9 -1 0 .
346 St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 10.
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compulsive and compulsory repetition that can only produce the effect of its own
originality.”347 If this is the case, then queer performances (like drag or
butch/femme) destabilize heterosexuality by emphasizing its repetition. There is an
analogy to be made here: if, like heterosexuality, racial hierarchy and separation
were compulsively reiterated (as w e’ve seen with the discursive repetitions that
created slavery), then outlaw reproduction could expose this anxious repetition.
Martha Vicinus argues for the centrality of lesbian histories precisely because lesbian
sexualities pose a threat to the dominant culture by pointing to the “social danger
inherent in women’s economic and sexual independence.”348 Again, an analogous
reading is necessary here: outlaw reproduction exposed the limitations and
boundaries of the cultural and legal culture of inherited racial slavery.
This reading of queer theory intends to show possibilities for foregrounding
the transgressive possibilities of women’s experiences in colonialism. The intention
of my reading of Butler and other queer theorists is not to argue that all lives lived are
transgressive. Instead, I wish to emphasize that lives lived (and babies bom) in
liminal, marginal, or outlaw spaces give the lie to the racial and gender categories and
hierarchies that slaveholders’ discourse labored to create and naturalize. To connect
this discussion of queer theory to Oksala’s framework of limit-experiences, the limitexperiences of queer and transgender sexualities transgress boundaries of power,
knowledge, and subjectivity by rejecting what is seen as “normal,” forcing the
unspoken to be spoken, and creating spaces for identities outside of rigid categories.

347 Judith Butler, “Im itation and G ender Insubordination” in The S eco n d W ave: A R e a d e r in F em in ist
T h eory, ed. Linda N ich o lso n (N Y : R outledge, 1997), 307.
348 Martha V icin u s, “L esbian History: A ll Theory and no facts or all facts and no theory?” in The
F em in ist H isto ry R ea d er, ed. Sue M organ (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 0 6 ), 2 2 0 -1 , 228.
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To be clear: I am not arguing that race and sexuality are/were constructed by
identical processes, but instead that queer theory offers a particularly compelling
insight into the power of transgressive identities by focusing on the ways that daily
interactions can destabilize cultural systems.349
In his study of interracial marriages in nineteenth-century Virginia, Joshua
Rothman argues that formally illegal relationships were tolerated by neighbors and
the authorities, so long as the participants did not push the boundaries of their status,
claim power that the community defined as undue, or allow their relationships to
become too publicly known.350 This reading of early American community relations
points to a way for us to understand the relationship between people’s transgressive
lives - whether defined by illegal marriages or outlaw reproduction - and community
norms. Transgressions like illegitimacy or interracial births could be tolerated or
even absorbed by the community when such absorption was in the interest o f colonial
power structures: the clearest example of this is the ways that black women’s
interracial children were absorbed into slavery because planters profited from this
form o f interracial birth. White women’s interracial births, on the other hand, were
too transgressive, and were punished harshly. On the other hand, we will see the
many ways that other forms of transgressive births - births by white servant women,

349 For a fem inist d iscu ssio n o f the parallels betw een the em erging d iscou rses o f race and sexuality, see
M cW horter, “S ex , R ace, and B iop ow er,” 3 8 -6 2 . M cW horter argues that the discourse o f race em erged
in a manner parallel and sim ultaneous to the em ergen ce o f a discourse o f sexu ality as described by
Foucault. For another Foucauldian reading that parallels the em ergen ce o f race and the em ergen ce o f
sexuality, see Stoler, R a ce a n d the E du cation o f D esire. Stoler argues that ou tsid e o f The H isto ry o f
S exu ality, Foucault considered d eep ly the p o litics o f racial discou rses, and that by rereading The
H isto ry o f S ex u a lity via F oucault’s ow n ideas and the history o f em pire, w e can c o m e to a fuller
understanding o f the form ation and transformation o f the b ourgeois d iscou rses that have marked the
modern world.
350 Rothman, N o to rio u s in the N eigh borh ood.
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births by free white women, and so on - might be tolerated so long as they did not
pose too much of a challenge to colonial power.
The project here, then, is to recover the transgressive possibilities of women’s
reproductive experiences in colonialism, even while understanding the limits of such
a knowledge-project. If poststructural feminist and queer theories are concerned with
recognizing transgressive power within systems o f domination, postcolonial theories
are engaged in a similar project - and particularly interested in the difficulties of
recognizing and naming those transgressions. Homi Bhabha emphasizes that in the
discursive field of colonialism, where colonial power depended on the construction of
a subaltern “other” in order to justify its own dominance, “subaltern social groups
were also in a position to transgress the authority of those who had hegemonic
power.”351 Understanding the politics of subaltern transgressions requires
reconstructing colonized subjectivities, a task that Gayatri Spivak has both demanded
and problematized in her influential essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”352 Spivak’s
framing is useful here for two reasons: her critique of the Western intellectual, and
her understanding of colonized subjectivities. Spivak points out that if colonial
power was constantly being reinscribed in the local context, it continues to be
reinscribed by the intellectual (or, in this case, the historian). Her critique is aimed
squarely at Foucault, who, she argues, reinscribes his own position as a Western
intellectual even as he critiques the notion of a unified subjectivity.353 Significantly,
Spivak does not reject Foucault wholesale, but instead forces us to consider the

351 H om i Bhabha, “U nsatisfied: N otes on Vernacular C osm op olitan ism ,” in Gregory C astle, ed.
P o stc o lo n ia l D isco u rses: A n A n th o lo g y (M alden, M A: W iley -B la ck w ell, 2 0 0 1 ), 50.
352 Indeed, Spivak problem atizes the very notion o f the “subaltern” as a category o f identity or
experience at all. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 6 6 -1 1 1 .
353 Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?” 67.
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limitations o f his (or any theorist’s) ideas and subjectivity. Spivak requires a constant
intellectual vigilance on the part of the intellectual to divest themselves from colonial
power even as they recognize that they are imbricated in that same power.
Second, Spivak’s discussion of colonized subjectivities points to ways that we
might consider and understand the transgressive experiences of colonized peoples,
even while recognizing the limitations of our understandings. She points to the
“epistemic violence” of colonization, which repetitively elides the subjectivities and
experiences of the subaltern (a process we’ve already seen in the deployment of
discourses of livestock in the creation of chattel slavery in Virginia).354 The point is
not that the subaltern cannot speak, but that her voice is so hard to hear across the
distances of differing experiences, chasms of time, and the purposive violence and
silencing characteristic of colonialism and slavery. Further, embedded in Spivak’s
concept of “epistemic violence” is the crucial understanding that colonized people’s
subjectivities did exist within colonization, however silenced by the colonial archive
and transformed by the experience of colonization itself.
Therefore, recognizing these silencing processes requires a hopeful reading of
the archive: in the words of historian Ania Loomba, we must “suppose a presence
which at first cannot be found."255 For Loomba, reading intently for the subjectivities
of women who “survived to tell the tale” allows us to get closer to understanding
those subjectivities within the context of the structures that silenced them.356 My

354 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 76.
355 L oom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o T a les,” 3 1 9 , em phasis in original.
356 L oom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o T a les,” 3 1 9 . L oom b a’s radical contextualization o f subaltern
w o m en ’s su b jectivities has m uch in com m on w ith Linda A lc o f f s con cep t o f a historicized
“position ality” in her rethinking o f fem in ist identity p olitics in a poststructuralist fram ework: “The
positional d efin itio n ...m a k e s [w om an ’s] identity relative to a constantly shifting con text, to a situation
that in clu d es a network o f elem en ts in volvin g others, the ob jective econ om ic con d ition s, cultural and
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approach here is inspired by the hopefulness of Loomba, but tempered by the
cautiousness of Spivak. The early Virginia archive, made up of court records and
other elite documents, is itself an artifact o f domination. One unarticulated but
present purpose of these documents was to do epistemic violence to colonized
subjects, be they women, enslaved or free African-Americans, or Native Americans a silencing of these voices and experiences via framing those subjectivities in the
terms of the dominant culture. Even so, for the women whose reproductive lives
crossed boundaries or complicated categories, these documents record that
transgression, not least because this boundary-crossing posed a challenge to power.
My examination may not necessarily reconstruct subaltern subjectivities, but it does
aim to make sense of the transgressive effects of those subjectivities.
To summarize, my goal in this chapter is to understand the ways that
individual women’s reproductivity could destabilize the seemingly solid, but always
tenuous, discursive formations that constructed inherited racial slavery in colonial
Virginia. Foucault’s poststructuralist understanding of power within discursive fields
reminds us that, even as power was consolidated in particular groups (read: the
slaveowning planter class in colonial Virginia), individuals at the bottom of
hierarchies could exercise power to influence their worlds. Indeed, as Virginia’s
planters tried to construct a society based on the twin dualisms of race (black vs.
white) and labor (slave vs. free), people who defied or blurred those dualisms could
pose a challenge to the system as a whole. This challenge could take as simple but
profound a form as the birth of a child. To seek out these transgressions is not to
political institutions and id eo lo g ies, and so on.” L inda A lc o ff, “Cultural F em inism versus PostStructuralism: T he Identity C risis in F em inist T heory,” in The S eco n d W ave: A R e a d e r in F em inist
Theory, ed. Linda N ich o lso n (N Y : R outledge, 1997), 347.
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ascribe to marginalized people some universal resistant subjectivity, but to try to
recognize the fissures in the system that allowed marginalized people to live their
lives. Further, the goal is not to underestimate the overwhelming power of systems of
domination like slavery, but instead to recognize how incredibly difficult
marginalized lives within those systems could be.
Recovering the stories of the women who “survived to tell the tale” in early
Virginia’s culture of inherited racial slavery is a complex task. This is further
complicated by the exigencies of reproduction in early Virginia. The events of
women’s reproductive lives - the birth of a child, the outlaw pregnancy, the intent to
limit one’s reproduction - are not so easily categorized as “resistance” or
“accommodation.” Instead, I tend to see these events as examples o f transgression
rather than resistance. As was described in Chapter 1, Virginia’s intersecting
hierarchies of race, labor, gender, and status were framed by discourses of
reproduction; lawmakers tried to use reproduction to create and police race and labor
categories. Simultaneously, reproduction also complicated those very categories:
interracial children, bastard births, and other births that crossed categories
destabilized hierarchies and blurred divisions. My focus here is to understand the
effects of the choices that women (both enslaved and not) made that transgressed or
complicated the structures of power in which they lived. In this way, my concern is
less about resistant intent than with transgressive effect. I seek to uncover the limitexperiences of women whose lives transgressed boundaries of power, of knowledge,
and of subjectivity, in a colonial space in which those boundaries were constantly
being constructed and reconstructed. The particularities of reproduction within
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colonialism - especially in a culture defined by inherited racial slavery - meant that
all women’s reproduction had political meaning. Because status (whether in terms of
race or labor) was marked by birth, birth itself carried significant potential political
power.

Transgressive Reproduction
An examination of the transgressive possibilities of reproduction in early
Virginia is undoubtedly attenuated by the available archive: the surviving court
records and plantation documents are, by definition, artifacts of the systems of
domination in the colony. This does not mean that all of the births recorded in the
archive transgressed social and cultural boundaries. For example, the required birth
records submitted by parishes recorded all white women’s births, both legitimate and
illegitimate (parishes were not required to record the births of slaves, though some
did). Nevertheless, the county courts’ records of births did focus on outlaw
reproduction - those births that caused problems, created legal crises, or challenged
social hierarchies. Indeed, it was because these births transgressed social and cultural
boundaries that they produced discursive effects. Further, planters’ records
sometimes provide clues for how enslaved women’s reproductivity could interrupt the
plantation economy. Therefore, the character of the early Virginia archive makes an
attention to transgression (rather than resistance) especially useful. In all but the
rarest of cases, I can’t begin to assert the intent of the women who bore these children
- their subjectivities are assiduously elided by the men who wrote the documents.
Nevertheless, some women’s transgressive actions left traces in the court records.

139

In the following section, I will examine how the Virginia court documents
(and, in some cases, other records) offer up some ways that women’s reproductivity
transgressed the lines of the increasingly calcifying systems of domination of early
Virginia. My analysis is organized, with some blurring and a few exceptions, by
women’s status: the pathways to and meanings of transgressive reproduction were
profoundly different if a woman was white, black, or mixed race, as well as whether
she was indentured, enslaved, or free. I first focus on the transgressive reproductivity
of white women, whose experience was complicated and defined by their status as
servants or free women. Then, I examine the possibility that black women’s
reproductivity in slavery could have transgressive meanings. The transgressive
reproductivity of free women of color, especially mixed-race women and their
families, is examined in depth in the next section.
White women’s reproductivity was transgressive of colonial systems of
domination in a number of ways. As we will see, for white women, transgressive
reproductivity took a number of forms depending on whether they were free or
indentured. Some free women simply defied the disciplinary power of the court by
escaping trial or punishment when they bore children outside of marriage. For
English servant women who bore bastard children, the rituals of childbearing,
especially the tradition of lying-in, challenged household hierarchies. Further, as we
will see, for both free and servant white women, the bearing of a bastard child could
allow some women to live outside of the strict hierarchical norms of colonial
patriarchy. As was outlined in Chapter 1, the establishment of racial slavery in the
colony was founded on the appropriation of black women’s reproductivity along with
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the disciplining of white women’s reproductivity: legitimate white reproduction
could occur only within marriage, and could not cross increasingly calcified racial
barriers. For many white women, both free and indentured, the record of their bastard
births stands as evidence of some unlikely (and tenuous) paths to transgressing the
disciplinary power of the colonial courts and elites.
For some women, their defiance of the court’s power over their reproductivity
was explicit: they evaded the court. An example of intentional resistance, escaping
the court’s punishment also shows ways that women charged with bastardy
transgressed social and cultural boundaries. First, these women transgressed lines of
power by disobeying the court’s orders and outwardly challenging the court’s
authority. In 1662, after being sentenced to ten lashes each for bearing bastard
children, Elizabeth Holloway and Anne Roberts enraged the court when they together
“escap[ed] from the Court without punishment.”357 This transgression of power was
also a transgression of knowledge, when women used their knowledge o f the law and
the masculine public sphere to their own advantage. In 1708, Judith Moody’s
bastardy case was dropped because she “hath absented & gone out of the County,” a
move that suggests that Moody understood the boundaries of the court’s jurisdiction
and used that knowledge to plot her escape.358
No matter the intention of women who evaded the court, women’s defiance of
the courts’ power had transgressive effects. Some women simply refused to show up

357 Y ork D O W 3: 161, 168. In another case, M argaret G eorge w as tried sim ultaneously for bastardy
and running aw ay. D O W 5: 11, 109.
358 Y ork D O W 13: 1 2 0 ,1 2 5 . For sim ilar cases, see the 1759 bastardy cases o f Martha Driver,
E lizabeth R obertson, and M ary B ay ley , w hich were d ism issed “the D efts not being to be found in this
C ounty.” It is p ossib le that the three w om en escap ed together. York JO 3: 66 , 7 3 . S e e also the case o f
E lizabeth H ughes, w h o se case w as d ism issed from the York Court because the o ffen se occurred in
another county: York D O W 3: 151, 175.
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to court when summoned for bastardy. When Mary Hubbard was charged with
bastardy in 1745, the court had to dismiss the case when she failed to obey her
summons and could not be found.359 When Barbara Hutton refused to obey her
summons for bastardy in 1707, her case was dismissed, and her accusers, George
Baskerville and Thomas Mountfort, were each fined 500 pounds of tobacco as
punishment for her nonappearance.360 Later that year, Mountfort was denied a
license to open an ordinary because the court thought him “insufficient.”

I

Was his

failure to detain Hutton evidence of his insufficiency? These cases indicate that free
white women were willing and able to frustrate the court’s attempts to discipline their
reproductivity and sexuality. And these cases caused a problem for the courts bastardy cases often clogged up the court’s dockets for months at a time as women
either refused or otherwise failed to show up to hearings.

Whatever women’s

intent in defying the court, the effect of their actions was to subvert the power of the
court, and, by extension, the colonial patriarchy it represented.
For other women, especially English servant women, the transgressive
possibilities of their childbearing were more implicit. These implicit meanings

359 York D O W 19: 3 6 5 -6 , 372. Interestingly, on the sam e day that D river, R obertson, and B ay ley left
the cou n ty, another w om an, E lizabeth G od ffy, w as fined for bastardy despite the fact that sh e did not
appear in court. T his su ggests that sim p ly skipping court w as not en ou gh to escap e punishm ent - one
needed to escap e the court’s jurisdiction altogether. York JO 3: 3 2 ,6 6 .
360 York D O W 13: 4 0 , 5 8 , 6 6 , 7 5 , 7 6 , 85, 93.
361 Y ork D O W 13: 94.
362 Mary C lay evad ed court for 16 m onths before finally b ein g sentenced: Y ork D O W 8: 3 0 0 , 5 1 2 . S ee
also the 1731-2 bastardy case o f A nne B anks (13 m onths b etw een initial charge and eventual
dism issal): Y ork D O W 17: 2 5 3 , 2 6 0 , 2 6 5 , 2 7 3 , 2 9 6 , 3 0 8 , 3 1 4 , 338; York D O W 18: 5; the 1741-2
bastardy ca se o f C leopatra B ee (9 m onths betw een initial charge and guilty decision ): Y ork D O W 19:
4 5 , 56 , 6 2 , 7 2 , 7 9 , 89; the 1745 bastardy ca se o f H ope D rew itt (6 m onths b etw een initial charge and
guilty d ecision ; D rew itt never sh ow ed up to court and w as found guilty in absentia): Y ork D O W 19:
3 6 5 -6 , 3 7 2 , 3 8 1 , 3 8 6 , 391; the 1751 bastardy ca se o f M ary H ughes (7 m onths b etw een initial charge
and eventual dism issal): York J O l: 5 0 7 , 517; JO 2: 13, 2 7 ,4 7 ; the 1731-2 bastardy case o f Elizabeth
Jones (6 m onths betw een initial charge and last m ention o f ca se, w hich w as never com pleted): York
D O W 17: 2 4 8 , 2 5 3 , 2 6 0 , 2 6 5 , 2 7 3 , 313.
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require a reading o f the Anglo-Virginian cultural context of those births. The
relationship between women servants and the master class reveals a tug-of-war over
power in cases of servant women’s bastard births. Undoubtedly, white servant
women’s pregnancies and births posed difficulties to the master class: a pregnant
servant couldn’t work as hard, and bastardy cases had to be investigated and tried in
the courts. In some ways, the colony’s appropriation of servant women’s
reproductivity was an attempt to reclaim that power. As discussed in Chapter 1,
Virginia lawmakers used bastardy law as a discursive foundation for the colony’s
culture of servitude and slavery: bastardy law was the basis by which Virginia’s
planter class extracted ever-increasing terms of service from women based on race.
Even so, preexistent English customs surrounding childbirth complicated those labor
demands. A close reading of the intent of Virginia bastardy law as it was applied to
English servant women’s bastardy cases indicates some of the ways servants’
reproductivity unsettled the social hierarchies of the master’s household.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, beginning in 1643, servant women were
treated differently, and increasingly punished more harshly, than free women for the
crime of bastardy. By 1696, punishments for bastardy had been rationalized in a way
that would stay more or less intact until the Revolution.363 All women convicted of
fornication were to be punished one of three ways: they were to be fined 500 pounds
of tobacco, or severely whipped, or (if a servant) forced to serve six more months.
Servant women who bore bastard children were to serve an additional two years.
Since fornication cases were rarely brought to court unless a bastard child was bom,
the result of the statute was that free women were fined or whipped for bastardy,
363 H ening 3: 137-40.
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while servant women could serve anywhere between six and twenty-four extra
months and could be whipped and/or fined as well. For example, in 1674, when
Mary Bell was found guilty of bearing a bastardy child while indentured to Edward
Baptist, she was ordered both to serve and extra two years and to be whipped “until
the blood come.”364 County courts exercised considerable leeway in assigning
punishments, but, as we will see, the reasoning for those punishments was remarkably
consistent.
Ann Elmes’ 1679 bastardy case demonstrates well the ways that the law was
applied by the York county court to English servants accused of bastardy. Elmes was
a 24-year old servant of William Wade when she was brought to court for bearing a
bastard child. Elmes was ordered to receive “20 lashes upon the bare back” for the
crime of fornication, unless Wade conceded to paying Elmes’ fine for her.365 Cases
like Elmes’ reveal a potent power held by masters in these cases: essentially, it was
up to Wade whether or not he would be generous enough to protect Elmes from the
whipping by paying her fine (for which he could demand extra labor for repayment).
Besides the fine or lashes, Elmes received a separate punishment for the birth of the
bastard child: she was ordered “to serve for same according to law.”

In other

words, besides being whipped (or serving extra as repayment for a fine), Elmes was
required to serve Wade for two additional years.
Why were servants like Ann Elmes required to serve the extra time for
bastardy? On one level, this question has an easy answer: as community members
with very little authority, white servant women were at the mercy of the law and those
364 York D O W 5: 68.
365 York D O W 5: 89; York D O W 6: 94.
366 Ibid.
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who applied it. W ith Virginia’s high demand for labor, why wouldn’t planters extend
their servants’ terms of service as much as they could? This answer, while selfevident and undoubtedly true, doesn’t tell the whole story. The language of the
statute and the individual cases indicates that the extended labor had a very specific
function: “If it happen a bastard child to be gotten in such fornication then the
woman if a servant in regard o f the losse and trouble her master doth sustaine by her
haveing a bastard shall serve two years after her time of indenture is expired.”

The

extra labor demanded from servant women was intended to repay the master for “the
losse and trouble” he had sustained, but what was this “losse and trouble” exactly?
The answer to this question lies in the potentially transgressive power of the early
modem European practice of lying in.
In his discussion of women’s culture of midwifery in eighteenth-century
England, Adrian Wilson notes that the tradition of lying-in could overturn the basic
hierarchies of the patriarchal household. 368 In early modem England, as well as the
colonies, recently delivered women were attentively cared for by other women for up
to a month as they recovered from childbirth.369 This highly ritualized process of
“lying-in” allowed women to recover from the strain of childbirth, enjoy female
sociability, and begin the process of nursing and infant care. The connection between
lying-in and resuming labor was clear in practice. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich points out
that recovery from childbirth was defined by women’s ability to return back to their

367 H ening 2: 114-5, em phasis mine.
368 1 d o not assum e that birth practices translated w h o lesa le from England to V irginia. Indeed, the
argument that fo llo w s indicates som e w ays that the servant eco n o m y in V irginia interrupted and
problem atized E nglish birth practices. T he differen ces b etw een E nglish and V irginian birth practices
w ill be d iscu ssed more fully in Chapter 3.
369 W ilson , The M aking o f M an -M id w ifery, 2 5 -3 0 . D avid C ressy, Birth, M a rria g e, a n d D ea th : R itual,
R eligion , a n d the L ife-C y cle in T u d o r a n d S tu a rt E n g la n d (N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 1999), 82 -8 4.
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usual labors after lying-in: “It wasn’t the size and position of the woman’s uterus but
her ability to make her own bed that signified recovery.”370 Wilson emphasizes the
political ramifications of this tradition, which essentially removed the postpartum
woman from the household sexual economy and labor structure:
The ceremony of childbirth inverted the normal pattern of conjugal relations;
the wife’s bodily energies and sexuality now, for the space o f ‘the month’,
belong to her; what marriage had taken from her, the childbirth ritual
temporarily restored.371
In this way, childbirth traditions could be seen as functioning in the same way as did
celebrations of carnival (or May Day in England) - both were a temporary
overturning of social hierarchies.372 Lisa Foreman Cody argues that the single-sex
environment of the birthing room and the lying-in chamber created an alternative
public sphere that challenged both gender and status hierarchies:
Whereas the culture of lying-in - like the ideal coffeehouse - was marked by
ignoring class differences and hierarchies, both the birth chamber and the
developing institutions of the public sphere often excluded on the basis of
gender. Whereas the Royal Society, for example, explicitly forbade women
from membership, the early modem lying-in chamber also prohibited men
from entering.

370 U lrich, A M id w ife 's T ale, 189.
371 W ilson , The M akin g o f M a n -M idw ifery, 29.
372 M ikhail Bakhtin, R a b ela is a n d H is W orld, transl. T vorch estvo Fransua R able (B loom ington:
Indiana U n iversity Press, 1984). W hile the lyin g-in tradition cannot be said to em brace the intentional
hilarity o f the R enaissance carnival d iscu ssed by B akhtin, it did, in this reading, offer a m om ent where
hierarchies w ere overturned and the patterns o f d aily life w ere reversed.
373 C ody, ‘T h e P olitics o f R eproduction,” 4 8 0 .
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At its core, the tradition of lying-in transgressed both gender and status hierarchies.
Those transgressions were intensified in the intensely stratified colonial culture of
early Virginia.
As practiced in Virginia, white servant women’s exercise of their right to lie
in after giving birth transgressed boundaries between master and servant and
complicated hierarchies of class and status. This means that the court’s demand that
servant women serve extra time to repay “the losse and trouble of her master” was a
repayment for the social upheaval signaled by lying-in. An early case shows the ways
that the court saw bastardy cases as an opportunity to reimburse women’s masters for
the costs incurred by their pregnancy, delivery, and lying in. Phoebe Hardy, a servant
to Thomas Mann, bore a bastard child in 1667. During her labor, Hardy named James
Clarke as the father of her child (later cases would not be concerned with such prosaic
information). Mann sued Clarke for the costs he had incurred due to Hardy’s
pregnancy and birth.374 Mann’s award from the court included 100 pounds of tobacco
and a barrel of com to repay the midwife, as well as “six pds sterling” for his
“troubles care & charge abt Phebe Hardy in the tyme of her lying in” - all to be paid
by Clarke, the father of the child.375 Mann agreed to keep the child, so long as Clarke
paid him another eight pounds sterling for support of the infant. This custody
arrangement did not last long: by 1669, Mann was relieved of responsibility for the
child when Charles and Alice Gratham offered to take custody.376 This case makes
clear that the court considered the lying-in period to be a significant cost to the
master, worth being repaid for a large amount of cash. The equivalencies here are
374 York D O W 4: 164.
375 Ibid.
376 York D O W 4: 273.
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fascinating and revealing: the cost of lying-in was considerably more than the
charges for the midwife, and nearly equivalent to the costs of supporting a child for
several years.

177

Phoebe Hardy’s case helps us to understand the deeper threat posed by white
indentured servant births in early Virginia: at least temporarily, the birth of a bastard
child overturned status hierarchies in the household. Significantly, even in the
intensified hierarchy of the master-servant relationship, English servant women still
expected - and received - the traditional month-long lying-in period after their
births.378 The specific language used by the county courts in adjudicating bastardy
cases elucidates the ways that white servant women’s lying-in was seen as a cost
bome by the master or mistress. The court records show that the extra term of service
was demanded as repayment by the servant woman for the transgressive social
upheaval of her lying-in.379 By extending the terms of service for servants who bore
bastard children, the court’s aim was to set right the social hierarchy.
As legal responsibility for bastardy shifted to mothers in the eighteenth
century, this repayment for lying-in was extracted through extra labor from the
mother, rather than cash or labor from the father.380 Furthermore, throughout the
record, the extra labor demanded from English servant women for bastardy was
framed by the York county courts in terms of repayment for lying-in. When, in 1712,
377 The 1699 bastardy trial o f indentured servant M argaret Stringer also points to these eq u ivalen cies.
Stringer is sentenced to on e extra year, and she forfeited her allotm ent o f corn upon her freedom (part
o f typical freedom d ues) rather than being w hipped for the crim e o f fornication. In other w ords,
w hipping w as the punishm ent for fornication, but the extra labor w as the punishm ent for bastardy and
the loss o f labor suffered by the master. Y ork D O W 11: 235.
378 For exam p les, see: Y ork D O W 3: 34 and York D O W 3: 43.
379 Karin W u lf has found a sim ilar pattern in colon ial Philadelphia, where the financial lo ss o f servants’
and sla v e s’ labor during pregnancy and lying-in w as reclaim ed by masters as soon as p o ssib le. W ulf,
N o t A ll W ives, 105.
380 See Chapter 1 for a d iscu ssio n o f this sh ift in responsibility.
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Ann Green bore a child during her term of service to Elizabeth Brookes, the court
demanded that Green serve “her sd mistress two years fo r her fin e & trouble o f her
house in the time o f lying m”.381 In 1714, after she gave birth to twins, Frances Lee
was sentenced to twenty-five lashes as well as a year of service “for the trouble of
[her master’s house] in the time of her lying in.”382 Benjamin Catton appeared in the
York county court in 1743 “praying relief’ because his servant, Jane Tomson, had
borne a bastard child: “he hath been at great expense and Trouble thereby.”383
Tomson paid her own fine, but was still sentenced to serve an extra year to Catton.
Even as the court records became increasingly perfunctory over the course of
the eighteenth century, clerks made clear why servants were required to serve extra
time: the extra time was repayment “for the trouble of [her master or mistress’s]
house in the time of her lying in.”384 These frequent and specific references to lyingin make clear that, at least discursively, the court did not consider itself to be
attempting to regain the labor lost during pregnancy and nursing. The court’s
calculus is also significant here: the “losse and trouble” that the master incurred for
one month was equal to, in the eyes of the law and the justices of the county court, up
to two years of a woman’s labor. This further emphasizes that the punishment for
servant bastardy was intended to symbolically right the social order: the labor
demanded from servant women far outweighed the actual time and labor lost by the
master. This inequity between crime and punishment may be explainable by the
specific language that the courts repeated. That lying-in was considered not just a
381 York D O W 14: 2 1 7 , em phasis in original.
382 York D O W 14: 348.
383 York D O W 19: 2 0 9 ,2 1 0 .
384 T he quoted language is repeated verbatim in the fo llo w in g ca se s in York County: D O W 7: 7, 16;
D O W 14: 138; D O W 15: 5 9 , 60; D O W 15: 124, 137; D O W 15: 110; D O W 15: 5 2 3 (1 7 1 9 ); D O W 15:
536; D O W 16: 75; D O W 16: 38; D O W 16: 75; D O W 16: 247; D O W 16: 513.
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financial burden but a social transgression is apparent in the repeated language of
“losse and trouble”: servant women’s lying-in may have equaled just a month of
“losse,” but the “trouble” that it caused was worth two years of labor.
A rare document filed with the York county court elucidates how masters and
mistresses framed the bearing o f a child by a servant woman as transgressive of social
norms and status hierarchies. In 1680, Elizabeth Mullins gave birth to a bastard child
while serving an indenture to Elizabeth Vaulx. Mullins was set free before the case
was tried, but Vaulx hoped to retain Mullins and extract her labor nonetheless.
Unable to appear at court for Mullins’ trial, Vaulx sent word to the court that she
hoped Mullins would serve out her extra time, since Vaulx asserted that “the childe
was bome in [Mullins’] servitude.”385 But the real problem, Vaulx intimated, was
that since the birth Mullins had ceased to observe the social deference demanded of
servants by masters and mistresses. Vaulx complained of Mullins: “she is grown soe
'l O Z

high and soe parantory, that I can scarce speake to her.”

Ultimately, the court fined

Mullins 500 pounds of tobacco for fornication; because Mullins could not pay that
fine, the court extended her service to Vaulx by six months. Significantly, the court
offered no reprimand at all for Mullins’ “high and parentory” behavior. Vaulx
expected deference from her former servant. Having been freed and having
experienced the social leveling of lying-in, Mullins was no longer compliant.

385 York D O W 6: 2 7 9 , 288.
386 The O x fo rd E nglish D ic tio n a ry lists “parantory” as an alternative sp ellin g for perem ptory, and lists
am ong its 17th-century d efin ition s “obstinate, stubborn, w ilfu l.” O x fo rd E nglish D ic tio n a ry O nline,
s.v. “parantory,”
http://dictionary.oed.com .proxy.library,v cu .ed u /cg i/en try /5 0 1 7 5 2 5 6 /5 0 1 7 5 2 5 6 sp g 1?sin gle= 1&query_t
ype=m issp ellin g& q u ery w ord=parantory& first= 1& m ax_to_sh ow = 10 & h ilite = 5 0 17 5 2 5 6 sp g 1 (July 24,
2009).
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For most servant women, the effects of transgression were temporary:
Elizabeth Mullins and the other servant women discussed so far all received extended
indentures for their crimes. The transgressive power of outlaw reproduction existed
in concert and in contest with the extraordinarily dominating power o f Virginia’s
servant and slave economy. This is especially clear for servant women who bore
multiple children during their time of indenture. For example, Sarah Paskins, an
English servant woman indentured to Charles Dunn, was charged with bastardy in
'I Q ’J

April 1673, for which she was sentenced to two extra years of service.

As it turns

out, Paskins was pregnant during that first bastardy case: by November 1673, she had
bome another bastard child. She was again ordered to serve an additional two years,
and the confessed father of the children, fellow servant W illiam Lane, was sentenced
1Q Q

to a year of extra service as well.

Exactly a year later, in 1674, Paskins was again

brought to court for bastardy, and again sentenced to two years of extra service.389
The court did not address the fate of Paskins’ children, but the law required that they
themselves were indentured until the age of 21. Even as we acknowledge the ways
that Paskins’ births, lying-in, and long-term relationship with her children’s father
might have had transgressive effects in the Dunn household, the fact remains that she

387 Y ork D O W 5: 4 4 . W hile the tim ing betw een P ask in s’ three cases w as extrem ely tight, it w as not
im possib le that she w as charged in such quick su ccessio n for these three cases. T his first, April 1673,
case w as lik ely brought to court a significant period o f tim e after the birth o f the child. The
seventeenth century York county court on ly m et quarterly, and masters on far-flung plantations may
have delayed bringing their servant w om an to court. T he discovery o f P ask in s’ secon d and third
pregnancies m ay have inspired Dunn to quicker action for the later cases.
88 York D O W 5: 56. W illiam Lane w as accu sed o f fathering P askins’ ch ild in this case, but not in the
other tw o cases. E ven so, it is p ossib le that he w as the father o f all three o f her children: as w as
d iscu ssed in Chapter 1, bastardy w as increasingly framed as a fem ale crim e by the 1670s. A t any rate,
it is p ossib le that Paskins and Lane shared a com m itted relationship even w ithin their indentures.
389 York D O W 5: 91.
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had to serve 6 additional years, and her relationship with her children was likely
severed as a result.
Paskins was one of many women, servant and free, who were accused
multiple times of bastardy in York county.390 We know exceedingly little about these
women - indeed, the records of their bastardy cases are often the only trace that exists
of their lives. It is impossible for us to know the specific circumstances of those
births. For English servant women, lying-in may have represented a temporary
respite from labor, a rare moment when the servant was the one who was served.
Nevertheless, it also typically meant an extension of their indentures and a separation
from their children. If childbearing offered servant women a moment to transcend
their status, the punishment of extended service certainly cemented their lower status
anew.
In Virginia’s intensely stratified colonial society, the transgressive
possibilities of reproduction were far different for free white women than for white
servant women. For some free white women, bastardy charges may stand as unlikely
evidence of a measure of independence enjoyed by some women during this period.
Take the case of Mary Cosby. Cosby was charged with bastardy in 1765; though she
never appeared at court, she was fined 500 pounds of tobacco in absentia.391 Cosby
disappears from the records until 1774, when, surprisingly, that 1765 case again
emerged as a question. It seems that Cosby, counter to the law which required
bastard children to be bound out, had managed to provide for her children herself for
390 O f the 3 8 0 ca ses o f bastardy I’ve uncovered in the York C ounty court records and the Charles
Parish, Y ork C ounty birth register, fully 30% (or 116 ca ses) were com m itted by repeat offenders.
T h ose 116 cases in v o lv e 4 8 separate w om en; o f those w om en, 2 9 were free w om en, 15 w ere servants,
and 4 saw their status change b etw een their ca ses (i.e., they were servants for on e ca se, and had been
freed by the tim e o f their later charges).
391 Y ork JO 4: 3 7 4 ,4 4 7 .
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those nine years. Cosby herself brought the case to the attention of the court - she
finally named John Holt as the father of her children, in an attempt to demand some
financial support from him.392 The court recognized that Cosby’s financial
circumstances had changed, and the children were “likely to become chargeable to
the.. .Parish.”393 The court stepped in, required Holt to provide financial support for
the children (six pounds annually for each child), and arranged for the children to be
apprenticed when they each turned ten years old. Thereafter, both John Holt and
Mary Cosby were understood to be the children’s parents: in the subsequent court
records that manage the boys’ indentures, Mary Cosby’s sons are alternately referred
to as “Thomas Holt and Matthew Holt” and “Matthew and Thomas Cosby Bastard
children of John Holt and Mary Cosby.”394 Was Mary Cosby a single mother,
independently supporting her children during the early years of their lives? It seems
likely. Indeed, it seems clear that Cosby steadfastly held onto her independence only
until she was sure that her actions would best benefit her children: her actions in 1774
guaranteed not only financial support for her sons, but the promise of an education, in
the form of an apprenticeship. That the court continued to recognize her parenthood
after the fact indicates the authority that she had carved out for herself.
Mary Cosby’s bastardy and custody cases give us a window into the ways that
some individual women could create independent lives for themselves and their

392 For other ca ses in w hich w om en approached the court for support on ly w hen they w ere unable to
support their children on their ow n, see: York D O W 11: 4 7 6 , Y ork JO 3: 103.
393 York O B 4: 21, 4 8 . W hile these and subsequent records make clear that C osb y had tw o son s, there
is no record that C osb y ever faced a second bastardy charge. (It is unlikely that the b o y s w ere tw ins.
Bastardy ca ses for m ultiple births clearly com m unicated that fact, and the 1774 custody case
indentures the b oys w hen “the[y] severally arrive to the age o f ten years,” im p lyin g that they had tw o
different birth dates.) For other ca ses in w hich the court stepped in w hen m others were unable to
support their children, see: York D O W 6: 2 2 , York J 0 4 : 4 5 0 , York O B 4 (1 7 7 4 -1 7 8 4 ): 77.
394 York O B 4: 3 2 1 ,3 3 3 .
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children, even in the patriarchal culture of eighteenth-century Virginia. Significantly,
it is only because these women broke both the law and social norms that we have any
record of their lives: their outlaw reproduction is the reason they appear in the
colonial records. Another example of some women’s transgression of the boundaries
of patriarchal culture is the ability of some free women to pay their own fines when
they were charged with bastardy. When Ann Bayley confessed to bastardy in 1738
and “agree[d] to pay the fine...at the laying the next Crop,” this could mean that
Bayley had access to her own crop, and therefore her own cash, to pay her fine and by
extension support her child.395 Martha Lester also paid her own fine when she was
charged with bastardy in 1735. It is clear that the court held her solely responsible for
her fine - and did not consider her under the protection or authority of any male
guardian, husband, or master - when the clerk recorded a year later that she herself
had paid the remainder of her fine.396 When free women could pay their own fines
for bastardy, they were able to sidestep the custom of infant indenture, thereby
transgressing both the discursive link between bastardy and servitude and the
assumption of a patriarchal household.
Single motherhood was an option not just for propertied women. The diarist
John Harrower, himself an indentured servant who worked as a schoolmaster for his
master, Colonel Daingerfield, observed a fellow servant with a child by her side:
“Yesterday came her Mary Fitsgyls to spin flax. She is an Irish girle and has now
been Nine year in Virginia. She is still unmarried but has had a Child to one Dolton a

395 Y ork D O W 18: 4 3 5 ,4 4 0 ,4 4 7 . Elinor H ayw ood also paid her ow n fine for bastardy: D O W 18: 155,
160, 167, 333. Linda Sturtz argues that propertied w om en - f e m e so le s w ho w ere m ostly w id o w s had access to m uch more p ow er and influence in colo n ia l V irginia than married w om en. Sturtz, Within
H e r P o w er, 2 0 -2 4 .
396 York D O W 18: 2 6 8 , 2 7 4 , 280.

154

Taylor in Fredricks[bur]g. The boy is with her & is now two years old.”397 When
read in the context of the journal as a whole, Harrower’s observation takes a
paternalistic tone: an educated man, Harrower tended to place himself above the
other servants whose paths he crossed. To be sure, Mary Fitsgyls’s story is a
heartrending one, especially considering Dolton was himself likely married and
already a father at the time.398 Further, it seems likely that Fitsgyls had originally
signed a seven-year indenture, but that it was extended upon the birth of her son. But
we also see the unlikely power of this young woman: somehow, she had arranged to
keep her son with her. Still working in her master’s house, Fitsgyls’ son was an ever
present reminder of her own subjectivity, her own sexuality, and her own family.
The construct of the fem e covert was a legal fiction in which women were
considered legally “covered” first by their fathers and then by their husbands.399
Some women, though, held a liminal position according to the law. For example,
English servant women had no legal standing outside of their masters (and thus were
similar to children), but they had independently signed contracts, and, as we have
seen, were held responsible for crimes. W omen’s historians have noted that widows,
temporarily independent, could act as fem e sole, representing themselves in the

397 Edward M iles R iley, ed. The J o u rn a l o f John H a rro w er: A n In d en tu red S erv a n t in th e C o lo n y o f
V irginia, 1 7 7 3 -1 7 7 6 (N Y : H olt, Rinehart and W inston, 1963), 121. Probably, M ary’s last name w as
Fitzgerald - Harrower frequently abbreviated and m issp elled w ords and names.
398 R iley, The Jo u rn a l o f John H a rro w er, 18 7 n l 15.
399 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A nxious P a tria rch s, 2 8 7 -9 0 ; L o is Green Carr,
“Inheritance in the C olonial C hesapeake,” in W om en in the A g e o f the A m erica n R evolu tion , ed.
R onald H offm an and Peter J. Albert (C harlottesville: U n iversity o f V irginia Press, 1989), 155-208;
N ancy Cott, P u b lic Vows: A H isto ry o f M a rria g e a n d th e N ation (C am bridge, M A: Harvard
U niversity Press, 2 0 0 0 ), 11-12. Kierner, B e y o n d the H ou seh old, 11; Salm on, W om en a n d th e L a w o f
P ro p e rty in E a rly A m erica , 147-60, 168-75; Julia Cherry Spruill, W om en 's Life a n d W ork in the
Southern C o lo n ies (N Y : Norton, 1972), 34 0 -6 6 .
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courts. This public authority would be whittled away by the eighteenth century.400
These cases of women retaining control over their children hint another category o f
women who acted as fem e sole - single women with children, who lived under the
radar as much as possible in order to maintain their independence, but who still used
the law when it could come to their defense or the defense of their children. Women
who supported their bastard children alone lived outside o f social norms and the law,
which may indicate why the evidence of their lives is so sparse.
Perhaps because their lives were transgressive of patriarchal norms, single
mothers’ ability to maintain independence and control over their children was tenuous
at best. The case of Mary Meade shows the ways that women’s fragile independence
was counterbalanced by a court system which could assert patriarchal power
seemingly at will. Mary Meade appeared in court three times for bastardy, in 1741,
1744, and 1750. The charges for the first case were dropped (which indicates either
that the court was operating on false information or that Meade paid the fine).401 In
the second case, the court sentenced her to 25 lashes.402 In the third case, Meade was
ordered to pay 500 pounds of tobacco as punishment for fornication 403 A free
woman, the court punished Meade only for the crime of fornication in both the 1744
and 1750 cases.
Throughout this period, Mary Meade was, for all intents and purposes, treated
as a fem e sole by the courts. She inherited money from the estate of John Bale in

400 Snyder, B ra b b lin g W om en, 122-7; B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s,
97; Sturtz, W ithin H e r P o w er, 20. For a sim ilar an alysis for C onnecticut, see D ayton, W om en B efore
the B ar.
401 York D O W 19: 9, 2 2 ,4 3 , 5 2 , 5 6 , 6 4 , 7 2 , 79.
402 York D O W 19: 33 1 -2 .
403 York JO 1 :3 0 7 , 326.
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1743 and acted as a sole defendant in a lawsuit in 1748.404 More importantly, for our
purposes, Meade retained custody of her daughters, Ann and Frances, even though
she was unmarried. Her lenient punishments indicate that the court was confident in
Meade’s ability to support her children: there is no mention made of protecting the
parish from being charged with the girls’ support. Yet, in 1751, the court stepped in
to check Meade’s power and assert its own patriarchal authority: Ann and Frances
were bound out as indentures. The court explained its decision to split up the family:
Meade was an unsuitable mother for the children, “by reason of her idle, dissolute,
and disorderly course of life.”405 While the court record leaves to the imagination
exactly what Meade had done to merit such a description, it remains that Meade’s
outlaw reproduction had put her in the view o f the court, which held the power to take
away her children. M eade’s outlaw reproduction was tolerated only as long as she
displayed proper deference - that Meade was punished for being too transgressive is a
tantalizing interpretation.
Kirsten Fischer reminds us that, in a culture in which illegitimacy was seen as
sinful, having a child outside of wedlock could be seen as “a conscious act of
resistance to authority, a specialized form o f nose-thumbing.”406 All of these cases
show not only these women’s defiance of the law but their willingness and ability to
transgress early Virginia’s intertwining status and gender hierarchies. The sexual and
labor economies of early Virginia demanded that white women’s sexuality and
reproductivity be confined to marriage: legitimacy (and therefore freedom and
community membership) was conferred by birth. Even so, those same economies
404 York W I 19: 152; JO 1 :6 9 .
405 York JO 1 :4 3 5 .
406 Fischer, S u sp ect R ela tio n s, 113.
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created populations of white women - especially servant women and unmarried
women - whose reproductive histories challenged the notion that white women’s
reproduction could be so unremittingly disciplined. Those economies which confined
white women’s legitimate reproduction to marriage were, ultimately, based on
slavery.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the institution of slavery reproduced itself via
the appropriation of black women’s reproduction. Within this context, enslaved
women’s reproduction - and its transgressive possibilities - took on very different
forms and meanings than did white women’s outlaw reproduction. We have seen the
ways that servant and free white women’s outlaw reproduction could be transgressive
on an individual level: challenging household economies, offering possibilities for
individual autonomy outside of the patriarchal household. Reproduction could be a
site for enslaved women to transgress limits of power, knowledge, and subjectivity.
For enslaved women, reproduction could be a transgressive means of both asserting
their own cultural frameworks and challenging slavery itself as a culture of
domination and exploitation.
Even within the context of inherited racial slavery defined by the law of
slavery by birth, slave women’s motherhood could be an assertion of self, of hope,
and of relationship to others.407 Jennifer Morgan points to the existential hopefulness
of childbearing in the context of enslavement: “After the Middle Passage and during

407 B lack w o m en ’s historians and black fem in ists have em p h asized the co m p lex ity o f the institution o f
m otherhood for en slaved w om en , esp ecia lly during the A ntebellum period, w hen black w om en w ere
ex p licitly exclu d ed from the dom inant culture o f sentim ental maternity for w hite w om en. B eck les,
N a tu ra l R eb els, 115-40; h ooks, A in 't I a W om an, 7 1 -8 2 ; King, ‘“ S uffer with them ‘til death’,” 147-68;
R oberts, K illin g the B lack B ody, 22 -5 5 ; S teven son , Life in B la ck a n d W hite, 9 5 -1 3 9 ; W hite, A r ’n ’t I a
W om an, 9 1 -1 1 8 . For an exam ination o f how this process o f ex clu sio n im pacted w o m en ’s m edical
practices, see W ilk ie, The A rc h a e o lo g y o f M oth erin g , 55 -7 4 .
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the interminable reality o f forced labor, reproduction could afford women and men an
opportunity to ground themselves, to manifest strength and persistence through
children.”408 Deborah Gray White notes that motherhood had very specific cultural
meanings for slaves who traced their roots back to west Africa, for whom ideas about
motherhood and childbearing traditions were an important assertion of culture in the
face of slavery.409 In this way, reproduction could be seen as both an assertion of self
and an assertion of community - both transgressive effects in the dehumanizing
conditions of chattel slavery.
While birth and motherhood could be read as transgressing the logic of
slavery, refusal to give birth was another form of subversion: if an enslaved woman
refused to have children, she was tacitly denying the master’s claim to ownership
over her body and reproductivity, and also denying him a key means of expanding his
property holdings.410 In 1773, the governor’s council recorded a rare case of
infanticide by an enslaved woman named Sail who was executed for “Feloniously
Murdering her own child.”411 We have no way of knowing Sail’s state of mind about
her actions. Further, assuming that women in similar situations either hid their births,
disguised the infanticide, or were disciplined by masters instead o f the courts, there is
no way to know how common actions like Sail’s were. While there is a fair amount
o f textual evidence attesting to the existence of abortion techniques amongst English
and Indian women during this period (as will be discussed in Chapter 3), there is
408 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 116-9.
409 W hite, A r ’n ’t I a W om an?, 106-9.
410 D avid G eggu s, focu sin g on the Caribbean, has found that infanticide w as recogn ized and feared by
masters as a threat to their property holdings. D avid P. G eggu s, “S lave and Free C olored W om en in
Saint D om in g u e,” in M o re than C h attel: B la ck W om en a n d S la v ery in th e A m erica s, ed. D avid Barry
Gaspar and D arlene Clark H ine (B loom ington: Indiana U n iversity Press, 1996), 2 7 1 -2 .
411 H.R. M cllw a in e, ed. L e g isla tiv e Jo u rn a ls o f th e C ou n cil o f C o lo n ia l V irginia, vo l. 3 (R ichm ond:
V irginia State Library, 1918), 1598.

159

considerably more silence on the issue for enslaved black women. We must
remember, though, that the textual evidence for this period, like the records of the
governor’s Council, was created by white (usually male) hands. We could interpret
the textual silences as evidence that black women did not seek to limit their
pregnancies and births. Conversely, could we instead interpret those silences as a
remarkable example of the ability of enslaved people to keep some parts of their lives
private, even in the face of tremendous social control?412 Darlene Clark Hine, writing
of black women’s strategies of resistance against the long history o f rape o f black
women by white men, argues that “black women as a rule developed a politics of
silence and adhered to a cult of secrecy, a culture of dissemblance, to protect the
sanctity of the inner aspects of their lives.” 413 This secrecy provided black women
with “the psychic space and.. .the resources needed to hold their own in their often
one-sided struggle to resist oppression.”414 In other words, lack of textual evidence
may not indicate a lack of agency or power - indeed, it may indicate the opposite.
Furthermore, the work of historians Jennifer Morgan and Barbara Bush points
to the possibility that enslaved women drew on their African cultural heritage to limit
their pregnancies, and, in some cases, to justify infanticide. Jennifer Morgan notes
that enslaved women had “transferred knowledge of fertility control from Africa to
the Americas,” including knowledge of plants (both African and American) that could

412 B lack w o m en ’s historiography on abortion and infanticide
413 H ine, “Rape and the Inner L ives o f B lack W om en ,” 9 1 5 . H in e’s argum ent fo cu ses on the culture o f
dissem b lan ce as it w as exp ressed in northern black w o m en ’s organizations in the tw entieth century,
but she em p h asizes that the roots o f dissem b lan ce can be found in the co m p lex and often violent
relationship b etw een en slaved w om en and w hite masters. Indeed, H ine m akes clear that the culture o f
d issem b lan ce w as on e that m oved from the South to the North during the Great M igration o f the early
tw entieth century.
414 Ibid.
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be used as abortifacients and emmenagogues.415 Barbara Bush argues that fertility
control went beyond medical knowledge to cosmology. She presents a fascinating
interpretation of the demographic impact these traditions might have had on the sugar
colony of Jamaica. Historians have long noted that the nineteenth-century Jamaican
slave population precipitously dropped, even as conditions improved. Bush explains
this demographic paradox by arguing that enslaved women (many o f whom were new
imports to the colony) drew on West African cosmologies that saw fetuses and infants
as inhabiting a liminal space between the human world and the spirit world. Bush
argues that enslaved women actively participated in a sustained pattern of abortion
and infanticide (or infant neglect), rather than submit their children to the injustices of
enslavement.416 Ywone Edwards-Ingram, investigating the archaeological evidence
for slave sites in British North America, including Virginia, describes similar rituals
and cosmologies in the mainland colonies.417 Interestingly, in her examination of
Carter’s Grove Plantation in York County, Virginia, Lorena Walsh has noticed a
similar phenomenon: increased importation of Africans was accompanied by a drop
in fertility.418 Did those newly-enslaved Africans resist their slavery by reinterpreting
and acting upon their ideas about the personhood of infants and fetuses? Bush warns
against portraying enslaved women as “passive subjects” of demographic trends
rather than “active agents with a degree of control over their own bodies”: the

415 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 113-4. The African plants aloe and okra, both used as abortifacients,
had been brought to the co lo n ie s by the eighteenth century.
416 Bush, “Hard Labor,” 193-217.
417 Edwards-Ingram, "African A m erican M ed icin e and the S ocial R elations o f Slavery,” 3 8 -4 0 .
418 W alsh, From C a la b a r to C a r te r ’s G ro v e , 30-1.
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limiting o f childbearing may have been not only a rational response to abhorrent
conditions, but a response rooted in long-held cultural traditions.419
One irony embedded in the appropriation of enslaved women’s reproductivity
was that childbearing represented both an economic profit and an economic loss to
the master class: while an enslaved pregnant woman’s child would ultimately be
claimed as a master’s property, pregnancy and nursing also limited her ability to work
in other ways.420 Masters, such as the planter Landon Carter, recognized this tension
between enslaved women’s reproductive and productive value. Carter’s diary is full
of his references to women who transgressed his power by turning his own economic
interests against him. Carter’s frustration was rooted in these women’s transgression
of the limits of his power and his ability to discipline them, but it was also rooted in
their transgression of the limits of his knowledge about the body, about reproduction,
and about the lives of people he purported to own.
Enslaved women’s pregnancies represented the promise of another child but
also the loss of a woman’s labor during her pregnancy and birth. In July 1775, Carter
complained of losing several pregnant women’s labor because “the Bellyed women
have been 5 in number good 5 months idle.”421 Then, the tobacco harvest was
delayed because “our Wenches have all taken it into their head to cry out at this busy
time.”422 Were the women’s labors triggered by the backbreaking work o f the
tobacco harvest? Or was Carter correct - did the women “cry out” in order to avoid

419 Bush, “Hard Labor,” 2 0 1 , 208.
420 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 4.
421 Jack P. G reene, ed. The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rte r o f S abin e H all, 1 7 5 2 -1 7 7 8 , V o l. 1
(C harlottesville: U niversity o f V irginia Press, 1965), 9 1 9 .
422 Ibid. E nslaved w o m en ’s births w ere remarkably seasonal. C heryll Ann C od y ob serves that, in
South Carolina, births peaked at the height o f sum m er and the dead o f winter, the tw o m ost dangerous
tim es in term s o f infant mortality. C ody, “C y c les o f W ork and o f C hildbearing,” 6 1 -7 8 .
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harvesting in the heat of summer? Ultimately, these five pregnancies and births are
notable for their transgressive effects, even if we cannot discern the intent of the
women. Importantly, the pregnancies and births were understood by Carter to be
transgressive. For Carter, the loss of women’s labor during pregnancy was not just an
economic loss, but a sign o f rebellion and conspiracy.
These were not the only women whom Carter believed took advantage of their
reproductive role to thwart his power. Carter often suspected that enslaved women
faked or exaggerated the symptoms of pregnancy in order to avoid other labors, even
A 'J 'i

openly pretending pregnancy in order to avoid work.

The bodily privacy of

women’s reproductive lives - the simple fact that only they knew if they were
pregnant, what symptoms they experienced, and when the pregnancy might end stymied Carter’s ability to control the enslaved population on his plantations. We see
this frustration when, in 1770, Carter complained that one enslaved woman “pretends
to be big with Child and perhaps may be so.”424 He also grew frustrated at the length
of women’s pregnancies, complaining once that a woman “seemed to be near her time
about 2 months,” implying that he believed either that she had announced her
pregnancy before she was actually with child or that she was somehow obstinately
refusing to give birth.425 One enslaved woman named Wilmot “pretended to be too
heavy to work” for a full year before Carter caught on 426 It is entirely possible that
these women were, in fact, pregnant, and were suffering repeated miscarriages or

423 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rte r, 3 7 1 -2 , 389.
424 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rte r, 389.
425 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 2 0 4 . A s w ill be d iscu ssed in Chapter 3, Carter’s
understanding o f pregnancy seem ed to assum e that w om en had som e lev el o f control over the length o f
their pregnancies and the tim ing o f their births. T h is control w as a source o f considerable frustration
for Carter.
426 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n e l L andon C a rter, 372.
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stillbirths. Or, they were lying about being pregnant in order to lessen their workload.
Either way, one transgressive potential for pregnancy was that it challenged Carter’s
assumption that, as a master, he could expect to be omnipotent over every aspect of
enslaved people’s lives.
The women Carter describes found ways to use their role as mothers to
undermine the slave economy and carve out opportunities for themselves and their
children. Once again, we see the conflict between Carter’s desire to claim women’s
productive labor and their reproductive labor as well. Breastfeeding mothers openly
and collectively defied the limits Carter placed on their ability to nurse their children,
convincing the plantation’s overseers to allow them to nurse their babies five times a
day, rather than Carter’s prescribed three times.427 Pregnant women not only refused
to work in the fields but stayed in the slave quarter, the closest thing they had to their
own domestic space: the women “not only fall behind, but come in, stay as long as
they please, and care not ever to go out though close by their homes.”
Reproduction offered women an opportunity to transgress lines of power by laying
claim to their own time and their own space.
Importantly, the transgressive possibilities of enslaved women’s reproduction
had limits; Carter’s frustration with the women often boiled over into rage. Carter
was more than willing to use violence against enslaved people, including pregnant
women. W ilmot’s pretended pregnancy ended when Carter “broke her.”429 When an
enslaved woman named Sarah pretended to be pregnant, Carter “had her corrected,”

427 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 4 9 6.
428 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 554.
429 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 372.
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and threatened to sell her.430 When another woman named Criss ran away during her
pregnancy, she was caught and suffered “a severe whipping.”431 Transgression and
domination existed in a tug-of-war: enslaved women’s transgressions were met with
violence, and that violence was met with further transgressions. Notably, even after
being whipped, Criss continued to transgress Carter’s power, “making her Children
milk [Carter’s] Cows in the night.”432
Enslaved women’s reproduction, embedded and appropriated as it was by the
law of slavery by birth, points again to the complex matrix of transgression and
domination in early Virginia. As we see in the multiple examples of the transgressive
possibilities of reproduction in Landon Carter’s diary, the particularities of slavery as
a system of domination created spaces for its own transgression. The law o f slavery
by birth fostered the dehumanization of black women, even as those same women’s
childbearing was a site for human expression and connection. Indeed, this conflict
between domination and transgression ultimately was a process of cultural
production. Jennifer Morgan argues that creolization - that process by which
enslaved Africans created a creole African-American culture - happened via
women’s childbearing: “children.. .made explicit the process of literal and symbolic
reeducation that is at the heart of creolization.”433 In other words, even as
childbearing in slavery was fraught with danger and dehumanization, it was also a site
for cultural creation. Slavery created deep tensions between violence and creativity,
domination and subversion.

430 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rte r, 389.
431 Ibid.
432 Ibid.
433 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 108.
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The context of racial slavery demanded that white women’s and black
women’s reproduction be disciplined in profoundly different ways. Where white
women’s reproduction was aimed at creating legitimate heirs for the transfer of
property, black women’s reproduction was appropriated into creating that very
property. This disciplining of reproduction required racial separation, but mixed-race
people and mixed-race families existed. Indeed, the creation and flourishing of
mixed-race families was an unlikely result of Virginia’s legal attempts at racial
separation. Again, domination and subversion existed in unlikely tension.

Transgressive Families
The lives of free black and mixed-race families, who by their very existence
challenged the notion that slavery and blackness were utterly linked, transgressed
lines of both race and servitude. The unplanned result o f Virginia’s attempt to create
inherited slavery and regulate sexuality through bastardy and miscegenation law was
the creation of a vast category of liminal people - neither black nor white, slave nor
free - that challenged the entire logic of inherited racial slavery.434 These
transgressions existed on a number of levels. Here, I will discuss three of these
transgressions of Virginia’s absolutist logic of racial slavery: liminal identities (the

434 For d iscu ssio n s on lim inal identities in early A m erica, see M errell, “ T h e C ast o f H is
C ountenance’,” 13-39; Jam es H. M errell, ‘“ A lthough I am dead, I am not entirely dead. I have left a
second o f m y s e lf: C onstructing S e lf and Persons on the M iddle Ground o f Early A m erica,” in
Through a G la ss D a rk ly: R eflection s on P erso n a l Iden tity in E a rly A m erica , ed. R onald H offm an,
M echal S ob el, and Fredricka J. T eute (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North C arolina Press, 1997), 4 0 4 4 1 8 . Robert Blair St. G eorge adopts from p ostcolon ial theory the con cep t o f h yb rid ity, arguing the
com p lex identities o f early A m erica, d efin ed as they were by contact w ith percieved others, dem ands a
m ethod ological attention to vernacular exp ression s o f hybrid identities. St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 2 35. I find the con cep t o f lim inality as more useful than hybridity in describing free black fam ilies
because their status was d efined so fully as “in b etw een ” - betw een black and w hite, b etw een slave
and free.
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ways free people of color moved between white and black identities), extra-legal
marriages (the ways free people of color created marriage traditions and families in
defiance of the law) and matrilineal genealogies (the ways that free people of color
remembered their maternal ancestors in an effort to solidify their freedom). I will
then analyze the ways that those three transgressions appear in the lives o f two free
mixed-race families, the Jewell-Catillas and the Inscows, who transgressed Virginia’s
absolutist racial and sexual policies. Through these case studies, we will see the twin
trajectories of power and transgression: while the race, sex, and status hierarchies
assigned at birth curtailed their lives, for Virginia’s free people of color, birth could
also be a pathway to transgressing lines of power, knowledge, and subjectivity in the
colony.
Since Virginia’s laws attempted to create a dualistic framework of black and
white, slave and free, the first challenge that free black and mixed-race families posed
was that of liminal identities. Throughout the colonial period, Virginia’s lawmakers
sought to preserve racial difference through ever-increasing sanctions on
miscegenation, especially on interracial births. The presence of mixed-race people,
both free and enslaved, points to the ultimate unenforceability of those laws. As
Foucault argued, the expression of juridical power in the form of bans on particular
kinds of sex (here, interracial sex) is always doomed to fail:
Power can ‘do’ nothing but say no to [pleasure]; what it produces, if anything,
is absences and gaps; it overlooks elements, introduces discontinuities,
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separates what is joined, and marks off boundaries. Its effects take the general
form of limit and lack.435
In other words, anti-miscegenation laws could never actually put an end to interracial
sex or mixed-race births. To be sure, the fact that the mixed-race children o f enslaved
mothers would also be enslaved illustrates that the intention of the law was never to
end all interracial sex. Conversely, the mixed-race children of white women or free
black women represented real threats to racial absolutism. Therefore, any
enforcement of racial dualism in the colony extended beyond the ban on interracial
sex, ultimately attempting to control and discipline the mixed-race population as
much as possible 436
The Virginia courts enacted this discipline via a multiple nodes o f surveillance
over free mixed-race and black women’s reproductive lives. First, tithing laws taxed
black and mixed-race women, but not white women. Therefore, Virginia’s tax laws
demanded that the court determine any woman’s racial status when her identity was
in question, calling into question her parentage, her family, and her own birth.
Second, because their marriages often were not recognized, many mixed-race women
were brought before the court each time they gave birth because their children were
considered legal bastards. Finally, as we’ve already seen, free mixed-race and black
women faced the threat of having their children indentured should the mothers be
determined insufficient parents, either financially or morally. Virginia was never able
to truly “outlaw” mixed-race people, but the colony sought to discipline their lives as
much as possible.
435 Foucault, The H isto ry o f S exu ality, 83.
436 D ou glas D eal outlines the ever-tightening restrictions on free black fam ilies, b egin n in g in the last
quarter o f the seventeenth century. D eal, “A C onstricted W orld,” 27 6 -7 .
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Existing outside of the law, free black and mixed-race families carved out
lives in defiance of legal codes. Their extra-legal marriages formed another
challenge to Virginia’s legislative authorities. In Virginia, the ability to legally marry
was a sign of full membership in the community, as defined by religion, status, and
race.437 In this Anglican colony, community membership was further marked by
religion. Starting in 1662, only marriages that were publicly announced and
performed by members of the Anglican clergy were recognized by the colony.438
These 1662 laws may have been, in part, an attempt to quash marriages that occurred
without state sanction 439 As racial slavery was institutionalized in the colony, legal
marriages were even more narrowly defined. Unsanctified by the church, slave
marriages were officially unrecognized, though it is clear that slaves married using
their own ceremonies.440 From the 1640s onward, Virginia outlawed the marriage of
any white servants without the express permission of their master.441 Further,

437 T hough she d oes not an alyze racial p olitics, M ary B eth N orton h ighlights the im portance o f
marriage as a sign ifier o f w hite com m unity m em bership in her an alysis o f the gender identity o f
seventeenth-century V irginian T. H all. N orton, “C om m unal D efin ition s o f G endered Identity,” 4 0 -6 6 .
438 H ening 2: 5 0 -1 . T h is statute, part o f the Restoration-era overhaul o f the c o lo n y ’s law s, m ade
ex p licit the role o f the clergy in regulating marriage.
439 For exam p le, in 1648, three married co u p les w ere presented to the York C ounty court on su sp icion
o f fornication b ecau se their marriages w ere not recogn ized by the church. Y ork D O W 2: 3 5 0 . It
seem s lik ely that the three co u p les w ere all D issenters o f som e form . For another sim ilar ca se see
York D O W 2: 3 8 7 . On sexual p erm issiven ess in V irgin ia’s early tob acco eco n o m y , see L ee G ladw in,
“T ob a cco and Sex: S o m e factors affectin g non-m arital sexual behavior in colon ial V irgin ia,” J o u rn a l
o f S o c ia l H isto ry 12, no. 1 (1 9 7 8 ), 5 7 -7 5 . Richard G odbeer has argued that, in the Carolina
backcountry, m any co u p les married, divorced, and remarried w ithout the b enefit o f clergy. G odbeer
refers to this as a sort o f so cia lly ( if not leg a lly ) sanctioned “serial m on ogam y.” G odbeer, S exu al
R evolu tion in E a rly A m erica , 125-35. For a York county ca se w hich fits G od b eer’s m odel o f “serial
m onogam y,” see the four bastardy charges against E lizabeth M orris in 1738, 1740, 1746, and 1748.
T he father o f M orris’s children w as Jones Irwin, w h o had separated from his w ife in 1727. York
D O W 16: 3 5 3 , 4 3 4 ,4 4 1 ; York D O W 18: 4 1 4 , 5 9 7 -8 ; York W I 18: 562; York D O W 19: 4 2 6 , 4 4 2 ,4 4 5 ;
York O W 19: 330; York W I 20: 108; York JO 1: 80, 100.
440 M asters seem ed to have inform ally recogn ized these unions on som e level. S ee, for exam p le, the
1674 w ill o f Peter T em p le, in w hich an en slaved w om an, “B e sse ” is referred to as the w id o w o f an
enslaved man, “O ld L aw ren ce.” York D O W 5 : 8 1 . For other exam p les, see: York D O W 11: 4 0 8 -1 1 ;
York JO 1 7 6 8 -1 7 7 0 :4 0 2 .
441 H ening 1 :2 5 2 -3 .
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Virginia outlawed interracial marriages in 1691, ordering banishment for any couple
that refused to comply with the law.442
Legal marriage and its benefits were limited to free white couples.
Nevertheless, in the York county court records, we see traces of informal marriage
traditions continuing throughout the colonial period. Interracial couples and free
black couples lived together, even without a legally recognized marriage.443 Further,
because they existed outside of and between the black/white racial binary, couples
made up of two mixed-race people, often informally but not legally married, could
find their relationships casually recognized by the courts or by the church. For
example, in 1725, Elizabeth Birdsong was summoned by the court for bastardy; the
case was never completed.444 Perhaps the case never came to fruition because the
Birdsongs, members of a large clan of free people of color were understood to be
married: the clerk of Charles Parish recorded that Elizabeth Birdsong and James
Birdsong, members of a large York County mulatto family, had two daughters,
Frances (bom in 1719) and Agnes (bom in 1736).445 The Birdsong family shows one
of the ways that mixed-race families could transgress the power of colonial
institutions: while the court did not believe the Birdsongs to be married, the church

442 H ening 3: 86-7.
443 H ening 3: 86 -7 . T he punishm ent for interracial marriage w as banishm ent from the colon y.
Interestingly, w hile there is m uch ev id en ce o f m ixed-race and interracial marriages in Y ork C ounty, I
have yet to find any exam p les o f such banishm ent in the county. T his seem s to anticipate Joshua
R othm an’s argum ent about 19th century Virginia: interracial relationships w ere tolerated so lon g as the
cou p le hew ed to other social expectations. Rothm an, N o to rio u s in th e N e ig h b o rh o o d , passim .
444 York D O W 16: 3 2 1 , 3 2 5 , 3 3 4 , 3 4 3 , 347.
445 C PR 5 1 , 52. C onsidering the w ide span o f years b etw een these births, it seem s lik ely that this
cou p le had more children w hich either did not survive or w ere not recorded by the Parish. Indeed, the
1725 bastardy case against E lizabeth B irdsong points to those p o ssib ilities. S ee also the case o f Sarah
W hiting: York D O W 11: 5 5 4 , 580; C PR 193-4.
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listed them as such, and because o f that, Elizabeth Birdsong was able to evade the
court’s discipline.
While lawmakers tried to limit marriage only to free white Anglicans, the
existence of extra-legal marriages shows both the willingness of people to live outside
the law and the inability of conventional regulatory frameworks to constrain pleasure
and desire. It also shows the ways that the marriages o f free people of color exploded
the narrow definitions of marriage in the colony. Indeed, the community seems to
have informally recognized these marriages as well: Kirsten Fischer points out that
these relationships “could attain social legitimacy outside the aegis of legal
authority.”446 The language of the Bruton Parish records, which unlike the Charles
Parish records include the vital records for some enslaved people and also free people
of color, shows the ways that free black marriages challenged the standards for
marriage in the community. Some free black and mixed-race couples are
unquestioningly listed as married by the Parish: for example, when Matthew, the son
of “Daniel Harmfield and Elizabeth his wife free negro” was bom in 1746.447 Some
births of free black children were listed like births of white bastard children: for
example, the baptism of Thomas, “Son of Elizabeth Stuart a free mulatta” was listed
only with the mother’s name, as was “John free Negro Son of Barbary.”448 But other
free black children were listed under only their father’s name, indicating a recognition
of paternity, if not of legal marriage: for example, in the cases of the birth of
“Reuben [,] Son of Peter Gillet a free Negro,” and the baptism of “Elston Son of Ned

446 Fisher, S u sp ec t R ela tio n s, 1 14.
447 John V o g t, ed „ R e g iste r f o r B ruton P arish, Virginia, 1 6 6 2 -1 7 9 7 (A thens, GA: N ew Papyrus
Publishing, 2 0 0 4 ), 3, 4. (H ereafter cited as B PR .)
448 B PR , 6.
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Edwards Formerly Majr. Swiney’s Slave.”449 Even the church, tasked with policing
the boundaries between legal and legal marriages, recorded these marriages and births
in ways that illustrate both the relationships’ liminal status and the inability of
colonial institutions to constrain desire. Colonial parish marriage and baptism lists
stand as a record of couples who were married in practice if not by law; the lists
recorded these relationships without conferring upon them legality or legitimacy.
The third challenge posed by free black and mixed-race families to Virginia’s
policy of inherited racial slavery was the casual adoption of matrilineal genealogies
by free black and mixed-race families in order to prove their freedom.450 As has been
discussed, by asserting that slavery was inherited from the mother, the law of slavery
by birth symbolically erased slaves’ fathers and fatherhood itself - in theorist
Hortense Spillers’ terms, slavery was a state of enforced “father-lacking.”451 In a
patriarchal society like the English colony of Virginia, this erasure of paternity was a
dehumanizing act of epistemic violence. The erasure of paternity extended to free
people of African ancestry as well. The law required free people o f color to
demonstrate their white ancestry in order to prove their freedom - specifically, free
black and mixed-race people had to prove that they were descendents of free
women.452 The marriages of free black and mixed-race people were not recognized;

450 Kirsten Fischer has recogn ized a sim ilar pattern in eighteenth-century N orth Carolina. Fischer,
S u sp ect R ela tio n s, 127. Perhaps there is irony to be found in the fact that A frican so cietie s w ere
m atrilinially organized. Brenda Steven son em p h asizes the W est A frican roots o f m atrilineality and
m atrifocality, w hich continued to ex ist in tension w ith the enforced m atrilineality o f slavery.
S teven son , Life in B lack a n d W hite, 22 3. Jennifer M organ notes the c o n flict b etw een sla v eo w n ers’
desire to assert patrilineality onto sla v es and sla v e s’ ow n culture o f m atrilineality. M organ, L a b o rin g
W om en, 107-43.
451 Spillers, “M am a’s B aby, Papa’s M ayb e,” 4 0 3 .
452 T he Y ork C ounty records include several ex a m p les o f sla v es suing for their freedom based on the
freedom o f their mothers or other maternal ancestors. A m ixed-race en slaved w om an nam ed Sarah
sued for her freedom in 1694, claim in g that her m other w as an E nglish w om an. N o result w as
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therefore, the supposedly “illegitimate” mixed-race children of free black and mixedrace families were recorded in birth registers only with mothers, not fathers.453
Ironically, Virginia’s patriarchal policies of inherited racial slavery created a
category of families who, by necessity, traced their ancestry to female progenitors.
Again and again, the courts required free people o f color to prove their white
ancestry. In 1673, Mary Cooke was a servant to Thomas Bushrod when she bore a
mixed-race daughter, Sarah. When Sarah was twenty-one, she sued for her freedom,
“alledging herself to be the daughter o f an English woman named Mary Cooke.”454
In another case in 1705, Thomas Danford sued for his freedom when he was twentyone, because he was “borne of a free woman.”455 Essentially, Virginia’s law of
slavery by birth required that the colony specifically recognize matrilineal
genealogies as legally binding. Again, we see limit and transgression existing in
tension with one another, as the erasure of paternity created alternative genealogies
for free people of color.
These three patterns - liminal identities, extralegal marriage, and matrilineal
genealogies - intertwined in the lives of free people of color. By examining two
mixed-race families - the Jewell-Catillas and the Inscows-Bees - we can begin to
understand how these forms of transgression existed in tension with the many forms
of domination in colonialism. The family histories of the Jewell-Catillas and the
Inscows help to illustrate the ways that, even as Virginia’s lawmakers tried to create
in slavery an airtight system based on an absolute racial binary, liminal families

recorded for the ca se (Y ork D O W 9: 3 1 8 , 35 2 ). Other exam p les are d iscu ssed in more depth later in
this chapter.
453 S ee, for exam p le, the ca ses o f Ann H obson (C PR 110) and Ann W hiting (C PR 193).
454 York D O W 5: 4 7 , 126; York D O W 9: 2 9 7 , 325, 352.
455 York D O W 12: 2 7 4 ,3 1 9 .
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existed and even thrived. These two family histories begin with the choices and
actions of individual women - Katherine Jewell and Joanna Inscow - but ultimately
they illustrate the transgressive effects of the lives of mixed-race people.
In 1670, an English servant woman in her twenties named Katherine Jewell
bore a mixed-race son, whom she named W illiam Catilla.456 Katherine was serving
an indenture to William and Margaret Booth at the time. Sometime before 1670,
Katherine had given birth to two more children, Mary Catilla and Matthew Catilla; it
is unknown whether Katherine served extra time after these births.457 Bom shortly
after the 1662 passage of the law of slavery by birth, but before the passage of long
term indentures for mixed-race bastards, the three mixed-race Catilla children faced
an uncertain future. What would their status be, as the mixed-race children of a white
servant mother?
We know virtually nothing about the father of the three Catilla children, but a
few things might be surmised from W illiam’s race and the surname that Katherine

456 Katherine’s birth date is estim ated from a w ill that she w itn essed in 1699. In the w ill, her age is
listed as “b ein g near sixfty] years o f A g e .” Jane M erry w ill, York D O W 11: 2 6 9 -7 0 . Her age at the
tim e o f W illia m ’s birth is estim ated from his 1695 freedom suit, where he is listed as being 2 4 years
old. W illiam C atilla freedom suit, York D O W 10: 137, 153. W illiam is referred to as a “m ulatto” by
the courts. Y ork D O W 7: 6 1 . W illia m ’s date o f birth is surm ised from tw o law su its he filed against his
master. T he first, in 1685, lists him as 14 years old, and the secon d , in 1695, lists him as 2 4 years old.
York D O W 7: 61; Y ork D O W 10: 137, 153.
457 It is lik ely that W illiam C atilla w as the you n gest o f the C atilla siblings; by 1672, tw o years after
W illia m ’s birth, Katherine w as listed as a free w om an, married to John Pond. C PR 153. Mary C atilla
is listed as Katherine J e w e ll’s daughter in a 1699 w ill. In that w ill, M ary’s age is estim ated as “b ein g
therty years o f age or thereabout,” placing her birthdate as near 1669. Jane M erry w ill, Y ork D O W
11:269-70. M atthew ’s age, and indeed his parentage, is le ss ea sily substantiated. There is no record o f
his birth, and there is no docum ent that directly links him to Katherine Jew ell. On the other hand, a
M atthew C atilla is listed in the Charles Parish R ecords as being married by 1693, and having tw o sons
o f his o w n by 1697. C PR 61. W hile M ary and W illiam are quite clearly sib lin gs, there is no absolute
evid en ce that M atthew is their brother. N everth eless, I assum e that the M atthew C atilla listed
contem poraneously in the C harles Parish R ecords is their brother because all three begin to have
children during the sam e tim e period (the late 16 9 0 s and early 17 0 0 s), indicating that they all married
and at childbearing age at nearly the sam e tim e. Interestingly, Katharine J ew ell w as never charged
with bastardy in the extant Y ork C ounty records; based on the ex isten ce o f W illiam C atilla’s indenture,
it is p ossib le that she and her master cam e to an alternate solution that did not in v o lv e the court.
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gave her son. William Catilla is consistently labeled a “mulatto” by the courts;
therefore, the elder Catilla was of African descent, either an indentured servant or a
slave. Judging from the surname “Catilla,” it is likely that W illiam’s father had been
brought to Virginia by Portuguese or Spanish slavers. Ira Berlin has identified a
generation of slaves (alive in the mid-to-late seventeenth century) whom he labels
“Atlantic creoles.” 458 These enslaved Africans might have lived in multiple ports of
call before eventually landing in British North America, were therefore frequently
multilingual, and often bore Spanish or Portuguese names. For this generation,
slavery was less o f an absolute institution than it would become by the eighteenth
century: many members of this generation eventually found freedom. Further, many
had business relationships, friendships, and sexual relationships with whites. Based
on the time of their relationship and his unusual last name, Katherine Jewell’s partner
seems to fit this pattern.
Apparent already in the story of the first generation of the Jewell-Catilla
family are the ways that they transgressed the increasingly calcifying boundaries of
race and servitude in 1670s Virginia. Like the other women who bore bastard
children during their indentures, Katherine Jewell’s birth (or births, if the two
younger children were also born while Katherine was indentured) transgressed the
expectations of servants’ obedience and deference. This transgression is further
apparent in the fact that Katherine was freed before 1672: it seems possible that
Katherine and her master, William Booth, came up with some alternative

458 Berlin, M a n y T housands G o n e, 17-28, 37, 3 9 ,4 4 . Lorena W alsh em p h asizes that the first
generations o f en slaved A fricans in V irginia were treated according to more traditional (and flex ib le)
custom s o f en slavem en t, w hich included custom ary p rivileges and m anum ission. T he am ount o f
respect given to the senior C atilla may indicate that he w as en slaved under these m ore flex ib le
conditions. W alsh, F rom C a la b a r to C a r te r ’s G ro v e , 32.
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arrangement than extending her service after lying in after the birth of William Catilla
in 1670.459 This willingness to handle the birth by extralegal means is yet another
transgression of lines of power in Katherine Jewell’s life. That her children were all
given the same last name indicates that, regardless of the law that disallowed servant
marriage, Katherine maintained a long-term relationship with her children’s father.
That this was an interracial relationship only heightens the transgressive meanings of
this family’s story. Finally, that the Catilla children took their father’s last name
shows a remarkable, and fleeting, moment in which black fatherhood was recognized
by the community and, to a lesser extent, the law. This recognition may be a further
indication that the Catilla children’s father, though clearly of African descent, was not
fully enslaved. Yet because their father was o f African descent, the Catilla children,
as legal bastards, could not place themselves in a patrilineal family, and instead were
attached solely to their mother.460 The Jewell-Catilla family’s matrilineal geneaology
would be significant to the family for generations.
William Catilla’s indenture, arranged by his mother and her master in 1670,
illustrates the precarious position of mixed-race children in the colony after the
passage of the law of slavery by birth. At this point in the colony’s history, mixedrace bastard children, like white bastard children, were expected to serve indentures
until the age of 21. Nevertheless, the indenture negotiated for William Catilla by his
mother and her master extended to thirty years. In exchange for that service, William
was promised “his bringing up and Come & Cloathes at the Expiration of his time

459 CPR 153. Katherine w as listed as a free w om an, married to John Pond, in 1672.
450 For exam ple, W illiam C atilla w as referred to as the “son o f Katherine Jew ell” in his original
indenture agreem ent. York D O W 7: 61.
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and a heifer of a yeare old when he attaines to the Age of fowerteen.”461 In 1685,
Booth honored his portion of the agreement, and transferred ownership of the heifer
to the teenaged William.462 In 1691, the law changed in Virginia: mixed-race bastard
children were ordered to serve 31-year indentures.463 When he was 25, William
Catilla challenged the original indenture: he sued William Booth’s widow for his
freedom in 1695, five years before his indenture would have been completed, arguing
that he should have only served 21 years, as was customary when he was bom 464
The court ruled in William Catilla’s favor. For the courts, the fact that William had
already served 24 years, and “was the son of a free woman & was baptized into the
Christian faith” took precedence over the original indenture agreement.465
By the 1690s, the entire Jewell-Catilla family had seen their statuses improve,
even as conditions for mixed-race people had deteriorated in the colony. Upon her
release from her own indenture, Katherine Jewell’s own position would change
dramatically: by 1672, she was a free woman, had married a white man named
Stephen Pond, and had given birth to a white son named John Pond 466 Significantly,
even as Stephen and Katherine’s marriage struggled, the Pond family and the Catilla
family would remain close over the years.467 Katherine’s children saw their fortunes

461 Y ork D O W 7: 61. It is p o ssib le that Katherine Jew ell negotiated sim ilar indentures for M ary Catilla
and M atthew C atilla. Indentures were private contracts, and w ere not brought to the attention o f the
courts unless they required sp ecific property transfer or they were ch allen ged . W illiam C atilla’s
indenture is docum ented because o f the transfer o f the heifer and his law suit. Sim ilar indentures for
Mary and M atthew may never have been negotiated or enforced in court. For other ca ses o f w om en
negotiating indentures for their children, see: York D O W 12: 6 7 , 181, 188; Y ork D O W 13: 51.
462 Y ork D O W 7: 61.
463 H ening 3: 7 1 -5 , 86-7.
464 Y ork D O W 10: 137, 153
465 Ibid. E ven as late as 1695, Christianity rem ained a marker o f freedom in Virginia.
466 C PR 153.
467 M atthew C atilla w ould testify in court for his w hite half-brother, John Pond in 1695. York D O W
10: 141. W hen M ary C atilla w as accused o f bastardy in 1694 (a case d iscu ssed in m ore detail later),
Stephen Pond paid her fine. Y ork D O W 9: 341. T he marriage b etw een Stephen Pond and Katherine
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improve as well, though their race would always make them vulnerable. Finally a
free man, W illiam’s facility in handling his legal affairs would be an advantage; he
would need those legal skills as his life went on, and Virginia’s free blacks found
themselves in an increasingly restricted world. By the 1690s, all three Catilla
children were also freed and had also started families of their own.
Freedom could not protect the Catilla family from the increasing strictures
placed on free mixed-race families in Virginia. The Catillas’ liminal identities, extralegal marriages, and matrilineal genealogy would both be sites of transgression of and
protection from colonial power as the years went on. As mixed-race free people of
color, the Catilla children and their descendents could not enter into fully recognized
marriages. Because of this, their childbearing would forever be in question. Indeed,
the historical record makes it very difficult to find conclusive evidence of the
marriages of many of the Catillas - lacking recognition by the court, there is often no
record of their marriages, and we are left surmising the nature of many of the
relationships in the Catillas’ family tree. While the freedom of William, Mary, and
Matthew - negotiated by Katherine Jewell, their white maternal progenitor protected the family from enslavement, it could not protect them from the increasing
surveillance by the courts over free people of color.
The court’s surveillance was especially focused on the Catilla family’s
childbearing. Over the course of the eighteenth century, all three branches of the
Catilla family tree - Mary’s, W illiam’s, and Matthew’s - were marked by births that
Jew ell w as not an uneventful on e, though. Stephen w as accused o f adultery in 1693. C ornell Cornute,
a former E nglish servant o f P on d ’s, accused Pond o f what can only be understood by a m odern reader
as falsely im prisoning and sexu ally harassing ( if not assaulting) C ornute’s w ife: Pond “kept & detained
[Cornute’s] w ife from him & made it his frequent custom to lye w / her op en ly boasting th ereof to sd
Cornute & others together w / diverse other rude behaviors & unjust action s.” P on d ’s higher status
protected him w hen the court on ly fined him 100 pounds o f tobacco. York D O W 9: 202.
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the court deemed illegitimate. Mary Catilla, Katherine Jewell’s daughter, was the
first to bear the brunt of the court’s scrutiny. M ary’s eldest son, James, was bom in
1693. James’ birth is recorded in the Charles Parish birth register; no father is listed,
and James’ last name is listed as “Catilla.”468 James’ father was known to the court,
though: upon James’ birth, Mary was accused of “comitting the sinn of fornication
with an English man named John Berry haveing a bastard child bome o f her body,”
for which she was fined 500 pounds of tobacco 469 This bastardy case shows the
tenuousness of Mary’s identity as a free woman of color and a bastard child herself:
while the parish register lists her name as “Mary Catilla,” the court summons lists her
as “Mary Jewell.”470 The Catilla last name would seem to nod at the legitimacy of
Mary’s birth, but the Jewell last name symbolically conferred upon Mary her
freedom. Further, while the court did not fully recognize M ary’s family relations, it
was that family - specifically, her white relations - that protected her: her stepfather,
Stephen Pond, stepped in to pay her fine so that Mary would not be whipped.471
Mary would bear three more children over the next ten years. Patience Jewell
was bom in 1697; no father was listed in the Charles Parish record of her birth.
Neither was a father listed for the birth of Matthew Catilla in 1700. In 1703, Mary
had another daughter, Catherine Catilla, who was named after Mary’s mother.472
While the court did not accuse Mary of bastardy for the births of Patience or
Catherine, she was summoned “for her late committing the sin of fornication” when

468 CPR 61.
469 York D O W 9 :3 4 1 .
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472 A ll three births are listed in C PR 6 1 . There is one more p ossib le birth that can be linked to Mary
Catilla: Ann C atilla, born in 1710, w as listed as the daughter o f Mary C atilla and Christopher
R obinson.
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Matthew was bom.473 Mary was furious at the indignity: she “refus[ed] to pay her
fine,” and suffered “25 lashes on her bare back.”474 Did she consider herself to be
married? It seems possible that the Englishman John Berry was the father o f all of
Mary’s children. Generations later, in 1773, descendents of Mary, Edward and Ann
“Cottillow,” named their newborn son “John Berry Cottillow.”475 It seems that the
family had preserved the genealogy of the family, including Mary’s extralegal
marriage to John Berry, which was recognized by the family, if not by the courts.
Significantly, the family’s remembered genealogy tied them to their white ancestry:
whether to Katherine Jewell or John Berry, the tie to whiteness conferred some
measure of freedom.
The women of the Catilla family would continue to be brought in to court for
bearing bastard children through the generations, drawing the eye of the court onto
the entire family. In 1729, Judith Catilla, W illiam’s 26-year-old daughter, was
accused of bearing a bastard child, and the court took the unconventional step of also
summoning her father. At Judith’s trial, the court referred to a little-used statute
which held that, in the case of a bastard birth, the owner of the house where the child
was bom could be punished as well.476 William was punished because he failed to
inform the churchwardens of the illegitimate birth. Did he (like his sister Mary in her
473 Y ork D O W 1 1 :4 0 0 ,4 4 4 .
474 Ibid. T he court’s language is extraordinary here - in no other case that I’ve co m e across d o e s the
court state that a w om an “refused” to pay a fine. T his language w ould seem to point to M ary’s
dem eanor.
475 C PR 72.
476 W averley K. W infree, com p . The L aw s o f V irginia, B ein g a S u p p lem en t to H e n in g ’s S ta tu tes a t
L arge, 1 7 0 0 -1 7 5 0 (R ichm ond: T he V irginia State Library, 1971), 2 5 3 -7 . H ening 4: 2 0 8 -1 5 . T his
statute w as applied to on ly four other ca ses in York county. York D O W 16: 5 2 7 , 535; Y ork D O W 17:
12, 29; York D O W 18: 4 3 - 4 ,6 0 , 6 7 , 73, 7 9 , 85, 103, 112; York D O W 18: 3 4 9 A , 3 5 9 -6 0 , 3 6 2 , 3 7 5 ,
3 7 6 , 3 7 9 , 3 8 0 , 381. Interestingly, in the 1733 case, Hannah Tavernor w as accu sed o f bearing “a
Bastard C hild at John [EJton’s h ou se.” T he ca se w as struck o ff the docket, m eaning that neither
T avernor nor Eton w as held responsible. T his is quite different from the ca se o f W illiam C atilla and
Judith C atilla, where both w ere held to be responsible for the birth.
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relationship with John Berry) believe that Judith was married? The court ordered that
William Catilla be whipped for his abetting of his daughter, itself a marker of
Catilla’s tenuous status as a mixed-race free man in Virginia: usually, if a man
couldn’t pay a fine, the sum was levied against his property.477 Either William did
not have enough property to make up for his fine of 500 pounds of tobacco, or the
court singled him out for the racially-charged punishment of whipping. Kirsten
Fischer argues that whipping and branding servants was prohibited in North Carolina
(as it was in Virginia).478 The result was that these punishments were reserved for
slaves by the eighteenth century, and as such “reinforced the idea that the bodies of
African Americans were inherently different.”479 It seems significant that whipping
would be used against a free man o f color, seemingly to underscore and emphasize
his race. Further, that the colonial state would reserve whipping as a punishment for
particular crimes like bastardy indicates the racialization of that crime in eighteenthcentury Virginia.
The court’s surveillance over the Catilla family lasted for generations, both in
the form of bastardy cases and tithing cases. Matthew Catilla (Katherine’s son) had
eleven grandchildren.480 His youngest granddaughter, Martha, was fined for bearing
a bastard child in 1764.481 The Charles Parish records lists another “bastard child of
Martha Cutillo,” Nancy, who was bom in 1766. No bastardy case was brought

477 For exam p le, R oger B adget w as protected from being w hipped w hen E lizabeth E llyson bore a
bastard ch ild in his house - his fine w as “le v y ’d on [his] G ood s & C hattels Lands & T en em en ts.” York
D O W 18: 381.
478 Fischer, S u sp e ct R ela tio n s, 10.
479 Fischer, S u sp e ct R ela tio n s, 10, 167.
480 C PR 61.
481 York JO 4: 1 8 6 ,2 3 7 , 254.
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against Martha for that birth.482 Again, with Martha, we see the possibility for racial
liminality and extra-legal marriages for the Catilla family: the year before Martha’s
first child was bom, Thomas Combs was fined for failing to list Martha as tithable.483
Were Martha Catilla and Thomas Combs married?484
Even with the constant scrutiny by the court, the Catilla family flourished, and
generations of the Catilla family continued in York county throughout the eighteenth
century. Their names indicate the tight-knit culture of this family: Mary Catilla
named her daughter Catherine after her mother, Katherine, an act that may indicate
both the closeness of the two women and the recognition that it was Katherine’s
whiteness that insured the family’s freedom. Further, in the four generations
following Katherine Jewell’s sons, there were three more Matthews and two more
Williams. These names also link the family back to that first generation of free
mixed-race Catillas. This attention to the matrilineal genealogy existed in tension
with the initial assertion of patrilineality by Katherine Jewell: if slavery meant
erasing fatherhood, it is certainly significant that Katherine Jewell’s children carried
their father’s last name. When later generations of Catillas were brought into court,
their memory of their genealogy was a means to maintain their freedom.
We see in the story of Katherine Jewell and her family the ways that free
people of color, guaranteed a measure of freedom by asserting a genealogy that
reached back to a white female ancestor, could transgress some of the racial
assumptions of Virginia’s culture of inherited racial slavery. Even as the court acted

482 C PR 62.
483 York JO 4: 90.
484 York D O W 18: 6 6 7 . Martha’s father, M atthew C atilla, Jr., had also been fined for failing to pay
taxes on M artha’s mother, Sarah.
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to discipline the Catilla family - through fines, surveillance, and physical punishment
- the Catillas were able to enjoy some level of independence. As a large free black
family in the racially dualistic slave economy of Virginia, the Catillas’ freedom
transgressed the notion that blackness automatically conferred slavery. While their
marriages were not legally recognized, we see a tension as the courts tacitly recognize
their legitimacy in most instances even as it refused to recognize them in others. It is
certainly remarkable that, of the 29 Catilla births for which there is some trace in the
records, only four were tried in the court as a bastardy case.485 The rest of those
births were recorded by the Charles Parish clerk as legitimate births bom to married,
mixed-race couples. Finally, we see how the memory of an English servant woman,
Katherine Jewell lived on in a family for whom genealogy was a ticket to some
measure of freedom.
Throughout the generations, the Catilla family was seen as a free black or
mixed-race family. While their white ancestry granted them freedom, the courts and
the church always categorized the family as non-white. As we’ve seen, that white
ancestry offered some measure of freedom, but it did not guarantee a life free from
the surveillance and harassment by the courts. Thus, the Catilla family, because of
their racial identity that transgressed the line between black and white, lived in a
liminal space between free and unfree, legitimate and illegitimate. For some free
people of color and their white family members, though, their identities themselves
were liminal and therefore transgressive. Such was the case with Joanna Inscow, a
mixed race woman whose own racial identity was so uncategorizable, and thus so

485 T h ese include the bastardy ca ses o f Mary Jew ell/C atilla (1 6 9 3 and 1700), Judith C atilla (1 7 2 9 ), and
Martha C atilla (1 7 6 4 ).
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transgressive, that the courts repeatedly recategorized her as a means of minimizing
her transgressions. Again, we see the ways that liminal identities, extralegal
marriages, and matrilineal genealogies were sites of transgression, this time for free
people whose race was not easily categorized. Joanna Inscow’s transgressive
identity, rooted in her birth and extending to the birth or her children, existed in
constant tension with the domination of the colonial state.
Joanna Inscow was the daughter of white woman named Elizabeth
Rawlinson.486 Elizabeth herself was probably the bastard daughter of another
Elizabeth Rawlinson, who, as a servant to Ralph Flowers, bore a bastard child in
1684.487 There is no surviving record of Joanna Inscow’s own birth (or the source of
her last name), but the circumstance of Joanna’s birth were questionable enough to
make her racial status suspect for her entire life.

Joanna’s identity, down to her

name itself, was slippery throughout her life - the court frequently mistook her for
her mother, even in 1728 summoning “Elizabeth Rawlinson, Elizabeth Rawlinson the
younger” and “Johanna Inscome” on the same day for the same crime.489 Several
years later, the court referred to “Rollinson” as Joanna Inscow’s “alias.”490
Inscow’s name was not the only aspect of her identity questioned by the court.
Over the course of her life, Inscow was called in to the York county court to prove
486 Y ork W I 20: 197. E lizabeth R o llin so n ’s w ill, dated O ctober 4, 1748, nam ed Joanna’s brother, John
R ollin son as executor and major inheritor o f the estate. Joanna inherited “ 1 E nglish S h illin g ” from her
mother. T he court sp elled “R aw lin son ” and “Joanna In scow ” m ultiple w ays; for clarity, I w ill use
“R aw lin son ” and “Joanna In sco w ” throughout, ex cep t w hen quoting directly from original sources.
487 York D O W 6: 6 1 2 . In that ca se, John H all is nam ed as the father o f the bastard child. H e d o es not
appear again in any o f the records connected to Joanna In scow or her mother, E lizabeth R ollin son .
4 N o bastardy case, m iscegen ation case or birth record survives that can be tied to the birth o f Joanna
Inscow . It is m ost lik ely that Joanna In sco w ’s father w as o f A frican or N ative A m erican d escen t. It is
p ossib le that Joanna’s mother, E lizabeth R aw linson Jr. w as h erself m ixed-race, though no ev id en ce
su rvives that confirm s or even su ggests that. It is also p o ssib le that E lizabeth R aw linson Jr. w as the
baby born in the 1684 bastardy ca se o f Elizabeth R aw linson Sr.
489 York D O W 16: 4 8 9 , 1727.
490 Y ork D O W 18: 6 0 , 6 7 , 7 3 , 7 9 86, 103, 112.
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her racial identity no less than four times. In her analysis of Inscow’s life, Kathleen
Brown emphasizes that Inscow’s marriage to Isaac Bee, a white man, temporarily
conferred upon her the status of whiteness.491 When Bee died, so did Inscow’s status
as a white woman. For Brown, Inscow’s story indicates the remarkable intertwining
of white families and free black families, and the power conferred by whiteness in
eighteenth century Virginia. I agree with Brown, but my focus here is different:
while Inscow’s marriage to Bee conferred privileged status, the questioning of that
status occurred whenever Inscow gave birth.
Virginia law regarding the tax status of black women’s labor shifted back and
forth throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In a groundbreaking 1643
law, black women’s labor was taxed the same as men’s labor; as Kathleen Brown has
argued, this law marked black women as field laborers, and was the first open legal
enshrinement of racial difference in Virginia law.492 This law was rescinded in 1662,
with the passing of the law of slavery by birth. Then, in 1668, black women’s labor
was again deemed taxable.493 Back and forth the law would go, until 1723, when
black women’s labor was again deemed taxable, following a Northampton county
petition complaining of the revenue lost from failing to tax that labor.494 The 1723
law would have a major effect on Joanna Inscow’s adult life, as it was the basis for
the court’s continued questioning and surveillance of her.
The narrative o f Joanna Inscow’s tithing cases points to the transgressive
liminality of her identity as a mixed race woman: even as the court sought a stable

491 B row n,
492 Brown,
493 H ening
494 H ening

G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 23 8 -9 .
G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 118.
2: 267.
4: 131.
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identity for her, Joanna Inscow was always difficult for them to categorize. She was
first fined for failing to pay her taxes in 1727, four years after the passage of the new
tithing law. The case was never completed, perhaps because the court was never
quite sure who Joanna Inscow was: this was the case where they simultaneously
summoned Joanna, her mother, and her grandmother for the same crime (even though
Joanna’s grandmother was most assuredly white, being a former English servant).495
Joanna’s racial identity again was called into question in 1735, when her husband
Isaac Bee was fined “for not listing Joanna Inscow a Molatto.”496 The court provided
a mixed ruling on the case: Bee was excused from the fine, but still had to pay the
taxes in question. Inscow was called in again “for not listing herself as a Tithable” in
1738 - this time she “prov[ed] herself not a Molatto” and was excused from paying
taxes in the future.497 The court’s memory was short, though. In 1746, Joanna was
again charged with not listing herself as a tithable 498 Joanna defied the court by
failing to appear, but to no avail: she lost that case, and was heavily fined. Clearly,
Joanna Inscow’s status as a white woman had lasted just over twenty years.
Inscow’s string of tithing cases was not accidental. Except for the first tithing
case (Inscow’s first appearance in the record), each summons came on the tail of
another case (or cases) in which Inscow’s transgressive behavior challenged the
court’s authority. In 1734, Inscow was charged with bastardy; in 1735, the second
tithing case occurred.499 Two more bastardy charges came in 1736 and 1738, the

495 York
bastardy
496 York
497 York
498 York
499 York

D O W 16: 4 8 9 ,4 9 9 . E lizabeth R aw linson Sr. w as treated as a w hite w om an during her
ca se in 1684. York D O W 6: 5 6 2 , 612.
D O W 18: 2 3 7 -8 , 245.
D O W 18: 4 4 0 .
D O W 19: 4 9 8 .
D O W 18: 4 3 -4 , 5 3 , 6 0 , 6 7 , 73, 7 9 , 86, 103, 112.
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latter immediately followed by the 1738 tithing case.500 Finally, from 1743 to 1746,
Inscow was involved in a series of debt cases as she worked to maintain her
husband’s estate. Following the pattern, these cases were followed by the last tithing
case, in 1746.
All of these cases - whether for tithing, bastardy, or inheritance - were linked
to Inscow’s extralegal marriage to Isaac Bee, and were thus rooted in questions about
transgressive reproduction. If racial identity was inherent in birth (and marked by
particular labor demands), then the tithing cases were about interpreting and
reinterpreting the legal status of Inscow’s birth well after the fact. Each and every
case somehow called into question Inscow’s own birth: the circumstances of
Inscow’s birth determined the legality of her marriage, and thus the legitimacy of her
own children. Thus, Inscow’s bastardy charges were inextricably linked to the
questions about her own racial status.
Significantly, Inscow was never actually punished for bastardy. The 1734
case was “Struck of the Docket,” the 1736-7 case was dismissed, and the 1738 case
was never completed. The court’s reasoning for dropping all three cases was never
made explicit, but the circumstances suggest several interpretations. Bom to a free
woman of some means, Inscow’s children were not likely to become destitute - the
court may not have seen further action against Inscow as necessary. Further, it was
possible, as with the Catilla family, Inscow’s extralegal marriage to Bee was
informally recognized by the court. Finally, the fact that none of these cases came to

500 York D O W 18: 2 7 9 , 2 9 3 , 3 0 0 , 3 2 4 , 3 3 3 . Interestingly, w hen charged the third tim e for bastardy,
In sco w ’s alias again surfaced: the initial charge w as brought against both In scow and “B etty
R oleso n ” . T he ca se against “R o leso n ” w as dropped w hen the court realized it had again m istaken
Inscow for her mother. York D O W 18: 4 1 4 ,4 3 4 .
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fruition points the possibility that the purpose of these cases was, on some level,
surveillance: the court was asserting its authority over Joanna Inscow’s transgressive
reproduction, even as it declined to actually punish her for those births. Ultiamtely,
these failed bastardy charges indicate that the court was willing to tacitly consider
Joanna Inscow as white (and thus married and bearing legitimate children), so long as
she submitted to their domination.
Isaac Bee died in 1740, leaving Inscow and her son, John Inscow, some
property.501 Upon Bee’s death, the courts ceased to abide Inscow’s transgressive
liminal identity. Again, we see a tension between transgression and domination, as
Inscow and the courts each tried to establish Inscow’s identity and her rightful access
to power. After her husband died, Inscow fought hard to maintain both Bee’s estate
and her relationship with her son, who was probably no more than six years old at the
time; considering his young age and Inscow’s questionable status, it was possible that
he could have been indentured out.

CM

This process was not easy for Inscow; the court

was not eager to grant her the authority she demanded. Nevertheless, Joanna Inscow
had seen the court in action for many years, and her role as a widow would only
expand her knowledge. Ultimately, and after many failures, Joanna Inscow used the
courts to win nominal recognition of her relationships, both to her husband and to her
son.
Following the death of her husband, Joanna Inscow was involved in a series of
debt cases, all related to Isaac Bee’s estate. In 1743, Inscow sued Thomas Dickson,

501 York D O W 19: 2 4 9 , 2 5 8 -9 , 2 6 7 , 2 7 5 . John Inscow is nam ed as Joanna In sco w ’s son in a 1753
deed. York JO 2: 363. D uring his youth, Joanna’s son used her last name; as w ill be d iscu ssed later,
as an adult, he w ould take Isaac B e e ’s last name.
502 T his age determ ination is based on the tim ing o f In sco w ’s earliest bastardy charge in 1734.
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the administrator of Bee’s will.503 After a series of delays due to legal technicalities,
Dickson died before the case could be completed - Inscow did not recover the debts
she felt owed to her. In 1746, Inscow herself was sued, first by Peter Hay, and then
by Thomas Hornsby.504 Again, Inscow was unsuccessful: she lost both cases. Just
eight months later, the court, which had in 1738 unequivocally stated that Inscow was
“not a Molatto,” changed its mind and presented Inscow “for not Listing herself as
Tithable.”505 When Inscow defied the court by failing to appear for her summons, the
court levied against Inscow a double fine of 1000 pounds of tobacco. In this series of
cases, the court whittled away at Inscow’s claims to her relationship with Bee - she
was unable to make a claim to his estate, and ultimately unable to make a claim to the
white status her marriage to him had conferred upon her. In other words, it took just
six years (between the 1740 death of Isaac Bee and the 1746 tithing charge) for the
court to recategorize Joanna Inscow from white (or tolerably transgressive) to free
black (or intolerably transgressive).
After 1747, Joanna Inscow’s name fades from the records. She was involved
in a few more court disputes, but ultimately the court’s decision to remove her status
as a white woman, and thus its erasure of her marriage to Isaac Bee, succeeded in
silencing her to a great extent. Nevertheless, Joanna’s son, John Inscow, would take
up her battle for recognition of his (and thus his mother’s) relationship with Isaac
Bee. Sometime before 1747, young John had been placed in the guardianship of John

5UJ York D O W 19: 2 4 9 , 2 5 8 -9 , 2 6 7 , 275.
504 Hay case: York D O W 19: 389. H ornsby case: York D O W 19: 4 1 1 , 4 1 6 , 4 2 1 .
505 Y ork D O W 19: 4 7 2 ,4 8 6 ,4 9 8 .
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Hatherway Carter, a mixed-race relative of Joanna’s mother, Elizabeth Rawlinson.506
These kinds of guardianships were common in the eighteenth century as a way to
ensure the support and education o f young children. The arrangement was not always
smooth - Carter and Joanna Inscow engaged in one court battle that was resolved
outside of the courtroom - but it did underscore the closeness of the Inscow’s to their
mixed-race extended family, as well as Joanna Inscow’s desire to connect with her
family after the crushing legal defeats of 1743-1746.507
Joanna Inscow died in 1759. Over the course of her lifetime, she was
summoned to the York county court more than 25 times, just for questions of
bastardy and tithing. As a free woman of color, Inscow’s status was always in
question, and her relationships (whether to her husband or to her son) were not legally
recognized. Yet it was Joanna’s relationship with her son, John, which would, in the
end, solidify her legacy. Shortly after Joanna’s death, John sued Fips Jackson for
major debts Jackson owed to the estate of Joanna Inscow. Finally, the Inscow family
was victorious in court: John Inscow recovered from Jackson well over £100
Sterling, plus interest.508
John Inscow’s victory in court was significant for a number of reasons. First,
it indicates that John, even as a very young man of color, had access to power in the
courts which his mother, as a woman, could not claim.509 Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that, while he was male, John Inscow’s access to power was
506 York D O W 19: 4 0 0 . If John w as born in conjunction with on e o f Joanna In sco w ’s bastardy
charges, he w ould have been b etw een 7 and 12 years o ld at the tim e o f this indenture, not an unusual
age for an educational apprenticeship to begin. On the relationship b etw een Carter and Elizabeth
R aw linson, see B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 238.
507 Y ork JO 1 : 6 , 1 4 , 71 .
508 York JO 3: 3 9 ,5 1 ,6 2 , 72, 133.
509 John Inscow w as lik ely ju st over the age o f majority and recently released from his
apprenticeship/indenture w hen he sued Fips Jackson.
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curtailed by both his race and the status of his birth. As a bastard child (legally if not
practically), John Inscow was legally the “child of no one.” According to Virginia
law, he was not legally qualified to inherit from Inscow (or from Bee, for that
matter).510 Yet John was a bastard child only because of a legal technicality - Isaac
Bee and Joanna Inscow were not allowed to marry because of Virginia’s law against
interracial marriage. Yet John Inscow clearly believed that Isaac Bee was his father by 1761, John had even taken on Isaac Bee’s last name.511 But John retained his
relationship with his mother’s mixed-race family as well.
We see in the lives of Johanna Inscow and her son, John Inscow, the tenuous
power that could be held by those with transgressive liminal identities in colonial
Virginia. The Inscows’ story hews particularly closely to Johanna Oksala’s
description of how limit experiences can transgress boundaries of power, knowledge
and subjectivity. Joanna Inscow’s questionable birth transgressed lines of power,
defying the notion that black and white should or even could be sexually separated in
the colony. Further, her life transgressed lines of knowledge, as she and the courts
grappled over her identity, which, in the context of Virginia’s racial duality, was
unintelligible and thus continually problematic both for the courts and for Inscow
herself. The courts sought to control Inscow’s transgressions, subjecting her to near
constant surveillance and the humiliation of refusing to recognize the legitimacy of
either her marriage or her children’s births. Yet, this attempt at domination was met
by one last transgression by the Inscow-Bee family: a transgression of subjectivity.
As Joanna Inscow’s life progressed, we see her continually grappling with the
510 V irginia w ould change this law in 1785, ruling that illegitim ate children cou ld inherit from their
m other “as if they had been law fu lly begotten o f such m other.” H ening 12: 138-9.
511 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 238.
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meaning o f her identity. Bom of a white woman, she was legally free, if not legally
white. She married a white man, Isaac Bee, temporarily cementing her privileged
status. But when Joanna Inscow and John Inscow’s ties to whiteness ceased to
protect them, they strengthened their ties to their free black family. How much did
Joanna Inscow’s understanding of herself, her identity, and her experiences transform
as her transgressions were met with increasing domination?
*

*

*

We began this chapter with the story of Mary Walters, a free woman o f color
so enraged by her situation that she was considered dangerous enough to banish from
the colony. We ended with the Catilla and Inscow families, whose transgressive
identities were met with less violent censure but who likewise met the domination of
the colonial state. Transgression and domination existed in constant tension with one
another. Significantly, in multiple ways, reproduction could be a site of transgression
of the increasingly calcifying lines of power of colonial Virginia. Those
transgressions were frequently met with the opposition of domination. Childbearing
offered servant women a respite from their labors; that respite ways paid back in the
form of years of extra service. Women who bore bastard children transgressed lines
of knowledge, defying the law and defying the court’s authority, with varying levels
of success. Single mothers carved out lives of some measure of independence, but
that independence was always shaky. Enslaved women found ways to instill meaning
in their reproductive lives, even using their reproductive role to openly defy the
authority of the master class. Finally, mixed-race families transgressed Virginia’s
racial order in multiple ways, especially if they were able to trace their genealogies
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back to a white female progenitor. These stories exist in tension with the
overwhelming domination of the colonial slave economy. Nevertheless, to borrow
the words of Ania Loomba again, reproduction offers a lens for us to see the women
“who survived to tell the tale.”
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CHAPTER 3
Knowledge “not fit to be discust publiquely”:
Colonialism and the Transformation of Reproductive Knowledge

During the hot Virginia summer of 1646, four days after delivering Anne
Owle’s baby, 46-year-old midwife Margaret Grimes returned to check in on her
patient.512 Margaret was horrified by what she saw. Rather than finding Anne in bed
with her baby, as the lying-in tradition required, Margaret found her patient “walking
upp & downe the house,” “beare legged” but for a blue linen petticoat.513 Margaret
urged her patient to go back to bed, telling Anne that “shee did very ill to goe soe
cold,” and that she worried that Anne “might soune take Could.”514 Anne was
reluctant to speak, but eventually told her midwife “shee was very ill” : “her water
scalded hir...and her beareing came downe,” which probably describes what we
would call a prolapsed uterus or vagina.515 Margaret urged Anne to keep herself
warm and to “keepe warme Cloathes” against “her faery parts.”516 As she treated
Anne, the midwife reassured her patient that she, too, had suffered the same ailment:
“I have been soe myself,” Margaret said, and she believed that Anne’s uterus “would
goe upp againe.”517

5,2 York D O W 2: 168. Laurel Thatcher U lrich ob serves that these postnatal visits from m id w ives were
m ost com m on in the ca se s o f com plicated births, where m id w ives were more lik ely to observe that
their patient needed more m edical attention after the birth. U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale, 189-93. Kathleen
Brown exam in es A nne O w le ’s case, arguing that M argaret G rim es’ testim ony sh o w s both her expertise
and the lev el o f trust the court place in her. B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s
P atria rch s, 9 7 -8 .
513 York D O W 2: 168.
514 Ibid.
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Margaret Grimes’ story of that summer day survives as the only testimony
recorded when Anne Owle reported the “unsufferable abuses” she’d experienced at
the hands of her husband to the York County Court.518 The Court had difficulty even
making sense of the tale: Anne’s complaint, they demurred, was “in such secrete
manner that it is not fit to be discust by the Court publiquely.”519 The court convened
a group of neighborhood women, including midwife Margaret Grimes, Elizabeth
Hopkins, and Elinor Coming, to “serch” Anne Owle and make a report of their
findings.520 The actions of the court would be decided by the women’s testimony:
the court would “proceed” in the case “as they [the women] shall cause.”

M1

The testimony of Anne Owle, Margaret Grimes, and the other women would
have extraordinary impact: Anne Owle was, for all intents and purposes, granted one
o f the few marital separations in the colony’s history.522 As the Virginia summer
cooled to autumn in 1646, Anne prepared to leave Virginia to return to England with
her baby, where Anne was “desirous to go...to her friends” so that she could “seek
cure” for her ailments.523 Anne’s estranged husband, Richard Owle, would stay in

518 York D O W 2: 166.
519 Ibid.
520
Ibid.
521 Ibid.
522 O f all the co lo n ie s, on ly V irginia d isallow ed d ivorce. N orton, F ounding M o th ers a n d F ath ers, 8995. The on ly w ay that a d ivorce cou ld legally be obtained in V irginia w as to apply to the H ouse o f
Lords - an unlikely scenario indeed. In the absence o f legal divorce, local courts arranged inform al
separations o f co u p les, w h o w ere not allow ed to remarry after obtaining the separation. G odbeer,
Sexual R evo lu tio n in E a rly A m erica , 130-2. S ee also: Fischer, S u sp ect R ela tio n s, 17n.4. There is one
other marital separation ca se in the York C ounty records. In 1691, the court arranged for the d ivision
o f the marital property o f M ary Savory and her husband Henry on the grounds o f H enry’s physical
abuse o f M ary. N otably, as in the O w le case, the agreem ent forged by the court in the Savory ca se did
not d isso lv e the marriage, but it did provide for the d iv isio n o f the c o u p le ’s property. Y ork D O W 9:
91. Kathleen B row n argues that w o m en ’s fe m e c o v e rt status “ironically may have strengthened the
legal position o f w iv es” w hen husbands failed to live up to com m unity standards. B row n, G o o d Wives,
N asty W enches, a n d A nxious P a tria rch s, 336. T herefore, w hile d ivorce w as not legal in the co lo n y ,
som e w iv es, such as A nne O w le, were able to find satisfactory alternatives in the courts. B row n, G o o d
W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A nxious P a tria rch s, 3 3 6 -4 0 .
523 York D O W 2: 168-9.
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Virginia. This transatlantic journey would fulfill the court’s order that the couple
“doe not Come togeather,” because “they have & doe dayly goe in danger of there
lives.”524 Anne’s journey would be funded by a financial settlement in which her
husband was required to relinquish to Anne 1,200 pounds of tobacco, a pig and her
shoats, a rug, “all her owne & her childs weareing cloathes,” “A Chest with locke &
Key,” as well as half o f the couple’s flock of chickens.525
This case presents a fascinating window into reproductive practices and
beliefs in seventeenth century Virginia. Not only that, it shows us the ways that
knowledge about reproduction worked in this particular space. We see knowledge
about reproduction emerge in several ways in the case of Anne Owle. First,
midwives held particular knowledge about childbirth, lying-in, and the medical
practices that helped to treat childbearing women. Importantly, Margaret Grimes’
knowledge about midwifery enabled her to not only treat but to reassure and protect
Anne Owle. Grimes’ knowledge here was both professional and personal. She knew
how to treat Anne particular symptoms with “warme Cloathes” and skilled hands.
She also knew how to allay Anne’s anxiety by telling Anne that she, too, had suffered
the same ailment and been cured. Was it because of this reassurance that Anne
revealed to Margaret the extent of her husband’s abuse? Or was it that, to Margaret
and the other women in the neighborhood, the ignoring of traditional lying-in
practices was simply beyond the pale? For Margaret Grimes, midwifery was not just

524
525

Ibid.
Ibid.
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about medical knowledge: it was about shared experience with the women of one’s
community.526
Second, that same knowledge about midwifery reveals the gender boundaries
that constructed and defined bodies of knowledge in this period. While Grimes and
the other women eagerly conferred with each other about the case, the male public
sphere of the court treated the case very differently. To the court, Grimes’ knowledge
about midwifery was not just outside of their purview, but it was literally unspeakable
- “not fit to be discust.” Given this, the court had to defer to women’s knowledge to
determine the facts of Anne Owle’s case. The women’s medical knowledge provided
both the reasoning and the basis for Anne’s extraordinary separation agreement:
Richard’s abuse of Anne endangered her life, and Anne was granted the right to go
back to England (in other words, to truly separate from her husband) in order to “seek
cure” for her illness. Did the midwife Margaret Grimes (who from her testimony
seemed confident that she could cure Anne herself) convince the court that Anne’s
illness was so severe that only a trip to England could cure her? The court was able
to craft this unprecedented decision precisely because the case relied on women’s
knowledge: even before the jury of women convened, the court granted that it would
proceed with whatever the women decided about the case.527 The court’s observance
of a gender division of knowledge - where women’s knowledge was private,
experiential, and medical, and men’s knowledge was public and legal - allowed for

526 1 d o not m ean to im ply an essential bond b etw een w om en. Instead, I use the phrase “w om en o f
o n e ’s com m unity” ad vised ly, to sh ow that shared exp eriences existed on ly w ithin the boundaries o f the
shifting com m unity lin es o f colon ial V irginia. T he varied experiences and ep istem o lo g ies o f European
w om en, N ative w om en , and enslaved and free A frican-A m erican w om en m eant that their
“com m u n ities” w ere increasingly d efined by race, status, and colon iality.
527 York D O W 2: 166.
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the “secrette” truths of the women’s testimony to have extraordinary power when
they erupted into the masculine public sphere.528
Finally, the case reveals the possibilities and limitations of historians’ ability
to see and understand past systems of knowledge, especially those that are not well
represented in the archive. We can see that Anne Owle’s case was decided based on
the knowledge of her midwife, but that knowledge remains elusive to us. We get a
glimpse o f the treatments Margaret Grimes used, and the importance of lying-in
traditions to seventeenth-century English women, and the relationship between
midwives and their patients, but the image we get is fragmentary at best. Margaret
Grimes’ practice was likely steeped in both years of practice and the rules of humoral
theory; she was deeply concerned that Anne would get too cold or too hot, and her
choice of treatments were rooted in that concern. Even with that understanding,
questions remain. Why was Anne’s walking about the house considered so
dangerous, beyond the fact that it countered long-held lying-in traditions? What
specific treatments did Margaret offer to Anne? How was Anne’s neglect of the
lying-in tradition evidence of spousal abuse? This incomplete image is a result of the
fact that the only evidence we have of this case (and any other similar case) is the
court’s record. This archive is an artifact of the very gendering of knowledge that
allowed the court to make its decision: the court recorded only its own version of the
story because women’s knowledge was “not fitt to be discust by the Court
publiquely.”529 Ironically, it was the very unspeakable nature of the case that
demanded that it be recorded. Anne Owle’s outlaw reproduction - the way her

528 Ibid.
529 York D O W 2: 166.
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failure to observe lying-in was a sign of her abuse by her husband - was recorded in
the archive precisely because it broke with tradition. Outlaw reproduction childbearing that became visible because it broke tradition, or because it broke the
law, or because it, for whatever reason, became public rather than staying private - is
often the only reproduction we can see from the distance of centuries.
As the case of Anne Owle makes clear, understanding the ways that
knowledge about reproduction was constructed in colonial Virginia is no easy task.
Such a study must not only attempt to reconstruct historical bodies of knowledge, but
it must grapple with the limitations and blind spots of the knowledge o f the historian
herself. Some of this difficulty is specific to the topic of reproduction, experiences of
which were rarely recorded. In her cultural history of pregnancy in England, Clare
Hanson, drawing on E. Ann Kaplan and Ann Oakley, argues, “in such areas as the
conduct of pregnancy and of child-rearing, subjective experience - complex,
contradictory and often unrecorded - is extremely difficult to recover.”530 For
Hanson, the solution to the silences in the historical record is a cultural historical
approach: “ .. .if we cannot recover subjective experiences, we can trace the
discourses that have framed and inflected pregnancy, and in so doing disclose a
history of the ideas that have shaped and informed experience.”531 This is particularly
true for a historical space such as colonial Virginia, where the archive is fragmentary
or even non-existent concerning the experiences and ideas of English women, and
especially true for women of Native or African descent. The archival silences
Hanson outlines are intensified in the colonial archive.

530 H anson, A C u ltu ral H isto ry o f P reg n a n cy, 5.
531 Ibid.
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In this chapter, I attempt to outline the contours of knowledge about
reproduction in the colonial space of seventeenth and eighteenth century Virginia. As
the analysis of the case o f Anne Owle shows, any examination of historical
knowledge must address that knowledge in at least two frames. The first is the
historical project of trying to reconstruct past systems of knowledge, with particular
attention to the intersections between knowledge and power. In a colonial context,
this transformation of knowledge was always tied to the ways that colonialism itself
shaped and reshaped colonized subjectivities in the process of what Robert Blair St.
George calls “becoming colonial.”532 The second is a self-critical, self-reflexive
examination of the limitations of such a historical project at all, considering not only
the limitations of the archive but also the subjectivity of the historian herself.
Speaking to both of these frames, Gayatri Spivak has described the ways that
colonialism both created and required “the complete overhaul of the episteme” of
both the subaltern and the colonialist (though, for her, the subaltern is the particular
focus).533 In other words, the process o f colonialism fundamentally remade the
knowledge of both colonizer and colonized, so that each needed to understand the
world in fundamentally new ways, with the colonizer’s knowledge erasing, silencing,
and remaking that of the colonized. The postcolonial scholar is left searching
(perhaps futilely) for the voice of the subaltern amidst this silencing process. With
that in mind, we must not only consider the organization, construction, and
dissemination of knowledge about reproduction in this particular space, but the ways

532 St. G eorge, “Introduction,” 4 -5 .
533 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 76.
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that the colonial experience shifted, transformed, and reframed knowledge about
reproduction.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between reproduction, colonialism,
and knowledge from a number of angles. First, I lay out the theoretical foundations
for my examination. A feminist historical reading of postcolonial theory offers a
grounding here for a discussion of how knowledge about reproduction was steeped in
gendered, raced, and colonial power relations. While the archive is largely and
lamentably silent about the knowledge systems of Native American and African
women, and that same archive presents only glimpses of English women’s knowledge
systems, it does provide a window into the ways that knowledge about reproduction
was transformed in a colonial space. After laying out this theoretical foundation, I
will describe the reproductive episteme of colonial Virginia - the unspoken
knowledge about pregnancy, childbearing, and genealogy held by women and men in
this time and space. The translation of that episteme into experience and medical
practice is the subject for the next section, which focuses on how knowledge about
reproduction was used by midwives and women. This knowledge gave midwives
some specific power in the public sphere, when their knowledge was required by the
colonial courts. Finally, I will examine the ways that colonialism created new
intimate relationships that challenged and remade previously held bodies of
knowledge about reproduction.
Ultimately, I argue that colonialism interrupted and remade the gendering of
knowledge about reproduction. Specifically, I argue that the intimacies of
colonialism reframed the relationship between knowledge, gender, race, and power.
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Where knowledge about reproduction was strictly gendered in Anne Owles’ world such that the (elite, male) court simply refused any knowledge over the topic - the
continued colonial encounter increasingly empowered masters and patriarchs to claim
knowledge about reproduction, thereby shifting the meanings of reproduction for all
involved.
*

*

*

In 1673, the York County court settled a dispute between the Robert Penrice
and the wife of Owen Davis. The court’s entire record of the case reads: “Whereas it
is manifestly apparent that an Indyan through Robert Penrice his meanes caused the
wife of Owen Davis to miscarry it is therefore ord[ered] that he pay her one thousand
[pounds of tobacco].”534 In other words, according to the court, Robert Penrice had
somehow procured an abortifacient from an Indian and gave it to Mrs. Davis. The
court judged in Mrs. Davis’s favor, and Penrice was ordered to pay damages to her.
As in the case of Anne Owle, the frustrating silences of the record may hide more
from us than they reveal. Also like Anne Owle’s case, this case shows us some of the
ways that the court addressed the intersection between reproduction, power, and
knowledge. Further, this case (hereafter referred to as the Penrice-Davis-“Indyan”
case) can be a platform to understand the ways that colonialism complicated and
transformed gendered systems of knowledge.
I will use the Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” case to outline some of the theoretical
foundations for this chapter’s discussion of reproduction, colonialism, and the politics
of knowledge. Four questions emerge (and overlap) in this discussion. First, what are
the limitations of the colonial archive and, therefore, historical knowledge? Next,
534 York D O W 5: 56.
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how does the position of the historian herself further constrict a historical
investigation? Then, if historical knowledge is so compromised, then, how is
knowledge defined in this study? Finally, what was the relationship between
colonialism and knowledge?
The abbreviated record of the Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” case illustrates in
particularly intense ways that historian’s knowledge of the past - especially the
colonial past - is limited by the available archive because the textual fragments we
have are an artifact of the very power relations we wish to uncover and understand.
In her examination of the literature of early colonialism, Myra Jehlen argues that we
must not limit ourselves to thinking of the archive as a record of its time, but instead
we must understand that the texts themselves are “self-conscious participants in the
events they represent.”535 Antoinette Burton takes a similar stance, arguing that
“ .. .archives do not simply arrive or emerge fully formed; nor are they innocent of
struggles for power in either their creation or their interpretive applications.”

This

is intensified in the colonial Virginia archive, for which the textual presence of the
nascent colonial state - in the form of court records and the written law itself - is one
of the richest (indeed, one of the only) archives available.
We see this simultaneous presence and absence of a colonial record in the
Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” case. Only the court’s decision in the case survives, and we
have very little sense o f the experiences, motivations, and opinions of Penrice, Davis,
or the “Indyan.” The judgment in Davis’s favor indicates that the court believed that
she was harmed by the remedy obtained by Penrice from the Indian, but little else can

535 Jehlen, “T he Literature o f C olon ization ,” 19.
536 Burton, “A rchive Fever, A rchive S tories,” 6. S ee also Stoler, A lo n g th e A rc h iv a l G ra in , passim .
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be surmised. More intensely, the “Indyan” whose reproductive knowledge stands at
the center o f the case - the miscarriage was supposedly caused by methods this
person provided - is not just silenced but unnamed. The court’s record is an artifact
of its production: what mattered to the court were its own decision in the case and the
monetary transaction that decision demanded.
Further, because the court’s record is an artifact of its own power in colonial
systems, it participated in silencing the colonized Other. Part of this silence is a result
of the abbreviated, recalcitrant nature of the colonial Virginia archive. We know
nothing about the “Indyan” and the knowledge he/she shared with Robert Penrice.
Further, we know similarly little about the relationship between the “Indyan”, Robert
Penrice, and Mrs. Davis. More importantly, though, the silences in this short record
are in fact revelatory of the colonial construction of race and power, especially in the
organization of knowledge. For Gayatri Spivak, the colonial historian might well find
their project reduced to “a task of ‘measuring silences.’”
There are multiple ways that we can measure the silences of this case. In one
possible reading of the text, Robert Penrice, his motives unknown, contracted an
Indian to somehow cause Mrs. Davis to miscarry her pregnancy - whether through
medicine, magic, or some other way.538 In this reading, the record transmits colonial
fears about the crossing of racial boundaries: the unnamed “Indyan,” a holder of
powerful and dangerous knowledge, crosses into English society to sow discord. In
this reading, the court did not only neglect to record the “Indyan’s” knowledge, it
refused to do so. In the court’s opinion, Robert Penrice needed to be punished
537 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 82.
538 O f course, m any other p o ssib le readings exist. W e ca n ’t know the relationship betw een Penrice and
D avis and w hy he w ould want to procure an abortion for her (or force one upon her).
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because it was through “his meanes” that this knowledge found its way into the
English settlement. In another reading, the silences point to the ways that the colonial
court privileged English agency over native agency. In the court’s view, Robert
Penrice was the only one who could be punished: Penrice was named as defendant,
despite the fact that the court claims that it is “manifestly apparent” that the
“Indyan.. .caused” the miscarriage. By naming Penrice as the defendant in the case,
the court shifts agency from the “Indyan” to Penrice. In this reading, the “Indyan” is
unnamed because his/her coloniality rendered him/her without agency in the eyes of
the court. Either way, the silences here - the refusal to record either the name o f the
“Indyan” or the knowledge he/she held - reveal the ways that the court tried to police
colonial boundaries between Indian and English and assert English power, especially
when threatened by Indian knowledge.
My project here is to allow the silences in the record to reveal what they can.
This requires being attentive to the ways that the archive specifically erases the
subjectivities of those at the bottom of various colonial hierarchies, including both
racial and gender hierarchies. Nevertheless, the exigencies of colonialism meant that
those hierarchies were constantly being negotiated and renegotiated; the colonial
archive does not totally silence colonized voices. Therefore, despite the power
structures etched into the silences in the archive, we can still hope to find the stories
of women and colonized peoples. Postcolonial theorist and historian Ania Loomba
argues that historians must look fo r women - we must “suppose a presence which at
first cannot be found.”539 In so doing, we must engage with the ways that race and
gender intersected in the colonial archive. Jane Haggis urges a reading of colonial
539 L oom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o T a les,” 319.
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gender relations that recognizes the overrepresentation of white women in the
archive: she warns that “recuperative histories” of white women “[colonize] gender
for white men and women rather than gendering colonialism as a historical
process.”540 Finally, as Ann Laura Stoler argues, colonial spaces - and colonial
archives - were the same spaces where hierarchies of gender and race emerged and
calcified; the reading of the archive amounts to the observation of the creation and
policing of hierarchy itself.541
An inquiry into the history of reproductive knowledge provokes a second
question: what is the position of the historian herself within bodies o f colonial
knowledge and colonial history? The hope to decode stories such as the PenriceDavis-“Indyan” case may reveal as much about the historian’s subjectivity as it does
the archive itself. In her examination of Chicana histories, Emma Perez warns
against another kind of recuperative history, one that would assert claims about
women that we wish were true, rather than acknowledging that our knowledge is
always incomplete:
Many of us [historians] try with our passions to reconstruct the epics, dramas,
comedies, and tragedies in a narrative that will echo ‘truth.’ We want so much
to unearth the documents and organize the ‘facts’ that will disclose the ‘real
truth.’ And what we know, what we discover as we venture into other worlds,
is that we can only repeat the voices previously unheard, rebuffed or

540 H aggis, “W hite W om en and C o lo n ia lism ,” 163.
541 Stoler, R a c e a n d th e E du cation o f D e sire , 102-13.
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underestimated as we attempt to redeem that which has been disregarded in
our history.542
For Perez, this realization of the archive’s silences not only reminds the historian of
the inevitable limitations of their knowledge, but fuels even more the need to
acknowledge historical silences. Perez’s approach reminds us that the historical
project of uncovering knowledge in colonial spaces is complicated not only by the
limitations of the archive, but by the limitations of the historical project itself.
With this in mind, an examination into the role Mrs. Davis took in this
particular case can begin to uncover the role of the historian’s subjectivity in the
creation bodies of historical knowledge. What can we learn about Mrs. Davis and her
reproductive experiences or her agency in this brief record? The record both erases
and highlights Mrs. Davis’s agency in this case, blurring the standard application of
the legal concept of the fem e covert, she is not named (referred to instead as “the
wife of Owen Davis”), but the court’s judgment is for her alone (Penrice is ordered to
pay damages to her, not her husband). Was this language intentional in the recording
of the case, and what did it reveal about what happened, either in the courtroom or in
the events surrounding Mrs. Davis’s miscarriage? We can hope to find Mrs. Davis’s
agency, but, ultimately, it is lost to us.
It’s worth noting that while we know little about Mrs. Davis, we at least know
her name; in the colonial archive, the “Indyan” is even more invisible. Further, the
invisibility of the “Indyan” is highlighted by my own historical methodology. This
case only came to my own view because it included some record of the reproductive
experiences of a woman in colonial Virginia. Admittedly, my interest in the “Indyan”
542 Perez, The D e c o lo n ia l Im a g in a ry , xv.
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emerged tangentially to my interest in Mrs. Davis; I need to resist a “recuperative”
history of white women not just because of the limitations of the archive but because
of the limitations of my own research methodologies. How do historians, through
recounting white experience in colonial spaces, re-establish the power relationships of
colonialism? When Spivak asked “can the subaltern speak?”, she was questioning the
ability of Western intellectuals to adequately hear and be able to understand the
subaltern, noting that “the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of
Other as the S e lfs shadow.”543 The problem was not the subaltern’s silence, but the
intellectual’s willingness to fill in those silences with his own politics: “representing
[the subaltern], the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent.”544 Feminist
theorist Michele Barrett offers a helpful rephrasing of Spivak’s original question:
“can the hegemonic ear hear anything?”545 In other words, Spivak not only critiques
the colonialist but also requires the historian/intellectual to recognize her own
position in historical narratives of colonial and postcolonial power relations.
The feminist concepts of positionality and intersectionality are useful in
helping historians to be self-critical of their own position in historical narratives.
Knowledge, in these theoretical frameworks, is always defined and constructed within
the power structures of identity: gender, race, sexuality, class, nation, and so on.
Donna Haraway argues that we must divest ourselves of the myth o f objectivity,

543 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 75.
544 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 70.
545 M ich ele Barrett, “Can the Subaltern Speak? N e w York, February 2 0 0 4 ,” H isto ry W orkshop
Jo u rn a l 5 8 (2004): 3 5 9 . S p ivak ’s approach in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” has been read by som e as
su ggestin g that the subaltern can, in fact, not speak - or certainly cannot be heard. S ee, for exam ple,
Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Jane B ellam y, “P o stco lo n ia lism ’s A rchive F ever,” D ia c ritic s 30:1
(2 0 0 0 ), 25 -4 8 .
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instead adopting a stance of what she calls “situated knowledge.”546 Haraway
defines situated knowledge:
I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and
situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard
to make rational knowledge claim s.... I am arguing for a view for a body,
always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured body, versus the
view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity.547
Haraway’s valorization of the self-conscious partial view challenges us not just to
acknowledge but to embrace the limitations of scholarly knowledge. Such a selfconscious positionality, in which we observe the colonial past from our postcolonial
position (while still embroiled in the neocolonial politics of our own historical
standpoint), will help us to “translate” (to use Jane Haggis’s term) colonial archives
while working to avoid recreating colonial power structures.548 We must admit that
the histories we write are, like the colonial archive itself, fictions. In the PenriceDavis-“Indyan” case, any attempt to recreate the story must be tentative and
hypothetical. Nevertheless, the very opacity of the record tells us a story about the
past - the ways that colonized knowledges were silenced, and the ways that
individual agency was elided by the colonial state. This act of “translating” the
colonial record into post-colonial meaning requires refusing the same position of
power that the court itself claimed.
546 D onna Haraway, “Situated K now ledges: T he S cien ce Q uestion in F em inism and the P rivilege o f
Partial P erspective,” in F em in ist T heory R ea d er: L o c a l a n d G lo b a l P e rsp e c tiv es, 2 nd ed „ ed. Carole R.
M cCann and Seu n g-K yu n g Kim (N Y : R outledge, 2 0 1 0 ), 3 7 0 -8 1 .
547 D onna Haraway, “Situated K n ow led ges,” 3 7 6 . Linda A lc o ff presents a sim ilar v iew , arguing for
the need to see the gendered subject as both “n on essen tialized and em ergent from a historical
exp erience.” L inda A lco ff, “Cultural F em inism versus Post-Structuralism : The Identity C risis in
F em inist T heory,” in The S e co n d W ave, ed. Linda N ich o lso n (N Y : R outledge, 1997), 34 8 -9 .
548 H aggis, “W hite W om en and C olon ialism ,” 175-77.
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I have discussed the “Indyan’s” knowledge and how the court erased it; I have
also inquired how my own view of the court’s knowledge constructs my
understanding of this moment in the colonial past. This brings me to the third
question regarding this history of reproductive knowledge: how is knowledge defined
in this study? Ultimately, knowledge about reproduction in the Penrice-Davis“Indyan” case was about the contours of reproductive control - abortion, pregnancy
care, medicine, and magic. My goal here is to define knowledge broadly, to include
how knowledge about reproduction was learned from sources both oral and written,
and through education both formal and experienced in everyday life. This must be
the case, as the period in question - the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries
in both Europe and the American colonies - witnessed profound shifts in what
constituted legitimate knowledge about reproduction, specifically about childbirth
practices. W omen’s historians and medical historians have traced in detail the ways
that women’s knowledge about midwifery, passed down orally from midwife to
midwife and through the combined experience o f witnessing birth upon birth, gave
way to medical men’s knowledge about medicine and anatomy, transmitted through
print and formal education.549 As we will see, this debate played out in eighteenthcentury Virginia, as well. Therefore, my approach to knowledge here must
encompass both the knowledges of midwives and of doctors. Further, my approach
must acknowledge the ways that women who were never named as midwives including Native women and enslaved and free women of African descent as well as
549 On shifting b od ies o f k n ow led ge in the history o f the transition from m idw ivery to m an-m idw ifery,
see: C od y, ‘T h e P olitics o f Reproduction,” 4 7 7 -4 9 5 ; D onegan, W om en a n d M en M id w ives; D uden,
“T he Fetus on the ‘Farther S h ore’”, 13-25; Ehrenreich and E nglish, W itches, M id w iv e s a n d Nurses',
H anson, A C u ltu ral H isto ry o f P reg n a n cy, Jordanova, “Interrogating the C oncept o f R eproduction,”
3 6 9 -3 8 6 ; Leavitt, B ro u g h t to Bed', Scholten, C h ild b ea rin g in A m erica n S o c iety , W ertz and W ertz,
Lying-In; W ilson , The M akin g o f M an -M idw ifery.
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English women - had access to the kinds of orally-transmitted, experiential
knowledge held and shared by midwives.
I am also concerned with uncovering knowledge about reproduction on a
much broader, deeper, epistemological level. Michel Foucault defined the episteme
as:
...the strategic apparatus which permits a separating out from among all the
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say
a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say
are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the
separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not
be characterized as scientific.550
This definition of the episteme mirrors, in some ways, the separation of knowledge
described in the debates between midwives and physicians. Physicians’ knowledge
was defined as scientific, and it defined itself against the non-scientific knowledge of
midwives. But Foucault is getting at something else here: for him, the episteme is
not just the separation of knowledge into categories, but the very ability to draw
categories at all. In this way, the episteme can be understood as that which is known,
if not necessarily questioned or proven - the fundamental, invisible assumptions that
organize all knowledge into what is true and what is false.
When considered as episteme, knowledge is fundamentally related to power:
the power to distinguish that which is true from that which is false, the power to
determine that which is known versus that which is unknowable. Emma Perez,

550 M ich el Foucault, P o w e r/K n o w le d g e : S e le c te d In terview s a n d O th e r W ritings, 1 9 7 2 -1 9 7 7 , ed. C olin
G ordon (N Y : Pantheon B o o k s, 1977), 197.
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whose work is rooted in Foucault’s methodologies, makes this clear: “The politics of
meaning, then, becomes the aim o f a history that interrogates the construction of
knowledges accepted and condoned in society, thus granting power to those who
make knowledge.”551 Following Perez and Foucault, I am utilizing a different
framework than scientific vs. unscientific to understand historical epistemes. Instead,
I am interested in the ways that knowledge was sorted into what might be termed the
“knowable” and the “unknowable.” The boundary between the knowable and the
unknowable was often defined via power relations, including gender and race. As we
saw with Anne Owle’s marital separation agreement, the court simply defined
women’s reproductive knowledge as unknowable - they deferred to women’s
knowledge because such knowledge could not be translated into the court’s episteme.
In the Penrice-Davis case, the “Indyan’s” knowledge of reproduction and abortion
was also unknowable and unrecordable by the court. Our knowledge o f the past is
limited by what past recorders understood as possible to be understood.
The fourth and final question about the history of reproductive knowledge that
I work to answer here is this: what were the precise contours of the relationship
between colonialism and knowledge? The framing of knowledge as episteme
emphasizes the ways that knowledge was and is always embroiled in power relations,
whether gendered, raced, or colonial. The history of colonialism was and is a history
of changing relationships of knowledge and power. Ania Loomba argues for the
interdependent relationship between colonialism and knowledge: “Colonialism
reshaped structures of human knowledge. No branch of learning was left untouched

551 Perez, The D e c o lo n ia l Im agin ary, xvi.
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by the colonial experience.”552 This is important to our exploration of reproductive
knowledges, as it begins to reveal one o f the connections between the midwifery-tomedicine shift and the history of colonialism, one which will be discussed further in
this chapter. Loomba points out the ways that colonialism’s urge to “discover” whether new lands, new peoples, or new ideas - was part o f the creation of the
Western mind (the very objective mind that Haraway rejects): “The central figure of
Western humanist and Enlightenment discourses, the human, knowing subject, now
stands revealed as a white male colonialist.”553 In the Penrice-Davis case, the
colonial court did not just refuse to record the reproductive knowledge of the
“Indyan” : it punished Robert Penrice for the temerity of crossing colonial knowledge
boundaries.
When knowledge is defined in this way - as episteme, as the framework of
knowable vs. unknowable - we can see the ways that knowledge was embroiled in
the exercise and distribution of power, especially colonial power. Spivak argues that
colonialism created and required “the complete overhaul of the episteme.”554 In other
words, colonialism was defined by the power of the colonialist to remake, erase, and
silence colonized knowledges. Spivak’s primary concern is the ways that colonialism
was a process of epistemic violence against the colonized subaltern. That said,
embedded in her analysis is the understanding that colonialism also transformed the
episteme of the colonizer, for whom colonialism amounted to what she, drawing on
Heidigger, called “the worlding of the world.”555 Therefore, Loomba and Spivak

552 A nia L oom ba, C o lo n ia lism /P o stco lo n ia lism (N Y : R outledge, 1998), 57.
553 L oom ba, C o lo n ia lism /P o stco lo n ia lism , 65.
554 Spivak, “C an the Subaltern Speak?” 76.
555 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 82.
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together understand colonialism as a knowledge project, and knowledge itself as a
colonial project.
The transformation of colonial epistemes took place in the intimate zones
inhabited by both colonizer and colonized. Ann Laura Stoller discusses what she
calls “the intimacy of empire”: the ways that colonialism was enacted not just in the
public arenas of conquering and law, but in the most private, intimate of spaces.556
For Michel Foucault, the “the will to knowledge” about sex was the transformation of
sex from experience, pleasure, and desire into discourse through the forced intimacy
of the confession.557 Stoler draws on Michel Foucault’s critique of the multiple
spaces where confessions demand the transformation of sex into discourse: the ritual
of confession, which originated in the church, spread to “a whole series of
relationships,” all defined by the intimacy between those who confess and those who
hear the confession.558 The kitchen, the bedroom, and the nursery are all spaces, for
Stoler, where the intimate relationships of colonial power (mistress and maid,
colonizer and concubine, infant and nurse) were enacted. Drawing on Foucault,
Stoler argues that these intimate relationships were especially “dense transfer point”
for the exchange and creation of power.559
I posit that because reproduction involved people’s most intimate relations, it
becomes an especially potent space to understand the intersections between
knowledge, power, and colonialism. Therefore, we can add the birthing room to the
bedroom, kitchen, and nursery as a potent site for the transfer of colonial knowledges.

556 Stoler, ‘T e n s e and T ender T ies,” 23.
557 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 12-13.
558 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 61 -3 .
559 Stoler, “T en se and T ender T ies,” 24.
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The reproductive knowledge of Anne Owle and her midwives, of Robert Penrice,
Mrs. Davis and the “Indyan,” was all made, transformed, and communicated in
private, intimate spaces. Because these intimate spaces became spaces for the
enacting of colonial power relations, they blurred the boundary between public and
private, we have a record (however elliptical) of the transactions that happened there.
The knowledge transactions of colonial spaces created both discourses of sex (and
reproduction) and discourses of colonialism itself.
My project in this chapter is to attempt to reconstruct the contours and
boundaries of reproductive knowledge in colonial Virginia, while being attentive to
the limitations of my ability to do so. The theoretical questions I’ve outlined above
help to explain the character of my argument herein. The archive upon which I draw
is limited and fragmentary; therefore, my own knowledge and the conclusions I draw
must be partial and impressionistic. Surely, the colonial archive reflects the interests
of colonizers, but even so, the development and creation of that archive was part of
the process of creating colonial and colonized subjectivities and therefore is neither
hegemonic nor totalizing. Knowledge and power were co-defined, but neither
knowledge nor power hierarchies were absolute or concrete in this space and time.
What I try to uncover here is the colonial reproductive episteme - the deeply held,
often unquestioned, assumptions about childbearing and its meanings that colored not
just childbirth experiences but people’s understanding of the world in which they
lived. Colonialism shook the foundations of people’s reproductive epistemes as they
participated in the creation of new hierarchies, new relationships, and new intimacies.
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This transforming and unstable relationship between colonialism, reproduction, and
knowledge is the focus of this chapter.
*

*

*

In the biblical creation story, after banishing Adam and Eve from Eden for
eating from the tree of knowledge, God punished Eve and all women thereafter:
“Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception, in
sorrow thou shalt bring forth children.”560 Eve’s curse, that biblical stricture that
seemed to doom women to frequent and painful childbirth, formed the basic
understanding of women’s reproductive lives in the British American colonies. The
myth seemed to reflect reality. In Virginia during the eighteenth century, white
women gave birth to an average of ten or eleven children during their lives, and
enslaved black women’s fertility rate increased throughout the century to an average
of nine children.561 For these women, repeated pregnancies, childbirths, and nursing
defined their adult lives. Understanding how this experience shaped their
understanding of their lives and of reproduction itself requires seeing childbearing not
just as the experience of childbirth but as a fundamental organizing principle of
everyday life - reproduction as episteme.
W omen’s knowledge, especially in the ways that they interpreted their own
bodily experiences, is difficult, but not impossible, to ascertain. W omen’s voices are
remarkably and frustratingly silent in the Virginia archive. Therefore, lacking sources
written in women’s own hand, we must read the existing archive against the grain to

560 G en esis 3:16 (K ing Jam es V ersion).
561 K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la ves, 5 7 , 72. Increasing black fertility over the century indicates the shift
from an im m igrant A frican slave labor force to an Am erican-born slave labor force. For a variety o f
reasons, not least the ph ysical, m ental, and em otional stress o f the M iddle P assage, im m igrant en slaved
African w om en had a m uch low er fertility rate than native-born en slaved w om en.
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find women’s knowledge. If we reframe knowledge to include that which is
knowable - in other words, as Foucauldian episteme - we can begin to ask how
women’s reproductive experiences would have constructed their understanding of the
world. As Foucault argued, episteme is the knowledge we hold but do not question,
and therefore this is knowledge that often goes unspoken. Therefore, we cannot
recreate this episteme in its entirety, but we can trace the outlines where this episteme
erupted into text and speech. Therefore, a reconstruction of early Virginian
reproductive episteme requires an examination about the deepest assumptions about
reproduction, as well as the ways those deep assumptions steered people’s choices
and colored their interpretations of their lives.
My analysis of the reproductive episteme of early Virginia is based on the
ephemeral moments when deeply held beliefs about reproduction were articulated.
First, I try to understand the ways that women themselves understood childbearing as
a specific process that impacted their lives. I use evidence both of women’s
description of the reproductive process and of women’s experiences of repeated
pregnancies. For women, reproduction was a central node of meaning in their lives while much of this meaning is lost, there is some evidence that reveals what
reproduction meant to women. Next, for all immigrant Virginians, birth and death
were inherently linked in the colony, especially in a disease environment that pushed
mortality to extraordinarily high levels. An examination of the discursive linking of
birth and death shows some of the ways that people made sense of the dangers of
childbearing. Finally, for men and the state, reproduction was both a challenge and
an affirmation of patriarchal power: efforts to assert control over reproduction (or at
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least over the impact of reproduction) show the beginnings of the ways that Virginia’s
patriarchy sought to colonize reproduction. I examine the language of wills to try to
decode the ways that men tried to make sense o f the unpredictability of reproduction.
Well into the eighteenth century, women controlled knowledge about childbearing;
nevertheless, ideas about reproduction were still central to patriarchal and colonial
concerns about the organization of property and power.
In English society in early Virginia, all adult women could be expected to
have some knowledge about childbearing, women’s reproductive cycle, and fetal
development. This knowledge was rarely articulated because it was so deeply rooted
in everyday life and bodily experience. An example of one York County servant
woman’s pregnancy illustrates this. When Elizabeth Knight was accused of
fornication in 1659, several witnesses testified to her familiarity with Nicholas
Taylor. Elizabeth confessed the liaison, saying that Nicholas “did oftentimes solicite
her to be naught of her body with him,” and that eventually, “his Importunity
prevailing at last to the getting of hir consent.”562 After meeting several times, the
couple had sex “by ye spring where ordinarily we fetch water,” and that “at which
time she conceived by him.”563 Beyond these testimonies, the proof of the
relationship lay in the fact that Elizabeth was pregnant at the time of her trial.564

562 York D O W 3: 6 5 , 6 7 (1 6 5 9 ) .
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid. Bastardy and fornication charges rarely com m en ced w hile the w om an w as still pregnant;
instead, as w as d iscu ssed in Chapter 2, the court brought charges after the w o m a n ’s lyin g-in . In York
C ounty, there are on ly nine colon ial-era ca ses o f w om en being charged w ith fornication w h ile they
were pregnant. S ix o f those ca ses (including the case o f Elizabeth K night) are clustered in the years
1655-1 6 6 2 , indicating a lo ca lized shift in enforcem ent priorities during those years. S ee, for exam ple,
the fornication case o f R achel H am m on, York D O W 3: 36, 3 9 (1 6 5 8 ).
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Asked to confirm her pregnancy, Elizabeth stated that “ye fruit that taken life this
fortnight,” and that she “felt it to stirre so long but faintly.”565
When called upon to judge Knight, the court was remarkably lenient in its
decision: Nicholas Taylor was to pay Elizabeth’s master, Charles Dunne, a small fine
of 200 pounds of tobacco, and there is no record of Elizabeth being punished at all.
There are several reasons for the court’s leniency in this case. First, there was no
child yet bom for the parish to support. Further, as was discussed in Chapter 2,
because she was relatively early in her pregnancy, Elizabeth had not yet disrupted her
master’s household with her lying-in. Finally, it is possible that the court believed
that Nicholas Taylor, a free man, would marry Elizabeth Knight and the child would
not be bom a bastard.
The 22-year-old Elizabeth Knight’s familiarity with the language of
conception and quickening points to the ways that even young, single, servant women
were well aware of the reproductive knowledge held by women. First, Elizabeth’s
claim that she could pinpoint conception seems to suggest her familiarity with the
popular medical theory that Thomas Laqueur has called the one-sex model.566
Laqueur argues that, in the early modem understanding of human reproduction, male
and female bodies were understood to be homologues of each other: both men and
women produced “seed” during orgasm, and both needed to orgasm in order for
conception to occur. In Elizabeth Knight’s testimony, she is able to pinpoint the date

565 York D O W 3: 6 5 , 67.
566 Laqueur, M aking Sex, 6 3 -1 1 3 ; Laqueur, “O rgasm , G eneration, and the P olitics o f R eproductive
B io lo g y ,” 1-41. T h is o n e-sex m odel had the effe ct o f m aking it im p ossib le for pregnant w om en to
con vin ce the court that they were raped. S ee, for exam p le, the case o f A nne C ollin s. Y ork D O W 3:
144, 148, 161, 167, 169.
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that she “conceived by” Nicholas Taylor.567 If Elizabeth Knight was in fact referring
to the one-sex model, she was able to identify that day as the date o f conception
because o f the pleasure she felt during intercourse with Taylor. For Elizabeth
Knight, as well as the court that recorded her testimony, knowledge about
reproduction was rooted in Knight’s own bodily experience.
Elizabeth Knight’s use of the language of quickening - “the fruit hath taken
life” - also indicates the ways that popular knowledge about pregnancy and fetal
development was rooted in bodily experience. In the early modem mind, pregnancy
was considered to be a “period of uncertainty,” in the words of historian Barbara
Duden:
A woman was truly pregnant when she had felt the ‘quickening’ of her child.
With its movements, the unborn announced itself as a child. Before
quickening, a woman whose menses did not come was in an ambiguous
situation; maybe she was ‘with child,’ maybe not. Perhaps the cessation of
her ‘monthly’ was due to some blockage, some ‘retention of the menses.’568
Elizabeth Knight may have believed she experienced “a conception” when she and
Nicholas Taylor met by the spring; that belief was confirmed when she felt the first
movements of her fetus. Again, it was bodily experience that formed the basis for
women’s knowledge about reproduction.
W omen’s bodily experience defined their knowledge about reproduction; this
was knowledge that made sense not only o f pregnancy but of women’s adult roles and
the narrative of their lives themselves. Marriage during the early modem period was

567 York D O W 3: 6 5 , 67.
568 D uden, “T he Fetus on the ‘Farther S h ore’,” 16.
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a rite of passage that marked one’s entrance into adult roles, including childbearing.
In some ways, for women, this entrance into adulthood was a biological experience:
legitimate marriage and childbearing were codefined for women during this period.
Roy Porter argues that early modem marriage was understood as inherently
reproductive: during this period, marriage was “the rite of passage that translate[d]
the biological potential for reproduction into social and moral actuality.”569 Susan
Klepp points out the ways this conflation of adulthood with reproductivity intersected
with discourses of feminity. She argues, “pregnancy was the natural condition of
married w om en...; barrenness was unnatural.”

MA

One place we see this conflation of

marriage, adulthood, and reproduction is in the language of wills. Wills frequently
stipulated that children would inherit property upon their own marriage - the
implication was that the marriage guaranteed future heirs for that property.571
Nicholas Harrison’s will declared that his mother should inherit his property “if he
should dye a Singleman,” thereby conflating marriage with the production of heirs.
This sense that adulthood, sexuality, and childbearing were codefined was
present in Native American and African societies as well. The Powhatan Indians’
polygynous marriage structure and matrilineal social organization befuddled English
observers, who did not bother to record much about that society, but it seems clear
that motherhood was central to women’s adult roles in the Powhatan community.573
Indian women had remarkable sexual freedom, especially compared to English
569 R oy Porter, “ ‘T he Secrets o f Generation D isp la y ’d ’: A r is to tle ’s M a ster-p ie c e in E ighteenth-C entury
E ngland,” E igh teen th -C en tu ry Life 9, no. 3 (M ay 1985): 5. On the social im plications and
enforcem ent o f this b elief, see N orton, “C om m unal D efin ition s o f G endered Identity,” 4 0 -6 6 .
570 K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ie s,” 9 2 0 .
571 Y ork D O W 2: 3 6 6 -7 (1 6 4 8 ); York D O W 2: 4 0 6 (1 6 4 8 ).
572 Y ork D O W 1: 1 7 5 (1 6 5 2 ).
573 H elen Rountree, The P o w h a ta n Indians o f V irginia: T h eir T ra d itio n a l C u ltu re (Norman: U niversity
o f O klahom a Press, 1988), 89.
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women. In the early eighteenth century, Robert Beverley observed that Powhatan
“maidens are entirely at their own disposal, and may manage their persons as they
think fit.”574 This sense of autonomy undoubtedly inflected Native women’s sense of
their reproductive role. Evidence from early modem African societies shows the
centrality of reproduction to adult status and to the community’s ritual life. Jennifer
Morgan emphasizes the importance of coming-of-age rituals such as circumcision
(for both boys and girls) in western African societies.575 Further, rituals meant to
ensure the fertility of marriages show the importance of fertility in understanding
adult women’s roles in western Africa.576 The survival, erasure, and transformation
of these rituals through the Middle Passage suggest the ways that colonialism and
slavery transformed not just women’s lives but their understanding of those lives in
the cosmos.
Early Virginian women’s experience of childbearing defined their lives in
ways that are hard to comprehend from our post-birth-control vantage point. If
marriage and reproduction were conflated during this period, lack o f effective birth
control meant that for fertile married women, pregnancy and childbirth were nearly
constant experiences. Judith Walzer Leavitt, examining the childbearing patterns of
middle class and elite New England women in the eighteenth century, has posited
that, because of repeated pregnancies occurring approximately every 2-3 years,
women spent up to a third of their adult lives pregnant.577 Paula Treckel shows that
Southern white women’s birth interval was far more unpredictable than New England
574 Robert B everley, The H isto ry a n d P re se n t S ta te o f V irg in ia ... B y a n a tive a n d in h a b ita n t o f the
p la c e (London: printed for R. Parker, 1705), Eighteenth Century C ollectio n s O nline Print E dition, 3: 89.
575 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 65.
576 Ibid.
577 L eavitt, B ro u g h t to B ed, 14-20.
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women’s during the colonial period: the south’s disease environment, pattern of later
marriage, and race and status hierarchy meant that women’s experiences are hard to
generalize.578 York County’s birth and baptism records from Charles Parish seem to
suggest a 2-year birth interval.579 For example, Sarah Hawkins’ five children were
bom 18-24 months apart: Thomas was bom in June 1725, Martha in February 1727,
Pinkethman in February 1729, William in March 1731, and Rebecca in May 1732.580
Scholars have argued that the two-year birth interval is evidence of women’s
agency: women used extended nursing to limit their pregnancies, which would
happen far more frequently in the absence of breastfeeding. Jennifer Morgan argues
that African women also intentionally used breastfeeding as a form of birth control;
the practice had the advantage, in the colonies, of bonding women with their children
and providing support to nutritionally vulnerable babies.581 Examining white
women’s birth histories, Paula Treckel asserts that the 18-24 month birth interval is
not accidental or “natural.” 582 Instead, Treckel argues, this birth interval was a result
of white women’s concerted use of breastfeeding to delay conception. The planterpatriarch Landon Carter was well aware of women’s use of breastfeeding to limit
their fertility when he chided his daughter-in-law, Winifred Carter, for continuing to
nurse her baby, even when Winifred was herself sick in 1770:

578 T reckel, “B reastfeeding and M aternal S ex u a lity ,” 4 5 -8 .
579 T h ese con clu sion s are im pressions; I have not em barked upon a full statistical an alysis o f the
C harles Parish birth records.
58°
| qq. | Recorcls for other w om en point to a sim ilar pattern. S ee, for exam p le, Elizabeth
Hayward, C PR 102-4.
581 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 66.
582 T reckel, “B reastfeeding and M aternal S ex u a lity ,” 4 2 -6 . For a d iscu ssion o f pregnancy lim itation in
V irginia after the R evolution, see L ew is and Lockridge, “S a lly H as B een S ick ,” 5 -2 0 . Susan K lepp
argues that w o m en ’s active lim itation o f their fertility w as an o ffsh o o t o f R evolutionary politics:
K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ies,” 9 1 0 -4 5 .
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Mrs Carter taken ill yesterday and was to be seen so before, though she would
not own it. And the poor little baby Fanny is every time to share her M ama’s
disorder by sucking her, and this because she should not breed too fast. Poor
children! Are you to be sacrificed for a parent’s pleasure? I have been a
Parent and I thought it murder and therefore hired nurses or put them out.
Winifred Carter had suffered several painful and debilitating miscarriages at this
point; her wish to limit her fertility may have had as much to do with protecting her
own health as pursuing pleasure. (Carter’s reference to hiring wetnurses will be
discussed more fully later on in this chapter.)
Interestingly, women who were accused of bastardy more than once seem to
follow this pattern of a 2-year birth interval as well: repeat bastardy charges often
occurred about two years apart. Some of these repeat offenders were, as was
discussed in Chapter 2, mixed-race women or women involved in long-term
interracial relationships which were not recognized as marriages. Therefore, for
women such as Joanna Inscow and Mary Catilla, it makes sense that their births
would follow the pattern of married women, and occur roughly two to three years
apart.584 For servant women like Elizabeth Dutchfield, the 2-year window between
her bastardy charges points to the possibility that servant women may have nursed
their babies for at least a year.585 Whether intentionally or unintentionally, this
practice provided some contraceptive effects.

583 G reene, ed ., The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L ondon C a rter, 511.
584 Mary C atilla’s births were recorded in 1694, 1697, 1701, 1703, and 1710. Joanna In sco w ’s births
w ere recorded in 1733, 1736, and 1738.
585 York JO 1: 141, 145, 157, 365. W hen O live Eaton, an A ccom ac C ounty servant w om an, w as
charged w ith bearing a bastard ch ild in 1638, she w as ordered to keep and nurse her child “until
w eanable.” S u sie M . A m es, ed ., C ou n ty C ou rt R eco rd s o f A cco m a ck -N o rth a m p to n , V irginia: 16321 640 (W ashington, DC: T he A m erican H istorical A ssociation , 1954), 129-30. (H ereafter cited as
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Enslaved women’s birth interval is hard to ascertain, given the lack of reliable
documentation, but it seems to reflect a 2-year birth interval as well. The parishes
were not required to record the births and deaths o f enslaved people, and therefore the
records are spotty.586 Sometimes, in wills, inventories, and probate suits, enslaved
women were listed with children, along with their ages. In the 1713 record o f the
division of the estate of John Kendall, an enslaved woman, Bety, is listed along with
her children: Bety (age 11), Johnny (age 6), Dick (age 4), Kate (age 2 V2 ), and Frank
(age 7 months).587 The ages of the youngest three children indicate that Bety’s births
occurred roughly 2 years apart. But, the gap between 6-year-old Johnny and 11-yearold Bety indicates that we must not overestimate women’s agency in determining
their birth interval. That gap could indicate a number of possibilities: intentional birth
spacing, loss of a partner, miscarriage, stillbirth, infant death, death in early
childhood, or sale of a child.
The life of Bety points to an important caveat: because birth records include
only live births, they do not provide documentation of miscarriages or stillbirths.
Incorporating pregnancy loss into our understanding of birth intervals helps us to
understand the extent to which pregnancy dominated women’s adult lives. For
enslaved women like Bety, we are left with only questions about the gap between her
two eldest children. For other women, more evidence is available, and we can begin
to understand the impact of pregnancy loss on women’s reproductive lives.
A m es, A cc o m a c 1, fo llo w ed by the page num ber.) S o m e other ca ses o f servant w om en having 2-year
gaps betw een bastardy charges include M argaret Clark, M ary C lay, and Sarah Paskins. Y ork D O W 15:
124, 137, 523; York D O W 8: 312; Y ork D O W 5: 4 4 , 5 6 , 91.
586 Charles Parish kept no record o f en slaved p eo p le’s births. Bruton Parish kept scattered records o f
enslaved p e o p le ’s births and baptism s, but not en ou gh identifying inform ation is included in those
records to establish birth intervals for en slaved w om en. See: John V ogt, ed ., B ruton P a rish R e g ister
(A thens, GA: N e w Papyrus Publishing, 2 0 0 4 ).
587 York D O W 14: 309.
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The records of the life of Lucy Parke Byrd provide an opportunity for such an
analysis. Lucy Parke married William Byrd II in 1706, when she was eighteen years
old. Over the course of their 10-year marriage (Lucy died of smallpox in 1716), Lucy
had four live births: Evelyn was bom in July 1707, Parke was bom in 1709, Phillips
William was bom in 1713, and Wilhemina was bom in 1715. Both Parke and Phillips
William died before they were a year old. If we count Lucy’s four completed
pregnancies, she had a long, but not unusual birth interval - average of 33 months
between pregnancies.
Nevertheless, William Byrd II’s diary for the period from 1709 to 1712 gives
us a remarkably detailed picture of Lucy’s reproductive experience - one that belies
this 36-month birth interval. In the diary, Byrd habitually noted the state of his own
health, as well as that of his wife. From the diary, we can get a remarkably clear
sense of the timeframe of Lucy Byrd’s pregnancies, often pinpointing the date of
conception with reasonable accuracy. During the period of the diary, Lucy was
pregnant four times, but only two of these pregnancies culminated in a live birth. The
first resulted in the birth of her son, Parke. The second ended in an early miscarriage,
probably in the fifth or sixth week of pregnancy. The third pregnancy also ended in
miscarriage, sometime between the third and seventh months of pregnancy. Finally,
the fourth pregnancy ended with the birth of Phillips William, several months after
the end of the diary.
Lucy’s experiences of repeated pregnancies, miscarriages, and infant death
force us to rethink the extent to which women could control their fertility, and the
impact that this lack of control had on their understanding of their lives. It is unlikely
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that Lucy Byrd breastfed her children (there is no mention of nursing in the diary);
therefore, she did not experience the contraceptive effect o f the practice. All told,
Lucy spent between 20.5 and 24.5 months pregnant during the 43-month period of the
diary, or, between 47.7 and 57% of this period - a far greater proportion than the 33%
suggested by Leavitt. The meanings of this disparity become clearer if, rather than
calculating Lucy’s birth interval, we calculate her conception interval. In other
words, by considering the interval between pregnancies, rather than births, we can see
that Lucy Byrd was pregnant roughly once every 13-14 months during the period of
the diary. 588

588 D uring the period o f the diary (c. 17 09 -1 7 1 2 ), L ucy B yrd ’s con cep tion interval w as about 13.6
m onths. T his chart attem pts to reconstruct L u cy’s B yrd’s con cep tion interval. T h is calculation d oes
not include the interval b etw een the births o f P hillips W illiam and W ilhelm ina, because w e d o n ’t know
w hether L ucy exp erienced m iscarriages or stillbirths during that tim e. A ll citations are from L ou is B.
W right and M arion T in lin g, eds. The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B y rd o fW e sto v e r , 1 7 0 9 -1 7 1 2
(R ichm ond, V A : T he D ietz Press, 1941).

Timeline of Pregnancies
A; Estim ated con cep tion date
A: Birth o f Parke Byrd
B: First m ention o f sex fo llow in g

Date

Interval between
conceptions (in
months)

Citation (shaded
areas are in the
period included in
the diary)

N /A

c. 1/1709
9 /5 /1 7 0 9
1/1 /1 71 0

12 m onths

birth o f Parke (first p ossib le
concep tion date)__________________

B: M iscarriage
C : Estim ated con cep tion date
C : First m ention o f pregnancy
m entioned in diary____________

2 /1 3 /1 7 1 0
c. 1 1 /1710
2 /1711
3 /3/1711

C : M iscarriage

6 /2 5 /1 7 1 1

D : Estim ated con cep tion date

c. 5 /1 7 1 2

D : Birth o f P hillips W illiam

2 /2 3 /1 7 1 3

E:

c. 2 /1 7 1 4

E:

Estim ated con cep tion date

Birth o f W ilhelm ina
D eath o f L ucy Parke Byrd

10-13 m onths

15-18 m onths
21 m onths

1 1 /6/1715
1716
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N ote: it is possib le
that Lucy
exp erienced
another
m iscarriage during
this longer
interval.

The idea that Lucy spent over half of her marriage pregnant, while only two of
her children survived past one year of age, helps us to think about the emotional
intensity, physical debilitation, and consciousness of the nearness of death that must
have accompanied women’s reproductive lives. In February of 1710, Lucy
experienced an early-term miscarriage. Just four months later, her nine-month-old
son, Parke, died suddenly. For William Byrd, Parke’s death could be explained by a
sort of theological fatalism: Byrd marked the death in his diary by intoning, “God
gives and God takes away; blessed be the name of God.”589 For Lucy, the emotional
toil of repeated pregnancies, miscarriages, and infant death were not so easy to bear.
Byrd compared his wife’s emotional state to his own: “My wife was much afflicted
but I submitted to His judgment better, notwithstanding I was very sensible of my
loss, but God’s will be done.”590 Late that fall, Lucy became pregnant again. This
pregnancy was marked by fears of miscarriage and mourning for her lost son. In
February, she “was melancholy of her misfortunes and wished herself a freak.”591
This pregnancy, too, would end in miscarriage.
Based on this analysis of Lucy Parke Byrd’s reproductive life, we can find
new insight in the gaps between births, not just for Lucy Byrd but for other women as
well. For example, seven of Abigail Lamb’s births are recorded in the Charles Parish
Records: Sarah in September 1713, John in June 1717, William in March 1722, Ann
in October 1724, Elizabeth in February 1726, Hannah in July 1729, and Elizabeth in

589 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B y rd , 186.
590 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd, 187.
591 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd, 301.
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December 1735.

This averages to approximately 38 months between births. Such

an average, though, erases the fact that Abigail Lamb experienced long gaps between
some births and short gaps between others. These gaps might be explained in a
number of ways, including separation from her husband, illness, malnutrition, active
use of sexual abstinence or other methods of pregnancy limitation, or stillbirths and
miscarriages. It is important to temper our interpretation of these gaps: they may
indicate not women’s agency, but instead the intensity with which their lives were
dictated by their reproductive role.
What did this cyclical rhythm of pregnancy, birth, and nursing mean to
women? How did early Virginians’ experience of reproduction impact their
understanding of the world? In age determination cases, the court called upon
mothers, midwives and friends to remember births that had happened long ago.

In

1675, Mary Avery was called in by the York County court to testify to the age of
Joane Morley, an orphan who was petitioning the court for access to her
inheritance.594 Mary Avery’s process of recollection reveals much about women’s
community values in York County in the seventeenth century. Mary Avery recalled
attending the lying-in of another woman, Mrs. Heyward, in the year 1654. Mary
Avery was “with child of her son William” at the time, and her friend Mary Morley

592 C PR 123-4.
593 T he court needed to determ ine ages for a number o f reasons, including determ ining w hen an heir
w as able to inherit, w hen an indentured orphan or bastard w as rightfully freed, and, m ost com m on ly,
w hen masters were required to pay taxes on slave labor, as en slaved children w ere not taxable. A ge
determ ination ca ses in v o lv in g en slaved children w ere pro forma: the court m erely estim ated the
ch ild ’s age, rather than callin g in w itn esses.
594 York D O W 5: 117, 119. In the age determ ination ca se o f M ildred M assey, the date o f M ildred’s
birth w as corroborated by her mother, Ann Brasett: York D O W 9: 314, 328. S ee also York D O W 5:
92; York D O W 9: 3 1 8 , 352; York D O W 14: 70.
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was “with child of her daughter Joan.”595 The two women commiserated, wondering
who would deliver first. Twenty years later, Mary Avery remembered clearly that
she had given birth to her son in July of 1654, and that Mary Morley “was brought to
bed before her.”596 Mary Avery’s memories were both bodily and communal: she
remembered her life, and her friends’ lives, by recalling the birth of her children.
Mary Avery’s memories show us the ways that women reckoned time by their
personal cycle of pregnancies and births, marking the passage o f years by
remembering their own bodily experiences as well as those of their friends.
Even with a dearth of records written by women, there are moments in the
archive where we get some sense of how mothers and fathers imagined their
relationship with their children. In 1667, in preparation for marriage to her second
husband, James Moore, the widow Anne Creighton drafted a will so that she could
guarantee that her son, Thomas, would be protected after her death.597 For Anne,
even the idea of leaving her son an orphan filled her with great sadness: she directed
that her entire estate be willed to “my poore fatherlesse & motherless Child Thomas
Chreighton.”598 Fathers, too, showed affection not only for their children but for
those children’s mother. John Overstreet, husband to midwife Sarah Overstreet,
dictated his will as he lay dying in 1671. When John asserted that his entire estate be
willed to his wife, Sarah jumped in, “asking him whether hee would give anything to
his children.”599 Counter to the patriarchal notion that children were the chattel of
their fathers, John repeated his desire that Sarah have possession over the entire

595 York D O W 5 :1 1 9 .
596
Ibid.
597 York D O W 4: 143.
598 Ibid.
599 York D O W 4: 363.
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estate: “Noe. .

he said, “they were her children as well as his.”600 We see here two

trajectories of affection: first, John’s implicit trust in his wife’s financial judgment,
and second, his belief that her role as the children’s mother was in some way
equivalent in meaning to his.
These glimpses into peoples’ intimate emotional lives are vanishingly rare in
the colonial Virginia archive. Yet the provenance of these examples - both ultimately
rooted in the fates of orphaned children - points to another key experience that would
be central to the construction of the reproductive episteme of colonial Virginians:
parental and infant death. During this period, birth and death were inextricably linked
in multiple ways. If women’s lives were organized by a repeated cycle of pregnancy,
birth, and nursing, then that cycle was punctuated by death, or at least the fear of and
planning for death. We have seen this already with the understanding that gaps in
women’s birth intervals might point to pregnancy loss due to miscarriage or stillbirth.
As we will see, the inherent unpredictability o f reproduction - not just in the threat of
death but also in the human inability to predict an unknown future - was a threat to
patriarchal power. In other words, men’s lack of knowledge about the innumerable
contingencies of reproduction posed a threat to their control over property and power.
By attempting to control this unpredictability, the colonial state (embodied by
property holders) sought to enact epistemic control over reproduction.
Reproduction is by its nature about contingencies: the outcome of
pregnancies, the sex of children, the health and life of mother and child are all in
question. M en’s knowledge about and ability to control these contingencies was
always limited. Recall that pregnancy itself was defined by women’s bodily
600 Ibid.
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experience: a woman did not consider herself to be truly pregnant until quickening,
which, in our medical terms, occurs roughly four to five months after conception and
implantation, or somewhere around the 16-20th week of pregnancy. Further,
paternity was decided (at least theoretically, if not in practice) based on the mother’s
own testimony. In other words, women’s knowledge had extraordinary power to
define and make sense o f the experience of reproduction.601 There is a deep irony
here: patriarchal power and authority in colonial Virginia was rooted in the
organization and distribution of property, but that patriarchal distribution o f property
was rooted in women’s knowledge about their own bodies. I will spend some time
examining wills for two reasons: first, they are one of the most extensive archives of
language about reproduction available for this period, and second, they show the
ways that property-holding Virginians tried to make sense of the inevitable
contingencies of reproduction.
Wills are an artifact of the ways that property holders tried to predict every
possible reproductive contingency in the face of the increased mortality of Virginia’s
colonial disease environment. Property was willed on the condition that an heir was
produced. The birth of a new baby might inspire the drafting of a new will. For
example, Robert Wilkenson drafted his will soon after his youngest son was bom in
1655. The child had not been baptized yet, and therefore had not even been named:
the baby is listed in the will only as “my Young sonn unbaptized.”602 If an heir did
not produce their own heir, alternate paths of inheritance needed to be established:

601 T his pow er seem s ev en more potent w hen w e consider the w ays that m odern m ed icin e d efin es both
o f these exp erien ces today. Pregnancy can be determ ined ju st days after unprotected sex . Paternity is
determ ined by a b lood test. W e can now d efin e pregnancy and paternity w ith remarkable accuracy, but
the locu s o f authoritative k n ow led ge has shifted from w om en to physician s and m edical testing.
602 Y ork D O W 1 :2 5 1 (1 6 5 5 ).
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John Heyward willed his estate to his eldest son, but “if it shall happen that my eldest
dye without Issue,” then the estate would go to Heyward’s second son.603 In this way,
wills were not about transferring property to individuals, but along family lines for
multiple generations. For example, Thomas Gybson willed his estate not just to his
son Nicholas, but “to his heirs of [Nicholas’s] body lawfully begotten forever.”604
Should Nicholas fail to produce his own heir, Thomas’s property would be
transferred to his daughter Cassandra, and “to her heires lawfully begotten
forever.”605 William Barbar, a grandfather, willed much of his property to his
grandchildren and their heirs, ensuring the life of the estate for at least four
generations.606 By attempting to control the disposition of property not just for
generations but “forever,” wills attempted to predict reproduction in order to combat
the impermanence of life itself, an impermanence that was intensified in the deadly
Virginia colony.
Wills written when women were pregnant attempted to predict all possible
outcomes for that pregnancy. Testators needed to take into account the possibility of
maternal and/or infant mortality. Richard Smith considered this in his own will,
because his wife Alice was “with Childe.”607 Smith willed that his property be
divided between Alice and the unborn child, “if she [liveth] and the Chyld live.”608
Sons were given preference over daughters. William Hay’s 1669 will divided his
603 York D O W 3: 177. S ee also York D O W 4: 327; Y ork D O W 9: 113, 157.
604 York D O W 2: 146.
605 Ibid. S ee the w ill o f T hom as R ay for a sim ilar transfer o f property from one ch ild to another,
should that ch ild fail to produce their o w n heirs. York D O W 1: 2 9 3 . S ee a lso York D O W 1: 337-9;
York D O W 3; 117.
606 York D O W 4: 2 5 4 . S ee also York D O W 4: 327.
607 York D O W 2: 119.
608 Ibid. S ee also York D O W 18: 2 3 5 -6 (1 7 3 5 ); A m es, A cc o m a c 1: 32 (1 6 3 4 ); Su sie M . A m es, ed.,
C oun ty C o u rt R e c o rd s o f A ccom ack-N orth am pton , V irginia: 1 6 4 0 -1 6 4 5 (C harlottesville: U niversity
Press o f V irginia), 3 0 2 -4 (hereafter cited as A m es, A c c o m a c 2, follow ed by the page number).
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estate equally between all of his children and his wife if his pregnant wife gave birth
to another daughter, but if she gave birth to a son, that son would inherit half the
estate.609 The desire for control over reproduction is clear in the 1659 will of Francis
Hayward, in which he listed conditions for all of the following contingencies: if his
pregnant wife gave birth to a son rather than a daughter, if that unborn son should die
before the age of 21, if his already born son should die before the age of 21, if the
pregnancy ended in miscarriage or stillbirth, and, finally, if it turned out that his wife
wasn’t pregnant at all.610
These wills remind us of the ways that birth and death were inherently linked
in the Virginia colony. Childbirth could be dangerous to both woman and child.
Women and infants died in childbirth.611 Infants and young children were more
vulnerable to deadly disease. When James Miller wrote his will in 1656, he carefully
distributed his property between his sons and daughters.612 He made his wife, Mary,
executor of the estate, instructing her to “improve the Estate to the best advantage for
the good of my Children.”613 But, in the final lines o f the will, Miller acknowledges
that all of his plans and calculations may come to nothing: “It is my will that in
Cause of the death of my Children that any land be shared among those that are
Living but in case all my Children dye then I give all that I have to [my] wife.”614
Anglo-Virginians accepted that children’s lives in the colony could be cut
short. Planter William Fitzhugh, writing to console a relative on the recent death of
two of his children, reveals the ways religion provided both explanation and weak
609 Y ork
610 Y ork
611 Y ork
6,2 Y ork
513 Ibid.
614 Ibid.

DOW
DOW
DOW
DOW

4: 229.
3: 62.
3: 4 3 .
1 :2 9 4 .
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comfort in cases of infant death. The loss of the children, he wrote, could be “easily
& cheerfully bom, if natural affection be laid aside.”615 While Fitzhugh
acknowledged the “affection” one had for one’s children, he wasn’t joking when he
advised his relative to bear his grief “cheerfully.” The bereaved must remember that
the children “have changed a troublesome & uncertain terrestrial being, for a certain
& happy Celestial habitation.”616 Indeed, small children were more likely to go to
heaven, as “their Regeneration in Baptism wash[ed] off all Original Sin, & their
fewness of years excus[ed] them from all wilfull & obstinate sins.”617 For Fitzhugh,
life was advantageously temporary, as our life’s sojourn would be mercifully brief:
as he closed his letter, he congratulated his relative on the recent birth of another
child, which Fitzhugh referred to a “new bom Guest.”618 The idea that children’s
lives were but temporary was a sentiment that Fitzhugh repeated in describing his
own family: “God Almighty hath been pleased to bless me with a very good wife and
five pledges of our conjugall affection, three of which he has been pleased to call into
the Arms of his Mercy, and lent me two, a hopefull boy and girle.”619 For Fitzhugh,
the birth and death o f children was an expression of God’s will - his children were
merely “lent” to him for a short time. Religion offered Anglo-Virginians a way to
make sense of the death of the children they loved.
Particular language repeated in many property-holding Virginians’ wills
points to yet another reproductive contingency: the ever-present question of

615 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d his C h esa p ea k e W orld, 198.
6,6 Ibid.
617 Ibid. W illiam Byrd II expressed a sim ilar sen se o f o b ed ien ce to G o d ’s w ill w hen his 9-m onth-old
son, Parke, died suddenly. W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd , 186-7.
618 Ibid. On referring to infants and children as “g u ests” or “strangers,” see K lepp, “R evolutionary
B o d ie s,” 9 2 8 -9 .
619 D avis, W illiam F itzhugh a n d H is C h esa p ea k e W orld, 170-1.
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paternity. Throughout their wills, property-holding Virginians refer to the “natural”
birth of their sons and daughters. In 1660, Eleanor Wheeler stipulated that her “owne
naturall children” would inherit her property.620 In another will, John Clark referred
to his “natural father John Clark.”621 This discourse of the “natural” in reference to
reproduction had two meanings, both o f which were significant in the relationship
between property and reproduction. First, the reference to “natural” children and
“natural” parents points to the way that familial relationships were remade and
restructured by Virginia’s high adult mortality and low life expectancy.622 Virginians
used a language of “natural” birth to mark the difference between children and stepchildren, a crucial distinction in the determination o f lines o f inheritance.
This language of “natural” children and “natural” parents had a second
meaning as well. In the early modem world, paternity could only be known socially:
through women’s adherence to marital monogamy, or, in cases of nonmarital sex,
through women’s naming of the father of her child during childbirth. As I argued in
Chapter 1, Virginia’s bastardy laws and miscegenation laws were about disciplining
white married women’s sexuality: legitimacy and illegitimacy were at the root of the
distribution of property, the organization of labor, and the definition of race itself.
Again and again, the York County court ruled that bastard children could not inherit
property, even when a will expressly directed that the child should inherit.624
The threat of illegitimacy lurks in the margins of nearly every colonial
Virginia will. In 1655 Margery Griggs and William Hay signed a marriage

620 York D O W 3: 7 7 . S ee also York D O W 2: 4 0 5 .
621 York D O W 3: 28.
622 Rutman and Rutman, ‘“ N o w -W iv es and S on s-In -L aw ’” 153-82.
623 S ee also Y ork D O W 3: 8.
624 S ee, for exam p le, York D O W 16: 2 1 3 , 222; York D O W 16: 4 6 1 ; York J 0 3 : 2 8 1 -2 , 287.
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agreement that guaranteed that their children from their earlier marriages would keep
their own property.625 Throughout the document, William Hay refers to children bom
during this new marriage as “Children of my body by Margery my own wife.”626
What does this language reveal about assumptions about reproduction, legitimacy,
and property? Certainly, the language of “Children of my body” shows Hay’s effort
to distinguish between stepchildren and “natural” children. Further, it reveals the
ways that Hay sought to assert the legitimacy of his heirs, both in the next generation
and in future generations. The presence of a discourse of natural children points to
the threat of children born who were not “of his body.” This language reveals the
ways that legitimacy was understood not just socially, but bodily - in some way, the
process of conception and birth conferred legitimacy. Birth mattered, because it
defined the boundaries of legitimacy, property, family, and nature.
Knowledge about reproduction - the colonial reproductive episteme - made
sense of bodily experience, organized and determined people’s life narratives, and
controlled the dispersal of property. W omen’s bodily experiences, such as their
sexual experiences and the physical sensations of pregnancy, were the root of their
knowledge of reproduction. For women, reproduction was a material reality that
determined their adult lives, marked always by the threat of loss and death. The
language of reproductivity in wills shows us something different. Here, knowledge
about reproduction was always contingent, always ephemeral. This was theoretical,
not material, knowledge about reproduction, because the result of any pregnancy was
fundamentally unknowable.

625 York D O W 1 :2 6 5 .
626 Ibid. S ee also York D O W 4: 189.
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Within these complex and contradictory epistemologies of reproduction,
midwives’ practice delivered women in their time of travail. Colonial medical
practice traversed the boundary between material and theoretical knowledge. As
such, practitioners of reproductive medicine - midwives, and, increasingly, manmidwives and physicians - had particular power in early Virginia.
*

*

*

On July 28, 1709, when Lucy Byrd was pregnant with her first child - before
all of those miscarriages and infant deaths - she was visited by her midwife, “Mrs. Bt-s.”627 Lucy was uncomfortably pregnant - her husband described her as
“indisposed” - but the birth was not imminent.628 Lucy’s husband, William Byrd II,
pestered the midwife with questions and worried over his wife’s symptoms. Mrs. Bt-s calmed the anxious gentleman by teaching him her method for calculating when a
woman might give birth: “20 weeks from the time a woman is quick when she will
seldom fail to be brought to bed. In this reckoning there are seven days in a week.”
Just a week later, and after several days of “pains” that seemed to William to have
“no purpose,” Lucy’s labor finally began in earnest the night of September 4.
Several other neighbor women joined Mrs. B-t-s, and they all surrounded the laboring
Lucy, “full of expectation.”631 William Byrd, perhaps knowing he had outstayed his

627 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B y rd , 6 4 , 74 , 78. Byrd abbreviated many nam es in
his diary; though those nam es have been decod ed , som e o f them , including “M rs. B -t-s,” cannot be
connected w ithout question to particular individuals.
628 W right and T inling, The
S e c re t D ia ry
o f W illiam B yrd , 74.
629 W right and T inling, The
S e c re t D ia ry
o f W illiam B yrd , 77.
630 W right and T inling, The
S e c re t D ia ry
o f W illiam B yrd, 78.
631 W right and T inling, The
S e c re t D ia ry
o f W illiam B yrd , 79.
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usefulness, went to bed at 10 o ’clock. When he woke the next morning, Mrs. B-t-s
informed him that Lucy “was happily delivered of a son.”
What can be known about Virginia midwives like Mrs. B-t-s? There are few
records of midwives and their practices in colonial Virginia. The diary of William
Byrd II is the only known record o f the work of Mrs. B-t-s. Further, the court records
are often quite silent and opaque regarding the lives and work of midwives in the
colony. In this section, I attempt to reconstruct the presence of midwives, whether
English, Native American, or African in the Virginia colony. This reconstruction
requires a reading o f the silences in the colonial record, and a willingness, in the
words of Ania Loomba, to “suppose a presence which at first cannot be found.” 633
Thus, examining the reasons for midwives’ invisibility in the colonial archive might
offer some understanding or sense of meaning about their work the ways their
knowledge was constructed. Therefore, this section explores the relationship between
the limitations of historical knowledge and the construction of bodies o f knowledge in
the colonial past. In this section, I will attempt to outline the knowledge that
midwives held and the skills that they used in the context of social childbirth; I extend
this analysis from English midwives to Native American and African midwives and
healers.
At first glance, midwives are virtually invisible in the court records of York
County. O f the 53 medical practitioners mentioned in the York County records
through the Revolution, only 5 are women. Yet the court records provide a surprising
view of English midwives’ “secret” practices; even if our understanding of midwives’

632 W right and T in lin g, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd , 79 -8 0 .
633 L oom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o T a les,” 319.
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knowledge in the birthing room is limited, we can reconstruct the ways that English
midwives’ knowledge was understood in the public sphere of the courts. Silences and
speech in the archive point to the different relationships and power held by women
and men in the colony: male medical practitioners are plainly visible in the archive,
where female medical practitioners are often difficult to discover. Nevertheless,
midwives were far more present in the colony than a cursory reading o f the court
records would attest.
Beginning in 1646, the colony regulated physicians’ and surgeons’ practices
and fees. These regulations reveal a general mistrust of male medical professionals,
who were assumed in the 1646 statute to be charging “immoderate and excessive
rates and prices.”634 Price gouging had a serious impact: apparently, masters had
been withholding medical care for their indentured servants because they found that
the cost of medicine outweighed the cost of a new servant. By 1726, the colony
established an explicit schedule of fees for doctors’ services, with university-educated
physicians authorized to charge higher fees than other practitioners.

Significantly,

though, only one of these regulations - one passed in 1761 - ever mentioned
midwifery as requiring regulation.

It is unlikely, though, that the statute was meant

to regulate female midwives. Instead, as will be discussed later, by the 1760s, several
man-midwives were practicing in the colony. In other words, the 1761 statute was
not intended to regulate female midwives, but male physicians as they expanded their
practices to include the lucrative new service of man-midwifery.

634 H ening 1 :3 1 5 . T h is 1646 statute w as repeated in 1652, and version s o f the sam e statute were
passed again in 1658, 1662, 1692, and 1726.
H ening 4: 5 0 9 -1 0 . F ee sch ed u les had previously been en forced on the county lev el. Y ork D O W 3:
24.
636 M cllw ain e, L eg isla tive Jo u rn a ls 3: 1264.
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The disparity in the county courts reveals a fundamental difference between
the economic relationship between female and male medical practitioners and their
patients. The regulation of fees charged by physicians and surgeons reveals the ways
that male medical practitioners acted within a cash (and debt) economy: they
expected their patients to pay cash or a cash equivalent for their services, and they
sued patients or patients’ estates to collect on those debts. Thus, Dr. Francis Haddon
sued Thomas Whitehead for 780 pounds tobacco in 1660 and John Myhill for 310
pounds o f tobacco in 1668; in the Whitehead case, the court recorded each specific
remedy administered and its costs.637 Midwives, on the other hand, operated within a
feminine domestic economy that relied on barter rather than cash.638 If these barter
agreements were disputed, the courts rarely adjudicated them. An exception, from
Accomac County in 1634, illustrates the varieties of payments that midwives
accepted for their services. Susan Helline, a midwife and a widow, sued John Major
for payment of 12 hens “for her paynes and tyme in lookinge to his wife the tyme she
did lay in Childbed.”639 The court decided in Helline’s favor, awarding her not just
the 12 hens, but 6 more as well.640 Besides this early case, the midwives that do
appear in the records are often the ones who, for some cases, arranged cash payments.
By the eighteenth century, the county court asserted that 10 shillings was “the
accustomed fee” for midwifery services; significantly, this was far less than what
would be charged by physicians for their services.641

637 Y ork D O W 3: 82; York D O W 4: 214.
638 U lrich, A M id w ife 's T ale, 7 5 -9 0 .
639 A m es, A c c o m a c 1: 15.
640 Ibid.
641 Y ork D O W 11: 105; Y ork D O W 14: 284.
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What can we learn from this economic and archival disparity? Physicians’
visibility in the archive is an artifact of their power, and of the ways that their work
occurred in the public sphere. Physicians are visible in the archive because they are
named as such. The honorific of “Doctor” may or may not have referred to a
university education; at any rate, the title marked its bearer as holding particular kinds
of medical knowledge. There was not only Dr. Francis Haddon, but also thirteen
other physicians explicitly given the honorific “Doctor” in the York County records,
and eighteen more whose profession can be surmised from the records. Further, there
are seven titled surgeons (or “churrurgions”) listed in the records. Meanwhile, just 5
women are named in the York County records as practicing any form of medicine Sarah Overstreet (1672), Elizabeth Shelden (1691), Mary Whitby (1707), Sarah
Smith (1711), and Ann Brooke (1713) - and only two of those, Ann Brooke and
Sarah Smith, are clearly named as midwives or as practicing midwifery. All of them
are white women. These disparities in the court records demonstrate that while
physicians practiced in a public, cash-based, professional economy, midwives
practiced in a private, barter-based, personal economy.
Because midwives like Overstreet, Shelden, and even Mrs. B-t-s, who
attended Lucy Byrd, operated in a private, barter-based, personal economy, our
knowledge of their practices are abbreviated. This is even more the case for non
white midwives, of whom there are no mentions in the York County records. Even
so, births like Lucy Byrd’s - attended by a trusted midwife and the women of the
community - were likely repeated again and again in the Virginia colony. The calm
and knowledgeable presence of the neighborhood midwife, aided by other local
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women, brought Lucy to bed as part o f a community of women. Lucy’s husband
William - a man known for his well-developed sense of his own importance willingly retreated from the scene. Midwives’ invisibility in the public records was a
result of the privacy of their practice; the tradition of social childbirth, when births
were ordinary and uncomplicated, occurred outside of the view of the courts.
Medical historians and women’s historians have reconstructed this model of
social childbirth, forms of which lasted well into the twentieth century in some parts
o f the United States and in some segments of the population.642 Focusing on Maine
in the late eighteenth century, Laurel Thatcher Ulrich describes the way that
midwives learned their craft:
This was the era of ‘social childbirth,” when female relatives and neighbors,
as well as midwives, attended births. Most midwives began as observers,
gradually assuming a more active role, until one day, when the old midwife
was delayed or willing, they ‘performed.’643
The learning process that Ulrich identifies was deeply rooted in the practice of early
modem midwifery in Europe and the colonies: this was a practice learned by women
through experience, informal apprenticeship, and observation of the many births that
occurred all the time.644 This learning process was informal, and therefore mostly
undocumented; reconstructing colonial midwives’ knowledge requires weighing the
existing textual evidence, while remembering that midwives’ knowledge was rooted
642 Leavitt, B ro u g h t to B ed , 171-95.
643 Ulrich, A M id w ife 's T ale, 12. T he term “social childbirth” w as co in ed by Richard and D orothy
W ertz, w ho saw colon ial-era childbearing as a proto-fem inist space w hich w as “the primary occasion
on w hich w om en exp ressed their lo v e and care for on e another and their mutual exp erience o f life .”
W ertz and W ertz, L ying-In, 2. M y concern here is less with identifying social childbirth as a
sp ecifica lly fem in ist space and more w ith understanding the w ay k n ow led ge w as constructed within
and outside o f that space.
644 Leavitt, B ro u g h t to B ed, 38; W ilson , The M akin g o f M a n -M id w ifery, 30 -3 3 .
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in experience, not in books. W omen’s knowledge about reproduction was part of
their basic understanding of the world; sometimes, the distinction between formal
midwife and everyday woman was not an easy or useful one to draw.
The social nature of childbearing in the early modem world extended to
African and Native American women in Virginia as well. As in the English
community, African and Native American midwives or medicine women in may have
held positions of honor, even as all reproduction was central to the episteme of all
women in those communities. Because the historiography of social childbirth has
focused on white women, Native and African women’s childbirth traditions have
been excluded from that narrative. This exclusion is a result of silences in the archive
as well as persistent colonial tropes of gendered and racialized bodies.
Early colonial records are mostly silent about Powhatan knowledge of
childbearing. Much of the particular knowledge and skills held by Native midwives
is hidden from the records, as English observers did not record any information about
Powhatan childbearing rituals. In the absence of direct observation o f Powhatan
birthing practices, English colonialists, like William Strachey, asserted that Powhatan
women had an easy time in childbirth, even giving birth unassisted.645 Responding to
this colonialist myth, ethnohistorian Helen Rountree argues that the Powhatans “must
have had means, practical and magical, of assisting difficult deliveries,” even if the
English didn’t record those means.646 The assertion that native women gave birth
unassisted had more to do with English beliefs about civilization and savagery - that
“civilized” Christian women were subject to Eve’s curse, where “savage” Indians

645 Rountree, The P o w h a ta n In dian s o f V irgin ia, 94.
646 Rountree, The P o w h a ta n In dian s o f V irginia, 94.
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were not - than any actual observation of Powhatan birthing traditions. It is
dangerous to assume that English men’s observations of Powhatan women’s birth
experiences were accurate.647 Powhatan women’s reproductive knowledge was
colonized by these tales of easy childbearing - replaced in the archive by a colonial
myth.
The secondary literature makes clear that Virginia women of African descent
were heirs to their own tradition of midwifery knowledge and skills. As with the
Powhatans, African women’s midwifery traditions often escaped English observation,
and, like Native women, African women were assumed to bear children with ease
(the easy transferability of this trope from one set of colonized bodies to another
exposes its role as a colonialist narrative rather than a reflection of observed
behaviors).648 Despite these silences, Ywone Edwards-Ingram’s survey of the
archaeological evidence of the medical practices of enslaved Africans shows that,
even in the conditions of slavery, enslaved midwives’ held a similarly broad skill-set
as English midwives, including using plants as remedies, caring for not only pregnant
women but also the sick and the dying, and serving as spiritual leaders within the
slave community.
Both African and Native American midwives were able to cross the cultural
boundaries established via colonialism. First, the slave trade itself transformed
African women’s knowledge, as ethnic differences were elided in the face of

647 For exam p le, Theda Perdue’s study o f nineteenth-century C herokee w om en sh o w s that w h ile som e
observers o f the C herokee continued this co lo n ia list m yth o f unassisted childbirth, others reported that
C herokee w om en had their o w n tradition o f sk illed m idw ifery. It seem s lik ely that Powhatan w om en
had sim ilar traditions that w ere sim p ly overlook ed by E nglish observers. T heda Perdue, C h erokee
W om en: G e n d e r a n d C ulture C h an ge (L incoln: U n iversity o f N ebraska Press, 1998), 32.
648 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 3 0 -1 ,4 0 - 2 .
649 Edwards-Ingram , “African A m erican M ed icin e and the S o cia l R elations o f Slavery,” 3 4 -5 3 .
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institutional slavery. Jennifer Morgan emphasizes the ways that the transatlantic
slave trade involved a collision not just between African and European cultures, but
specific and varied African ethnic groups.650 For Morgan, the traditions around
childbearing, including childbirth practices, pregnancy spacing techniques, and
breastfeeding traditions, would have been shared and transformed by the women
caught in the midst of the transatlantic slave trade. Further, Morgan argues that this
process of creolization waxed and waned, as importation of African slaves increased
and decreased.651 Further, the evidence seems to suggest that Native women and
African women crossed not just ethnic but racial boundaries, sharing medical
information with each other. Archaeologist Laurie Wilkie emphasizes the Native
American roots of antebellum slave midwifery, quoting nineteenth-century slave
midwives whose knowledge, passed down through generations, originated with “the
old home remedies, mostly come from the Indian remedies.”
Most of the knowledge held by early modem English and Anglo-Virginian
midwives - the techniques they used to deliver babies, the herbal remedies they
created, the rituals they performed - is also lost to us. Some textual evidence of
English midwifery technique exists from the period, but it needs to be read critically.
A few book-length midwifery manuals exist, but it is unlikely that they were intended
for a female audience, so it is unclear how much their contents actually reflect
midwifery practice during this period. The most popular o f these manuals Aristotle’s Master Piece and Eucharius Rosslyn’s The Byrth ofM ankynde - were
intended for a masculine audience, as both purport to “display” information that had
650 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 6 4 , 123-8.
651 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 142.
652 M id w ife O ssie L ogan, quoted in W ilk ie, The A rc h a e o lo g y o f M oth erin g , 126.
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been held “secret” by women.653 The goal of these texts was to make public, via text,
knowledge that had been held private by women. It is unlikely that midwives used
these texts to learn their craft. At its heart, midwifery was an art learned through
story and experience; recipes and remedies might be shared, but the knowledge about
how to handle the processes and complications o f childbirth could only be learned by
doing.
Other texts seemed to have been aimed at a female audience. For example,
recipe books such as Eliza Smith’s The Compleat Housewife, or Accompleshe’d
Gentlewoman's Companion included numerous herbal remedies to improve women’s
reproductive health. Smith’s text, originally published in England but reprinted in
Williamsburg in 1742, included several recipes intended to ease women’s suffering in
childbirth. ‘T o procure easy Labour,” women were instructed to drink a tincture of
figs, raising, licorice, and anise.654 If labor stalled, Smith recommended borax
dissolved in white wine with sugar and cinnamon.655 Smith’s cure for Anne Owle’s
ailment - a prolapsed uterus - involved sitting over heated ginger.656 These recipes
offer a tantalizing glimpse not only into the remedies available for laboring women,

653 C o p ies o f Eucharius R o ssly n ’s B yrth o f M an kyn de, w ere available in private libraries in V irginia
during the seventeenth century. Edward W . Jam es, ed „ The L o w e r N orfolk C ou n ty V irgin ia A n tiq u a ry,
vol. 1 (N Y : Peter Sm ith, 1951), 122-3. S om e inventories from Y ork C ounty include references to
m edical books. S ee, for exam p le, Y ork D O W 2: 343; D O W 4: 4 3 0 . A r is to tle ’s M a ste r-p iec e was
published d ozen s o f tim es from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. S ee Porter, “ ‘T he
Secrets o f G eneration D isp la y ’d ’,” 1-21. Lynn Hunt has written o f the w ays that texts about w o m en ’s
bod ies blurred the lines b etw een scien ce, p olitics, and pornography in the eighteenth century. Lynn
Hunt, ‘T h e M any B o d ies o f M arie A ntoinette: P olitical Pornography and the Problem o f the F em inine
in the French R evolu tion ,” in E ro ticism a n d th e B o d y P o litic , ed. Lynn Hunt (B altim ore, M D: The
Johns H opkins U n iversity Press, 1991), 108-130.
554 E [liza] Sm ith, The C o m p lea t H ousew ife, o r A c c o m p le sh e ’d G en tle w o m a n 's C om pan ion
(W illiam sburg, V A: 1742), Early A m erican Imprints no. 5 0 4 1 ., 188-9.
655 Sm ith, The C o m p lete H ou sew ife, 189.
656 Sm ith, The C o m p lete H ou sew ife, 192.
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but a sense of the overlap between the knowledge held by midwives and the
knowledge held by all housewives.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to our application of such texts. First,
much of the knowledge that informed Smith’s recipes has been lost, and the text
contains only echoes of that knowledge. Smith’s recipes are full of ingredients that
are mysterious to modem readers: it is unknown, for example, what Smith meant
when she called for “dragon’s blood” and how that ingredient might help to “prevent
Miscarrying.”657 Second, the audience for such a text was limited to the literate
women who could afford to purchase not only a book but the imported ingredients for
the recipes - it is not coincidence that the text is explicitly aimed at “gentlewomen.”
Indeed, Smith herself emphasized the gentility - and thus the power - o f her intended
audience:
[The recipes] are very proper for those Generous, Charitable, and Christian
Gentlewomen that have a Disposition to be serviceable to their poor Country
Neighbours, labouring under any o f the afflicted Circumstances mentioned;
who by making the Medicines, and generously contributing as Occasions
offer, may help the Poor in their Afflictions, gain their Good will and Wishes,
entitle themselves to their Blessings and Prayers, and also have the Pleasure of
seeing the Good they do in this World, and have good Reason to hope for a
Reward (though not by way of Merit) in the World to come.
In other words, Smith intended her elite audience to use the recipes to minister to
their poor neighbors; the practice of housewifery here is tied up with a genteel
657 Sm ith, The C o m p le a t H ou sew ife, 192. Laurel Thatcher U lrich offers a list o f ingredients used by
m idw ife Martha Ballard - it too includes “d ragon’s b lo o d .” Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale, 3 6 0 .
658 Sm ith, The C o m p le a t H ou sew ife, preface.
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noblesse oblige rooted in England’s stratified system of class and status. How well
that translated to Virginia’s colonial hierarchies of race and status is unclear. Smith’s
emphasis on the knowledge of elite women - and the apparent backwardness of those
this mistress would treat - makes clear that the text likely has little to tell us about
non-elite women’s medical knowledge. While the book did have some audience in
Virginia, it is unknown how the recipes had to be transformed to fit local ingredients
and conditions. How did the experience of colonialism transform even elite women’s
use of such texts?
Even lacking textual evidence of their techniques, it is clear that midwives’
oral and experiential education endowed them with estimable skills, not just in
delivering babies, but in fostering women’s reproductive health, ministering to the
sick, and even burying the dead. As Ulrich makes clear in her biography of midwife
Martha Ballard, a single midwife might deliver hundreds, or even thousands, of
babies in her career, and might have a very low maternal mortality rate.659 A 1774
notice published in the Virginia Gazette suggests that Martha Ballard’s expansive
practice was not an anomaly: “Mrs. Catherine Blaikley, of [Williamsburg], in the 76
years of her Age, and eminent Midwife, and who, in the course of her practice,
brought upwards of three thousand children into the World.”660 The vast majority of
women who practiced midwifery never earned public accolades, but the lack of such
records does not mean that other women did not have similarly successful practices in
the colony.

659 U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T a le, 171-3.
560 V irginia G a ze tte , Purdie and D ix o n # 1 0 5 6 , O ct. 2 4 , 1771, page 2.
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Midwives’ skills extended beyond attending women in childbirth. As Ulrich
makes clear, midwives also held a vast array of medical knowledge, and treated not
just pregnant women, but sick people as well, offering medicines both homemade and
purchased.661 The York County records include several examples of women
practicing medicine. In 1707, John Hilliard paid Mary Whitby a debt “due for
medecines & visits in the time of his families sickness.”662 Further, midwives
attended to the dying, participated in autopsies, and prepared bodies for burial.

fs f\\

For

example, in 1672, York County widow Sarah Overstreete was awarded the costs of
“funeral chardges” from the estate of Thomas Kelton “for her trouble & pains” in
caring for him as he died.664 Significantly, the court’s records do not explicitly name
either Mary Whitby or Sarah Overstreete as midwives - the source of their expertise
goes unmentioned. Nevertheless, their recognized skills in the medical arts suggest
the distinct possibility that their expertise was rooted in training in midwifery.
The skills and knowledge of midwives were recognized in the masculine
sphere of the courts. When Margaret Grimes testified to the court about Anne Owle’s
illness and her treatment by her husband, she was translating the epistemology of
social childbearing into the public sphere of the court. Midwives like Margaret
Grimes held knowledge about the most private (or as Aristotle’s Master Piece termed
it, “secret”) aspects o f women’s lives: their reproductive cycles, their sexualities,
their bodies. Midwives’ legal role required them to use that knowledge in public
spaces: testifying in court in cases of illegitimacy or births that were otherwise

661 U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale, 1 1 ,4 9 -5 8 , 2 4 9 -5 0 . W ilson , The M akin g o f M a n -M id w ifery, 36-8.
662 York D O W 13: 31.
663 U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale, 5 4 , 2 5 0 -1 .
664 York D O W 4: 363; York D O W 5: 27.
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suspicious. Further, non-midwives, in the form of juries of women, could also be
called upon to speak of women’s reproductive knowledge in court. In these cases, the
private, intimate realm of reproduction exploded into the public sphere - and their
anomalous presence in public is the only reason why we have any record o f them at
all.
Midwives were the chief witnesses in court cases involving extramarital
childbearing and other suspicious births. When the York County court issued
summons for women accused of fornication and bastardy, they were ordered “to
appeare...with Midwives and other Evidences.”665 W omen’s knowledge about
childbearing had several purposes within the walls of the courtroom. First, it is
important to distinguish between juries o f women, midwives’ testimony, and
women’s personal testimony. Juries of women were formed when the court needed to
examine the body of a woman, be she a plaintiff or a defendant. These juries were
called by the court not only to protect modesty but to capitalize on women’s
particular knowledge about anatomy and reproduction. Recall that a jury of women
was called to examine the body of Anne Owle when she accused her husband of
abuse; we can assume the women looked for signs of injury and also corroborated the
testimony of the midwife Margaret Grimes about Anne’s prolapsed uterus. Juries of
women were also impaneled to determine whether women were pregnant. In 1633,
when Margaret Hatch was convicted of infanticide, she attempted to delay or escape

665 Y ork D O W 3: 167.
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her execution by claiming to be pregnant. When a “jury of Matrons [found] her not
pregnant,” the execution went forward as scheduled.666
Unlike juries of women, midwives were called as witnesses by the court to
provide testimony about particular births. These might include the recognized
midwives who were the main attendants at a particular childbirth, or any of the
f.f.n

women who were present at the birth.

Midwives’ testimony was called for in

births that were in some way questionable: either because paternity was in question,
or because of the death of the fetus/infant. Midwives also provided corroborating
evidence to support (or question) women’s own testimony about the progress of their
pregnancies. Often, when the woman herself testified, the court did not require any
further expert opinion.
Midwives’ primary form of testimony was attesting to the paternity o f the
infant. It was believed during this period that paternity could be determined by
questioning a woman during childbirth: whomever she named must be the father,
tradition averred, because a woman simply could not lie when in the pain of
childbirth.

In this way, midwives acted as interrogators even as they cared for

women during childbirth.669 In 1662, midwife Dorothy Bullock recalled attending
servant Ann Roberts during childbirth. “In [the] extremity of paine,” Bullock
“demanded o f [Roberts] who was the father of hir said Child,” and Roberts named

666 H ening 1:209. For another sim ilar exam p le occurring in 1711, se e W right and T inling, The S e c re t
D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd, 5 4 2 -3 .
667 For exam p les o f a sin gle m id w ife providing testim ony, see: Y ork D O W 3: 166, 168; York D O W 6:
2 8, 32; Y ork D O W 5: 117, 119; Y ork D O W 6: 4 4 4 , 6 0 6 . For exam p les o f several w om en providing
testim ony, see: Y ork D O W 3: 28; York D O W 4: 3 1 3 , 342.
668 Pagan, A nne O rth w o o d ’s B a sta rd , 79 -8 3 ; U lrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale, 149. S om e m others nam ed the
fathers o f their children in open court. B ecau se they w ere under oath, this co n fessio n carried legal
w eigh t as w ell. S ee, for exam ple: York D O W 8: 205.
669 Pagan, A nne O rth w o o d ’s B a sta rd , 81-3.
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John Reason.670 In another example, the fact that Margery King “in the tyme of her
travaile & labor” named Andrew Dudden to be the father of her child was evidence
enough to determine that Dudden was the father o f her child.671 W omen’s refusal to
name the father during labor could hamper a paternity investigation. When Francis
Pressee categorically refused to name the father of her child, either during labor of
after labor, she was committed to jail until she confessed.672
Midwives’ expertise in childbearing, rooted in their witnessing of multiple
births, made them invaluable witnesses in cases of suspicious births, especially when
the court suspected infanticide. In 1678,60-year-old midwife Susanna Evans
testified that servant Mary Beckett had given birth to a “still borne” child.673 Virginia
law construed infanticide as a servants’ crime - committed by “leud mothers” who
wished to “conceal” the birth of bastard children.674 Therefore, infanticide cases such
as the case against Mary Beckett came to light because her birth was suspect from the
beginning.
Across race and status, women acted as interlocutors, translating the
epistemology of reproduction into the practice of everyday medicine and midwifery
in the Virginia colony. For English midwives and elite women, this gave them
considerable power in the public sphere - their testimony was essential to
determining illegitimacy, infanticide, and pregnancy. This public role points to the
670 Y ork D O W 3: 169. For other cases, see: Y ork D O W 4: 159, 164, 169, 2 0 9 , 2 1 4 , 273; York D O W
4: 313 , 342; York D O W 12: 4 1 4 , 4 2 4 , York D O W 13: 17; Y ork D O W 14: 83. S ee also A m es,
A cco m a c , 1: 129. C lear-cut ca ses o f childbed c o n fessio n s drop o ff in the eigh teen th century. T he
court records becam e more stream lined in the eighteenth century, and often contain no transcriptions
o f testim ony, including m id w ives.
671 Y ork D O W 4: 3 8 ,4 3 .
672 York D O W 14: 4 9 3 .
673 York D O W 6: 2 8 , 32. For sim ilar ca ses see: Y ork D O W 6: 4 4 4 ,6 0 6 ; York D O W 13: 181, 182,
187.
674 H ening 4: 133. On bastardy being a servants’ crim e, see Chapter 1.
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ways that the reproductive episteme of women could unsettle established boundaries,
hierarchies, and structures. David Cressy argues that midwives’ power stemmed
from their ability to cross boundaries, both physical and social:
Midwives were summoned as servants but performed as officiants. They
crossed social boundaries and entered homes of all sorts.... The midwife’s
office allowed her to pass thresholds and open doors, to reach day and night to
the heart of material matem a.615
Social childbirth blurred and transgressed boundaries of class and status. Adrian
Wilson emphasized that, in the birthing room, the midwife had power that defied her
status: “It was even possible for a young and inexperienced midwife, probably of no
higher than yeoman status, to defy a mother who was a lady, that is, the wife of a
gentleman, a member of the ruling class.”676 In Virginia (and the other English
colonies), midwives also crossed the boundary between the intimate spaces of
women’s lives and the public space of the court. Midwives acted as mediators
between women and the moral authority of church and court. Lisa Foreman Cody
posits that this public role for midwives was an “alternative public sphere,” a space
where midwives occupied “a necessary public position seemingly unavailable to
men.”677 W omen’s knowledge, borne of the intimate sphere of childbearing, gave
them some authority in the public sphere. As colonialism challenged, shifted, and
remade boundaries and hierarchies, women’s reproductive authority would be called
into question.

675 C ressy, B irth, M a rria g e, a n d D ea th , 6 1 . C ressy em p h asizes the “priest-like” p ow er o f m id w ives,
w h ose rituals w ere so sim ilar to religious o fficia n ts’ practice o f baptism and last rights.
676 W ilson, The M aking o f M an -M idw ifery, 26.
677 C ody, “T he P olitics o f R eproduction,” 4 8 1 .
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In the afternoon of Monday, April 5,1658, Elizabeth Dunne, Elizabeth
Taylor, and Mary Sevill were summoned by two servants to help attend a birth at the
home of Elizabeth and Ralph Hunt.678 The Hunts’ servant, 30-year-old Margaret
Barker, was having her baby. Dunne and Sevill got to the Hunts’ house too late - it
had been “a quick delivery,” and Barker had already given birth.679 But something
was terribly amiss. The infant was dead: “the head bruised to pieces & the Child
bleeding very fresh att ye nose.” Further, Elizabeth Hunt refused to let the women
see Margaret Barker, who she said was “in a very weake condicon.”

£Rn

What the women had seen troubled them, and they reported it to the constable.
The next day, Dunne and Taylor returned to the Hunt home, along with the constable
and several other neighborhood women, including Elizabeth Rooksby, Elizabeth
Johnson, and Margaret Bouth. They found Margaret Barker weak and reluctant to
speak to them, and the dead infant buried in the yard. The women exhumed the tiny
body, and their examination confirmed what Seville and Dunne had seen the previous
day: “they found ye head of ye said Child much bruised & ye skull.. .broken in
pieces.”681 The women pressed Margaret Barker - how had the newborn come to be
in this condition? Barker finally answered: “she knew not unless it were by blowes
rec’d from her [Mistress].”682
The women’s interrogation revealed that Margaret Barker had been brutally
beaten by her mistress multiple times in the days preceding the birth. After first

678 York D O W 3: 28.

making “some refusal either to take knowledge of any hurt either to ye child or
herself,” Barker reluctantly revealed her injuries to the women.683 Her body, from the
thighs upward, was “full of cruell blowes & stripes,” and her belly was “very black &
blew.”684 Elizabeth Rooksby and Elizabeth Johnson commented that Barker’s body
was “in a sad condicon from ye Knees upwards all her body full of stripes & black &
blew,” with apparently only Bakers arms spared from the beating.
As the four women examined her, Barker revealed the details of the terrible
beatings she received from her mistress 686 Three weeks previously, Elizabeth Hunt
had beaten Barker with a peach rod. The Friday before the birth, Hunt had
“grievously whipped & kicked her.”687 Then, on the morning of her delivery, Hunt
found Barker while she was doing the washing. Hunt whipped Barker with a tobacco
stick - a particularly cruel punishment that sliced the skin, creating harsh welts that
zoo

swelled and numbed from the tobacco juice.

The women postulated that perhaps it

was this final beating that caused Barker’s labor to begin, and to proceed so quickly
that Barker was attended only by her mistress and tormentor who “d id .. .take ye
C. O Q

Childe from her,” “cursing” her the entire time.
Upon hearing this testimony, the York county court charged Elizabeth Hunt
“of the supposition of the Death of an Infant bom of her husbands woman servant &

683 Ibid.
684 Ibid.
685 Ibid.
686 Ibid. T hroughout the testim ony, Barker “a ck n ow led ged ” her master, Ralph Hunt, “to be cleare” o f
the injuries - it w as Elizabeth, not Ralph, w ho beat her.
687 Ibid.
688 On the racial and sexual sy m b o lism o f different punishm ents, see Kirsten Fischer, S u sp ect
R elatio n s, 159-90.
689 York D O W 3: 28.
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in hir house.”690 Ultimately, though, the court found “noe cause of binding her over”
to the Governor and Council - in other words, the court ruled that Hunt was not guilty
of infanticide. The court did make some effort to check Hunt’s violence against
Barker. The court ordered Elizabeth Hunt’s husband, Ralph Hunt, to enter into a
bond of 5,000 pounds of tobacco to guarantee “his said wifes good behavior.”691 He
was required to guarantee that Elizabeth Hunt would “[keep] the peace towards all
[persons] especially towards the said Margarett [Barker.]”692 In other words, while
Elizabeth Hunt was not guilty of killing the infant outright, the court agreed that her
treatment of Barker was egregious. Their solution: greater discipline over Elizabeth
Hunt by her husband.
The harrowing story of Margaret Barker shows us the ways that the relations
of colonialism - here, the intense intimacy and violence of the mistress-servant
relationship - interrupted, transformed, and reconstructed knowledge and practices
concerning reproduction. In some ways, the precolonial model of social childbirth
was upheld in Barker’s case. When she went into labor, neighborhood women were
called to attend the birth. When questions arose, the court deferred to women’s
knowledge - it was women who examined the dead infant, and it was women who
both questioned Margaret Barker and inspected her injuries. And, when the court
made its decision, it deferred to the women’s knowledge and authority in assigning
some punishment (however weak) to Elizabeth Hunt.
The actualities of the case, though, reveal the ways that colonial conditions
fundamentally remade these relationships between gender, knowledge, and authority.
690 York D O W 3: 20.
691 York D O W 3: 27.
692 Ibid.
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First, it is significant that the women never actually made it to the birth. Instead of
being attended by a midwife, Margaret Barker’s birth was attended by her mistress.
As we will see, colonialism fundamentally reshaped social childbirth. Second, the
court’s decision shows the ways that status, rather than experience, conveyed
authority in colonial spaces, ultimately causing the court to craft a decision that
contradicted the women’s testimony. The women’s testimony did not outweigh the
fact that Elizabeth Hunt’s status gave her the right to beat (though not to kill) her
servant. Further, the court’s check on Hunt’s violence - disciplinary surveillance by
her husband - shows the ways that the court relied on patriarchal power to keep
women in check.
Colonialism cemented old power structures like gender even as it created and
enhanced new power structures, like status and race. Ultimately, these two colonial
trajectories - the reshaping of the tradition of social childbirth and the assignment of
hierarchy, rather than experience, as the locus o f authority - would fundamentally
reshape reproduction in the colony. Ann Laura Stoler argues that it was in intimate
spaces - like the birthing bed - that colonialism was enacted, as it was in those spaces
that “relations of power were knotted and tightened, loosened and cut, tangled and
undone.”693 Colonialism demanded new kinds of categories, and new kinds of
knowledge, as race, status, and servitude created and enforced a hierarchical structure
of all colonial bodies. Yet, intimate zones were spaces in which people at multiple
points in those hierarchies came into contact with each other. This contact could be
threatening, as it was within intimate zones that colonized people could “transgress

693 Stoler, “Intim idations o f Em pire,” 3.
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the protected boundaries” of race and status upon which colonialism was build.694
Therefore, colonizers looked for ways to reenact their power and their worldview in
those intimate zones.
We see these competing trajectories of colonial intimate zones in the case of
Elizabeth Hunt and Margaret Barker. The mistress-servant relationship between Hunt
and Barker required and created intimacy: they lived and worked alongside one
another, far enough from neighbors that it took hours for help to come during
Barker’s labor. Barker’s pregnancy complicated this already explosive situation. As
we saw in Chapter 2, servant women’s pregnancies can be seen as a transgression of
social norms and a rebuke to the absolute power of masters and mistresses. If this is
the case, Hunt’s torture of Barker might be seen as an effort by Hunt to reassert her
power over Barker in order to realign the status hierarchy.
This final section of this chapter will attempt to use this understanding of
intimacy as a crucial element of colonial relations to outline the ways that colonialism
transformed reproductive knowledge in early Virginia. Previously, we’ve seen that
knowledge about reproduction imbued English women with authority in Virginia’s
colonial culture. How did the colonial categories of status, race, and servitude
fundamentally remake that authority? First, I will examine cases in which, as in the
Barker-Hunt case, relations of colonialism fundamentally transformed the social
childbirth model. Next, I will discuss the ways that colonialism diminished
midwives’ power. Finally, to close the chapter, I will discuss the ways that, as
midwives’ authority was diminished, master-patriarchs stepped in to claim medical
authority over reproduction.
694 Stoler, “T en se and T ender T ie s,” 35.
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As we’ve discussed, English women brought to Virginia a centuries-old
tradition of social childbirth led by an experienced midwife. The exigencies of
colonial life in the seventeenth century, though, could interrupt and complicate that
ideal, especially in colonial Virginia, where plantations could be far-flung, and
women might not have the close contact they enjoyed in England or New England. In
Virginia, it was sometimes impossible to summon a community of women for births.
When Ann Roberts, a servant, gave birth to her baby in 1662, the midwife Dorothy
Bullock attended the birth.695 No other women were present. Instead, when Dorothy
Bullock questioned Ann Roberts about the paternity of her child, two men, 47-yearold Lewis Griffith and 50-year-old John Gaiford, stepped in to repeat the question.696
It is unclear what role Griffith and Gaiford took in the birthing room, but the lack of
any other women’s testimony besides the midwife indicates two interpretations: first,
that men had entered into what had been seen as a strictly women-only spaces, and
second, that even if there were other women in the room, the men’s testimony was
seen as most convincing or believable. What did it mean to Ann Roberts that her
birth was so different from the expected norm? It is difficult to say how many births
saw these kinds of gendered interruptions and transformations of social childbirth.
The evidence presented previously shows the persistence of the social childbirth
model, even with challenges. Nevertheless, it should be noted we are aware o f these
cases because they involved servant women giving birth to bastard children. How
many births saw a similar complication of the social childbirth ideal, but were not
recorded because legal births did not warrant documentation by the colonial courts?

695 York D O W 3: 168.
596 Ibid. For an exam p le o f a m ale servant w itn essin g a birth, see York D O W 5: 92.
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Besides gender, colonial hierarchies of status and race remade social
childbirth. Adrian Wilson argues that, in England, social childbirth was an
expression o f the “collective culture of women.”697 The hierarchies of colonialism
fundamentally remade that collective culture. First, status relationships were
intensified in a colonial space, and those status relationships found their way into the
birthing room. As we saw in the Barker-Hunt case, when servant women gave birth,
their mistresses took an active role in the childbirth process. For example, when
Mary Margerum gave birth to her child, her midwife, Elizabeth Tindall, was assisted
by Mary’s mistress, Sarah Townsend.698 In this case, Sarah Townsend took an active
role in questioning her servant Mary about the father o f her baby - an interrogation
that must have been inflected by the hierarchy in Mary and Sarah’s relationship. On
the other hand, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the lying-in tradition overturned the
relationship between servant and mistress, as new mothers took a traditional month
long period to rest and heal. The point here is that the meanings of the servantmistress relationship were thrown into relief by the intimacies forced by the childbirth
experience.
Even “normal” social childbirth - a birth attended by women, with an
experienced midwife as the authority - was transformed by Virginia’s colonial
culture. Specifically, as hierarchies of status and race intensified and cemented, social
childbirth created moments of intimate contact that crossed, complicated, and
crystallized both status and racial boundaries. Social childbirth depended on clear
relationships between women; the race and class hierarchies of the eighteenth century

697 W ilson , The M aking o f M an -M id w ifery, 2 5 -3 3 , 185.
698 York D O W 4 4 4 , 606.
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made social childbirth both a space of enacting those hierarchies and of expressing
elite anxiety over the maintenance of those same hierarchies.
In the colonial racial and status hierarchy o f early Virginia, social childbirth
could become a space where hierarchies were intensified, not ameliorated by a socalled “women’s culture.” Social childbirth, in the extant records, became a space to
serve the needs of elite women. Women servants were “loaned out” by one
household to help with the births of elite women. For example, when John
McDearman’s wife went into labor in 1775, Lucy Gaines, an indentured housekeeper
at Belvidera, the plantation of the Frazer family, was immediately sent to offer
assistance.699 Lucy was a young single woman - her role was not to offer assistance
in the birth or to join the other women in the birthing room. Granted, such events
provided space for sociability and a change in a servant’s day-to-day responsibilities.
Nevertheless, for Lucy, participating in this iteration of social childbirth was just an
extension of her own responsibilities; it would simply mean serving Mrs. McDearman
and her friends.
Race inflected social childbirth as well, as white midwives were hired by
masters to attend the births of slaves. William Byrd occasionally recorded slave
births in his diary. Notably, he was not interested in recording all slave births - this
was not an accounting of his slave property - but only those that occurred which
disrupted his domestic space. We see this blending of slave women’s reproductive
experience with Byrd’s personal interests in a typically terse entry from 1709: “Our
maid Jane began to cry out. I danced my dance. Jane was brought to bed o f a boy.”

699 R iley, ed „ The J o u rn a l o f John H a rro w er, 124.
700 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd , 19.
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When another enslaved woman, Jenny, “threatened to be brought to bed,” Byrd
attempted to call the local white midwife to attend her.701 The midwife wasn’t home,
so Jenny was able to depend on the women in her community for support.702 We can
only imagine the power relationship between the white midwife and the enslaved
woman; suffice it to say that this relationship was much different from a relationship
built on common experience upon which social childbirth was built.
Planter Landon Carter’s fundamental mistrust o f black midwives underscores
the ways that social childbirth (in this case, the practices of enslaved women) was
interrupted by colonialism. A reader of Carter’s diary can feel his palpable contempt
for the “old midwife” at Nomini Hall. The relations of slavery and colonialism
remade the relationship between gender and authority in the colony. Carter saw a
conflict between the midwife’s work as a health care provider and his expectation that
she contribute in terms of the agriculture o f the plantation. The “old woman” who
served as plantation midwife also tended Carter’s turkeys; Carter grew angry when
four turkeys (of the total 86) died because the midwife “was obliged to attend
Manuel’s daughter Peg.”703 Carter was eager to call in his friend Dr. Mortimer when
he doubted a black midwife’s call, but he still complained that the doctor charged
fees.704 Landon Carter need not even pretend he had any respect for the knowledge or
authority of the plantation’s midwife, even as he benefitted from her skills.
Servants and slaves were also called upon to act as wetnurses and baby nurses
for their mistresses’ children. As early as 1690, “The Trappan’d Maiden,” an English

701 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd , 5 4 9 -5 0 .
702 For another exam p le o f a w hite m id w ife being hired to assist an en slaved w om an ’s labor, see York
D O W 18: 27 1 -2 .
703 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 306.
704 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 514.
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ballad that lamented the poor treatment experienced by indentured servants in
Virginia, listed child care as a burden held by servants:
When the Child doth cry, I must sing ‘By-aby!”
In the land o f Virginny, O;
No rest that I can have, whilst I am here a Slave,
When that I am weary, weary, weary, weary, <9.705
Amidst complaints about starvation rations, illness, and abuse, it was caring for
children which was likened to slavery.
Infant care was a site of conflict and anxiety for masters, mistresses, servants,
and slaves. While Philip Vickers Fithian expressed surprise at the use o f slaves as
wetnurses - “I find it is common here for people of Fortune to have their young
Children sucked by the Negroes!” - it was an accepted practice throughout the
colony.706 Yet Fithian showed little more respect for Mrs. Oakley, the free white
woman who acted as a nanny and baby nurse. He eagerly recorded a rumor that “the
Nurse, a short Stump of a [wom]an,” had been seduced when young and bore an
illegitimate child: she “felt the difficulties of being a Mother, several years before
She enjoyed the Pleasures of being a Wife.”707 Paula Treckel has found that
wetnursing would have been most common in elite families, as it was in England.708
White wetnurses were hard to find, they were expensive to hire, and their morality

705 C. H. Firth, ed. An A m erica n G a rla n d : B ein g a C o llectio n o f B a lla d s R ela tin g to A m erica, 15631759 (Oxford: B .H . B la ck w ell, 1915), 53.
706 Hunter D ick en son Farish, ed. The J o u rn a l a n d L etters o f P h ilip V ickers F ithian 1 7 7 3 -1 7 7 4 : A
P lan ta tio n T u tor o f th e O ld D om in ion (C harlottesville, T he U niversity Press o f Virginia, 1957), 39.
707 Farish, J o u rn a l a n d L etters o f P h ilip Vickers F ithian, 133. Fithian’s concern w ith the nurse’s
m orality d o es not stop there. Later in his journal, Fithian hinted that Mrs. O akley had a relationship
with an en slaved man, and he jo k e s that her taste in cloth in g reveals her desire to reach beyon d her
station. Farish, Jo u rn a l a n d L etters o f P h ilip V ickers F ithian, 134, 142.
708 Treckel, “B reastfeeding and M aternal S exu ality,” 31.
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was always in question, as parents feared that the woman’s moral character would be
communicated through her milk.709 Thus, enslaved women were considered ideal
wetnurses. Landon Carter expressed frustration at the role that enslaved women
played in raising his children: “I have none but negroes to tend my children nor can I
get anyone.”710 He had little better opinion of white wetnurses. When a friend
complained to him about the health of her white wetnurse, he replied to her, “these
creatures may be ladies of the Game, and possibly may have got foul that way.”711
For Carter, wetnursing was one step away from prostitution. Despite his discomfort
with slaves caring for his children, he recommended a slave wetnurse, whose morality
might be more easily guaranteed: “I there wished little Paculet rather at some cleanly
negro bubby, but that as she pleased.”712
The intense intimacy of the relationship between masters, mistresses, and the
women who cared for their children could become explosive. Lucy and William
Byrd’s children were provided care by two women in particular: Mrs. Joanna Jarrett
(or Mrs. G-r-t, as it appears in the diary), a white widow hired by the family since
William himself was a child, and Anaka, an enslaved women who cared for the older
children. From the snippets of Byrd’s diary that discuss the two women, it appears
that they had a rapport, even a true friendship. At least one time, Anaka protected
Mrs. Jarrett from W illiam’s rages, refusing to disclose to her master any details about

709 T reckel, “B reastfeeding and M aternal S exu ality,” 2 6 -8 . S e e also Perry, “C o lon izin g the B reast,”
3 0 2 -3 3 2 . S ally M cM illen , exam in in g the antebellum period, argues that w e should not overstate the
prevalence o f slave w etnursing. M cM illen , M o th e rh o o d in the O ld South, 126-8. T his may be the case,
but, as both T reckel and Perry argue, the eighteenth century saw w idespread debates around the
m orality and healthfulness o f w etnursing. B eca u se o f this, sla v e w etnursing w as m uch more
acceptable am ong elite fam ilies in the eighteenth century.
710 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n e l L andon C a rter, 194.
711 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 811-2.
712 Ibid.
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Mrs. Jarrett’s relationship with an enslaved man, Daniel.713 Once, Anaka and Mrs.
Jarrett were caught stealing alcohol together.714
The relationship between William Byrd, Lucy Byrd, Mrs. Jarrett, and Anaka
was marked by violence bred by suspicion, anger, and recriminations. The Byrds
were unhesitant to discipline the two other women with violence for the smallest
infractions. Once, when 2-year-old Evelyn Byrd wet the bed, William Byrd blamed
Anaka and beat her.715 Another time, when Mrs. Jarrett arrived home late after
attending a wedding, Lucy Byrd flew into such a rage at the woman that “she could
not forbear beating her.”716 Lucy was 5 months pregnant at the time. Eventually,
W illiam’s suspicions of Mrs. Jarrett meandered to familiar grounds: he began to
suspect her of being morally insufficient. William was all too eager to believe a
rumor that Mrs. Jarrett had had a baby and abandoned the child in Williamsburg.717
Mrs. Jarrett protested, and even threatened to quit this family for whom she had
worked for decades.718 Six months later, William Byrd fired Mrs. Jarrett when she
and Anaka broke into the cellar to steal beer, cider, and wine.719 Byrd did not record
what punishment he meted out to Anaka.
While the discord between the Byrds and the women who raised their children
seemed to be peripheral to the women’s work, it was the intimacy o f their
relationships that provided the fuel for the conflicts. Byrd’s anger at Mrs. Jarrett
stemmed from his intimate knowledge and suspicions of her intimate life - her sexual
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partners, her reproductive history. There is a tit-for-tat aspect to Byrd’s accusations:
Anaka and Mrs. Jarrett must have known extraordinary detail about the Byrds’ life
and marriage - a marriage that even we know was explosive. Ultimately, given the
chance to exert his power as master and mistress over these women, William and
Lucy Byrd did, either through physical violence or removal o f their livelihood.
As an intimate space, social childbirth was transformed by colonialism. In
some cases, Virginia’s geography of far-flung plantations made the neighborhood
model o f social childbirth impossible to uphold. Further, social childbirth,
wetnursing, and infant care were all intimate zones where the status, race, and gender
of the participants were constantly being negotiated and renegotiated. We see in the
anxiety over wetnursing the ways that the master class expressed discomfort over the
cross-race and cross-class intimacies of that relationship. Upholding colonial
hierarchies meant asserting that status - defined by class, by race, by gender - was
the basis of authority. As we will see, this meant a diminishment of midwives’
authority in the public sphere at the same time that a new authority arose to take their
place: master-patriarchs asserted themselves as the new authority in medicine and
reproduction. Lisa Foreman Cody, analyzing the shift from midwifery to manmidwifery in England, argues that we must focus on the causes for this shift: “ .. .even
if we are right to grasp the story as both interesting in itself and standing for much
larger shifts in gender relationships, the mechanics of the tale - how men conquered
the midwives - seem much more elusive.”720 I argue here that the experience of
colonialism does much to explain how midwives lost their authority in the public
sphere.
720 C ody, “T he P o litics o f R eproduction,” 4 7 7 .
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By the eighteenth century, midwives and juries of women were no longer so
present in the York County court records. For the historian, it becomes more difficult
to use that archive to illuminate experiences of reproduction - the stories, testimonies,
and depositions of the seventeenth century disappear quite precipitously at the end of
the seventeenth century. What caused this shift in the archive? After the 1660s, the
Burgesses consciously Anglicized the Virginia court, both in terms of proceedings
and record keeping. As a result, the cases in which women’s testimony was recorded
in the early seventeenth century either were not tried (such as defamation cases), or
were recorded in only the most cursory ways (in the case o f bastardy and fornication
cases).721 Therefore, the eighteenth-century recording of bastardy cases - the cases in
which midwives were most frequently deposed - focused on the verdict in the case,
and as a rule included no testimony at all.
Anglicization of the courts also meant that cases were decided using new
standards of proof. The childbed confession, so powerful in the seventeenth century,
was supplanted by sworn courtroom testimony as the most potent proof of paternity.
As early as 1689, paternity was decided in Elizabeth Hambleton’s bastardy case when
Hambleton “did this day declare in open court upon her corporall oath that Mr. John
Child of James Citty parish and county is the father of a man child begotten of her
body.”722 Similarly, in 1706, Mary Hanson “declared] on oath” that the father of her

721 John Rustin Pagan offers a clear d iscu ssion o f the cau ses, p rocesses, and con seq u en ces o f
A n glicization in V irginia, esp ecia lly focu sin g on bastardy law . Pagan, A n n e O rth w o o d ’s B astard. On
the w ays that A n glicization sp ecifica lly silen ced w o m en ’s v o ices, see D ayton, W om en b efo re th e B ar.
For a gender an alysis o f A n glicization in V irginia, see Sturtz, Within H er P o w er. F inally, for an
A tlantic v ie w o f A n glicization not ju st as legal p rocess but as cultural transform ation, see Bernard
B ailyn and Philip D. M organ, eds. S tra n g ers W ithin th e R ealm : C u ltu ral M a rg in s o f th e F irst B ritish
E m pire (C hapel Hill: U N C Press, 1991).
722 York D O W 8: 2 0 5 , 220.
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child was an enslaved man named Dick.723 Another space of midwives’ authority the inspection both infant and maternal bodies in cases of suspected infanticide - was
eroded in the eighteenth century. When Ann Tandy, a free woman was charged with
killing the “bastard male child borne of her body” in 1701, the investigation was led
by the coroner and a “jury of inquest,” not a jury of women.724
This shift in authority was not just about a shift in legal procedures. Instead, it
was about a shifting epistemology of reproduction - as midwives’ public authority
was being eroded in the courts, experience was also being eroded as a reliable font of
knowledge. Instead, male physicians and text-based scientific knowledge were
supplanting the authority of women in matters of reproduction. By the eighteenth
century, the shift to man-midwifery - or, in other words, the employment o f male
physicians in normal births, not just emergency surgeries - was well underway in
both Britain and in Virginia. By the 1760s, several man-midwives were practicing in
the colony, and they specifically advertised themselves as experts not only in
midwifery but in surgery and general medicine as well. For example, in a 1766 issue
of the Virginia Gazette, Dr. William Coakley advertised his skills “in every branch of
SURGERY, MIDWIFERY, and PHYSICK.”725 This shift was not absolute - the
Gazette even ran an essay criticizing man-midwifery as an affront to female modesty

723 Y ork D O W 12: 4 1 4 ,4 2 4 ; York D O W 13: 17. S ee also York D O W 14: 83; York JO 3: 2 2 4 -5 .
724 York D O W 1 1 :5 1 8 , 526; York D O W 12: 73.
725 V irginia G a ze tte , Purdie and D ix o n # 7 9 0 , July 11, 1766, page 2. Further advertisem ents and
m entions o f m an -m id w ives in the G a ze tte were published throughout the decade. See: V irginia
G a ze tte , Purdie and D ixon # 7 9 5 , A ugust 15, 1766, page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Purdie and D ix o n # 9 0 1 ,
D ecem b er 4 , 1766, page 3; Virginia G a zette, Rind, N ovem b er 2 7 , 1766, page 2; and V irgin ia G a zette,
Purdie and D ixon , February 2 , 1769, page 3.
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in 1772 - but, as we will see, it was indicative of a larger shift in framing elite men as
medical authorities.726
The shift to man-midwifery was a result of a larger epistemic shift in the
Anglo-Virginia world. First and foremost, medical authority became increasingly
couched in the discourses of science and the Enlightenment, which were
communicated and learned through text rather than through orality and experience.
As Lisa Foreman Cody argues, “the language and logic o f midwifery fundamentally
differed from the rational-critical debate of the scientific revolution and
Enlightenment.”727 Adrian Wilson echoes this view, arguing that not only were manmidwives seen as newly authoritative due to the scientific discourse of the
Enlightenment, but that elite women were more likely to accept man-midwives as
attendants in normal births precisely because those women were themselves
participants in the newly emergent bourgeois culture of literacy.728
While, as discussed before, midwifery texts were vanishingly rare in the
colony, elite planters often included medical texts as an essential part of their
libraries. As early as the 1660s, Matthew Hubard, a York County planter, had several
medical books in his library, including “[Riverews?] Body of Physick, Phisitiens
Library; Culpepps Dispensatorys; [...] Sennuatory Institution of Physick; [...] [and]
Culpeppers Alchomy.”729 By the eighteenth century, planters’ libraries included

726 V irginia G a ze tte , Purdie and D ixon # 1 1 0 5 , O ctober 1, 1772, page 1.
727 C ody, ‘T h e P olitics o f Reproduction,” 4 8 0 .
728 W ilson, The M aking o f M an -M idw ifery, 185-192; C ody, “T he P olitics o f R eproduction,” 4 8 9 .
Judith W alzer Leavitt also m akes a class-b ased argum ent for w hy elite w om en ch o se m ale p hysicians
to attend their births. L eavitt, B ro u g h t to B ed, 6 4 -8 6 . W ilso n ’s and C o d y ’s argum ents are esp ecially
useful here because they cou ch that c la ss co n scio u sn ess in q uestions o f literacy, k n ow led ge, and
epistem o lo g y .
7 9 York D O W 4: 4 3 0 . For York C ounty, see also York D O W 2: 3 4 4 . For outside o f York C ounty,
see: Jam es, ed ., The L o w e r N orfolk C ounty V irginia A n tiq u a ry 1: 104-6, 122-3; L yon G. T yler, ed.,
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stacks of medical books. For example, John Parke Custis’s library included 42
medical titles - he was a planter and an attorney, not a physician.730 Rhys Isaac has
argued that inventories like these might actually underestimate the importance of
medical texts in a gentleman’s library. The inventory o f Landon Carter’s extant
library includes not a single medical book - which is simply impossible as an
accurate snapshot of his actual reading, as he frequently referred directly to multiple
medical texts in his diary. Instead, Isaac argues, the most useful books - medical
books, especially - were simply “culled from the collection” over the generations.731
Undoubtedly, medicine was part of any learned gentleman’s personal education and
private library.
Along with seeing medicine as a necessary area of knowledge for any
gentleman, medicine was claimed as a sphere of influence and authority for planters.
The laws that regulated physicians were rooted in the understanding that masters were
responsible for providing medical care to their families and white servants: prices
needed regulation so that masters would not be “swayed by profitable rather than
charitable respects.”732 In fact, white servants used the courts to guarantee their
access to medicine. In 1657, Robert Crouch was ordered by the court to find and pay
a surgeon to treat the “very soare & much perished Legg” of his servant, Robert
Crouch.

Captain Daniel Parke, a wealthy and influential York County planter, saw

“N o tes from C ounty R ecords,” T yle r's Q u a rterly H isto ric a l a n d G e n e a lo g ic a l M a g a zin e 7 (1 9 2 6 ): 5 9 67; Lyon G. T yler, ed ., “Arthur Sp icer’s Inventory,” T y le r ’s Q u a rterly H isto ric a l a n d G e n e a lo g ica l
M aga zin e 10 (1 9 2 9 ): 163; “Carter Papers,” V irginia M a g a zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y 6 , no. 1
(1 8 9 8 ), 145-52.
730 Lyon G. Tyler, ed ., “T he Library o f John Parke C ustis, E sq., o f Fairfax C ounty, V irginia,” T yler's
Q u a rterly H isto ric a l a n d G e n e a lo g ic a l M a g a zin e 9 (1928): 9 7 -1 0 3 .
731 Isaac, L andon C a r te r ’s U n easy K in g d o m , 87.
732 H ening 2: 109-10.
733 York D O W 3: 2.

271

his medical authority as extending not just to his servants but also to his neighbors.
In 1665, Parke was paid the considerable sum of 1,450 pounds of tobacco “for
physicke administered to & attendance about” his neighbor Thomas White.734 Elite
planters’ responsibility for providing medical care extended not only to paying for
physicians, but also to acting as a physician oneself.
By the eighteenth century, planters’ interest in medicine extended to
midwifery. Two eighteenth-century Virginia planter diaries - those of William Byrd
II and Landon Carter - show the ways that planters saw themselves not only as
responsible for the medical care of their “people” but ultimately claiming authority
over knowledge of childbearing as well. Both diaries represent their writers well.
Byrd was a secretive and suspicious man, ever anxious about his power.

7 * jc

His

medical techniques were rudimentary, at least as expressed in his diary. Carter, on
the other hand, was truculent and cranky, confident in his knowledge and authority,
and forever feeling slighted by others when they failed to live up to his
expectations.

Carter fashioned himself as a man o f learning, and for him, medicine

was an area where he could both prove and expand his knowledge. For both men,
medicine (especially midwifery) was an intimate space in which they enacted their
power as colonial patriarchs. And for both men, medicine was a sphere in which their
various patients - slaves, neighbors, wives, daughters - found ways to resist that
power.
William Byrd II’s approach to medical and reproductive knowledge bridged
between the world of midwives and the world o f man-midwives. Byrd himself
734 York D O W 4: 37. S ee also York D O W 3 : 4 1 .
735 L ockridge, On th e S o u rces o f P a tria rc h a l R a g e, 8 5 -9 0 . Treckel, “T he Em pire o f M y Heart,” 135-6.
736 Isaac, L andon C a rte r's U n easy K in g d o m , passim .
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imagined himself as a Biblical patriarch, and his medical expertise was part o f that
role. In 1726, he famously wrote to a friend: “Like one of the patriarchs, I have my
flocks and my herds, my bond-men, and bond-women, and every soart of trade
amongst my own servants, so that I live in a kind of independence on every one, but
Providence.”737 Byrd saw doctoring his slaves as one of his responsibilities to his
“bond-men and bond-women.” When slaves were sick, he applied the techniques of
the heroic medicine of his era, giving vomits, bleeding veins, and prescribing
medicines made from local herbs.738 For Byrd, his role as plantation doctor was in
keeping with his identity as a patriarch. When a wave of smallpox swept through the
slave quarters, Byrd interpreted the event as his punishment from God: “These poor
people suffer for my sins; God forgive me all my offenses and restore them to their
health if it be consistent with his Holy will.”

7TQ

Even when admitting his faults, Byrd

imagined himself to be at the center o f the universe, the cause and consequence o f all
events.
Byrd extended his medical authority from his slaves to his wife. Recall that
when Lucy Byrd was brought to bed in 1709, she was attended by an experienced
midwife to whose knowledge William unflinchingly deferred. Over time, though,
that deference would be undermined, first by Byrd’s desire for intimate knowledge of
his wife’s reproductive health, and second by his decision to trust physicians over the
expertise o f his wife’s midwife. The intimate detail of Byrd’s diary extended to his
wife’s health: Byrd recorded Lucy’s mood, her symptoms, and her menstrual cycle
throughout the diary. For Byrd, this surveillance was not just his right as a husband,
737 T inling, C o rresp o n d e n c e o f Three W illiam B yrd s, 35 4 -5 .
738 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B y rd , 188, 2 9 3 ,4 9 0 .
739 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B y rd , 278.
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it was a necessity to make sure that Lucy stayed healthy. As has been discussed
previously, Lucy Byrd suffered greatly from miscarriages, illness, and depression
after the birth of her son, Parke. These only intensified when Parke died as an infant.
Throughout Lucy’s 1711 pregnancy, William recorded her symptoms, recording that
Lucy was “sick,” or “indisposed” more often than not.740 As Lucy’s condition
faltered, Byrd recommended that Lucy allow him to bleed her. Again and again,
Lucy refused. On June 22: “I persuaded her to be let blood but she would not
consent.”741 The next night: “My wife was indisposed and was threatened with
miscarriage. I again persuaded to bleed but she would not be persuaded to it.”742
Finally, Lucy relented the next morning: “My wife grew worse and after much trial
and persuasion was let blood when it was too late.”743 Lucy’s condition worsened
through the day, until she finally miscarried: “she was delivered of a false conception
and then grew better.”744 The narrative of resistance, refusal, and eventual
acquiescence marks many of the medical interactions between William and Lucy
Byrd.745
Alongside this narrative of William Byrd treating his wife by letting blood
(and also prescribing purgatives and other remedies), we see the gradual destabilizing
of Lucy’s connection to the feminine knowledge of social childbirth. When Lucy
gave birth to Parke in 1709, her birth and her lying-in were attended by a group of
midwives and female friends. The 1709 birth was attended by Mrs. B-t-s, the
midwife, and also by William Byrd’s cousin, Betty Harrison, and Lucy’s friend, Mrs.
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Hamlin, plus whatever unnamed servants and slaves attended the group.746 After the
birth, Lucy was cared for by Anaka and Mrs. Jarrett, and Betty Harrison and Mrs.
Hamlin visited several times.747 When Lucy miscarried in 1710, she was again
attended by Mrs. Jarrett, Mrs. Hamlin, and Betty Harrison, as well as a new friend,
Mrs. Anderson.748 When little Parke died a few months later, Mrs. Anderson and
another friend, Mrs. Baker, came to be with Lucy in her grief.749
After Parke died, though, Lucy’s social circle shrunk, and she was
increasingly attended by her husband and his chosen physicians, Dr. Cocke and Mr.
Anderson. It was during the next pregnancy, in 1711, that William Byrd fired the
nurse, Mrs. Jarrett. It was also during this pregnancy that William tried multiple
times to convince Lucy be bled, either by him, or by his new ally Dr. Cocke, or by
their friend Mr. Anderson. This time, when Lucy miscarried, only one friend, Mrs.
Dunn, was with her.750 William and Mrs. Dunn clashed over Lucy’s care - William
wanted to call Dr. Cocke, but Mrs. Dunn insisted that the physician’s care wasn’t
needed.751 When the doctor arrived, he prescribed a tincture of chamomile, and
William paid him four gold pieces for his services.752 When Lucy was pregnant again
in 1712, Dr. Cocke was a near constant presence, prescribing medicines and
bleedings throughout the pregnancy.753

746 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd ,
747 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd ,
748 W right and T in lin g, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd ,
749 W right and T in lin g, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd ,
750 W right and T in lin g, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd,
751 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd ,
752 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd,
753 W right and T inling, The S e c re t D ia ry o f W illiam B yrd,
that pregnancy; it is unknown w h o attended that birth.
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We should be reluctant to interpret too broadly the experiences of Lucy Byrd
- she was, after all, an extremely elite woman whose frail health, both physical and
mental, required considerable medical attention. That said, throughout the period of
the diary, William and Lucy’s opposing medical epistemes come into constant
conflict. William cajoled Lucy to accept his heroic medical techniques; Lucy resisted
again and again. It was only when her connection to the authority of other women
was broken - when she, for whatever reason, was no longer attended by a group of
neighbor women, midwives, and friends - that William was able to convince her to be
seen by a physician. When women’s community faltered, men’s medicine stepped in.
Even more than William Byrd, Landon Carter epitomized the model of the
master-patriarch as medical authority. Like Byrd, Carter regularly practiced medicine
on his slaves, seeing doctoring as an essential aspect of mastery. Unlike Byrd, who
relied on just a few medical techniques, Carter approached these cases with a
scientific eye: he carefully listed the various treatments he tried, measuring their
outcomes so that he might improve his practice. In 1757, smallpox spread throughout
Carter’s population of enslaved people. One case, that of Betty Oliver, was especially
interesting to Carter because Oliver was pregnant at the time of her infection. She
had first gotten sick in the summer:
.. .She was releived [sic] as others were by evacuants, but her pregnancy
preventing a repitition of them she relapsed with the Season into an
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inflammatory disorder for which she was twice blooded and recovered so as to
imploy herself about light works.754
Here, we see the entanglement of Carter’s interests all in one case: the proper method
of curing an illness, the measuring of success of one method over another, and,
finally, the guarantee that a slave might still do labor, even when sick and pregnant.
After Oliver had her baby, Carter redoubled his medical interventions, prescribing
“Nervins,” purging with rhubarb and castor oil, treatment with “Sal Ammoniae,”
drinking a concoction of wine, whey and chamomile, taking a “hysteria medicine”
prescribed by Dr. Flood, and finally treatment with opiates.755 Despite all of these
interventions, Betty Oliver died. It took three days for Carter to remember to record
her death in his diary.756
This attention to sick slaves, and this ready use of heroic treatments such as
purges, bleeding, and vomits, is a source of considerable similarity between Landon
Carter and William Byrd II. One difference, though, is Carter’s willingness - even
eagerness - to assert himself into cases of reproduction, including childbearing,
miscarriage, and stillbirth. Where Byrd’s influence over his wife’s childbearing was
gradual, Carter had no hesitation in claiming his authority over reproductive
knowledge. In 1776, Carter was visited by a neighbor, Vincent Garland, “about his

754 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L an don C a rter, 144-5. Carter’s treatment o f another sick and
pregnant slave, W inney, also included m any different rem edies, including herbs, p h y sicia n s’
prescriptions, b leeding, tinctures, and purges. G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n e l L andon C a rter, 2 1 4 -2 1 .
55 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 144-5, 146, 154, 155. T h is experim entation on slave
w om en brings to mind a later m aster-physician, A labam a planter J. M arion Sim s, w h ose
experim entation on slave w om en led to breakthroughs in fistula treatment, but am ounted to torture o f
the w om en w hom he ow n ed . S im s is considered the “father” o f Am erican g y n ec o lo g y . K apsalis,
P u b lic P riv a te s, 3 3 -5 9 . S ee also M cM illen , M o th e rh o o d in th e O ld South, 99.
756 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 156.
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poor wife dangerously ill, as he thought, with the labour of her first Child.”757 Rather
than deferring to the midwife (who was likely present with the wife), or even to a
physician, Carter eagerly expressed his own opinion, having never seen the patient in
question:
I enquired into Particulars and found nothing amiss there [illeg.jted the man
and administered a mild provoken of Pains and bid him be satisfied his wife
might to very well, and he returned well satisfied. I cautioned him against all
hot Cordials for fear of increasing the Natural fever which would attend....

7SR

For Carter, knowledge about reproduction was a token of his status as a man of
authority and gentility: as he sent Garland home, he hoped to himself that the man
would be impressed by his “good advice.”759
Carter’s medical authority extended to his own family, especially his
daughter-in-law Winifred Carter, who experienced three miscarriages (or stillbirths it is unclear how far along in pregnancy Winifred was) in 1766, 1771, and 1774. For
all of these events, Carter was not just an active participant in the diagnosis and
treatment of W inifred’s ailments - he was her primary attendant. In these cases, we
see two themes. First, Carter’s knowledge about reproduction was deeply rooted in
the textual basis o f man-midwifery: he refers often to midwifery texts and the science
of man-midwifery. Second, we see the ways that Winifred resisted Carter’s claim to
authority by finding ways to block his view of her reproductive experience.
Landon Carter’s diagnosis of Winifred Carter’s 1766 miscarriage shows his
devotion to the new scientific accounts of pregnancy and childbirth. Even so, as
757 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 980.
758 Ibid.
759 Ibid.
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enlightened as Carter imagined himself to be, he held some patently unscientific
views. When Winifred Carter miscarried her pregnancy in 1766, he blamed the
unfortunate event on her dishonesty and apparent belief (however joking) that women
chose when to go into labor: Winifred was “in labour the 3d time without a midwife
so punctual are women or rather obstinate to their false accounts.”760 Finding that
“the child was dead and the womb was fallen down and what not,” Carter stepped in
an acted as man-midwife to his daughter in law.761 He forwarded several possible
diagnoses, including a prolapsed uterus and a “swelled and inflamed” vagina, before
finally concluding that what he saw “proved only the protuberance of the waters
through the thickness o f the membrane.”762 The fetus, “much squeezed and indeed
putrified was delivered,” but without any “lochial discharge.”763 He struggled to find
the cause of the lack of fluid, since the circumstance he saw “I never read o f...in any
Author.”764 Days later, Carter still struggled to find an explanation for the lack of
fluid in one of his books: “Indeed Smellee says that is various in women some more
some less, some of one Colour some another.”765 Here, Carter is referring to William
Smellie’s influential text, A Sett o f Anatomical Tables, with explanations, and an
abridgement, o f the practice o f midwifery, first published in London in 1749. Carter
concluded that, since his reading could not find an absolute diagnosis, that he had in
fact discovered a new scientific phenomenon: “If she should continue so books and
experience have not yet amounted to all the particular cases in Midwifery,” he
760 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L an don C arter, 31 5 -6 .
761 Ibid.
762 Ibid.
763 Ibid. It’s unclear here what Carter means by “lochial disch arge,” and why it cau sed him such
concern. A p ossib ility is that he is referring to a lack o f am niotic fluid, indicating that W in ifred ’s
w ater had broken som e tim e before the m iscarriage.
764 Ibid.
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exclaimed.766 For Carter, midwifery was not something to be learned from
experience - he was a knowledgeable authority because of his immersion in the
scientific literature, and the fact that he had never seen anything like W inifred’s
miscarriage before was a moment of scientific discovery, not a sign of his lack of
knowledge.
Despite his confidence in his knowledge and authority, or perhaps because of
it, Landon Carter grew ever more furious with Winifred Carter when she strived to
keep her reproductive experiences to herself. When Winifred miscarried again in
1771, Landon Carter complained:
She is a strange woman. I suspected her being with child some months ago,
and advized her to be carefull in many things, particularly to get timely
blooded, as she always knew how fatal the want o f [s]uch a thoughtfulness
had been [tom] a laughing matter, both in her husband and herself.767
Instead of telling her father-in-law about the pregnancy, Winifred had kept it a secret.
Even on the day of her miscarriage, she hid her trauma from her father-in-law, her
husband, and their guests: “ ...she was taken with very suspicious complaints,
concealed] from everybody, for she went about as Usual, and after the Company was
gone she would only be blooded in the morning.”768 When Winifred finally admitted
her symptoms to her father-in-law, he called Doctor Mortimer to tend to her.
Winifred repeated the same pattern on an autumn morning in 1774. After
refusing to come to breakfast, she finally admitted to her husband and her father-inlaw that she was “in labour and now it comes out: she had not felt her child these 2
766 Ibid.
767 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 6 2 0 .
768 Ibid.
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months; a thing she had never spoak of to one soul.”769 In fact, Winifred insisted, she
had told her father-in-law the truth: she told him she “was not with child,” because “a
woman with a dead Child in her, could be thought much more said not to be with
Child.”770 Winifred was hearkening to the belief that she was not pregnant until she
felt the fetus stir within her at quickening. For Landon Carter, a man of the new
scientific mind, women’s experience was no longer a compelling definition of
pregnancy. Therefore, we can suggest two reasons why Winifred Carter might want
to hide her pregnancy from her father-in-law. First, perhaps she was seeking out
some modicum of privacy in a household in which the patriarch had such
overwhelmingly invasive power. If this was the case, W inifred’s silence was a form
of resistance against the intimacies of her father’s patriarchal authority. Second,
perhaps she was holding on to an understanding o f reproduction in which her
knowledge was rooted in her bodily experience. If this was the case, W inifred’s
silence was a way of resisting her father-in-law’s demands to be the arbiter of all
knowledge in the household.
We see in the diaries of Byrd and Carter not only an expansion of planters’
authority and influence, but a significant epistemic shift in the understanding of
reproduction. First, we see an increased willingness to observe, interfere, and even
control the processes of childbirth - this is a far cry from the justices at Anne Owle’s
case claiming that knowledge about reproduction was “not fit to be discust
publiquely.”771 Second, this claiming of authority in the birthing room amounted to a
claiming o f a new kind o f cultural power: the power of abstract knowledge over
769 G reene, The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon C a rter, 8 5 9 -6 0 .
770 Ibid.
771 York D O W 2: 166.

281

experiential knowledge. |As Lisa Foreman Cody argues, the expansion of physician’s
authority to midwifery had profound social and cultural meaning: “Man-midwives
ultimately worked in the interests of the developing bourgeois public sphere to
articulate the natural, physiological, psychological, and moral constitution of both
female and male individuals.”772 In other words, the expansion of physicians’
authority to female bodies involved a fundamental shift in how the gendered and
sexed body was scientifically understood, from rooting knowledge about childbearing
in women’s experience to rooting that knowledge in text and abstract education. The
man-midwife - and, in Virginia, the layman planter-physician-midwife - colonized
female knowledge about women’s bodies. By extension, by claiming authority over
medicine, and then over reproduction, planters engaged in their own epistemic
colonization.
For both William Byrd II and Landon Carter, knowledge and authority were
claimed by virtue of their status. That status was rooted in their identities as planterpatriarchs: they were empowered as caretakers of their neighborhoods, masters of
slaves, scientists of the Enlightenment, and patriarchs of families to be the bearers of
knowledge, power, and authority. This was the consequence of colonialism: the
fundamental transformation of knowledge and power.
*

*

*

One day, watching his charges play about him, the tutor Philip Vickers Fithian
observed the little girls imagining their lives as adults: they ran about, “stuffing rags
and other Lumber under their Gowns just below their Apron-Strings,... .prodigiously

772 C ody, ‘T h e P olitics o f R eproduction,” 4 8 9 .
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charmed at their resemblance to Pregnant Women!”773 What did these little
eighteenth-century girls imagine for their futures? Did they look at the women
around them - their mothers, sisters, aunts, grandmothers, and also the slaves and
servants who labored for them - and assume that adult womanhood and pregnancy
went hand-in-hand? What did they think their pregnancies and childbirths would be
like? These little girls were born into a new world, where those questions were no
longer decided by tradition, but instead were expressions of power, status, authority,
and knowledge in their colonial context.

773 Farish, ed. The J o u rn a l a n d L e tte rs o f P h ilip V ickers F ithian, 193.
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CHAPTER 4
“She lives in an infant country that wants nothing but people” :
Discourses of Reproduction, Print Culture, and Virginia’s Colonial Project

In a 1729 letter to his sister-in-law, Anne Taylor Otway, William Byrd II
offered, amidst standard family news, his detailed fantasy of how the colonial
government could better encourage marriage amongst its people. Byrd opined that
every man should be required to marry or else suffer public whipping by “2 of the
oldest virgins in the neighbourhood.”774 Further, engaged couples should “view each
other stark naked thro’ an iron grate,” so that they wouldn’t be “surprised” by their
spouse’s body on the wedding night. To ensure legitimate births, Byrd proposed that
fornicators be sentenced to a diet of “thin water gruel...to quench the excessive heat
of their constitutions.”775 Why enact these policies? Byrd hoped that “many unhappy
matches will be avoided, to the great peace o f familys.”776 His greater purpose was
“the propagateing a strong and vigorous posterity,” so that the next generation of
children “wou’d be all six feet 4 inches without their shoes.”777 In case mandatory
marriage didn’t achieve Byrd’s procreative goals, he suggested that people with ten
children should be exempt from all taxes, and that “those who are fumblers and have
no children” pay double taxes.778

774 T inling, ed ., The C o rresp o n d en ce o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 1: 4 0 1 -2 .
775 Ibid.
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William Byrd II is notable to historians, of course, for often making explicit
the thoughts that his peers kept to themselves or left abstract.

77Q

Byrd’s fantasy was

notable in its varied imaginings of the corporeal body, which he envisioned publicly
displayed, tortured, examined, starved, and sexually joined. Byrd’s procreative fancy
reveals his beliefs about the role of marriage and reproduction in the creation of a
civil society. For him, reproduction should be unfettered, so long as it occurred
within the bounds of marriage. He imagined only positive effects to this pronatalist
policy, including happier families and haler progeny. For William Byrd II, since
reproduction should ideally be copious, the state’s role was to encourage even more
childbearing: procreation, he believed, “was ever for the publick good.”780
Just over eighty-five years later, Thomas Jefferson wrote a (now famous)
letter to Francis Gray. Seeking to define absolutely the legal and racial status of
mixed-race people, Jefferson turned to algebraic equations to determine race:
...one-fourth of negro blood, mixed with any portion of white, constitutes the
mulatto. As the issue has one-half the blood of each parent, and the blood of
each of these may be made up of a variety of fractional mixtures, the estimate
of their compound in some cases may be intricate; it becomes a mathematical
problem of the same class with those on the mixtures of different liquors or
different metals; as in these, therefore the algebraical notation is the most
7 0 1

convenient and intelligible.

779 On B yrd’s frankness, see: Sm ith, In side th e G re a t H ou se, 199-204; T reckel, ‘“ T he Em pire o f my
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Jefferson went on for several pages of equations, imagining generation after
generation of people “cohabit[ing],” until he was satisfied that “two crosses with pure
white, and a third with any degree of mixture, however small, as clearing the issue of
negro blood.”782 In an aside, Jefferson remarked that even that person, who was
white according to his equations, might still be legally enslaved, because of the law of
slavery by birth. Jefferson’s calculations were aimed not just at defining racial
categories but about literally erasing blackness, if not the institution of slavery.
Jefferson’s reproductive calculations could not be more different from Byrd’s.
Byrd espoused a vision of prolific reproduction, where fertile bodies combined in
marital sexual bliss to birth innumerable strong and healthy children. For Jefferson,
on the other hand, reproduction was rationalized, reduced to a series of equations.
There are no bodies in Jefferson’s mathematical modeling, only “crossings” who
“cohabit” in order to produce “issue,” who then themselves cohabit and cross. For
Byrd, reproduction was a public good that should be encouraged by any means; for
Jefferson, reproduction was rational, scientific, mathematical, and predictable, and the
state’s role was to categorize births according to hierarchical labels of race and
servitude. For Byrd, reproduction was a bodily phenomenon, inextricably linked to
marriage and sexuality (which for him ought to be co-defined). For Jefferson,
reproduction - especially the reproduction of black, mixed-race, and enslaved people
- was an abstract process divorced from human relationships. Finally, for Byrd,
reproduction was a means of growing an implicitly white colonial population. For
Jefferson, reproduction and state policy regarding reproduction was always about race
- racial categories, hierarchy, and domination.
782 Bergh, ed ., The W ritings o f T hom as Jefferson, 270.
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore the transition between the prolific
reproduction promoted by Byrd and the rational reproduction calculated by Jefferson.
The period bookended by these two men’s lives was one of tremendous political,
cultural, and social change ranging from the Enlightenment to scientific and
democratic revolutions. As Western society lurched into modernity, even the most
basic intimate relations were altered: gender ideology transformed, birth rates fell,
and elite marriage relationships were redefined. Michel Foucault posited that, with
the combined changes that pushed the Western world into modernity came a new
organization of the state’s power over people’s intimate lives: “the ancient right to
take life or let live was replaced by a power io foster life or disallow it to the point of
death.”783 This new power, which Foucault termed biopower, involved “the set of
mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became
the object of a political strategy... [in which] modem Western societies took on board
the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species.”784 For Foucault,
capitalism required wholly new understandings of the relationship between the body
and society: the basic biological processes o f life (e.g., birth, sex, death) were to be
•JO C

regulated in order to produce the most profitable outcomes.

Therefore, into this

new modem world came a new, scientific understanding of the reproductive body,
and supervision and intervention in order to develop an ideal population.786 In short,
biopower was the state’s modem project of developing rational population strategies.

783 M ichel Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 138. Em phasis in original.
784 M ichel Foucault, Secu rity, T erritory, P op u la tio n , trans. M ichael Senellart (N Y : Picador, 2 0 0 9 ), 1.
785 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 140-1.
786 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 139.
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Foucault’s understanding of biopower helps us to understand how Byrd’s lusty
reproducing bodies were replaced by Jefferson’s coldly abstract equations.
This chapter will use a postcolonial reading o f Foucault’s concept of biopower
to examine competing reproductive discourses in colonial Virginia. The English
colonial project was first understood within the discourse of prolific reproduction.
Within this discourse, reproduction was understood to be inherently natural and
godly. Taking seriously the biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply,” this
discourse saw profuse reproduction as the ideal, and the state’s role concerning
reproduction was to encourage population growth. Within this discourse, Virginia
was imagined as a fertile garden waiting to be exploited - and peopled - by English
colonizers. This discourse, though tenacious, was challenged by the actual
experience of colonialism. Alongside the discourse of prolific reproduction came a
new discourse, which saw unchecked fertility as threatening to colonial order.
Instead, reproduction was reimagined as rational - orderly, predictable, abstract, and
adhering to the laws of science. Even as the colonial state continued to prioritize
populating the “empty” land of the colony, managing that population - creating an
ideal colonial population - arose as a new priority. Central to the discourse of
rational reproduction were concern about racial purity: reproduction became a tool to
separate, categorize, and define races. While these two discourses would exist
simultaneously, they bore fundamentally different relationships to the colonial
project: while the discourse of prolific reproduction was one of the earliest
justifications for English colonialism, the discourse of rational reproduction was itself
a product of the colonial project.

288

*

*
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From their first voyages to the New World, English colonizers idealized
America as an exceptionally fertile, fruitful land uniquely suited for the development
of English colonies. Well into the eighteenth century, the English colonial project
mirrored English views o f reproduction, where colonialism depended on and would
be accomplished by the creation of a large population for this new fertile land. The
discourse of prolific reproduction would be remarkably tenacious, surviving for
several generations, well into the eighteenth century. We see it not only in the early
documents of colonialism (such as colonial booster texts and Virginia’s earliest
statutes) but also in the 18th century letters of the planter William Byrd II, and in the
Virginia Gazette, the Williamsburg newspaper that served the colony beginning in
1736.
The English vision of a fertile, virgin land meshed perfectly with the discourse
of prolific reproduction, which demanded childbearing that would answer the Biblical
commandment that man “be fruitful and multiply.” Susan Klepp has argued that, in
the early modem period, women’s reproductive role was defined by frequent
childbearing: women’s bodies were described both in print and in private as
“teeming,” “breeding,” “flourishing,” or “fruitful.”787 One print example of the
discourse of prolific reproduction was Aristotle’s Master Piece (the most popular
medical book in England and the colonies during the eighteenth century), which
purported to discover to the reader the “secrets” o f sex, generation, and childbirth.

7 88

787 K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ies,” 9 1 7 .
788 R oy Porter, ‘“ T he Secrets o f Generation D isp la y ’d ’,” 4; Otho T. B eall, Jr., “A ristotle’s M aster P iece
in A m erica: A Landmark in the Folklore o f M ed icin e,” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rterly 2 0 , no. 2 (1963):
209.
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In his exegesis of Aristotle's Master Piece, Roy Porter described the book as
remarkably positive (if “pronuptialist and pronatalist”) in its approach to sexuality
and reproduction: so long as it took place within marriage, sex and its pleasures were
“portrayed as nature’s way of ensuring generation and safeguarding the life of the
species within the wider rhythms of the cosmos.”789 That connection between nature
and human reproduction can be seen in seventeenth-century Virginia wills in which
testators requested a Christian burial by metaphorically “bequeathing” their bodies
“to my Mother the earth from whence it came.”790 Even in these explicitly Christian
documents (the same wills make clear that the testator’s soul was bequeathed to God
or to Jesus), an explicit connection was drawn between nature, fertility, earth, and
motherhood. In some ways, the discourse of prolific reproduction was positive for
women: it embraced a certain form of women’s sexuality, even affirming that
sexuality as reflective of nature and G od’s plan.
Nevertheless, the early modem connection between reproduction and nature
should not be idealized. First, the discourse of prolific reproduction was deeply
essentialist, defining women’s lives by their childbearing. Second, the discourse of
prolific reproduction, while it embraced women’s reproductive role, defined that role
in masculine terms. Early modern theories of human generation defined the human
body as inherently masculine, with the female body being a lesser version of the
male.791 This idea of reproduction as inherently masculine was not just academic; it
permeated popular medical texts as well. Mary Fissell has noted the ways that early

789 Porter, ‘T h e Secrets o f G eneration,” 13, 15.
790 York D O W 1: 277; York D O W 2: 154.
791 Laqueur, “O rgasm , G eneration, and the P olitics o f R eproductive B io lo g y ,” 1-41; Jordanova,
“Interrogating the C oncept o f R eproduction,” 3 6 9 -3 8 6 .
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modern English domestic medical texts, while deeply ensconced in the discourse of
prolific reproduction, increasingly used male-centered metaphors for human
reproduction. Metaphors of arable land, craft labor, and formal gardening - all rooted
in nature, but also all masculine professions and pursuits - were used to describe
female reproductivity. As Fissell argues:
[These metaphors] played upon images of the female, making landscape
highly gendered. The land was a woman, a woman tamed and controlled,
alluring and erotic. Men planted, constructed, and enclosed her in ways
7Q?

congruent with cultural expectations of women’s behavior.
In this way, the discourse of prolific reproduction imagined a feminine natural world
upon which men must act in order to fulfill God’s plan.
The discourse of prolific reproduction found a conceptual match with the
early modem British colonial project. That colonial project, as exemplified in
colonial booster texts, emphasized the unbounded fertility of American spaces; this
was a “virgin” land just waiting to be exploited by British agriculture and industry.
Kathleen Brown makes clear the connections between the British characterization of
Virginia as “virgin,” empty land and their gendering of Native Americans as
feminine, ineffectual stewards of that land. These twin discourses, both rooted in the
belief that prolific reproduction and large populations were the ideal, provided the
basis for English conquest.793 Joyce Chaplin makes a similar argument,
demonstrating the ways that English colonizers justified their conquest by claiming

792 F issell, “Gender and G eneration,” 4 3 7 . On the gendered con n ection b etw een fem ininity and nature,
see Sherry Ortner, “Is F em ale to M ale as Nature is to Culture?” in W om an, C u ltu re a n d S o ciety, ed.
M ich elle Z im balist R osaldo and L ou ise Lamphere (Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press, 1974),
6 7 -8 7 .
793 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 56 -6 4 .
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that Natives had insufficiently populated American lands.794 Jennifer Morgan argues
that these colonial metaphors of fertility originated in early travel writings which
viewed African women’s bodies as simultaneously savage and fertile; this fertility,
Morgan argued, provided a discursive basis for the exploitation of both colonial
colonized lands and colonized bodies.795
According to these discourses of reproduction and colonialism, much as a
pregnant body grows, or a family multiplies, the British commonwealth would
expand with colonialism through conversion of the Indians and expansion to
American lands. This connection between fertility and expansion can be seen in both
the texts that advertised and boosted the colonial project, and in the Virginia legal
archive as well. The Virginia writer John Hammond put this succinctly in the
opening of his 1656 book, Leah and Rachel, or the Two Fruitfull Sisters Virginia and
Mary-land: “It is the glory of every Nation to enlarge themselves.”796 Throughout
his text, Hammond emphasized that the success and growth of the colony would rest
on the fertility of Virginia’s land itself. Virginia’s founders, who continued to believe
that the colony would grow even after the disaster at Roanoke, embraced this
pronatalist mission. In the first and second colonial charters (in 1606 and 1609), they
pledged that not only settlers but “every of their children, which shall happen to be

794 C haplin, S u b je c t M a tters, 157-200. S ee also: Gordon Sayre, “N ative A m erican S exu ality in the
E yes o f the B eholders 1 5 3 5 -1 7 1 0 ,” in Sex a n d Sexu ality in E a rly A m erica , ed. M errill D . Sm ith (N Y :
N ew Y ork U niversity Press, 1998), 3 5 -5 4 .
795 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 12-49.
796 John H am m ond, L eah a n d R achel, or, th e T w o F ruitfull S isters V irginia a n d M ary-L a n d : T h eir
P resen t C on dition , Im p a rtia lly sta te d a n d re la te d (L ondon, 1656), Early E nglish B o o k s 131: E .865, 1.
For another exam p le, see Edward Bland, The d isc o v e ry o f N ew B ritta in e (L ondon, 1651), Early
E nglish B o o k s 3155: 3 0 7 .3 . For a reading o f H am m ond that (uncritically) em p h asizes H am m ond’s use
o f metaphors o f fertility, see R obert D . Arner, “A N ote on John H am m ond’s ‘Leah and R a ch el,” ’
Southern L itera ry J o u rn a l 6:1 (1 9 7 3 ), 77 -8 0 .
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bom” in Virginia would enjoy the rights and privileges of English subjects.

797

That

the colony should be home to a growing English population was implicit.
The experience of actual colonization interrupted this idealized vision of a
fertile, yielding Virginia, but English colonizers still embraced the discourse of
prolific reproduction. Virginia’s early years were marred by much-publicized deaths
from starvation, sickness, and war with the not-so-docile Indians, which would seem
to interrupt the belief that America was a lush Eden just waiting to be settled by
fertile English bodies. But from Virginia’s founding, English colonizers believed that
births would always outweigh inevitable deaths. This notion that births cancelled out
deaths can be seen in seventeenth century ballad titled “Newes from Virginia,” which
recounts the deaths of two people on the voyage to the colony:
And for the loss of these two soules,
Which were accounted deere,
A sonne and daughter then was bome,
And were baptized there.798
While the death o f two people at sea was a “deere” loss, they were providentially
replaced by two children bom and baptized in the colony, thus literally expanding the
realm of Christendom into the new colony. As Joyce Chaplin has argued, in a culture
that had only recently survived the plague, the birth of children was needed to
outmatch a dying population, and marriage and childbearing took on dual meanings
in the colonies, both as replacing that lost generation and in populating the new

797 H ening 1: 6 4 , 95.
798 “N e w e s from V irgin ia,” in An A m erica n G a rla n d : B ein g a C o llectio n o f B a lla d s R ela tin g to
A m erica, 1 5 6 3 -1 7 5 9 , ed. C. H. Firth (O xford: B.H . B lack w ell, 1915), 9.
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land.799 The first births in the colony - including the famous Virginia Dare of
Raleigh’s colony at Roanoke - had deep cultural resonance.800
Therefore, even in the face of the hardships that colonization brought, English
colonizers continued to embrace the pronatalist discourse of prolific reproduction,
seeing fertility as a providential gift from God and a sign of God’s approval for the
colonial project. John Hammond, who referred to Virginia and Maryland as “fruitfull
sisters,” claimed that it was only Virginia’s natural fertility that had kept it solvent
through the difficult early years: the two colonies were “in danger to moulder away,”
and there was not “any thing but the fertility and natural gratefulnesse of them, left to
remedy to prevent it.”801 Hammond averred again and again that “the Country is
fruitfull, apt for all and more then England can or does produce,” tying Virginia’s
natural fertility to the success of the colonial venture.802 The fruitfulness of Virginia
was recognized by Virginia’s government when it passed the 1646 Act for Binding
Out of Children, which set up an apprenticeship program for poor children: “God
Almighty, among many his other blessings, hath vouchsafed increase of children to
this colony, who are now multiplied to a considerable number.”803 Like those two
births that outweighed the deaths at sea, the “increase of children” in the colony was
sign of G od’s providence.
The discourse o f prolific reproduction, rooted as it was in deeply held
religious beliefs, gender ideology, and nascent colonialist and racial discourses,
would survive into the eighteenth century. William Byrd II’s letters provide us with a

799 C haplin, S u b je c t M a tters, 127-9.
800 C haplin, S u b je c t M a tters, 155.
801 H am m ond, L eah a n d R ach el, 1-2.
802 H am m ond, L eah a n d R ach el, 6, 10.
803 H ening 1: 33 6 -7 .
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remarkable account of the ways that the discourse of prolific reproduction impacted
this elite planter’s thoughts on both the colony at large and his wife’s own
pregnancies. Not only did William Byrd II espouse the belief in a fertile Virginia, he
proposed that women in Virginia were similarly fertile. For Byrd, Virginia was a new
Eden, where “men evade the original curse o f hard labour,” and women “bring forth
children with little sorrow, and hardly any danger.”804 Native women, Byrd claimed,
had no need for assistance of any kind at their births: “They retire to some lonely
place, when they find their pains comeing on, and leaning upon a crutch, leave all to
the midwifery of nature.”805 According to Byrd, easy childbearing was facilitated by
Virginia’s climate and was thus available to English women as well. When Byrd’s
wife, Lucy, was pregnant for the fourth time, Byrd posited that her frequent
pregnancies were “certainly oweing to the climate,” in which, he believed, even
elderly women could easily get pregnant.

R06

Throughout his letters, Byrd expressed admiration and amazement at
extraordinary reproductive events, which he understood within the discourse of
prolific reproduction. He marveled at the reproductive cycles of plants, which
(unlike human generation, hidden as it was in the female body) were “by a good
microscope.. .plainly discovered.”807 Human reproduction, on the other hand, could
be made visible only through one’s numerous progeny, something he hoped for

804 T inling, The C o rre sp o n d en c e o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 35 6 -8 .
805 Ibid.
806 T inling, The C o rre sp o n d en c e o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 4 0 2 .
807 T inling, The C o rre sp o n d en c e o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 5 3 6 -7 . On the centrality o f sexu alized
and gendered m etaphors in the d evelop m en t o f the scien ce o f botany in the late seventeenth century
and early eighteenth century, see Schiebinger, N a tu r e ’s B o d y, 18-23. Interestingly, S ch ieb in ger argues
that such m etaphors o f reproductive marital sexu ality w ere fundam entally con servative, em p h asizin g
marital, reproductive sexu ality over more modern, com panionate marriage. Schiebinger, N a tu r e ’s
B ody, 25 -8 .
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himself. His fondest recollection of York in England was “a tomb-stone in the
minster of Dr. Honywood, upon which it is recorded that his grand mother livd to see
367 persons of her legitimate posterity namely 16 children 114 grand children, 228
great-grandchildren, and nine of the 4th generation.”808 He later hoped that his wife
would “live to see as many of her descendants as my Lady Honiwood.”809
Sometimes, Byrd’s comments tested the boundaries of eighteenth-century gentility,
but his adherence to the discourse of prolific reproduction (and his love for bawdy
jokes) won out over social propriety. For example, Byrd commented on Lucy’s best
friend Mary Jeffreys Dunn’s pregnancy by mentioning that “there goes a prophecy
about, that in the eastern parts of Virginia a parson’s wife will, in the year o f our
Lord, 1710, have four children at a birth, one of which will be an admiral, and another
archbishop of Canterbury.”810 He hoped that his joke would not be rejected because
Mrs. Dunn had become “too demure a prude, now she is related to the church.”811
For Byrd, prolific reproduction was not just desirable, but magical and prophetic.
Ultimately, Byrd saw prolific reproduction - and, specifically, Lucy Byrd’s
prolific reproduction - as a necessary boon to the colony. In a 1729 letter, Byrd
complained that Lucy would not be travelling soon because o f pregnancy, and,
anticipating many future pregnancies, Byrd declared that Lucy “will hardly be in a
travelling condition till she’s towards 50.”812 Byrd saw Lucy’s frequent pregnancies
as a humorous sign o f her animalistic nature (which he ascribed to all women): “I

808 T inling,
809 T inling,
810 T inling,
811 Ibid.
812 T inling,

The C o rresp o n d en ce o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 214.
The C o rresp o n d en ce o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 4 0 2.
The C o rresp o n d en ce o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 271.
The C o rre sp o n d e n ce o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 39 1 -2.

296

know nothing but a rabit that breeds faster.”813 His attempts to slow down her
childbearing, he complained, were for naught: “I know no remedy but to make a trip
to England some times, and then she must be content to lye fallow til I come back.
But then she’ll be revenged of me, and redeem her lost years by having 2 at a time
when I return.”814 Byrd’s characterization of his wife’s childbearing exemplifies the
complications of the discourse of prolific reproduction. Byrd forgave Lucy her
fertility (even as he claimed he wished he could “disswade her from it”) because
childbearing fulfilled the goals of the colonial project: “The truth of it is, she has her
reasons for procreateing so fast. She lives in an infant country that wants nothing but
people.”815 For Byrd, childbearing was necessary for the colonial project, yet
women’s fertile bodies, like the land of the colony itself, were wild, fecund, and
unpredictable (or predictable only in their fertility). Unlike plants, women’s
reproductive cycles were not “plainly discovered” ; Byrd’s only means of controlling
Lucy’s childbearing was to flee to the other side of the Atlantic. While Byrd
idealized prolific reproduction, there is ambivalence here: what did it mean that the
future of the colony, o f mankind itself, was dependent on fickle women and their
mysterious bodies? Further, what did it mean that Byrd, who saw himself as a
paragon of modernity and gentility, embraced prophecy, magic, and his own
powerlessness because of his belief in the necessity and desirability of prolific
reproduction?
813 On B yrd ’s v iew o f w om en , see: L ockridge, The D ia ry, a n d Life, o f W illiam B y rd II, 95; L ockridge,
O n th e S o u rces o f P a tria rc h a l R a g e, 30-4 5 ; Kenneth A . L ockridge, “C olon ial Self-F ashioning:
Paradoxes and P athologies in the C onstruction o f G enteel Identity in E ighteenth-C entury A m erica,” in
Through a G la ss D a rk ly: R eflectio n s on P e rso n a l Iden tity in E a rly A m erica , ed. R onald H offm an and
Fredrika T eute (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f North Carolina Press, 1997), 2 8 7 -3 0 1 ; T reckel, “The
Em pire o f m y heart,” 137.
814 T inling, The C o rresp o n d en ce o f The Three W illiam B yrd s, 39 1 -2 .
815 Ibid.
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William Byrd II inhabited a different world than the founders of the colony,
yet he, like that first generation, adhered to the belief that the colonial project required
prolific reproduction. This belief found a wider colonial audience in the form of the
readership of The Virginia Gazette, which began publication in 1736 and continued to
be published under several different editors. Among the news reprinted from British
newspapers and gathered from private correspondents, advertisements, and reprinted
essays from magazines like The Spectator, were ephemeral notices o f unusual events
that occurred throughout the British Empire. Many of these notices told stories of
extraordinary births. Stories of successful multiple births (such as twins, triplets, and
quadruplets), large multi-generational families (like the Honiwoods so admired by
William Byrd), and elderly parents successfully having babies showed up frequently
in the pages of the Gazette. These stories show a continued fascination with prolific
reproduction by Virginia’s gentry (the prime readership of the newspaper). Another
category of extraordinary birth stories, which recounted the births of royalty, filled a
significant amount of column space in this weekly, 4-page newspaper. These stories
point to the political meanings of extraordinary births and prolific reproduction. Even
so, as we will see, the discourse of prolific reproduction did not fit perfectly into this
new medium.
Successful multiple births were newsworthy because they tend to be relatively
rare and they likely challenged the medical abilities of birth attendants in eighteenth
century Virginia.

o*

Therefore, examples of successful multiple births pepper the

pages of the Gazette. These notices typically included two pieces of relevant

816 There are three m entions o f su ccessfu l m ultiple births in the York county records. York D O W 14:
348; York D O W 16: 2 6 7 , 2 8 0 , 287; York JO 3: 3 5 8 , 384.
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information: first, the event of the birth, and second, the health of the mother and
children. One such example is this short notice of an English birth in 1739: “They
write from Wells in Sommersetshire, that a Woman of that Place was delivered of
Four Sons and a Daughter at a Birth, and that they are all Christened and likely to
live.”817 Women who had experienced more than one multiple birth were especially
remarkable. In a 1736 notice, a woman who had given birth to quadruplets was
doubly fascinating because of her history: ‘T h e Woman has been married but 4
Years, and lain in 3 Times; at First she had 2 Female Children, at the Second 2 Males,
and the Third 4.. .”818 Multiple births, rare as they were, pointed to a remarkable and
tantalizing fertility. Readers were invited to imagine multiplying sets of twins, all
marked by the auspiciousness of their births. For example, a remarkable baptism in
Marblehead, Massachusetts, invited the reader to imagine the coincidence o f many
multiple births: “Last Lord’s Day were bro’t to Baptism in the new Meeting-house
here, 2 Children, which were the Third Pair of Female Twins of the same Parents:
They were brought out by the first Pair, who are now Women grown, were held up to
Baptism by their Father, who was a Twin, and Baptiz’d by a Minister who was a
Twin.”819 Such a baptism was a blessed event, indeed.
Along with multiple births, large families were celebrated in the pages of the
Virginia Gazette as examples of prolific reproduction. Some notices resembled the
Honiwood tombstone that William Byrd II so admired. In 1739, the Gazette reprinted
a Rhode Island obituary from 1739 for Mrs. Mary Hazzard, who was praised for her

817 V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 5 1 , June 2 2 , 1739, page 1. For other sim ilar exam p les, see V irginia
G a zette Parks # 5 3 , Sept. 9, 1737, page 3 and Virginia G a zette, Hunter # 9 , Feb. 2 8 , 1751, page 3.
818 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 5 , N ovem b er 12, 1736, page 4 . For another exam p le, see V irginia
G a zette , Hunter # 6 1 , Feb. 27, 1752, page 2.
819 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 8 2 , Feb. 24, 1737/8, page 3.
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huge family: “This Gentlewoman has had Five Hundred Children, Grand-children
and Great-Grandchildren; and has now left behind her living Two Hundred and Five
of the aforesaid Number.”820 Other examples highlight elderly people who survived
to see numerous generations of their progeny. In one such example, the birth of a
baby girl whose maternal great-great-great grandmother was still living inspired the
following riddle: “Rise up Daughter, and go to thy Daughter, for her Daughter’s
Daughter hath a Daughter.”821 The said great-great-great grandmother is described as
“about 92 Years of Age, is in perfect Health, has all her Senses clear, and hopes to see
five Generations more.”822 These celebratory stories showed the aspirations of people
who believed that prolific reproduction was a measure of a life well lived.
Another category of extraordinary births, births by elderly parents, frequently
found its way onto the pages of the Gazette. These stories show not only how the
discourse of prolific reproduction embraced births that challenged social and
biological norms, but also the extent to which marriage and fertility were codefined.
One such story recounted the birth of a “Lusty Boy” by a 64-year old woman,
echoing the biblical story of Sarah giving birth to Isaac.823 More common were
stories of elderly men who married young wives. An Irish man, who died at the age
of 112, was celebrated for his marriage, when he was 84, to a 14-year-old girl, “by

820 V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 4 0 , April 6 , 1739, page 2. For more exam p les, see V irgin ia G a zette,
Hunter # 2 0 , M ay 16, 1751, page 2; V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 6 9 , April 2 4 , 1752, page 2; V irginia
G a zette, Hunter # 8 7 , A ug. 2 8 , 1752, page 2
821 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 5 5 , July 2 0 , 1739, page 2. For more exam p les, see V irginia G a zette,
Hunter # 4 , Jan. 24, 1751, page 3; Virginia G a zette, R oyle, Feb. 12, 1762, page 2.
822 Ibid.
823 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 0 0 , June 30, 1738, page 2. For another exam p le, see V irginia G a zette,
Parks # 3 6 , April 8, 1737, page 4.
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whom he had about twenty Children, she bearing a Child every year.”824 This fertile
marriage was credited, along with exercise and an appetite for alcohol, for his
longevity. While these stories were sometimes jocular in tone, they uniformly
expressed the sense that such unions should be sexual and fertile ones - and readers
were implicitly invited to imagine the sexual habits of the people whose lives were
recounted in the Gazette. For example, when an 84-year-old Philadelphia man
married “a young vigorous Nymph o f Twenty-five,” the editor wished the couple “all
possible nuptial Felicities!”825 This same issue of the Gazette devoted space to two
other similar marriages, which show both that marriages between old men and young
girls were not considered abnormal, and that those marriages were expected to be
fertile.

A local marriage announcement celebrated that “on Tuesday, the 3d

Instant, was married, Mr. ROBERT FERGUS, of AMELIA County, aged 83, to Miss
ANNE JONES, a Girl between 14 and 15, being his third Wife.”827 Printed alongside
the Philadelphia notice, readers are implicitly invited to imagine the “nuptial
felicities” of this local marriage. Another marriage, between an 89-year-old man and
a 72-year-old woman, on the other hand, was derided because of the advanced age of
the bride: the marriage “promises little Hopes of Success in the more common
Effects of the matrimonial State.”828 A reader would easily pick up the subtext here:

824 V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 7 3 , M ay 2 2 , 1752, page 1. For another exam p le, see V irgin ia G azette,
Parks # 7 3 , D ec. 2 3 , 1737, page 2.
825 V irginia G a ze tte , Rind # 4 4 ,
March 12,
1767, page 2. In another reading, the em p h asis on the word
“p ossib le” m ay be a jo k e about
age-related m ale im potence. T h is reading still supports the notion that
marriage - even marriages w ith a w ide age gap - w ere exp ected to be sexual and fertile.
826 Brewer, B y B irth o r C on sen t, 2 9 7 -3 0 0 . N otably, child marriages were property arrangements,
aim ed at con solid atin g property, and thus w ere more com m on am ong the m ost elite V irginians. For
anyone serving out an indenture, o f course, marriage w ould be delayed. Sm ith, In side th e G re a t
H ou se, 127-8.
827 V irginia G a zette, Rind # 4 4 ,
M arch 12,
1767, page 2.
828 V irginia G a zette, Rind # 4 4 ,
M arch 12,
1767, page 4.
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marriages were meant to be fertile, and marriages that did not (or would not) produce
children were suspect.829
These extraordinary births - multiple births, large families, and elderly parents
- all illustrate the continuing power of the discourse of prolific reproduction in the
eighteenth century. Not only that, their placement in the Gazette underscored the
importance of prolific childbearing to the colonial project. Note that these stories
originated across the British empire: from the London metropole and the English
countryside to Ireland to Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
Significantly, these were English births and marriages that were celebrated: there are
no similar accounts of multiple births, large families, or elderly childbearing by
Native women or women of African descent in the Gazette. In this way, we see the
unspoken racial implications of John Hammond’s dictum that “It is the glory o f every
Nation to enlarge themselves.”830 Within the discourse of prolific reproduction, the
success of colonialism depended on and celebrated the multiplying of white colonial
bodies.
Another category of extraordinary reproduction - births in the English royal
family - made this connection between prolific reproduction and national identity
explicit for English readers of the Virginia Gazette: with the prolific reproduction of
the royal family, the nation grew and survived. Throughout the eighteenth century,
the Virginia Gazette ran frequent announcements of royal pregnancies, births,
baptisms, and birth celebrations. These announcements were readers’ primary

829 A s Mary B eth N orton has argued in her reading o f the seventeenth-century A cco m a c C ounty
T hom as/T hom asine Hall ca se, marriage and fertility w ere so co-d efin ed that Hall w as prohibited from
marrying because the county court b elieved Hall w as unable to have children. N orton, “C om m unal
D efin ition s o f G endered Identity,” 6 0 -6 1 .
830 H am m ond, L eah a n d R achel, 1.
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window into royal events. When Princess Augusta gave birth to Prince George (who
would become King George III) in 1738, the Gazette ran six separate announcements
of the birth. The news first arrived in Williamsburg via the passengers of the ship
Forward, and then was more formally announced via a reprint from the London
Gazette:
On Wednesday Se’nnight, at half an Hour past Seven in the Morning, her
Royal Highness the Princess of Wales was safely deliver’d of a Prince, who
was immediately christen’d by the Name of GEORGE; which was occasion’d
by some dangerous Symptoms that appear’d at first, though they are now
O ') I

happily over, and the Princess likewise is in a very good way.

Other royal births were similarly chronicled in the Gazette.*32 Indeed,
coverage of royal reproduction often began well before the actual birth, as
pregnancies were carefully recorded in the pages of newspapers across the Empire.
For example, in 1736, the Gazette reported, “Yesterday the News that her Royal
Highness the Princess of Orange is with Child, came confirmed.”
announcements also extended to the lesser British aristocracy.

Q-)-)

Birth

Soon, Virginians

began imitating these birth announcements, as local gentry planters began publishing

831 A nnouncem ent from the F o rw a rd : V irgin ia G a ze tte , Parks 109, Sept. 1, 1738, page 3.
A nnouncem ent from the L on don G a ze tte : V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 0 , Sept. 8, 1738, page 3. Other
announcem ents: V irgin ia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 1 , Sept. 15, 1738, page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 3 ,
Sept. 2 9 , 1738; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 4 , Sept. 2 9 , 1738, page 3.
832 V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 13, M arch 2 8 , 1751, page 2; V irginia G a zette, Hunter # 4 1 , O ct. 11, 1751,
page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 4 7 , N ov. 2 1 , 1751, page 2; V irginia G a zette, R oyle, O ct. 2 5 , 1765
supplem ent, page 2; V irginia G a zette, Rind, D ec. 11, 1766, page 1.
833 V irgin ia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 0 , Oct. 8, 1736, page 4 . Other sim ilar pregnancy announcem ents:
V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 2 2 , D ec. 1, 1738, page 2, 4; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 7 0 , N o v . 2 9 , 1739,
page 3, 4; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 7 7 , D ec. 2 1 , 1739, page 3.
34 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 8 7 , M arch 31, 1738, page 3; V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 1 0 , Sept. 8, 1738,
page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 1 , Sept. 15, 1738, page 4; V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 2 9 , Jan. 19,
1739, page 3.
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similar messages regarding their own growing families: “We hear from Goochland
County, That Mrs. Randolph, Wife of William Randolph, of Tuckahoe, Esq; was
safely delivered of a Daughter, on New-Year’s Day, to the great Joy of the Family;
they having been marry’d about 4 Years, and had no Child before.”835
While the Randolph birth was undoubtedly important to the local gentry,
births within the British royal family had profound political significance and thus
were part of constructing eighteenth century British nationalism in a colonial space.
These births cemented the alliances between royal families that governed war and
peace in Europe. For example, the announcement of the pregnancy of the Duchess of
Lorraine (which coincided with birthday celebrations for the Austrian Empress) was
embedded in a report of a Russian treaty that had recently been negotiated in
Vienna.836 More viscerally for Virginia readers, though, these announcements
offered English colonials a chance to participate in nationalistic celebrations. While
the actual announcements were quite concise, considerable column space was
devoted to detailed descriptions of celebrations of these royal births. Upon the birth
of Princess Augusta, the Gazette provided descriptions of celebrations both at the
palace and throughout the British Isles, including London, Edinburgh, and Dublin.
These accounts provided exhaustive detail of royal visitors to the family, gifts offered
to the new baby, and lavish public celebrations.837 As if to play up the nationalist
intent of these notices, descriptions of the celebrations of royal births in other
countries were depicted as wasteful and even harmful to those countries.Firesand

835 V irgin ia G a zette, Parks # 8 0 , Feb. 10, 1738, page 3.
836 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 7 , N o v . 2 6 , 1736, page 3.
837 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 6 7 , N o v . 11, 1737, page 1, 3;V irginia G a zette, Parks # 6 9 , N o v . 2 5 , 1737,
page 3, 4; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 7 1 , D ec. 9 , 1737, page 3.
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deaths marred the celebrations of the birth of the Duke of Burgundy in France, at
which the starving populace held banners which read, “Amidst our Sufferings we
;

•

rejoice.

»838

These descriptions of public celebrations provided Virginians an opportunity
to witness from afar the rituals o f the British crown, and thus to affirm their own
Britishness. Public speeches celebrating the births were reprinted in the Gazette,
inviting the reader to participate in the patriotism that the birth events inspired.
Lengthy speeches given by government officials in honor of the births were reprinted
in full in the Gazette. These speeches not only celebrated the birth, but spoke to the
political meanings o f royal reproduction. For example, a 1738 statement by the Lord
Mayor of London drew an explicit connection between the “very happy Event” of the
D ’l Q

birth of Prince George and the continued “Welfare and Prosperity of this Nation.”
The Lord M ayor’s 1751 statement, reprinted in the Gazette, makes clear that the
survival of the nation depended on the survival of the royal family’s line:
...w e are truly sensible o f the Blessings we enjoy under Your Majesty’s
Government, and are convinced, that the Security of our Rights and Liberties,
in Time to come, depends on the Protestant Succession established in your
illustrious House; it is, at this Time, a peculiar Satisfaction to us, that we have
once more the Honour of congratulating Your Majesty on the Increase of
Your Royal Family.840

838 V irginia G a zette, Hunter # 5 2 , D ec. 19, 1751, page 2. For other sim ilar exam p les, se e V irginia
G a zette, Hunter # 4 7 , N o v . 2 1 , 1751, page 2; V irgin ia G a ze tte , Hunter # 7 1 , M ay 8, 1752, page 2.
839 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 0 , Sept. 8, 1738, page 3.
840 V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 4 7 , N ov. 2 1 , 1751, page 2. For other exam p les o f sim ilar sp eech es, see:
V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 6 8 , N ov. 18, 1737, page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 3 1 , Feb. 2 3 , 1739, page
3-4; V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 4 5 , M ay 11, 1739, page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 5 4 , July 13, 1739,
page 3.
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Speeches delivered at birthday celebrations for the King also drew this connection.
When the Mayor of Bath in England proclaimed that he was “truly sensible how
auspicious the Birth o f His Majesty [the Prince of Wales] was to this Nation,” he
explicitly tied that birth to the survival of the nation and English liberty:
A Birth, to which we owe the Continuance of those invaluable Blessings,
which our successful Struggles for Liberty have procur’d us in that glorious
Act of Succession; A Birth, to which we are indebted, Sir, for your royal
Person, in whose Presence we enjoy all possible H appiness...841
An “ODE for his Majesty’s Birth-Day, 1736” exaggerated its subject’s qualities, but
it also drew this connection between the birth of royalty and the success of the nation.
In the “Ode,” King George II is credited with bringing peace and prosperity to
Britain; George’s reign promised to British subjects that “Your Commerce, your Arts,
/ Shall all flourish and sing.”842 The birth of the King - “the happy Day / That gave
the Godlike Hero life” - was the origin of this blessed time.843
Virginians participated in these birth-centered displays of nationalism in
multiple ways. Local celebrations imitated the glory of English fetes. King George
II’s birthday in 1739 was celebrated in Williamsburg by the display of flags, three
cannon volleys, illumination of public buildings and private homes, and a ball at the
Governor’s house: “ .. .the Night was concluded with great Demonstrations of Joy,
suitable to the happy Occasion, and agreeable to the distinguish’d Loyalty o f this

841 V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 3 5 , M arch 2, 1739, page 3. For other celebrations o f royal birthdays, see:
V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 2 2 , D ec. 1, 1739, page 3; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 3 5 , M arch 2, 1739;
V irgin ia G a zette, Parks # 1 5 6 , July 27, 1739, page 2; V irginia G a zette, Parks # 1 8 1 , Jan. 18, 1740, page
1- 2 .

842 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 2 8 , Feb. 1 1 ,1 7 3 7 , page 1-2.
843 Ibid.
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Colony in general, to His Majesty, and His Illustrious Family.”844 Significantly,
though, the primary means of observing royal births - both in the sense of witnessing
the birth, and of marking their importance - was through print. Virginians, unable to
participate in the rebirth of the British nation in Britain itself, could do so
imaginatively through the consumption of these numerous stories printed in the
Virginia Gazette.
These print-based celebrations of royal births show the complex and
sometimes tenuous nationalist connection that Anglo-Virginians felt to the mother
country. Benedict Anderson has argued that newspapers provided the basis for
modem nationalism through the development of “imagined communities.”845
Specifically, Anderson emphasizes that colonial spaces - because they were far-flung
and connected to the metropole only through print - were the first crucible for these
imagined communities. Anderson focuses on the ways that creoles imagined
themselves as communities, separate from the metropole; he does not examine the
ways that, prior to democratic revolutions, creoles may have adhered to the metropole
in forging their national identities. Further, while Anderson concentrates on creole
identities as defined by their geographic placement, he is not concerned with the
development of creole subjectivities or coloniality as such. Kathleen Wilson has
argued that Anderson’s argument, while correctly focused on “cultural
representations,” fails to recognize the relationship between colony and metropole:
British print elided the “crueler aspects” of colonialism in favor of a more patriotic

844 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 7 0 , N ov. 2 , 1739, page 4 . For other exam ples, see: V irginia G a zette,
Parks # 6 6 , N o v . 4 , 1737, page 4; V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 1 8 , N o v . 3, 1738, page 5.
845 B enedict A nderson, Im a g in ed C om m unities: R eflectio n s on the O rig in s a n d S p re a d o f N ation alism ,
2nd Edition (N Y : V erso, 1991), 5 0 ,6 2 .
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vision of empire.846 Wilson argues that British nationalism developed in part in order
to exclude colonized and feminized bodies.847 W ilson’s formulation of British
nationalism helps us to understand the competing nationalisms that were in play for
colonial subjects: were they part of a creole imagined community, or were they part
of the patriotic British empire marked by masculinity and whiteness?
We see, therefore, in the Virginia Gazette's celebration of royal reproduction
a tinge of colonial anxiety. Kathleen Brown argues that, in the eighteenth century,
Virginia elite masculine identity was marked by significant anxiety: “Conscious of
being colonials whose dependent and marginal relationship to London diminished
their status, [elite planter men] could never achieve enough success to reassure
themselves that the foundation of their identity would not collapse.”848 Royal
reproduction would seem to fit the discourse of prolific reproduction, where
numerous royal births guaranteed the survival of the nation. Nevertheless, this
constant attention to the celebrations of royal births only served to underscore the
distance, both geographical and cultural, between Virginia and London. Virginians
did not learn of royal births the way that people in London did, through the sound of
cannon volleys and ringing church bells on the day of the birth; they learned through
sketchy reports provided by sea captains months after the event. Celebrations of
these births, no matter how heart-felt, paled in comparison as well. How could
W illiamsburg’s illuminated houses compete with the official celebrations that were so
copiously described in the Gazette?

846 W ilson , “C itizenship, em pire, and m odernity,” 160-1.
847 W ilson , “C itizenship, em pire and m odernity,” 167-9.
848 B row n, G o o d W ives, N a sty W enches, a n d A n xiou s P a tria rch s, 3 1 9 . S ee also Lockridge, The D iary,
a n d Life, o f W illiam B yrd 11, 29 -3 1 ; L ockridge, “C olon ial S elf-F ash ion in g,” 2 8 7 -2 9 0 .
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If the meaning of royal reproduction stories shifted depending on the colonial
context, becoming not just about the rebirth of the British nation but about the
distance between colony and metropole, then do we need to re-examine the meanings
of the other prolific reproduction stories in the Virginia Gazette? Specifically, if the
colonial print context for stories of royal reproduction was significant in
understanding the meanings of those stories for Virginia readers, then how does that
context shift our understandings of other stories of prolific reproduction?
Newspapers were not simply repositories for text; as Anderson’s and W ilson’s
discussions of newspapers and nationalism make clear, colonial print culture did not
just reflect but created new and different ways o f understanding the world. These
new understandings would inevitably impact colonial reproductive discourses - as we
will see, the discourse of prolific reproduction was in competition with other
reproductive discourses more suited to the modem era.
*

*

*

The discourse of prolific reproduction had fueled the English colonial project,
where English bodies, urged to “be fruitful and multiply,” would populate Virginia’s
wilderness. As we have seen, that ancient discourse survived well into the eighteenth
century in newspapers, letters, laws, and pamphlets. Yet the anxieties exposed by the
Virginia Gazette's coverage of royal births begins to reveal the ways that the
discourse of prolific reproduction faltered in the face of colonial subjectivities. Print
representations of royal reproduction underscored the differences and distances
separating Virginia and the mother country. That separation was further emphasized
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as Virginians began to reframe prolific reproduction not as an ideal, but as a curiosity
or even a threat.
In the pages of the Gazette, alongside announcements o f multiple births and
royal celebrations came more disturbing stories o f monstrous births. Where the
discourse of prolific reproduction celebrated extraordinary births, monstrous births
presented the possibility that prolific reproduction could go very wrong. In one such
story, an English farmer “having a Cow that had been ill for some Time, [...] knock’d
her o’th’Head; and when she was open’d, there were found in her Five Calves, all
hair’d, and One Four Feet long.”849 Here was a multiple birth, albeit by an animal,
that proved deadly and terrifying, or at least bizarre. Another story recounted the
story of a “casual Poor” woman who miscarried three fetuses: “the first time with a
Male Child, the next Day with a Female Child, and the third Time with a Monster,
which had a Head and Body like a Toad, and a Tail like a Rat.”850 Other stories
recount tales of monstrous births that challenged normal categorization. A monstrous
calf bom in England was described as “about the Size of a Child of ten Years old,”
with a face like “an old Man,” a chest that resembled female genitals, a “Spanish
Mustacho,” and a complexion “equal to a French Foot soldier after a Summer’s
Campaign.”

ac i

This monstrous calf blurred the boundaries not only o f human and

animal, but of nation, age, and sex.852

849 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 9 2 , M ay 5 , 1738, page 1. V irginia planter Landon Carter recorded a
sim ilar birth o f a deform ed sh eep in his diary in 1770. G reene, ed„ The D ia ry o f C o lo n el L andon
C a rte r, 1: 353.
850 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 0 1 , July 7, 1738, page 3.
851 V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 9 0 , Sept. 2 9 , 1752, page 2. For a description o f a local tw o-headed calf,
see: V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 3 2 , Feb. 9. 1739, page 4.
852 On m onsters in colon ial discourse, see C haplin, S u b je c t M a tte rs, 55 , 137. On m onstrous births as
sign s o f fem ale fertility gon e awry, see Parrish, A m erica n C u rio sity, 34 -4 0 .
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How were these stories of monstrous births read, and what do they reveal of
Virginians’ ideas about reproduction in the eighteenth century? First, they must be
put into the context of Virginia’s nascent print culture. For a colony that prided itself
on its Englishness and modernity, Virginia was very late in developing a local print
culture. A royal order specifically prohibited printing beginning in 1682, and that ban
stayed in effect until 1730, when William Parks brought a press to Williamsburg. He
began publication on the Virginia Gazette in 1736; by contrast, Boston had had a
local newspaper since 1704.853 When the Gazette finally did begin publication,
genteel readers needed instruction on print culture - how newspapers should be read,
consumed, and discussed. Newspapers were meant not just to report current events,
but also to be both didactic and diversionary. An early letter to the printer of the
Virginia Gazette offered this praise of the infant newspaper:
The Design you have undertaken of adding to the Instruction of your Readers,
while you entertain them, and o f mixing their Improvement with their
Diversion; and the candid Reception, I understand, your Endeavours meet
with from Gentleman of the highest Distinction, as well for their good, as
great Qualities; and the natural Propensity we have to believe what we wish,
give a solid and well-grounded Hope to all Lovers of Humanity, that we may
see, in these our Days, Virtue and Good Manners encouraged, Vice and Folly
depressed, and Mankind reformed.854

853 L aw rence C. W roth, The C o lo n ia l P rin te r (N Y : D over Publications, 1938, 1994), 3 8 -9 , 60; D avid
D. H all, “T he C hesapeake in the Seventeenth C entury,” C u ltu res o f P rin t: E ssa ys in the H isto ry o f the
B ook (Amherst: U niversity o f M assachusetts Press, 1996), 110-1.
854 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 3 , Oct. 2 9 , 1736, page 1.
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This letter, in characteristically baroque eighteenth-century prose, outlined this
reader’s hopes for the Gazette: that it should be instructive yet entertaining, and that
it should improve readers’ virtue. That the newspaper should entertain and divert was
of particular importance: newspapers were a key prop in the display of genteel wit
and conversation.

oee

Another early entry in the Gazette offered readers a demonstration of exactly
how newspaper stories should be used in genteel conversation. Apparently, a
“romantick” story of an Alligator eating three sailors had made its way from India
back to London, and was then reprinted in the Gazette. The story “had furnish’d all
our Coffee-House Connisseurs with Discourse” and inspired various reactions, from
“the Jocular and Gay,” to “Horor and Surprize.” One young man doubted the story’s
veracity, comparing it to an “old English Ballad” about “the Dragon of Wantley,”
which also ate three victims at a time. The debate continued, with some in the
coffeehouse siding with the young man, and others trusting “the Probability of the
Narration.”856 This “romantick” story had several purposes. On the surface, it was
merely a repetition of a tall tale for a new audience, but it also provided readers with
some instruction on how to read similar tall tales found in the pages of the Gazette.
These stories were to be debated and discussed, regardless of their veracity, in a
genteel display of wit. Significantly, the debate over the alligator was never resolved
in the Gazette; obliquely, the story invites new readers to take their own positions in
the dispute. Further, genteel debates placed readers in a reading community that
spanned the empire: the alligator story originated in India, travelled to London, and
855 D avid S h ield s, C ivil T ongues a n d P o lite L etters in B ritish A m erica (C hapel Hill: U niversity o f
North C arolina Press, 1997), 20-2.
856 Virginia G a zette, Parks # 1 1 5 , Oct. 13, 1738, page 3.
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eventually made it to Virginia. Therefore, readers of the new Virginia Gazette were
participating in a global colonial conversation. Ultimately, it did not matter if the
stories in the Gazette were factual - what mattered was the conversation that they
could inspire.
It was in this context - where newspaper stories were published as curiosities,
not necessarily as facts - that the stories of extraordinary reproduction found their
home. Alongside stories of monstrous births in the Gazette came other accounts that
reframed prolific reproduction - and the bawdy marital sexuality that supported it as threatening, violent, and immoral. A notice about an especially fertile woman
illustrates how subtle this shift was: “We learn from the Head of Timber-Creek in the
Jerseys, that a Woman there has lately had 5 Children, all bom alive, within the Space
of 11 Months, by 2 Husbands.”857 On one hand, this notice reports yet another
multiple birth and could be seen as celebrating the woman’s extraordinary fertility.
Yet, within the context of genteel coffeehouse culture, readers were expected to read
between the lines here. While the obvious reading is that the woman was widowed
and swiftly remarried, having one set of triplets with one husband and one set of
twins with the other, the vagueness of the prose invites other readings: was she a
bigamist? How many pregnancies were there? Was it possible for a woman to have
so many pregnancies in such quick succession? While seemingly fitting into the
discourse o f prolific reproduction, this story invites the possibility that prolific
reproduction was the result of aggressive female sexuality or the threatening
unpredictability of the female body.

857 V irgin ia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 3 6 , M arch 9, 1739, page 3.
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Another form of threatening reproduction emerged in the colonial context:
English colonialism had always depended on the prolific reproduction of white
bodies. A “dream” recounted by an anonymous Virginia writer in the Gazette in
1738 reveals the ways that reproducing black bodies did not fit into the discourse of
prolific reproduction, even as white Virginians’ demand for slaves rose to a fever
pitch in the early eighteenth century.858 In this dream, the writer recounts the
possibilities and problems facing the colony: the foremost threat was slavery,
specifically the multiplying black bodies imported to Virginia.

The writer envisions

slave ships as monstrous mothers whose “Bodies were o f a dark Hue” with
“exposed...Bellies” from which they “discharg’d their Spawn upon the Shore.”859
That “pernicious Spawn” was “innumerable black Creatures, not unlike Monkies.”860
In an orgy of trading, white Virginians buy up the “filthy Creatures,” and the slave
ships depart, newly filled with coffers of gold.861 Virginia’s economic dependence on
slavery clashed with a nascent white terror o f black bodies - this conflict was
represented as a horrifying nightmare of prolific reproduction. Significantly, after
decades of reliance on the international slave trade, beginning in the 1730s, the slave
population was majority creole in the colony.862 This fantasy of slave ships as a form
of monstrous reproduction masked the reality that most slaves were acquired by
biological, not metaphorical, reproduction.
These various monstrous births pushed at the boundaries of prolific
reproduction: how could this old ideal make sense of deformed calves, oversexed
858 V irgin ia G a ze tte , Parks # 9 1 , April 2 8 , 1738, page 1-2.
859 Ibid.
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid.
862 Berlin, M an y T housands G on e, 126-30; K ulikoff, T o b a cco a n d S la ves, 70 -7 4 ; Parent, F oul M ean s,
86-95 .
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mothers, or, most importantly, the proliferation of other bodies which, through
colonization, English bodies must contact? The discourse of prolific reproduction,
while still present throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, failed to fully
make sense of the relationship between colonialism and reproduction. Ultimately, the
colonial project itself necessitated new ways of thinking about reproduction. These
examples of monstrous reproduction, or prolific reproduction gone wrong, stand in
opposition to a new reproductive discourse that emerged in the colonies: rational
reproduction.
Before examining Virginia legal and print culture to demonstrate the rise of
rational reproduction as a new discourse and reproductive ideal, it is necessary to
situate this analysis within particular theoretical and historiographical frameworks.
Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower is especially useful in mapping the competing
discourses of prolific reproduction, monstrous reproduction, and rational
reproduction. As discussed above, for Foucault, one of the defining qualities of the
modem state was unprecedented surveillance over and involvement in individuals’
private lives. Foucault’s published work focused on the European - specifically the
French - case, sidestepping the twin issues of colonialism and race. Yet, as Ann
Laura Stoler has argued, Foucault’s transitions are more convincing when we interject
race and colonialism into his framework. I will outline the major chronological
transitions that Foucault posits, and then discuss Stoler’s interjections in order to
show how a postcolonial reading of Foucault’s concept of biopower can be especially
useful in understanding discourses of reproduction in colonial Virginia.
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As Foucault argues in The History o f Sexuality, premodem state power was
rooted in “the deployment of alliance,” where power was organized via family lines
and inheritance, and the state’s role in regulating sex was “built around a system of
rules defining the permitted and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit.”863 Within the
constraints of the deployment of alliance, sex was about the transmission of wealth
from one generation to another. In this framework, the people o f the nation were the
embodiment of the king’s power - the crown had absolute power of life and death
over the people, and the nation survived in the body of the king.864 The discourse of
prolific reproduction, which we have seen in Virginia print culture, fits well within
the deployment of alliance. In the deployment of alliance, sex acts were defined as
basically licit or illicit; we see this in the embracing of marital, procreative sexuality
in Aristotle’s Master Piece and William Byrd’s letters. Further, at its root, the
discourse of prolific reproduction was about the production of many heirs (think of
the Virginia Gazette's admiring descriptions of multiple births and large families).
The colonial project, within the discourse of prolific reproduction, was one of
peopling: the creation of more British bodies would expand the glory of the British
empire. We can see as well how print culture representing royal reproduction was
indicative of the deployment of alliance: the reproduction of royal bodies literally
reproduced the nation and its power.
Foucault’s focus in The History o f Sexuality is understanding the rise of
modernity, specifically the deployment of the modem discourse of sexuality which
863 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 106.
864 In D iscip lin e a n d Punish, Foucault fo cu ses on the kin g’s pow er o f death, sp ecifica lly through
torture and execu tion . D isc ip lin e a n d Punish and The H isto ry o f S exu ality are parallel arguments,
where the former ex a m in es the state’s pow er o f death, and the latter d iscu sses the state’s p ow er over
life. M ich el Foucault, D isc ip lin e a n d Punish: The B irth o f the P riso n , transl. A lan Sheridan (N Y :
V intage, 1977), 4 8 .
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replaced the deployment o f alliance as the basis of state power. The discourse of
sexuality justified increasingly intrusive state power over people’s sexual behaviors
by “proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating and penetrating bodies in an
increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly
comprehensive way.”865 In this new power regime, the people of the nation - the
population - became a resource to be managed and controlled. This management of
the population occurred through the deployment of biopower - whereas the king had
previously held power over life and death, now the state held the power to maximize,
grow, control, and shape populations through the deployment of sexuality and the
organization of people’s most intimate lives. Biopower demanded rethinking the
nation not as a people but as a population:
Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or
even with a ‘people,’ but with ‘population,’ with its specific phenomena and
its peculiar variables; birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of
health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation.... At the heart of
this economic and political problem of population was sex: it was necessary
to analyze the birth-rate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate
births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways o f making
them fertile or sterile, the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the
impact of contraceptive practices.. .866

865 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 107.
866 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 25 -6 . In D isc ip lin e a n d Punish, Foucault sh o w s h ow the state’s
pow er over intimate liv es expanded to the d iscip lin in g o f all p eop le in institutions, from prisons to
sch oo ls to hospitals. Foucault, D iscip lin e a n d Punish, 135-194. Foucault w ould expand on his ideas
about biopow er in Secu rity, T erritory, a n d P o p u la tio n , where he made clear that the state’s pow er over
intim ate liv e s exten d ed not ju st to sexuality (in other w ords, the cou p lin g o f particular b od ies) but to
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In other words, biopower required a new, rational approach to reproduction: in order
to develop and manage a population, childbearing became differently politicized.
The remainder of this chapter will examine the rise of a new discourse o f rational
reproduction in colonial Virginia that strikingly mirrors Foucault’s model of
biopower and its attendant focus on population.
To be clear, though, the point here is not merely to apply Foucault’s model to
the colonial Virginia context. Instead, this Foucauldian reading of colonial Virginia
print culture is an intervention not only into Virginia history but into Foucault’s
model as well. Ann Laura Stoler has argued that the transitions that Foucault outlines
can be understood only if placed in the context of colonialism and colonized spaces:
according to Stoler, it was in the colony that Foucauldian modernity took shape,
specifically via the creation of race.867 Indeed, Stoler argues that Foucault, in his later
lectures, himself recognized and discussed the importance of race in the deployment
of sexuality. Stoler’s intervention into Foucault’s narrative is in part an attempt to
reconstruct his chronology; this intervention is not about quibbling with dates, but
instead to argue that the discourse of sexuality “was situated on an imperial landscape
where the cultural accoutrements of bourgeois distinction were partially shaped
through contrasts forged in the politics and language o f race.”868 Stoler argues that
colonial spaces “anticipated” the rise of sexuality that he describes in The History o f
other b io lo g ica l functions, including a ccess to food and water, the egress o f w aste, and ev en the air w e
breathe. Foucault, Security, T erritory, P o p u la tio n , 23.
867 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D esire , passim . W h ile she d o es not exam ine colon ial sp aces with
sp ecificity , philosopher L adelle M cW horter has argued that race and sexu ality w ere identically
defined , em erging at the sam e tim e and in the sam e w ays. M cW horter, “S ex , R ace, and B io p o w er,”
38-62 .
868 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D e sire , 5. Indeed, Stoler intervenes in her o w n ch ron ology in her
later work. W hile R a ce a n d the E du cation o f D e sire focu sed on the high im perialism o f the nineteenth
century, in later w ork, Stoler expanded her an alysis sp ecifica lly to colon ial North A m erica. Stoler,
“T en se and T ender T ie s,” 23 -6 7 .
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Sexuality,869 For example, colonial spaces were deeply concerned with recording,
studying, and quantifying populations before that impulse was witnessed in Europe.
This concern with population was rooted in colonial race relations: the colonial
project focused on defining racial boundaries and policing sexual relations in
thoroughly modem ways well before Foucault recognizes it happening in France.870
Specifically, Stoler sees Virginia’s seventeenth-century laws forbidding interracial
sex as a moment when both alliance and biopower coexisted in a colonial space:
“While these injunctions were clearly legal and concerned with the conjugal couple features that Foucault attributes to the apparatus of alliance - they also linked
individual desires to social reproduction in ways that he dates for Europe a century
later.”871 Therefore, Stoler argues, transitions that Foucault sees as happening
chronologically in Europe (e.g., first the deployment o f alliance, then the deployment
of sexuality) may have been far more blurry in colonial spaces, as the colonial project
demanded both new ways of thinking and adherence to deeply held beliefs from
home. We see in colonial spaces the first rumblings of process that would become
manifest later in Europe.
To summarize, Foucault’s understanding of modern state power as biopower
is tremendously useful in understanding reproductive discourses in colonial Virginia
print culture. With the rise of biopower and the discourse of sexuality, the modem
nation state became focused on managing its population as a resource. Reproduction
was central to national interests not just in terms of creating a large population (as in
the discourse of prolific reproduction) but in managing that population. Ann Laura
869 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D e sire , 42.
870 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D e sire , 40.
871 Stoler, R a ce a n d th e E du cation o f D e sire , 41.

319

Stoler’s interjection of race and colonialism into this framework helps us to see that it
was in colonial contexts like Virginia that this idea of managing a population would
become especially important - colonial contexts became the proving ground for the
rise of biopower. Colonial populations would be managed both in terms of policing
racial categories (as we saw in chapters 1 and 2) and in terms o f creating a colonial
population in a so-called “empty” land. The colonial project required new, modem,
scientific, and rational attention to reproduction in the interest of growing and
managing a colonial and colonized population. Even so, Stoler’s recognition of the
simultaneity of some discourses that Foucault saw as chronological helps remind us
that this transition to rational reproduction would not be complete, sudden, or
absolute. We will not see here the emergence of the full-blown bureaucratic state that
Foucault describes. Instead, following Stoler, we will see in colonial Virginia a space
where Foucauldian biopower could emerge in its earliest form. That said, as we will
see, from nearly the inception of the Virginia colony and inspired by the exigencies of
colonial life, a discourse of rational reproduction emerged parallel to the older
discourse of prolific reproduction.
The earliest attempts at creating a stable colonial population in Virginia show
the new reproductive discourses that colonialism inspired and required. As early as
1620, colony’s leaders used their power to shape the English colonial population not
just in terms of growth but in terms of specific moral and economic concerns. During
its earliest history, Virginia’s emerging colonial society was perceived as inherently
immoral or amoral: one writer described the colony as “an unhealthy place, a nest of
Rogues, whores, desolute and rooking persons; a place of intolerable labour, bad
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usage, and hard Diet, etc.”872 These pronouncements countered the popular notion of
Virginia as a fertile new Eden. In these harsh conditions, English settler men weren’t
contributing to the colonial project: rather than participating in the “Noble worke” of
creating a colony, these men were “esteeminge Virginia, not as a place of habitation
Q ‘1 '1

but only of a short sojouminge.”

In other words, by failing to settle permanently,

these male colonists were working towards their own profits, not towards enriching
the colony as a whole - these settlers were insufficiently colonial. A group of English
investors resolved to send “young, handsome, and honestlie educated Maides to
Virginia” to marry the reluctant colonists, and in 1621, 57 young women were sent to
the colony.874 Significantly, there was no belief that the women themselves would
provide a moral compass (this was an idea that would emerge much later). Instead,
the investors hoped that the presence of women would help Virginia to approximate a
civil society because it would “tye and roote the Planters myndes to Virginia by the
bonds of wives and children.”

In other words, by intervening in the private lives of

the colonists through the encouragement of patriarchal family forms, the nascent
colonial state hoped to engineer a more compliant colonial population and therefore a
more profitable colony. While the goal was the birth of children, this was not prolific
reproduction for its own sake (or for the glory of God); instead, patriarchal planter
families were seen as the proper foundation for building a moral, permanent, lucrative
colonial society. For example, when two unmarried “maids” got pregnant at sea in
1632, they were summarily “sent back again” to England - bastard children were not

872 H am m ond, L eah a n d R ach el, 3.
873 D avid R. R ansom e, “W iv es for V irginia, 1621” W illiam a n d M a ry Q u a rte rly 4 8 , no. 1 (1991): 7.
874 R ansom e, “W iv e s for V irginia,” 7, 10.
875 R ansom e, “W iv es for V irgin ia,” 7.
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an acceptable addition to the colony’s new moral order.

In Foucauldian terms,

these are remarkably modem goals: the colonial state was implementing biopower,
achieving economic goals through the organization and management of the
population’s private, sexual, and moral lives.
The 1621 importation of women to the colony was not the only, or even the
first, instance of the exercise of biopower in Virginia, but it gives a sense of how we
must rethink the colony’s approach to reproduction, where prolific reproduction
might help the colony grow, but rational reproduction would help the colony survive.
Indeed, examining the laws of early Virginia reveals the ways that a modem, rational
approach to population growth was present even in the early seventeenth century.
From its inception, Virginia’s laws reflected the colonial state’s interest in exercising
biopower to not just maximize the colonial population, but to rationalize that
population through careful counting and record keeping. Where the discourse of
prolific reproduction emphasized population growth for its own sake, the discourse of
rational reproduction fundamentally reshaped the relationship between reproduction
and the state. Rather than idealizing unfettered reproduction, the discourse of rational
reproduction understood childbearing as measureable and controllable. In both the
discourse of prolific reproduction and the discourse of rational reproduction,
childbearing served the interests of the colonial project. But where the earlier
discourse had simply idealized population growth, this new discourse saw
reproduction as something over which humans and the state could and should exert
control. This control came in many forms, but the most prominent was population
measurement.
876 H ening 1: 552.
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In The History o f Sexuality, Foucault argues that demography became a
central tool in modernizing the state’s approach to population - in order for the state
to enact biopower, it would first have to measure and understand its population.
European states transitioned from the “crudely populationist arguments of the
mercantilist epoch” (such as Hammond’s exhortation that nations must “enlarge
themselves”) to “much more subtle and calculated attempts at regulation that tended
to favor or discourage - according to the objectives and exigencies of the moment an increasing birthrate.”877 In the modem epoch, a population that simply multiplied
was no longer ideal. Instead, the concept of population emerged as “an economic
and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labor
capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it
commanded.”878 The rational and measured growth of population required deep
attention to sexuality and reproduction because national strength was “tied not only to
the number and uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules and family
organization, but to the manner in which each individual made use of his sex.”

R7Q

For

Foucault, the regulation of sexuality was key to the accurate measuring of population,
and thus the strength o f the nation as a whole.
Two interventions into the Foucauldian framework are necessary, though: a
rethinking of reproduction in the Foucauldian narrative and an understanding o f the
centrality of race and colonialism in this chronology as well. Foucault elides
reproduction here - it is understood, but barely stated by him, that the birth of
children is the means by which populations grow. Yet, the regulation of not just
877 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 26.
878 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 25.
879 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 26.
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sexuality but of reproduction as well lies at the center of the rise o f biopower.
Demographer S. Ryan Johansson reminds us that “nations, provinces, counties,
communities, occupational groups, households, or couples do not have babies, except
by courtesy of metaphor.”880 Further, if we recall Ann Laura Stoler’s argument that
colonial spaces saw both of those epochs simultaneously, we can see how Virginia
was beginning to focus on rational reproduction even as Europe continued to embrace
prolific reproduction. By examining the legal discourses of early Virginia, we can
see not only how reproduction fits at the center o f the new modem view of
population, but also how that modem view emerged in this particular colonial space.
This modem view of population emerged in Virginia’s attempts to regulate the
tobacco market (in Foucault’s terms, balancing population growth against “the
resources it commanded”), as well as the colony’s continued attempt to enumerate its
laboring population (in Foucault’s terms, assessing its “manpower or labor capacity”).
From the moment the tobacco economy took hold in Virginia, the colony’s
welfare was tightly linked to wildly fluctuating commodity prices. In 1630, the
Burgesses attempted to regulate the tobacco market by deliberately trying to shrink
the supply and thus raise prices, which had dropped precipitously following the boom
of the 1620s.881 Planters were ordered to limit their crops to 2,000 tobacco plants “for
every heade within his family including weomen and children.”882 Simultaneously,
planters were ordered to plant and tend 2 acres of com “for every head that worketh

880 S. Ryan Johansson, “ ‘Im p licit’ P o licy and Fertility during D ev elo p m en t,” P o p u la tio n a n d
D e velo p m e n t R e v ie w 17 (Septem ber 1991), 3 9 2 , qtd. in K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ie s,” 913.
881 M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reedom , 108.
882 H ening 1: 152.
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the ground.”883 Along with these laws were regulations on merchants, as well as a
requirement that planters make their own potash and saltpeter.884 Edmund Morgan
argues that these regulations were necessary in a boom economy in which “men
OOC

would risk both prosecution and hunger in order to put their time into tobacco.”
Yet these regulations reveal more than just an attempt to force planters to diversify
their crops: the regulations were explicitly linked to population. Com - the staple
food crop in the colony - was needed to feed the laboring population, those who
“worketh the ground.” Tobacco, on the other hand, was the purview o f planters, who
were implicitly rewarded by the law for marrying and having children. The colonial
economy rationalized resource distribution by linking it to population. These new
laws sought a balance between resources and population: planters were enjoined to
supply enough resources to support the laboring population, and were rewarded for
raising the families that were believed to provide the colony with stability and
permanence. Further, population growth was rewarded within particular moral and
colonial parameters: the law limited tobacco production to legitimate, marital
reproduction by landowners who participated in the plantation economy.
As the tobacco economy became more entrenched, Virginia used biopower
not only to encourage families but to encourage the expansion of the laboring
population through both importation and reproduction. The colony would continue to
use the law to link population growth with economic growth, rewarding planters for
the importation of servants and slaves. The headright system, first put into effect in
1617, promised 50 acres of land to any planter who paid for an indentured servant’s
883 H ening 1: 152.
884 H ening 1: 150-1.
885 M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erica n F reed o m , 112.
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passage to the colony. The headright system quickly allowed planters to consolidate
their holdings into large plantations.886 According to Anthony Parent, planters took
advantage of the headright system to fund their importation of slaves and consolidate
their own interests.887 As discussed in chapter 1, these interests were further
consolidated by the decision to enact the law of slavery by birth, wherein the colony’s
economic future was specifically tied to the reproduction of the enslaved colonized
population. At its root, the creation of a colonial population in Virginia was about
more than just advocating prolific reproduction - the colonial population in Virginia
was a product of deliberate economic policies that were focused on managing
population growth in the interests of the colonial planter elite and the colonial state.
Rationalizing colonial population growth required bureaucratic record
keeping. From the beginning of the colony, Virginia’s attempts to enumerate its
population functioned as a means of measuring the expansion of colonial power.
During the earliest years of the colony, population estimates focused on English
immigrants and their children - those who could be considered full members of the
colonial community. Nevertheless, as the colony grew, more detailed population
records were needed precisely because the colonial project involved more than just
English settlers. As we will see, detailed bureaucratic records provided a means to
make sense of a population that included both colonizer and colonized. Virginia used
an existing bureaucratic structure - the church - to enforce a careful and constant
calculation of the colony’s population. Benedict Anderson argues that the census was
a central tool of colonization, one which “profoundly shaped the way in which the

886 Parent, F oul M ea n s, 2 6 -3 0 ; M organ, A m erica n S la very, A m erica n F reedom , 4 0 5 -7 .
887 Parent, F oul M ean s, 4 0 -5 4 .
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colonial state imagined its dominion.”888 In short, the colonial project required
counting bodies and categorizing them according to race and servitude.
Empowered by the House of Burgesses, the Anglican church was the
institutional record keeper in Virginia. Starting in 1619, complete church records of
births, marriages, and deaths were required by law, and a keeping those records was a
major component of ministers’ work.889 Ministers were fined for failing to comply
with the law.890 The logic behind these laws seems simple: to provide an accurate
record of the inhabitants of the colony. Nevertheless, these records wove into
numerous aspects of colonial life. Feminist political theorist Jacqueline Stevens
argues that because demographic records document our most intimate relationships,
“the state’s relation to normal and deviant forms of being is not stenographic, but
pornographic.”891 Marriage and birth records expose the state’s interest in defining
what it considers normal kinship forms, while still meticulously recording kinship
relationships that contest the norm. Therefore, the Virginia birth, marriage, and death
records were not mere lists. They were central tools in enforcing legitimacy, the
distribution of wealth, and emerging racial categories. In Chapter 1 ,1 argued that
Virginia’s miscegenation laws made every birth suspect, since the circumstances of
one’s birth determined one’s life-long inherited status; it was in the church records

888 A nderson, Im a g in ed C om m unities, 164.
889 The law s requiring m inisters to keep records o f births, baptism s, m arriages, and deaths were
reiterated throughout the seventeenth century. T h ese law s were passed in 1619, 1632, 1643, 1652,
1658, and again, in m od ified form , in 1713. H.R. M cllw a in e, ed., Jou rn a ls o f the H ou se o f B u rg esses
o f Virginia, 1 6 1 9 -1 6 5 8 /5 9 (Richm ond: V irginia State Library, 1915), 13; H ening 1:155; H ening 1;
158; H ening 1: 182; H ening 1: 241; H ening 1: 290; B illin gs, ed. “S o m e A cts N o t in H en in g ’s
S ta tu tes,” 31; H ening 1: 4 3 3 ; H ening 4: 4 2 .
890 There were no such ca ses in the York C ounty records, but m inisters in other cou n ties w ere fined
for failing in their duties. A m es, A cc o m a c 1: 78-9; James, ed ., The L o w e r N orfolk C ou n ty V irginia
A n tiqu a ry, 2: 12.
891 Jacqueline S teven s, R ep ro d u cin g th e S ta te (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U n iversity Press, 1999), xv.
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that these births were recorded. Thus, in the Charles Parish (York County) records,
illegitimate births and births of free mixed-race infants were meticulously
recorded.892 Birth, marriage, and death records were also necessary for regulating
inheritance and taxation. Taxes were levied based on gender, race, and age, and
accurate birth records were needed to insure accurate taxation; in the absence of good
records, midwives could be called in to testify about births that happened years
previously.893
Ultimately, birth records were central to the policing of racial categories in the
colony, as can be seen with the evolution of Virginia’s taxation records. Prior to the
passage of the law of slavery by birth in 1662, tithing lists had included the ages of all
male servants, so that servants under the age of 16 would not be taxable.894 W ith the
passage of the 1662 law, and the shift from indentured to slave labor as the dominant
form of labor in the colony, these lists were no longer sufficient. Therefore, in 1672,
the counties were required to keep lists of “all negro, and molatto children, and slaves
that shalbe borne in this country,” so that taxes could be collected from their
masters.895 In 1680, this law was determined to be “too hard and severe” on masters,
since small children were taxable “before they are capable of working.”896 The new
law, which exempted masters from paying taxes on enslaved children until the child
turned 12, required even more accurate accounting: all birthdates should be recorded,

892 S ee, for exam p le, the birth o f Abraham C om bs or G eorge Jam es in C PR 6 7 , 96.
893 For exam p les o f age determ ination ca ses, see: York D O W 5: 92; York D O W 5: 117, 119; York
D O W 9: 3 1 4 , 328; York D O W 14: 70.
894 H ening 1: 361.
895 H ening 2: 296.
896 H ening 2: 4 7 9 -8 0 . In the sam e law , w hite indentured servants w ere determ ined to be taxable at the
age o f 14 years.
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and any imported enslaved children would have their ages judged by the county
courts.
This meant that ministers were required to keep comprehensive lists of
enslaved and free people in the colony. Ann Laura Stoler argues that race is a
“crucial colonial sorting technique,” and that these sorts of records were part of a
colonial project set on devising clear lines between categories of people.897 Since
1619, ministers had been required to keep records of all christenings, marriages, and
burials that they performed. Starting in 1713, those lists of christenings were
expanded to include information on “every child which shall be bom free,” as well as
“every child which shall be bom a slave.”898 This law makes clear that the ministers
were not just to perform their religious duties, but to act as agents of the colonial
state. The blurring of the religious and the governmental can be seen the 1714
accounting of births and burials in one parish: the minister categorized the births and
burials as “Crist’d Males,” “Crist’d Females,” “Negro Slaves Males & Molatoes,”
and “Negro Slaves ffemales & Molatoes.”899 For this minister, and arguably for the
colony as a whole, whiteness (“Crist’d Males” and “Crist’d Females”) became a
defining identity, as slavery and race coalesced to form a category of a colonized
Other. Yet, that category of colonized Other required its own subcategorization slaves, “Negroes,” “Molatoes” - which, though not fully sorted (to use Stoler’s term)
by this minister, hints at the beginnings of this kind of colonial thinking.
Virginia’s approach to population and demography, then, was more complex
than simply advocating for prolific reproduction. This is not to say that population
897 Stoler, “Intim idations o f E m pire,” 2.
898 H ening 4: 42.
899 Palmer, ed ., C a le n d a r o f V irginia S ta te P a p ers, 1: 176.
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growth was not a goal for the colony. When Governor William Gooch reported to the
Board o f Trade about the status in the colony around 1730, he proudly declared that
“without all doubt the Inhabits are greatly increased & in all likely hood will continue
to do so.”900 As with other advocates of prolific reproduction, Gooch credited
Virginia’s environment for easy reproduction: the colony was a place “where Nature
furnishes the requisites of Life wth less Labour & vexation than in many other
Places.”901 But when it came to reporting the actual population of the colony and
proposing policies to increase that population, Gooch shifted into the discourse of
rational reproduction. “The Rules for computing” the colony’s population, Gooch
explained, was “by a List of Tithables,” which included all white men older than 16
years old and all black men and women older than 16 years old.902 He then moved on
to calculate that since there were 85,000 tithable white men and 40,000 tithable black
men and women, then “therefore ye white women married & unmarried, & ye white
& black children under 16” should be “treble [triple] the no. of ye white Tithables.”
Using this method, he asserted that the population of the colony “will be about
QAT

135,000.”

As much as prolific reproduction was natural in Gooch’s Edenic

Virginia, actual population estimates depended on the colonial language of biopower.
This colonial language required categorization of bodies: blacks were separated from
whites, men from women, and children from adults. Further, it assumed that
reproduction was rational: total populations could be estimated based on a sample.
Colonial power required not just population growth, but state knowledge of not only

900 “V irginia Under G overnor G ooch: Q ueries from the Board o f Trade to G overnor G ooch , n.d.
(probably 17 3 0 ),” V irginia M a g a zin e o f H isto ry a n d B io g ra p h y 3, no. 2 (1895): 119.
1 “V irginia Under G overnor G o o ch ,” 119.
902 “V irginia Under G overnor G o o ch ,” 118.
903 “V irginia Under G overnor G o o ch ,” 118-9.
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the size, but the racial composition of that population. While “a malignant Fever”
had recently “occasioned a Mortality in whites and Blacks,” he hoped for population
growth both through importation of slaves and “the early marriages o f the males & ye
aptness of ye Females for generation in both complexions.”904 In other words, the
governor was confident that the colonial state both should and could encourage
childbearing - and the breeding of more slaves. Insofar as Gooch assumed easy
reproduction in an Edenic Virginia, he was confident that he could safely produce a
mathematical estimate of the population and the use of the power of the colonial state
to decrease deaths and increase births. The discourses o f prolific and rational
reproduction were not only simultaneous, but mutually defined.
By the eighteenth century, this colonial discourse of rational reproduction was
reflected in the colony’s print culture. As with Virginia’s legal culture, the discourse
of rational reproduction existed in newspapers simultaneously with the previously
examined discourse of prolific reproduction. As we will see, the Virginia Gazette
participated in this new discourse, with its attendant focus on population and racial
categorization, but it did so within the particular context of colonial genteel print
culture. W e’ve examined how the Virginia Gazette's content both reflected and
destabilized the discourse of prolific reproduction, where stories of multiple births
and large families were offset by stories of monstrous births. The discourse of
prolific reproduction was further destabilized by the same discourse of rational
reproduction that was present in Virginia’s legal documents as the colony enacted an
early form of biopower. Within eighteenth-century print culture, rational

904 “V irginia Under G overnor G o o ch ,” 119.
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reproduction reflected racialized ideas about population and colonialism, and it was
central to the development of new gender ideologies.
The discourses of prolific and rational reproduction existed simultaneously in
the Virginia Gazette; therefore, one place to see the discourse of rational reproduction
was in stories of prolific reproduction gone wrong. As has been discussed,
colonialism required categorization or sorting of people, and the records of the
colonial state served as a means to enact this sorting. Therefore, some stories in the
Gazette reframed prolific reproduction as threatening specifically because it could
challenge categorization of births. For example, some stories o f large families played
up confusing familial relationships for their humor value. A 1752 story announced
the double wedding of a Spanish ambassador and his son to the two daughters of a
Danish baron. The marriages inspired the following “enigmatical Conundrum”: “My
Father is father of my Father: My Father Is Brother of my Sister: My Mother is
Daughter of my Mother: My Mother is Sister of my Brother: My Wife is Daughter of
her Sister: I am the Son of her Brother, and she is Great-Aunt o f my Children.”905
The announcement concludes, “All this is true without any Body being guilty of
Incest,” thereby raising the specter of incest while simultaneously denying it.
Here, marriages that reflected the old world o f alliance - royal marriages, arranged
marriages, and marriages that too deeply intertwined family and politics - existed on
the edge of propriety. Even as the Virginia gentry class itself was deeply embroiled

905 V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 6 0 , Feb. 2 0 , 1752, page 3
906 For another exam p le o f con fu sin g fam ily relationships, see V irginia G a zette, Hunter # 4 , Jan. 24,
1751, page 3. For another exam ple o f foreign royal births as being ridiculous, see V irginia G a ze tte ,
Parks # 3 4 , M arch 25, 1737, page 2.
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in such arranged marriages and family alliances, the practice was made unfamiliar by
making it literally foreign here.
Another story, printed in one of the very first issues of the Gazette, similarly
trades on the idea that prolific reproduction was foreign and boundary-crossing. It
seemed that the dean of the cathedral at Orihuela, Spain, was not a man at all - the
dean had “brought to Bed of Two Daughters.”907 Upon investigation, it was found
that “this Lady for long Time disguised herself under the Ecclesiastical Habit, and
embracing that State had several Benifices conferr’d on her, ‘til she was promoted to
the Deanery.”908 Indeed, she seemed in line to become Pope! This story of genderbending served several purposes. First, it certainly fit into the Gazette's project of
entertaining its audience with titillating stories that would inspire debate and
conversation. That same issue of the Gazette was full of titillating notices: the pages
included stories of cannibalism and murder as well. More importantly, the tale of the
dean served a political purpose. On the page facing the story o f the pregnant priest
was an analysis of European politics, which reports a new alliance between “the
Catholick Princes [of France and Spain, who] shall join their Forces, in order to drive
the Turks out of Europe, and enlarge their Dominions on that Side.”909 These two
stories, taken together, trade on English fears and derision of Catholicism - Spain and
France were still considered threats to Virginia and to the entire British Empire.910
Here, prolific reproduction was reframed as something ridiculous and foreign, but
also threatening to the colony itself.

907 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 6 , Sept. 10, 1736, page 2,
908 Ibid.
909 V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 6 , Sept. 10, 1736, page 3.
910 M organ, A m erica n S lavery, A m erican F reed o m , 28 -3 0 .
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The most potent boundary crossing in colonial Virginia was transgressing the
racial boundary. While racial slavery and the law of slavery by birth would seem to
require prolific reproduction, we’ve already seen some of the ways that the growing
slave population provoked anxiety among elite white readers. The discourse of
rational reproduction helped to make sense of prolific childbearing that challenged
the colony’s emerging racial order. In 1752, the Gazette reprinted an account from
the London-based Gentleman’s Magazine of a “dissimilar Birth” that had occurred
locally in Virginia: “A young Negroe Wench of Col. Mason’s began to breed early,
and had at the first Birth a Negroe Child. Soon after she was delivered of two, a
Mulatto Girl, and a Negro Boy, named Austin.”911 Births like this one posed a threat:
what did it mean that racial boundaries were so easily blurred? By way of
explanation, the Mason family believed the babies to be “of different fathers”: the
girl’s “Negro Husband,” and an overseer named Thomas Plum, who “kept Company
with her, to the no small Uneasiness of her black Husband.”912 The family explained
the extraordinary birth by calling on their beliefs in black women’s hypersexuality,
black men’s ineffectual and even feminine lack of control over black women, and a
class-based suspicion of the overseer’s access to black bodies. The writer of the
Gazette article, J. Mercer, concurred with the family’s conclusions about the
children’s parentage, but he offered a different set of evidence as his proof: scientific
observation. He argued that “the Appearance of the Children was a Proof stronger
than any Witness” that the twins had two different fathers.913 The boy, Austin, “was
as black a Negro as I ever saw, and had short, curled, woolly Hair,” while his twin
911 V irginia G a ze tte , Hunter # 9 9 , D ec. 1, 1752, page 1.
9.2 Ibid.
9.3 Ibid.
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sister was “white, with blue Eyes, and long black Hair, that reached to her Waist.”914
According to Mercer, the new scientific language of racial categorization (focused on
the specifics of skin color, hair texture, and eye color) provided the most potent
explanation so that this “dissimilar birth” could be explained in a rational way. It was
more important to Mercer to assert the absolute heredity of racialized body
morphology than to entertain the possibility that racial categories could be imprecise.
The discourse of rational reproduction defused the threat of prolific reproduction and
reasserted racial binaries.
In these examples, prolific reproduction was refigured as a threat because it
blurred the very categories that colonialism demanded be clearly separated. Rational
reproduction stood in opposition to the ways that prolific reproduction signified loss
of control, boundary crossing, and category blurring. Essentially, rational
reproduction offered a way to reinterpret the world, and thus rethink the meanings of
prolific reproduction. But, as we’ve seen with Virginia’s governmental language, the
discourse of rational reproduction also stood on its own as an alternative to the
discourse of prolific reproduction. J. Mercer’s reliance on scientific observation to
interpret this cross-race birth reveals the ways that scientific language reframed
understandings of birth and parentage and thus was central to the discourse of rational
reproduction. Scientific language and changing ideas about marriage combined to set
up rational reproduction as a new ideal for elite childbearing.
The discourse o f rational reproduction could be seen clearly in eighteenth
century scientific and medical culture. Numerous scholars have pointed to the ways
that the scientific revolution reframed European and Euro-American understandings
9,4 Ibid.
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of reproductive processes. For Michel Foucault, the rise of scientific language about
sexuality - a scientia sexualis, as opposed to the ars erotica of an earlier age - was
part and parcel of the rise of sexuality as a discourse and the emergence of the
modem era.915 Susan Scott Parrish has shown that, with the rise of scientific
thinking, nature itself was fundamentally reconsidered, as both nature and the human
body (including especially its reproductive functions) were reframed as rational,
organized, and fundamentally understandable.916 Ludmilla Jordanova echoes this
notion o f rational reproduction, arguing that scientific discourses of reproduction (as
opposed to earlier patriarchal discourses o f generation) framed reproduction as
rational and natural, thereby divorcing reproduction from religious frameworks and
instead connecting it to nascent capitalism.917 The rise of rational reproduction had
mixed impacts on women. Lisa Foreman Cody points to an interesting tension in the
rationalizing of reproductive knowledges: even as print culture made reproduction
“an area of knowledge available to all, attainable through ‘rational-critical’ means
rather than personal bodily experience,” that “rational-critical” knowledge model
explicitly excluded older, women-centered bodies of knowledge.918 On the other
hand, Susan Klepp has argued that rational reproduction gave women unprecedented

915 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 5 3 -7 0 . N otably, Foucault firm ly dates the em ergen ce o f a French
scien tia sex u a lis in the nineteenth century, though its roots are found in the m edieval form s o f the
con fessio n . Y et, as Laura Stoler argues, F oucault’s fram ework is itse lf co lo n ia list, contrasting the
W est’s scie n tia sex u a lis w ith the a rs e ro tic a o f an im agined East. Stoler p osits instead that the
em ergen ce o f a scie n tia sex u a lis w as itse lf a product o f the co lo n ial project and colon ial subjectivities.
Stoler, R a ce a n d the E du cation o f D e sire , 14. T he em ergence o f a scien tific d iscou rse o f sexu ality in
eighteenth-century colon ial sp aces indicates again the w ays that colon ial sp aces served as cru cib les for
the d iscou rses o f m odernity. F oucault’s observation o f the em ergen ce o f a scien tific language about
sexu ality holds, y et the co lo n ia l lim itations o f his argum ent must b e observed.
916 Parrish, “T he F em ale O p ossu m ,” 4 7 5 -5 1 4 .
917 Jordanova, “Interrogating the C oncept o f Reproduction in the E ighteenth C entury.” S ee also
D uden, “T he Fetus on the ‘Farther S h ore’,” 13-25.
918 C ody, “The P o litics o f R eproduction,” 4 8 2 .
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control over their fertility as new reproductive discourses allowed women “to deemphasize bellies and to stress head and heart.”919
The new focus on head and heart fundamentally transformed marriage in the
eighteenth century. This transformation required a rethinking of the relationship
between marriage and childbearing. As elite Virginians began to be suspicious of the
examples of prolific reproduction that threatened the colonial order, these same elites
were adopting a new gender ideology and concomitant marital practices that made
their own lives hew more closely to ideal presented by the discourse of rational
reproduction. Specifically, the new elite ideal of companionate marriage idealized
limiting fertility in favor of prioritizing the marriage relationship. Scholars have
outlined the rise of a companionate marriage ideal within both the upper and middle
classes throughout the Anglo-American world. Daniel Blake Smith argued that
“sentimental and sometimes passionate male-female relationships reflected the
growing importance in marriage during the eighteenth century of companionship and
the declining significance of property and lineage.”920 The companionate marriage
ideal, which demanded that women be sexually pleasing to men, existed in tension
with the demands of reproduction and motherhood, possibly contributing to a drop in
fertility at the end of the eighteenth century.

Q91

By emphasizing romantic love over financial bonds as the basis for marriage,
the companionate marriage ideal hews to the transition Foucault described from the
premodem deployment of alliance to the modem deployment o f sexuality; thus we
see the connection between marital forms and political economy. A locally-produced
919 K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ies,” 9 1 0 -4 5 .
920 Sm ith, In side the G re a t H ou se, 135.
921 K lepp, “R evolutionary B o d ies,” 928.
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anonymous essay, published in the Gazette in 1738, argued that marriages should be
based on romance, not property:

. .the Reason why there are so many unhappy

Matches, is not because Marriage is a miserable State in itself, or that the other Sex is
less pleasant and agreeable than our own; but that Money is often married instead of
the Person; that is, in other Words, Persons marry where they do not love.”922 In the
deployment of alliance, marriage upheld society by providing an orderly means to
transmit wealth from generation to generation - these were the marriages that the
writer in the Gazette critiqued when he opined “Money is often married instead of the
Person.”923 Within the new context of modem sexuality, marriage had a more
complex, though still deeply political, set of purposes. Foucault argued that marriage
and sex themselves were simultaneously disciplined and romanticized, as a new focus
was trained on “the sensations of the body, the quality of pleasures, and the nature of
impressions.”924 Companionate marriage still had an economic basis - specifically,
the reproduction and disciplining of more consuming bodies in capitalism - but that
basis was less explicit than in the deployment of alliance. In other words, marriage
gained new importance as it became the idealized, and sole, acceptable site for
pleasure. The nuclear family became the place, in Foucault’s terms, “to anchor
sexuality and provide it with a permanent support.”925
What we see in the actual deployment of the companionate marriage ideal in
eighteenth century Virginia print culture is the conscious emphasis on romance,
friendship, and pleasure coupled with the remarkable invisibility o f childbearing and

922 V irginia G a ze tte ,
923 Foucault, H isto ry
924 Foucault, H isto ry
925 Foucault, H isto ry

Parks # 8 9 , April 14, 1738, page 1-2.
o f S exu ality, 106-7.
o f S exu ality, 106.
o f S exu ality, 108.
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parenthood. An anonymous author in the Gazette proclaimed that “agreeable
Conversation” is “one of the greatest Pleasures of a married Life,” and that men who
deny women’s intelligence “over value themselves.”926 If witty conversation was
essential to a happy marriage, perhaps children were not: the essayist never mentions
children at all. The absence of any discussion of parenthood in that essay was not a
fluke. Another description of an ideal wife (which ends with the plea, “O give me
such a Wife - or give me none”) depicts a woman with every positive quality,
including being “A gay Companion and a Friend sincere” - but never mentions
children or motherhood.927 An essay reprinted from the Universal Spectator in the
Gazette praised marriages that were rooted in sobriety, rather than passion, yet never
mentioned parenthood as part of a happy marriage.

(V } 0

How does this invisibility of childbearing reflect the discourse of rational
reproduction? Where children were mentioned, they were made abstract, and they
were never numerous. The anonymous local writer of one long poem, entitled “The
Wish,” described his ideal wife and family.929 The wife is described extensively and
extravagantly: she was to be “witty, good natur’d, ever prompt to please,” have
“Judgement,” and “converse with Ease.” She should “love” and “Desire” her
husband “as Angels feel.” That love and desire would produce a “Brace” (or pair) of
ideal children, in whose faces “bloom the Parental Grace.” In the companionate
marriage ideal, women and children were meant to be a flattering reflection o f the
man. This sense that marriage should reflect upon the husband had some impact on
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how Virginians understood their own relationships. For example, in the few
obituaries published in the Gazette memorializing local women, the women were
remembered primarily for their relationships with men.930
By making parenthood secondary to the marriage relationship, the
companionate marriage ideal imagined that reproduction could be placed in human
control, rather than in the control of God or nature. As a result o f companionate
marriage, English colonial women’s fertility rates dropped during the eighteenth
century, especially among elite white women.931 Examining Virginia women’s letters
from the end of the eighteenth century, Jan Lewis and Kenneth Lockridge posit that a
drop in fertility among middle class and elite white women was precisely the result of
new marital forms that prioritized the marital relationship over the parental one.
Nevertheless, the new model had its costs: fertility dropped only when women and
men began to believe that pregnancy was “pathological.”932 Literary historian Ruth
Perry argues that the sentimentalizing of marriage in the eighteenth century served
masculine interests by separating maternity and sexuality, and thus robbing women of
their sexuality: “In the eighteenth century, maternity came to be imagined as a
counter to sexual feeling, opposing alike individual expression, desire, and agency in
favor of a mother-self at the service o f the family and the state.”

Historian Cynthia

Kiemer makes clear the continuing patriarchal impulses o f companionate marriage:
companionate marriage “combined a new appreciation for feminine sensibility, or
improving emotion, with the more traditional assumption that the sole function of a

930 S ee, for exam p le, V irginia G a ze tte , Parks # 1 5 0 , June 15, 1739, page 3; V irginia G a z e tte , Parks
# 4 8 0 , O ct. 10, 1745, page 2.
931 Klepp, “R evolutionary B o d ies,” 91 4 -7 .
932 L ew is and L ockridge, “S ally Has B een S ick ,” 12-13.
933 Perry, “C o lo n izin g the B reast,” 305.
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wife was to serve her husband’s needs and interests.”934 The new ideal of
companionate marriage enabled rational reproduction by pathologizing childbirth and
reasserting in new ways patriarchal control in marriage. Foucault points out that “it
was around and on the basis of the deployment of alliance that the deployment of
sexuality was constructed.”935 In other words, while the deployment of alliance did
give way to the deployment of sexuality, this was not a total or sudden replacement.
If idealized marriage was set apart from childbearing, this made the stories of prolific
reproduction suspect - prolific childbearing was, in a word, something other people
did.936
Thus, stories of prolific reproduction gone awry - the dark-hued bodies of
ships spewing their “Spawn” onto the shore, the cross-racial births of slaves, the
cross-gender births of Spaniards, and the monstrous reproduction of both human and
animal - were meaningful precisely because they contrasted so fully with the rational,
even invisible, reproduction of the emerging ideal of the bourgeois, white, married
couple. For Foucault, the legitimacy of the married couple was inextricably linked to
silence, privacy, and domesticity:
The legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality, had a right to more
discretion. It tended to function as a norm, one that was stricter, perhaps, but
quieter. On the other hand, what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of
children, mad men and women, and criminals; the sensuality of those who did

934 Kierner, B eyo n d the H ou seh old, 28.
935 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 107.
936 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 126.
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not like the opposite sex; reveries, obsessions, petty manias, or great
transports of rage.

937

A focus on discourses of reproduction in colonial spaces shows that to that list of
scrutinized sexualities must be added the slave, the servant, the colonized body.
Jennifer Morgan traces the ways that black women’s bodies, sexualities, and
reproductivity stood “as evidence of a cultural inferiority that ultimately became
encoded as racial difference.”938 Haunting the margins of the discourse of rational
reproduction safely ensconced in companionate, bourgeois, legitimate marriages was
the prolific reproduction of the colonized body.
The discourse of rational reproduction exposed the limitations of prolific
reproduction in a colonial space. The colonial project required more than just
population growth - that population growth needed to foster the long-term economic
goals of the colony. Colonial population growth needed to adhere to categories of
race and servitude. It needed to be measurable, so that colonial expansion and
colonial success could be assessed. Within this new colonial context, prolific
reproduction began to be seen as suspect, especially when it challenged colonial
racial categories. A new ideal for marriage even went so far as to introduce rational
reproduction within elite households, as fertility was limited in favor of a focus on the
marriage relationship. Vestiges of the discourse of prolific reproduction remained,
but the discourse of rational reproduction, which originated in colonial law, had made
inroads into colonizers’ intimate lives. Prolific reproduction had become a sign of
colonial inferiority, rather than a strategy for colonial domination.

937 Foucault, H isto ry o f S exu ality, 38 -9 .
938 M organ, L a b o rin g W om en, 4 9 .
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By way of conclusion, a comparison between two eighteenth-century natural
histories of Virginia will crystallize the distinctions between the discourses of prolific
reproduction and rational reproduction, while still showing the threads that connected
those two discourses. Robert Beverley’s 1705 book, The History and Present State o f
Virginia, presented his version of the colony’s history to that point, along with a
description of the colony’s “Works of Nature,” a “true Account o f the Indians,” and
an account of the colony’s laws.939 The History is one of a long line of colonial texts
that emphasized the colony’s natural fertility as a means to attract more immigrants.
Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State o f Virginia, first printed in 1785 and more
widely published in 1787, was Jefferson’s attempt to catalogue his knowledge about
the new state.940 Jefferson’s Notes, like Beverley’s History, offers to the reader a
description of Virginia’s natural resources, people, and government. Where Beverley
hoped to attract new immigrants, Jefferson hoped to advocate for his home state’s
worth to the scientific community.
For both Beverley and Jefferson, the question of population, and thus the issue
of reproduction, was a central concern in their representation o f Virginia. Beverley’s
text is steeped in the discourse of prolific reproduction: Virginia is a fertile, if
underused, promised land, and the colony’s strength could be measured by the growth
of its population. Jefferson’s book, on the other hand, is emblematic of rational
reproduction: for Jefferson, ideal reproduction is measured, predictable, and
controllable, and therefore the new state should manage and measure its population in
939 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P re se n t S ta te o f V irg in ia , preface.
940 T hom as Jefferson, N o te s on the S ta te o f V irginia, ed. W illiam Peden (C hapel Hill: U n iversity o f
North C arolina Press, 1954), xvi-x v iii.
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order to grow. For both Beverley and Jefferson, their ideas about reproduction were
deeply entwined with their colonial vision: where Beverley would advocate
population growth through intermarriage between English settlers and Native
Americans, Jefferson placed sexuality and reproduction at the center of his ideas
about the racial differences between colonized bodies.
Beverley’s History, like so many other colonial booster texts, presents
Virginia as an abundant garden, teeming with resources waiting to be harvested.
Within the discourse of prolific reproduction, fertility was a natural expression of
God’s favor. This fertility emerged from Virginia’s soil and was intrinsically devoted
to the support and happiness of human civilization: “The Soil is of such Variety,
according to the Difference of Situation, that one Part or other of it, seems fitted to
every sort of Plant, that is requisite either for the Benefit or Pleasure of Mankind.”941
With this soil as its foundation, Virginia exploded with such a “great Abundance” of
wild fruits and other plants that Beverley confessed “I may not mention one half of
what the Country affords.”942 Fish swam so thickly in the rivers that Indian “Boys
and Girls wou’d take a pointed Stick and strike the lesser sort, as they Swam upon the
flats.”943 Virginia’s “extream fruitfulness” extended to crops: “No Seed is Sowed
there, but it thrives.”944 Beverley’s description of the fertility of the colony slipped
easily into an eroticization of nature. Nature’s creations themselves unabashedly
displayed the workings of reproductive sexuality: Beverley offered a description of
an “extraordinary” flower that “resembled the Pudenda of a Man and Woman
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lovingly join’d in one.”945 These natural wonders were placed in Virginia for
mankind’s enjoyment. To any observer of nature, the colony was a pleasure garden
where “all their Senses are entertain’d with an endless Succession of Native Pleasures
[and] Their Eyes are ravished with the Beauties of naked Nature.”946
This eroticism coexisted with Beverley’s view that Virginia was the promised
land - a new Jerusalem marked by God’s extraordinary blessings. Beverley noted
that Virginia was “very near the same Latitude with the Land of Promise”:
As Judea was full of Rivers, and Branches of Rivers, So is Virginia. As that
was seated upon a great Bay and Sea, wherein were all the conveniencies for
Shipping and Trade; So is Virginia. Had that fertility o f Soil? So has
Virginia, equal to any Land in the known World. In fine, if any one
impartially considers al the Advantages of this Country, as Nature made it; he
must allow it to be as fine a Place, as any in the Universe.947
For Beverley, the teeming, sexualized fertility of Virginia’s natural environment was
an expression of God’s will, a garden given to mankind. Even the Powhatans
themselves seemed to anticipate this comparison of Virginia to Judea. Again linking
fertility and Christianity, Beverley remarked, “children are not reckon’d a Charge
among [the Powhatans], but rather Riches, according to the blessing of the Old
Testament.”948 He further imagined that English settlers would also follow the path
of the Biblical patriarchs. He tells the story of a remarkable English settler family
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comprised of “an ancient Woman” and her elderly husband who, like Sarah and
Abraham, had a 12-year-old son.949
The success of the English colony in Virginia depended on population growth
that could take advantage of the extraordinary riches of the land. Colonial successes,
for Beverley, were inextricably connected to reproductive successes. The birth in
Roanoke of Virginia Dare, “the first Child there bom of Christian Parentage,” is
linked in the text to the expansion of the colonial project.950 That birth occurred “on
the same Occasion” as the baptism of Manteo, who Beverley claims was “the first
Indian that was made a Christian in that Part of the World.” These two auspicious
events signaled the success of the colony: “This seem’d to be a Settlement
prosperously made, being carry’d on with much Zeal and Unanimity among
themselves.” For Beverley, the birth of English settlers, the Christianization of
Indians, and consensus among the settlers all signaled the success (however
premature) of the Roanoke colony. Less tinged with later mystery is the first
marriage performed in Jamestown. Beverley links this marriage to the growth of the
colonial population: “Anno 1609, John Laydon and Anna Burrows were marry’d
together, the first Christian Marriage in that Part o f the World, and the Year following
the Plantation was increased to near Five Hundred Men.”951 Within the discourse of
prolific reproduction, these two facts - the marriage and the growth in a colonial
population - are not distinct, but instead inextricably linked.
Beverley’s main concern was that Englishmen were failing to adequately
make use of Virginia’s many blessings. In the book’s preface, Beverley states his
949 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, 1: 97.
950 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, 1: 9.
951 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, 1:19.
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hope that his book would inspire future English immigrants to Virginia to make the
most of “the Excellencies o f my Country,” if only they (unlike their predecessors)
*952

would approach their work with “a due Spirit o f Industry, and Management.”

Unlike the English settlers, Virginia’s natives did not need to rely on industry. They
lived in an enviable and perfect state of nature, relying on the land for their
sustenance:
This and a great deal more was the natural Production of that Country, which
the Native Indians enjoy’d, without the Curse of Industry, their Diversion
alone, and not their Labour, supplying their Necessities. The Women and
Children indeed, were so far provident, as to lay up some of the Nuts, and
Fruits of the Earth, in their Season, for their future Occasions. But none o f the
Toils of Husbandry, were exercised by this happy People, except the bare
planting a little Com, and Melons, which took up only a few Days in the
Q C -l

Summer, the rest being wholly spent in the Pursuit of their Pleasures.
Berkeley worried, though, that exposure to the beauties and luxuries of the Virginia
environment had made English settlers, like the Indians, averse to industry. Virginia
Englishmen, he complained:
.. .depend altogether upon the Liberality of Nature, without endeavouring to
improve its Gifts, by Art or Industry. They spung upon the Blessings of a
warm Sun, and a fruitful Soil, and almost grutch the Pains of gathering in the
Bounties of the Earth.954

952 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, preface.
953 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, 2: 40.
954 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, 4: 83.
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Beverley idealized Native Americans, but he did not imagine that Englishmen should
reduce themselves to a state of nature. Instead, he hoped that his writing would
inspire English settlers in Virginia to “make the most of all those happy Advantages
which Nature has given them.”955
Ultimately, only the presence of women in the colony would guarantee the
growth of the population. Once Englishmen were “settled [in Virginia] in a
comfortable way of subsisting a Family, they grew sensible of the Misfortune of
wanting Wives.”956 The men “excepted against the Indian Women, on account of
their being Pagans."951 This decision Beverley finds unfortunate, and it is on this
point that he embarks on a fascinating counterhistory: he suggests that intermarriage
between English men and Indian women would have been a boon to the struggling
colony in its early years. Beginning with the marriage of Pocahontas and John Rolfe
as his starting point, Beverley suggest that the English should have followed the
Indians’ suggestion o f further intermarriage between the two societies: “I can’t but
think it wou’d have been happy for that Country, had [the English] embraced this
Proposal.”958 Because it would have defused “the Jealousie of the Indians,”
intermarriage would have prevented “most of the Rapines and Murders [the Indians]
committed.”959 Ultimately, Beverley’s argument for intermarriage rested on his belief
that intermarriage would increase the colonial population. First, Virginia could have
avoided deaths by wars. The colonial mission of spreading Christianity would have
been more successful, and therefore the wars of 1622 and 1644 could have been
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avoided: “the Country would have been full of People, by the Preservation of the
many Christians and Indians that fell in the Wars between them.”960 Second, these
Christianized Indians could have been absorbed into the colonial population, and their
numbers increased rather than decreased. Third, immigrants would have been
attracted to the colony by “so much Success and Prosperity,” rather than repelled by
“Frights and Terrors.”961 Finally, Beverley hoped the colony “wou’d have been
encreasing in Children to its Advantage.”962 That these children would have ties to
both the Indian and the English communities did not concern Beverley; by
Christianizing the Indians, the English colonial presence and civilizing influence
would override any vestiges of Indian culture.
While published in the eighteenth century, Beverley’s History was rooted in
reproductive discourses of the earlier era. Beverley’s depiction of a hyper-fertile
Virginia landscape reveals his adherence to the discourse of prolific reproduction, in
which reproductive sexuality was godly and natural. Prolific reproduction fueled the
colonial project and was a marker of colonial success. It was Beverley’s imagining of
the colonial project that most reveals his commitment to the discourse of prolific
reproduction. Rather than advocating separation of colonizer from colonized,
Beverley imagined a colony that could absorb colonized people and thereby increase
its numbers not only through avoiding wartime deaths but by embracing
intermarriage and its resulting births. For Beverley, the noble Powhatans, who lived
in a perfect state of nature, wanted only Christianization and civilization; the English,
who brought both, wanted only greater numbers to truly tame the fertile Virginia
960 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P re se n t S ta te o f V irginia, 1: 26.
961 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P resen t S ta te o f V irginia, 1: 26.
962 B everley, The H isto ry a n d P re se n t S ta te o f V irginia, 1: 26.

349

wilderness. Prolific reproduction, then, achieved multiple colonial goals: subduing
of native populations, spreading Christianity through intermarriage, and increasing
numbers of English-identified settlers.
Thomas Jefferson’s vision of Virginia’s environment and its population was
radically different from Beverley’s. For Beverley, fertility, nature, and God were all
equally boundless and outside of his comprehension - plants were too numerous to
name, animals too numerous to count. Jefferson’s approach to nature is that of a
scientist in the age of Enlightenment: God’s plan was fundamentally orderly, and
science provided man with the ability to understand the natural world.963 Contrary to
Beverley’s effusive prose admiring the fertility of the colony, Jefferson provides
succinct catalogs of the observed plant, mammal, and bird species native to
Virginia.964 These lists include common names and Linnaean designations for each
species; the goal here was to both present an impressively long list of species and to
fit those species into European scientific discussions that were deeply engaged in the
categorization of knowledge.965 The fertility of Virginia did not result in
innumerable creatures - instead, those newly discovered plants and animals simply
needed to be studied, understood, and categorized.
Jefferson’s lists of species place his discussion within the larger field of
history. While Jefferson’s natural history did argue for the fundamental fertility of
Virginia and America at large, he does not make this argument by pointing to the
teeming fecundity of its wildlife. Instead, within the discourse of rational

963 Parrish, A m erica n C u rio sity, 15; Parrish, “T he F em ale O p ossu m ,” 47 6.
964 Jefferson, N o tes on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 3 8 -4 3 , 5 0 -2 , 6 6 -7 0 .
955 Parrish, A m erica n C u riosity, 9. On the exten sion o f this urge to categorize to the categorization o f
humans into races, see Schiebinger, N a tu r e ’s B ody, 143-83.
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reproduction, Jefferson’s focus was on the relative size of animals. Jefferson took
exception to the Comte de Buffon’s claim that animals in the New World were
smaller than those in the Old. Jefferson dismantles de Buffon’s argument point by
point, arguing that American animals, both wild and domestic, were either equal or
greater in weight than their European counterparts. Jefferson found what he
considered the most convincing evidence in the fossilized remains of the mammoth
(an animal he was convinced was not extinct), which he noted was “the largest of all
terrestrial beings.”966 The existence of the mammoth proved the fertility of the
American climate: “ [The mammoth] should have sufficed to have rescued the earth it
inhabited, and the atmosphere it breathed, from the imputation of impotence in the
conception and nourishment of animal life on a large scale....967 Like his predecessor
Beverley, Jefferson was arguing for the fundamental fertility o f the American
environment. Yet, rather than making a claim about the mere numbers of animals,
Jefferson focused on the better quality (here, the increased size) of those animals. In
his one lapse into the discourse of prolific reproduction, Jefferson allows that goats
“are very prolific here, bearing twice or three times a year, and from one to five kids
at a birth.”968 Yet he immediately shifts to a discussion of sheep, and how sheep in
Virginia weigh much more than sheep in Europe. Jefferson may still have been
impressed by prolific reproduction, but he built his argument around rational
reproduction. Jefferson continued to imagine Virginia as uniquely fertile, but that
fertility was channeled into more efficient, rational reproduction than the prolific
reproduction advocated by Beverley.
966 Jefferson, N o tes on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 47.
967 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 47.
968 Jefferson, N o tes on the S ta te o f V irginia, 57, 87.
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How did this reimagining of the fertility of Virginia impact Jefferson’s
discussion of Virginia’s human population? It is here that we see most clearly
Jefferson’s immersion in the discourse of rational reproduction, in terms of his
understanding of reproduction itself, the role of the state in managing it, and
Virginia’s continued colonial project. For Jefferson, human reproduction was
fundamentally measurable and predictable, and thus controllable or manageable by
the state. Not satisfied with simply calculating the current total population of the
state (which he estimated at 567,614 in 1782), Jefferson focused his attention on the
rate of population increase over time, which he was confident that was able “to
calculate, with a considerable degree of precision.”969 Jefferson allowed that the
colony’s population fluctuated greatly in the early years, but that it quickly became
very predictable:
By the year 1654, however, it becomes tolerably uniform, importations having
in a great measure ceased from the dissolution of the company, and the
inhabitants become too numerous to be sensibly affected by Indian wars.
Beginning at that period, therefore, we find that from thence to the year 1772,
our tythes had increased from 7209 to 153,000. The whole term being o f 118
years, yields a duplication once in every 21lA years.... Should this rate of
increase continue, we shall have between six and seven millions of inhabitants
within 95 years.970
This is a remarkable assertion, for Jefferson was claiming that Virginia’s population
growth - which included free and enslaved immigration as well as births - was so

969 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 82-3.
970 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 82-3.
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fundamentally uniform that it could be reduced to a rather simple calculation that
could be used to predict future population growth, and thus inform state policy.
Population was inextricably connected with political representation in the
republic, and therefore the state’s interests lay in the proper management of
population growth. Jefferson tacitly agreed that Virginia’s population should grow,
not least to provide enough people to work the land: “In Europe the object is to make
the most of their land, labour being abundant; here it is to make the most of our labor,
land being abundant.”971 But by what means should the population grow,
immigration or birth? Using his equation for estimating the rate of population
increase, Jefferson theorized that it would take about 30 years longer for the
population to reach 4.5 million through birth rather than through immigration.972
Even with this delay, Jefferson advocated population growth through “natural
propagation” rather than rapid immigration.973 Jefferson opined that immigrants from
monarchical Europe lacked the natural love o f liberty held by native-born Americans.
Suddenly exposed to Americans’ “temperate liberty,” immigrants and their children
would mire themselves in “unbounded licentiousness.”974 And, because these
licentious immigrants would have representation in the population-based republican
government, their presence would be disastrous to the republic: “They will infuse
into [the legislature] their spirit, warp and bias its direction, and render it a
heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.”975 For Jefferson, managing population
growth had profound consequences in the post-Revolutionary world - consequences
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that could threaten or strengthen the republic itself. Because native-born bodies were
needed both to work the land and to outweigh non-native-born votes, Jefferson’s
pronatalist, anti-immigrant policy implicitly depended upon white women’s
childbearing to advance his economic and political vision for the nation. Jefferson
was not making an argument for “republican motherhood,” in the sense of mothering
being essential to the creation of republican-minded citizens.976 Instead, he was
arguing for white women to birth citizen bodies in order to populate the nation: he
was arguing for republican breederhood.
Implicit in Jefferson’s discussion of the effects of population growth on the
republic was that his analysis was limited to the white population. This is a
fundamental logical flaw in his argument. His estimate of the total current population
of Virginia included both free people and slaves, but his discussion of future
population growth and its impact on the republic took into account only full citizens
and their dependents. Jefferson participated in a sort of colonial blindness here: he
saw only white bodies when he imagined his ideal republic, but the development of
that republic depended on the colonization and exploitation of colonized peoples,
both African American and Native American.977 The expansion of the white
population was necessarily embroiled in the growth of the enslaved population and
the shrinking of the Native American population. When Jefferson did include
enslaved and Native American peoples in his vision of Virginia, he did so within the
discourse of rational reproduction by using fertility and population as a justification

976 Kerber, W om en o f the R epu blic.
977 A s Edward Said argued, the presentation o f the colon ial Other - “the Orient” in S a id ’s fram ework w as alw a y s about reflecting back the self-presentation o f Europe itself. In this w ay, Europe was
created by its co lo n ies. Said, O rien ta lism , 12.
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for racial hierarchy and separation. Fertility was fundamental to Jefferson’s theory
of racial difference, and thus his vision o f Virginia’s continued colonial project.
Contrary to his plan for white population expansion, Jefferson presented black
sexuality and fertility as threats to the state. In concluding his discussion of the
growth of Virginia’s population, Jefferson attempted to calculate the relative numbers
of enslaved versus free people in the state. He found that slaves outnumber free
people “nearly as 11 to 10.”978 The growth in the slave population was a result of
their “mild treatment” and inherent fertility: “Under the mild treatment our slaves
experience, and their wholesome, though course, food, this blot in our country
increases as fast, or faster, than the whites.”979 What was the source of this
hyperfertility? Jefferson described black sexuality, and thus black reproduction, as
utterly opposed to the rational reproduction of modem sexuality: “They are more
ardent after their female: but love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a
tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation.”980 Masters exacerbated this
uncontrolled sexuality: unlike the slaves of ancient Rome, who were segregated by
sex, ‘T heir situation and manners place the commerce between the two sexes almost
without restraint.”981 Jefferson praised the end o f the international slave trade as one
means to limit the growth of the black population in Virginia, and he advocated a
never-adopted plan to emancipate the slaves through colonization.

The goal of this

emancipation plan was racial separation - specifically, avoiding mixed-race births
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that would mar white families.983 Again comparing Virginia slavery to Roman
slavery, Jefferson emphasized the whiteness of slaves in Rome:
Among the Romans emancipation required but one effort. The slave, when
made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with
us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, [the slave] is to be
removed beyond the reach of mixture.984
Jefferson’s advocating of the end of slavery was intertwined with his adherence to the
discourse of rational reproduction. The growth and survival of the republic depended
on the birth of virtuous white citizens, which was being outpaced by the birth and
importation of slaves. Managing the white population required removing this threat
to its purity and dominance.
Jefferson treated the decline of the Native American population as a scientific
curiosity that absolved English colonization and American expansion of
responsibility for that decline. Like Beverley, Jefferson idealized the Indians as
living in a perfect state of nature: “Their only controuls are their manners, and that
moral sense of right and wrong, which, like the sense of tasting and feeling, in every
QOC

man makes a part of his nature.”

That very connection to nature was the source of

the Indians’ demise, as it was insufficient to protect them from the ravages of
983 T he irony o f this stance is hard to ignore, considering Jefferson ’s ow n long-term relationship and
fathering o f sev en children w ith the en slaved m ixed-race w om an S ally H em in gs. H em in gs w as h erself
the half-sister o f Jefferson ’s w ife, Martha W a y les Jefferson, and H em in g s’ mother, E lizabeth H em ings,
w as the daughter o f an E nglish sea captain and an A frican w om an. N eed le ss to say, Jefferson ’s
personal life w as marked in very real w ays by interracial sex and interracial reproduction. A nnette
G ordon R eed ’s work plum bs the breadth and depth o f the relationship betw een Jefferson and H em ings,
its m eanings in their tim e, and its continued resonance. Annette G ordon-R eed, ‘“ T he m em ories o f a
F ew N e g ro e s’: R escu in g A m erica’s Future at M o n ticello ,” in Jan E llen L ew is and Peter S. O nuf, ed s.,
S ally H em in gs a n d T hom as Jefferson: H istory, M em ory, a n d C ivic C u ltu re (C harlottesville: U niversity
Press o f V irginia, 1999), 2 3 6 -2 5 4 ; A nnette G ordon-R eed, The H em in gses o f M o n ticello : A n A m erican
F am ily (N Y : N orton, 2 0 0 8 ).
984 Jefferson, N o te s on the S ta te o f V irginia, 143.
985 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 93.
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European colonization. Observing the tremendous drop in the Native American
population in Virginia since the seventeenth century, Jefferson blamed “spirituous
liquors, the small-pox, war, and an abridgment of territory,” which “to a people who
lived principally on the spontaneous productions of nature, had committed terrible
havock among them, which generation, under the obstacles opposed to it among
them, was not likely to make good.”
These “obstacles” to generation, for Jefferson, are illustrative of the primary
differences between the races. Jefferson believed that reproduction answered to
rational human intervention: Indians’ failure to intervene to increase their own
reproduction was the root of their failure to compete against the ravages o f European
colonization. While Jefferson rejects the Comte de Buffon’s characterization of the
Indians as feminine and desexualized, he blames Native culture for failing to
Q 07

prioritize and facilitate sufficient reproduction to continue the population.

Native

women, Jefferson opined, “are submitted to unjust drudgery,” and therefore were less
fertile than European women. Further, Native women actively sought to end their
pregnancies: “they have learnt the practice of procuring abortion by the use of some
vegetables and that it even extends to prevent conception for a considerable time
after.”988 Like Beverley, Jefferson imagined intermarriage between Indians and
English colonizers as facilitating population growth; unlike Beverley, Jefferson saw
this boon as benefitting the Indians, not the English. When exposed to white culture
- through the marriage of Indian women to white men, or the enslavement of Indian
women - Indian women proved able to “produce and raise as many children as the
986 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 96.
987 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irgin ia, 58 -6 0 .
988 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 60.
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white women,” and, presumably, less likely to limit births through contraception or
abortion.989 Ultimately, while Jefferson allowed that colonization had some effect on
Native American populations, he placed blame for the drop in population on Native
women’s bodies and actions:
To the obstacles then of want and hazard, which nature has opposed to the
multiplication of wild animals, for the purpose of restraining their numbers
within certain bounds, those of labour and of voluntary abortion are added
with the Indian. No wonder then if they multiply less than we do.990
For Jefferson, the drop in Native population was rooted in their racial difference,
which he interestingly constructed as both natural and cultural. While Indians were
too much like “wild animals,” and thus too exposed to the dangers of the natural
world, their culture did not just fail to protect them from those dangers, it exacerbated
them through abortion and contraception.
Jefferson’s analysis of the Native American population, along with his
opinions about Indian fertility, was part of his adherence to the discourse of rational
reproduction, and thus the American colonial project. In the chapter of Notes titled,
“Aborigines,” Jefferson placed Indians into the narrative o f natural history and
anthropology, and thus the Enlightenment scientific imaginary. In that chapter,
Jefferson provided a general description of Indian culture, but he also attempted to
catalogue and define Native American tribes. Like his charts of animal, plant, and
bird species, Jefferson attempts to catalogue all past and remaining Virginia Native
American tribes. Here, we see the most modem iteration yet of Ann Laura Stoler’s

989 Jefferson, N o te s on the S ta te o f V irginia, 61.
990 Jefferson, N o te s on the S ta te o f V irginia, 61.
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contention that race was a “crucial colonial sorting technique.”991 Stoler argues that
“racial thinking secures racial designations in a language of biology and fixity and in
the quest for a visual set of physical differences to index that which is not ‘selfevident’ or visible - neither easy to agree on nor easy to see.” Jefferson’s
categorization of Native groups both asserts their racial difference and places that
difference into the discursive framework of biology. Jefferson argued that his main
categories of Indians - the Powhatans, the Mannahoacs, and the Monacans - were
illustrative of an ancient racial difference within the Native population. Observing
the linguistic differences between the groups, Jefferson argued that “very possibly
there may have been antiently three different stocks, each of which multiplying in a
long course o f time, had separated into so many little societies.”992 Within those
three main ethnic categories, Jefferson lists those tribes, or “little societies,” whose
names were recorded by the English. Jefferson’s charts of Native ethnic groups, so
similar to his charts of plant and animal species, placed Native American political
groups into the same discursive field as biological categorization. Yet where
Jefferson’s biological charts attempted to demonstrate the fertility and strength of
Virginia’s natural world, the charts of Indian tribes were part of a colonial narrative
of population disaster.
Beyond sorting Native Americans into discrete ethnic groups, Jefferson
attempted to provide estimates of their populations. The information is laid out in
two separate charts; the charts themselves are documents of the impact of
colonization. The first chart includes a list of the tribes first encountered by the

991 Stoler, “Intim idations o f Em pire,” 2.
992 Jefferson, N o te s on th e S ta te o f V irginia, 92.
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English, along with “their numbers when we first became acquainted with them” and
again in 1669, “when an attempt was made by the assembly to enumerate them.”993
Jefferson described the marked decrease between those two columns as “the
melancholy sequel of their history...by which we discover that the tribes therein
enumerated were, in the space of 62 years, reduced to about one-third o f their former
numbers.”994 As to their current (1787) numbers, the Indians were marked by their
disappearance. O f the Mattaponi, “there rem ain.. .three or four men only, and they
have more negro than Indian blood in them.”995 The Pamunkies were similarly
devastated: they “are reduced to about 10 or 12 men.”996 The Nottoways were the
worst hit: “not a male is left. A few women constitute the remains of that tribe.”997
Following this narrative of colonial population devastation, Jefferson’s second chart
of Native Americans provided “the nations and numbers of the Aborigines which still
exist and a respectable and independent form.”998 If Jefferson’s charts served two
purposes - racial categorization of Natives and a narrative o f colonial population
devastation - then this second chart would seem to imply that those projects were yet
unfinished. Jefferson regretted the lack of specificity in this second chart, blaming
“imperfect information, and sometimes...a greater or less comprehension of
settlements under the same name.”999 He did not mention the ways that America’s
colonial westward expansion would wreak similar devastation on these uncharted
tribes. The collapse of the Native American population was the unspoken basis for
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Jefferson’s plan for the white population expansion that would fuel his vision of a
republican nation.
For both Beverley and Jefferson, reproductive discourses were deeply
intertwined with Virginia’s colonial project. For both, Virginia’s fundamental natural
fertility was the root of the success of the colony and the state. For both, expansion
of the white population was central to their understanding of Virginia’s history and
their vision of Virginia’s future. For both, white fertility was embroiled in the
colonial encounter between Europeans and colonized peoples, whether the removal of
Native Americans or the enslavement of African Americans. In some ways, then, The
History and Present State o f Virginia and Notes on the State o f Virginia were deeply
similar texts. Yet by distinguishing between the competing discourses o f prolific and
rational reproduction, we see profound differences between the texts and their
relationships to the Virginia colonial project. Where Beverley saw in Virginia a
teeming Eden, Jefferson tamed that Eden with the scientific tools of Enlightenment
rationality. Where Beverley celebrated population growth and saw in that growth
Virginia’s colonial success, Jefferson sought to harness population growth in order to
best serve the needs of the republic. And, finally, while Beverley’s version of
colonialism would absorb Indians into the colony, Jefferson’s colonial vision was one
of strict racial division.
The most significant difference between these two texts was the relationship
between reproductive discourses and the colonial project. Where Beverley brought
the discourse of prolific reproduction to his understanding of the colonial project,
Jefferson’s use of the discourse of rational reproduction was shaped by the colonial

361

project itself. For Beverley, colonization was, at its most fundamental level, a
process o f populating empty lands - prolific reproduction would accomplish that task,
and the goal of the colonial project was to facilitate population growth. The
relationship between colonialism and reproduction for Jefferson was far more fraught.
The process of colonization had decimated one colonized population - Native
American - while multiplying another - enslaved Africans and African Americans.
The white population was in danger of being infiltrated by immigrants who had little
invested in the republican experiment. Simple population growth could no longer
sustain what was now America’s colonial project. Instead, for Jefferson, reproduction
must be rationalized - tamed by science and managed for the sake o f the future of the
republic.
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CONCLUSION
Revisiting the Concept of Outlaw Reproduction

This dissertation began with the stories of three women and the babies they
bore: the widow Mary Hubbard and her baby daughter, the enslaved woman Sarah
and her unnamed child, and the servant Judith Clarke and her interracial baby. My
methodology privileges stories like these: faced with an archive that is frustratingly
silent about women’s experiences of pregnancy and childbearing, any glimpse of a
moment of childbearing emerged as potential evidence of experiences lost over time.
These stories serve not as mere illustration of my ideas, but as a foundation for my
argument itself. Surely such stories offer glimpses of women - especially of non-elite
women - whose voices might be silenced by the colonial archive. But the stories that
populate this dissertation, with their multiple interpretations, their silences, and their
evoking o f the shifting power relations of the colonial world, also reveal the
complexities of interrogating the history of women in the colonial past.
Why were these stories - bastard births, enslaved women’s births, interracial
births - the ones that emerged from the archive? The reproduction that is visible in
the colonial Virginia archive is the childbearing that was somehow understood to be
extraordinary or troublesome. These were births that created problems that needed to
be solved - the bastard child who needed support lest he or she become a burden on
the community, the enslaved child who embodied both a profit and an expense to his
or her master, the interracial child who defied colonial racial binaries. To explain this
sense of colonial anxiety around such births, I introduced the concept of “outlaw
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reproduction,” which I used not just to label these births as occurring outside of the
law, but to begin to explicate the complex relationship between reproduction,
colonialism, and the colonial archive.
As outlined in the introduction, I define outlaw reproduction in three ways.
First, we can consider outlaw reproduction in the literal sense: juridical outlaw
reproduction included those births which the law defined as criminal. The people
involved in this juridical outlaw reproduction were subject to punishment or censure.
The concept of juridical outlaw reproduction allows for the possibility that such
lawbreaking occurred in defiance of community rules and strictures - juridical outlaw
reproduction encompasses both transgressive reproduction and the disciplining of
those transgressions. The archival traces of these illegal or transgressive births lead
us to the second definition of outlaw reproduction: archival outlaw reproduction
refers to the ways that some births made their way into public view, despite the
intimacy of birth and the fact that so much of women’s lives, not just birth, is
invisible in the archive. The concept of outlaw reproduction, then, encompasses the
ways that births that broke the law (especially, but not exclusively, when the law was
broken by non-elite women) would be recorded and thus available for historical
analysis. This leads to the third and final definition of outlaw reproduction: colonial
outlaw reproduction reflects the ways that the intimate relations embedded in
reproduction could transgress colonial boundaries and hierarchies, thereby
destabilizing the colonial project even as it was being constructed. In this
conclusion, I trace the ways that all three of these definitions of outlaw reproduction
wind their way through each chapter of the dissertation. I close with a defense of the
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concept of outlaw reproduction as a revelatory way to understand not just the history
of reproduction but the history of colonialism as well.
In Chapter One, I examined the centrality o f discourses o f reproduction to the
solidification of race-based chattel slavery. I argued that Virginia’s colonial
lawmakers capitalized upon juridical outlaw reproduction in establishing the law of
slavery by birth: lacking a direct precedent for inherited racial slavery in English
common law, Virginia law was built on a precedent that linked fornication and
bastardy law with servitude. The result was that enslaved women’s births were
reframed as outlaw by definition: fatherless and thus outside of patriarchal culture,
inheritance, and power, enslaved children could now be understood as the chattel
property of their masters. This reading of colonial law connects to the idea of
archival outlaw reproduction - the moments when reproduction, normally silent,
emerges in the archive. I argued that the amassing of discourse about enslaved
women’s reproductivity shows the centrality of childbearing to the construction of a
colonial slave economy. It was childbearing that allowed masters to imagine not only
that enslaved children were fatherless but that enslaved women’s reproductivity made
them fundamentally like livestock, and thus able to be treated as property. Further,
because slavery and servitude rested on a foundation of reproduction, we are able to
reconstruct some abbreviated glimpse of the cost of reproduction upon women’s lives
which would otherwise be invisible to us: the repeated extension of servant women’s
terms as punishment for their outlaw reproduction, and the vulnerability o f enslaved
women’s lives and connections to their children because their reproduction was
constructed as outlaw as well.
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The overwhelming power o f masters emerged in a slow process, of which the
establishment of the law of slavery by birth was a major part. Thus, colonial outlaw
reproduction - reproduction’s role in the construction and negotiation of colonial
boundaries - allows us to see the ways that the discursive power of the master class
was constructed and therefore never absolute. The conflation of race, servitude, and
illegitimacy took decades to emerge in law and practice; a long period of competing
practices predated the establishment of slavery by birth in law. Further, the attempt to
police a binary definition of race would always fail, as interracial children lived as
testimony to the permeability of that boundary. Finally, well after the 1662 law of
slavery by birth was passed, masters had to deal with the consequences of their
appropriation of enslaved women’s reproduction: the extended debate over how
slaves should be categorized as property hinged, in part, on masters’ inability to fully
rationalize and control the reproduction of enslaved people. In other words, even as
Virginia’s master class worked to capitalize upon reproduction in service of colonial
racial absolutism, outlaw reproduction destabilized those goals.
Outlaw reproduction is located more obviously at the center of Chapter Two,
which investigated the transgressive possibilities of childbearing in a colonial space.
There, I examined the destabilizing effects o f juridical outlaw reproduction,
especially bastard and interracial births. With its focus on the transgressive effects of
reproduction, this chapter serves as a balance to the first chapter, which focused on
the ways that reproduction could be disciplined and appropriated in the interests of
the colonial project. This chapter expanded on juridical outlaw reproduction,
allowing it to encompass not just births which were deemed illegal, but the ways that
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entire lives could be constructed as “outlaw” due to reproductivity: interracial
families, single mothers, and women who repeatedly committed bastardy all created
lives for themselves outside of the narrow confines of colonial legality. Thus, we also
see archival outlaw reproduction in this chapter - the ways that the colonial archive
made some kinds of reproduction visible due to its outlaw nature. Therefore,
interracial families and single mothers, because they were under the surveillance of
the colonial courts, left considerable traces in the colonial archive. Colonial
authorities needed to keep tabs on reproductive outlaws; because of this, we are able
to understand the lives of those outlaws and their families, sometimes for generations.
This focus on transgressive reproduction emphasizes transgressive effects
over resistant intents; in this, colonial outlaw reproduction helps us to see the ways
that the colonial project could be undermined or destabilized. We would be remiss to
see the colonial courts as hegemonic, or even internally consistent, institutions.
Instead, throughout this chapter, we see the ways that colonial institutions like the
courts changed courses, reconsidered cases, and even tolerated some outlaw
reproduction, so long as these actions served the interests of the colonial project at
large. The attempt, explored in the first chapter, to create an airtight system of racebased chattel slavery and attendant racial hierarchy, was undermined by the existence
of individuals and families that gave the lie to such absolutism. Interracial children,
free black families, and single mothers all transgressed the racial and status
hierarchies so essential to the colonial project.
Chapter Three examined the meanings of power and knowledge in our
understanding of outlaw reproduction. Again, we see the interplay o f all three
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definitions of outlaw reproduction. The epistemic knowledge that I explored in this
chapter concerns the unspoken knowledge that women and men held about
reproduction; this knowledge emerged from and reflected daily life and bodily
experience. As such, the chapter is mostly concerned with archival outlaw
reproduction, in which the private, intimate sphere of childbearing was recorded in
court records, personal papers, and printed texts. The recording of such moments is
doubly significant here: first, because the gender politics of childbearing meant that
the birthing room was rarely open to the public eye, and second, because, by
definition, episteme is the unquestioned, unspoken knowledge that is rarely put into
words, much less recorded for posterity. Even the knowledge of midwives, the
respected community experts in matters of reproduction, was learned via experience,
not text, and therefore was rarely recorded. Therefore, any scraps of the reproductive
episteme that survive in the archive are fleeting and must be read with deliberation
and care.
With these caveats about the colonial archive in mind, the third chapter
examined the other two definitions o f outlaw reproduction as well. Because of their
role as arbiters of knowledge about childbearing and reproduction in general,
midwives’ and women’s expertise gave them a public role in adjudicating cases of
juridical outlaw reproduction, especially bastardy, infanticide, and other questionable
births. Thus, juridical outlaw reproduction allowed women to engage in the colonial
outlaw reproduction that unsettled hierarchies and transgressed boundaries.
Reproduction was a singular area in which women’s knowledge gave them public
authority, and institutions like the court deferred to that knowledge. The intimate
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relations of colonialism would transform and undermine this public role: childbirth
became an intimate space for the negotiating of colonial power relations between
mistress and servant, master and slave, and patriarch and dependant. The production
of knowledge itself was itself a colonial endeavor in this instance, so that access to
knowledge about childbearing was yet another way for planter-physicians to
discipline the bodies of various colonial others.
The final chapter engaged with outlaw reproduction as a discourse o f colonial
power. In another framing of archival outlaw reproduction, here the colonial archive
preserved particular stories and images of reproduction because that reproduction was
central to representing the colonial project in both law and in print - stories of
monstrous births fell alongside attempts to enumerate the colonial population as
colonizers sought to make sense of the meanings of reproduction in a colonial space.
Ultimately, this archive existed to frame and reframe colonial discourses as a form of
colonial outlaw reproduction. In this chapter, the ways that colonial outlaw
reproduction remade both understandings of reproduction and colonialism, as
reproduction informed colonial discourses, and the experience of colonialism remade
reproductive discourses. While early colonialism prized prolific reproduction to
populate colonized spaces, a later colonial discourse emphasized the ways that
rational reproduction could be used to discipline and enforce colonial hierarchies.
The key difference between these two discourses was that the experience of
colonialism reframed the meanings of outlaw reproduction: where the discourse of
prolific reproduction imagined that the colonial project amounted only to populating
an “empty” land, the discourse of rational reproduction saw that the outlaw
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potentialities of reproduction needed to be contained and controlled in the service of
the colonial project. Unrestrained reproduction - especially the reproduction
nonwhite, colonized bodies - could sate the plantation economy’s demand for labor,
but unchecked, such outlaw reproduction could undermine racial hierarchies, and,
after the Revolution, threaten the infant republic. Therefore, we see the underlying
reasons for the need to police and discipline juridical outlaw reproduction: bastard
births, interracial births, and even prolific reproduction could destabilize the colonial
project as a whole.
It is the multiplicity of the concept of outlaw reproduction that makes it a
useful tool for understanding the colonial past. The juridical sense o f outlaw
reproduction encompasses both the efforts of the law to discipline bodies, and the
ways those bodies transgressed lines of power and knowledge. The archival sense of
outlaw reproduction points to both the limitations and the opportunities o f the
colonial archive: reproduction was a space of silence in the archive, so when stories
of childbearing were spoken, they are potent textual ruptures. The colonial sense of
outlaw reproduction emphasizes the ways that reproduction was central both in the
creation of colonial projects, and in moments when that project was undermined. In a
sense, reproduction became visible in the colonial archive by necessity: moments of
outlaw reproduction transgressed boundaries, destabilized epistemic frameworks, and
unsettled the colonial project.
It is so obvious as to be virtually unspoken that the British colonial project in
Virginia utterly depended on the reproduction of peoples for its success. The
settlement of a permanent colony, the displacement of the native population, the
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creation of a labor force for the emerging plantation economy - these could not
happen through the transport of bodies alone. Colonialism happened via the
reproduction of bodies, and via the disciplining of those bodies within colonial
hierarchies of status, servitude, and race. It goes without saying that colonialism
happened via women’s bodies - this dissertation strives to interrupt that silence.
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